Text in German / Many treatises and disquisitions concerning "Die Blendung" concentrate on the main character, Peter Kien, as well as on other protagonists. In contrast, this dissertation deals with Pfaff, the primitive force and his influence on Peter Kien, the "Brain", the masterspirit. Common traits of these di verse characters are highlighted and it is explained why Pfaff, the brute, manages to exult over Kien, the intellectual. Their interactions and their interdependence are dealt with and it is shown that insanity which is prevalent in both protagonists prepares the way to Kien's doom whereas it leads to Pfaff's survival. / Das Interesse zahlreicher Untersuchungen Uber "Die Blendung" konzentriert sich auf die Hauptperson, Peter Kien, sowie auf andere Protagonisten. Im Gegensatz dazu beschaftigt sich diese Arbei t mi t dem Hausmeister Pfaff, dem "Schadel", und mit dem EinfluB, den er auf Peter Kien, den "Kopf", den Geistesmenschen hat. Es wird versucht, Gemeinsamkeiten, die diese beiden so gegensatzlichen Charaktere aufweisen, aufzuzeigen und darzulegen, warum der Gewaltmensch Pfaff Uber den wirklichkeitsfremden Wissenschaftler Kien zu triumphieren vermag. Der EinfluB, den sie aufeinander nehmen, und die Abhangigkeit voneinander werden aufgezeigt, und es wird aufge fUhrt, wie der Wahnsinn, dem sie be ide verf all en, zu Kiens Untergang filhrt, wahrend Pfaffs Uberleben durch seinen Wahnsinn gesichert wird / Linguistics and Modern Languages / M. A. (German)

Text in German / Many treatises and disquisitions concerning "Die Blendung" concentrate on the main character, Peter Kien, as well as on other protagonists. In contrast, this dissertation deals with Pfaff, the primitive force and his influence on Peter Kien, the "Brain", the masterspirit. Common traits of these di verse characters are highlighted and it is explained why Pfaff, the brute, manages to exult over Kien, the intellectual. Their interactions and their interdependence are dealt with and it is shown that insanity which is prevalent in both protagonists prepares the way to Kien's doom whereas it leads to Pfaff's survival. / Das Interesse zahlreicher Untersuchungen Uber "Die Blendung" konzentriert sich auf die Hauptperson, Peter Kien, sowie auf andere Protagonisten. Im Gegensatz dazu beschaftigt sich diese Arbei t mi t dem Hausmeister Pfaff, dem "Schadel", und mit dem EinfluB, den er auf Peter Kien, den "Kopf", den Geistesmenschen hat. Es wird versucht, Gemeinsamkeiten, die diese beiden so gegensatzlichen Charaktere aufweisen, aufzuzeigen und darzulegen, warum der Gewaltmensch Pfaff Uber den wirklichkeitsfremden Wissenschaftler Kien zu triumphieren vermag. Der EinfluB, den sie aufeinander nehmen, und die Abhangigkeit voneinander werden aufgezeigt, und es wird aufge fUhrt, wie der Wahnsinn, dem sie be ide verf all en, zu Kiens Untergang filhrt, wahrend Pfaffs Uberleben durch seinen Wahnsinn gesichert wird / Linguistics and Modern Languages / M. A. (German)

Revelation is God's Word addressed to the human being and so speaks of God in relation to the person and the world. Revelation can therefore only be fully understood, proclaimed and lived through an encounter with the world and its conceptions. To understand the evolution of human consciousness and the creation of the soul, we look to the sources of revelation (scripture and tradition) in dialogue with secular anthropology. The latter's paradigm of development and growth is not foreign to the former's understanding of conversion and growth in grace . The image of God, which characterises the human person, is shown to be an emergent likeness, which is created and drawn to its fullness by God. This accounts for Pius XII' s insistence that the soul is created immediately by God, who is responsible for the physical dynamics that bring forth consciousness and the personal dynamics that empower the human soul to develop. / Philosophy Practical &Systematic Theology / M.Th (Systematic Theology)

Background: Breastfeeding confers health and social benefits on both mother and baby and is thus a key global public health priority, with exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months recommended. A variety of factors can influence a woman’s decision to initiate breastfeeding but a short duration of breastfeeding appears to be common in developed countries. In the UK, promotion of breastfeeding has been government policy since 1974 and gradually the incidence has increased. In Scotland in 2010 the incidence was 74% but by one week 17% of women had given up. A minority of women find that their babies attach easily at birth and more than half report problems at this time. The prevalence of exclusive breastfeeding falls sharply in the first few weeks and the introduction of formula is associated with a shorter duration. It is therefore crucial to understand what happens at this time to enable women to continue breastfeeding effectively. Study Aim: To use Social Cognitive Theory (SCT) to explore and help explain the expectations, knowledge and experiences of women and midwives with regard to breastfeeding initiation. Methods: A systematic review of qualitative studies synthesised using thematic analysis and SCT was conducted and afforded insight into what had been known before and highlighted further aspects that needed to be explored with a qualitative study. The qualitative study was comprised of five focus groups with ten antenatal women, eight postnatal women and eighteen midwives. Photographs included in a leaflet “Feeding cues at birth”, and the chart of “Feeding cues after the first few hours” were developed and used as focussing exercises during the focus groups and interviews. The focus groups and interviews were recorded, transcribed and analysed using a hybrid process of inductive and deductive thematic analysis which integrated data driven codes with theory driven codes based on SCT. Results: Twenty one studies were included in the systematic review and identified clear differences in the experiences of women when breastfeeding was going well as compared to when it was going wrong at the start. There were also differences in the midwives’ knowledge, experience and confidence when breastfeeding was going well in contrast to when it was going wrong. The synthesis did not identify any qualitative studies relevant to initiation which explored skin contact, instinctive behaviour or strategies to resolve failure to attach in the first few days after birth, from the perspectives of mothers and midwives. These topics were therefore explored in detail in the qualitative study. Few mothers recruited to my study experienced instinctive behaviour and successful attachment (in SCT enactive behaviour) at birth. The majority of mothers did not experience attachment at birth and struggled to persist and maintain their motivation to enable breastfeeding initiation in an unfamiliar environment. Midwives’ social expectations and environmental circumstances made women centred care difficult. Midwives considered that sleepy babies who were unable to feed were normal, but women were unprepared for this, compounding the difficulties in initiating breastfeeding. The triangulation of the findings from the systematic review and the qualitative study provide a more complete picture of contributory factors to understanding of difficulties in breastfeeding initiation. Conclusion: It is recognised that behaviour interacts with emotions, perceived abilities and the environment, as in triadic reciprocal causation, which affects peoples’ decisions, experiences and abilities to enable the successful initiation of breastfeeding. Social Cognitive Theory could be used as a framework to develop strategies and materials to enhance women’s confidence both antenatally and in the postnatal period. In a minority of women, breastfeeding goes well and is more likely when the baby is an active participant and the midwife a knowledgeable and confident supporter. This is not the case for the majority of women and babies or their midwives. There is a need to consider strategies to develop appropriate skills and environmental changes that would in turn lead to changes in behaviour and successful interventions. More emphasis should be made clinically on facilitating instinctive behaviour. The current position where babies’ sleepy behaviour is considered normal in this particular environment could be challenged. Social Cognitive Theory could be utilised in research to develop strategies to increase women’s and midwives’ confidence specifically in initiation.

The purpose of this thesis is to make a plot of generations changes in motherhood. The aim of the theoretical part is to introduce possible views on motherhood. It gives us a look at materhood like a social construct and a biological instinct. This part is also dealing with their reciprocal combinations. Another parts of this section is to introduce motherhood like a social role and motherhood like a sense of identity. The aim of the practical part is to collect information from mothers of three generations about their own experiences with motherhood. The interview was according to The Grounded Theory. The particular aims of this section are to discover important areas of motherhood for women of all generations, find out the generation changes in this areas and evaluate the impact of this changes on the final image of motherhood. The generation changes and important areas of motherhood are compared and discussed with theoretical findings from the first part. The conclusion of this work thesis is focused on importance of these generation changes on the final image of motherhood.

Diante da explicação freudiana para o fenômeno da compulsão à repetição através da tese da pulsão de morte concebida enquanto retorno ao estado inorgânico, formula-se a seguinte questão: seria possível, por um lado, recusar a explicação freudiana pautada em seu biologismo mítico e, por outro lado, aceitar a tese de que a pulsão de morte seja uma força de desligamento? Para responder a essa pergunta encontramos um vasto material na obra publicada por André Green ao longo de sua carreira de mais de quarenta anos sob a rubrica trabalho da pulsão de morte, mais tarde, substituída por trabalho do negativo. Este texto tem como objetivo sistematizar a leitura e os aportes de Green à teoria das pulsões freudiana, sobretudo em relação ao segundo dualismo pulsional. Ele se divide em duas partes. Na primeira, destaca-se a análise de Green sobre as relações entre a pulsão de morte e a teoria do narcisismo na obra freudiana; na segunda, sua crítica em relação ao solipsismo freudiano e a necessidade de sua superação através das teorizações contemporâneas em torno às noções de objeto e de espaço potencial. Estas são complementadas por uma teoria da temporalidade do psiquismo. O trabalho defende a tese de que Green aceita o conceito freudiano de pulsão de morte enquanto força de desligamento, mas recusa o biologismo mítico subjacente à ideia do retorno ao estado inorgânico. Além disso, se Green concorda com a explicação freudiana para a pulsão de morte enquanto força de desligamento expressada no narcisismo negativo , ele se recusa a conceber que o processo de desligamento possa se instaurar de maneira espontânea ou automática. Para ele, este processo deve ser pensado mediante a articulação do funcionamento pulsional e da reposta do objeto que, neste caso, falha no estabelecimento do princípio do prazer; em outras palavras, o fracasso na instalação da espera institui a compulsão à des-fazer e des-ligar. De tal modo, a compulsão à repetição mortífera, ao contrário de repetir o desejo inconsciente e, portanto, estar referida à intemporalidade do inconsciente e à lógica da esperança é, na verdade, um anti-tempo. Nesse sentido, presente, passado e futuro ficam reduzidos ao instante da descarga completa de toda tensão, impossibilitando qualquer projeto. Dado o anterior, resulta que as teorizações de Green em relação ao trabalho do negativo, ainda que avessas à tese freudiana do retorno ao estado inorgânico, aceitam, não obstante, a tese da pulsão de morte enquanto processo de desligamento desde que esta seja pensada através da articulação das dimensões intrapsíquica e intersubjetiva. Isso implica pensar na resposta do objeto e fazê-lo responsável pelo malogro na instalação da heterocronia no psiquismo. 8 Conclui-se que a obra de Green oferece uma alternativa original ao biologismo mítico para a explicação da pulsão de morte / Given the Freudian explanation for the phenomenon of compulsion to repeat based on the death drives thesis, conceived as a return to the inorganic state, one formulates the following question: would it be possible, on the one hand, to refuse the Freudian explanation guided by its mythical biologism, and on the other hand accept the thesis that the death drive is a disengagement force? To answer this question we find a vast amount of material on the work published by André Green throughout his career of more than forty years under the title \"work of the death drive\", later renamed \"work of the negative\". This thesis aims to systematize Greens reading and contributions to the Freudian drive theory, especially regarding the second drive dualism. It is divided into two parts. The first one is Green\'s analysis of the relationship between death drive and theory of narcissism on Freud\'s work; the second one is about his criticism of Freud\'s solipsism and the need to its overcome through contemporary theories around the notions of object and potential space. These will be complemented by a theory of the temporality of the psyche. The present work supports the thesis that Green accepts the Freudian concept of death drive as a disengagement force, but refuses the mythical biologism subjacent to the return to the inorganic states idea. Furthermore, if Green agrees with the Freudian explanation of the death drive as a disengagement force expressed in the negative narcissism he will refuse to conceive that the disengagement process will be established spontaneously or automatically. To him, this process should be thought through the articulation of instintual functioning and the objects response that in this case fails in establishing the principle of pleasure; in other words, the failure of the waiting installation establishes the compulsion to disengage and to disconnect. Insomuch, the deadly compulsion to repeat, instead of repeating the unconscious desire and therefore be referred to the intemporality of the unconscious and to the logic of hope is actually an anti-time. In this sense, present, past and future are reduced to the instant of total discharge of all tension, precluding any project. Given the above it follows that Greens theorization regarding the work of the negative, though averse to the Freudian thesis of the return to the inorganic state, accept however the thesis of death drive as a shutdown process provided that this is thought through the articulation of the intrapsychic and intersubjective dimensions. This implies thinking of the objects response and make it responsible for the failure in the installation of heterochrony in the psyche. It concludes that the work of Green offers an original alternative to the mythical biologism regarding the explanation of the death drive

Cette thèse explore la clinique de l’enfant violent au travers du concept de « violence infantile » qui permet d’en dégager toutes les potentialités et de maintenir un regard créatif sur les « cliniques de l’extrême ». Loin de défendre un point de vue innéiste ou déficitaire, cette thèse envisage le recours à l’acte violent, chez des enfants présentant des troubles de la personnalité « narcissiques-identitaires », comme le témoin des faillites précoces de l’organisation du narcissisme. Au-delà de ses aspects manifestes, la « violence infantile » constitue donc un organisateur central des pathologies narcissiques dont nous retrouvons les traces jusque dans la vie adulte. Son articulation avec le geste explore la manière dont l’enfant a pu trouver à organiser sa vie pulsionnelle au contact de l’objet maternel. En lieu et place du jeu de la destructivité, l’enfant a fait l’expérience d’une destruction. La thèse envisage les destins du geste spontané confronté à un environnement qui ne s’est pas laissé utiliser. La « violence infantile » témoigne d’un jeu de bébé qui aurait dégénéré, elle est envisagée comme une tentative d’exploration de la psyché de l’objet. Cela implique des remaniements du cadre et de la posture du clinicien, qui l’engagent corporellement, condition nécessaire pour qu’une symbolisation des enjeux précoces contenus dans la « violence infantile » puisse avoir lieu. / In this thesis, the violent child’s clinical exploration is questionned using the concept of « infantile violence », which allows us to extract all the potentialities and to maintain a creative view on the extreme situations of subjectivity. In this work, children with serious personality disorder using violent acts are considered as witnesses of early failures of narcissistic organization. « Infantile violence » constitutes a central organizer of the narcissistic pathologies whose traces may be found in the adult state. His articulation with the gesture explores the way by which the child has organized his instinctual life in contact with the maternal object. In state of playing destructivity the child has experimented destruction.This work discusses the destiny of a spontaneous gesture which is confronted by an environment that does not allow for it to be used. « Infantile violence » shows a baby’s play that could have been degenerated, it is seen as an attempt to explore the object’s psyche. These facts involve revisions of setting and clinician’s posture. This leads him to a corporal engagement which is a necessary condition to allow an infantile violence symbolization.

Esta dissertação pretende mostrar que a tese de Hume de que nós estamos inevitavelmente determinados a crer na existência de objetos externos tem a circunscrição de seu significado condicionada à identificação e à resolução de uma inconsistência presente na teoria humeana da crença inevitável em objetos externos. Essa inconsistência se expressa pela incompatibilidade entre a tese de que (P1) nós inevitavelmente cremos em objetos externos e a tese de que (P2) não podemos conceber objetos externos. Essas teses são incompatíveis se se considera que, para Hume, (P4) não podemos crer em algo que não podemos conceber. Esse problema só emerge se se supõe um uso unívoco da expressão "objeto externo" por parte de Hume em (P1) e (P2), e se se supõe que (P4) é o caso para Hume, o que se mostra ser um ponto de partida razoável. Os resultados indicam que as duas interpretações gerais do significado da tese de que nós inevitavelmente cremos em objetos externos, o naturalismo cético e o realismo cético, chegam a conclusões insatisfatórias porque ignoram esse problema. Por fim, conclui que não há, de fato, uma inconsistência na teoria humeana da crença em objetos externos porque não é o caso que não possamos ter uma concepção de objetos externos para Hume. Essa concepção se origina de um sentimento ou instinto original da mente. / This paper aims to show that Hume's claim that we are unavoidably determined to believe in the existence of external objects has the delimitation of our meaning conditioned to the identification and resolution of an inconsistency present in Hume's theory of the unavoidable belief in external objects. This inconsistency expresses itself by the incompatibility between the claim that (P1) we unavoidably believe in external objects and the claim that (P2) we can't conceive external objects. These claims are incompatible if we recognize that Hume claims as well that (P4) we can't believe in something that we can't conceive. This problem arises only if we suppose that Hume univocally uses the expression "external object" in (P1) and (P2), and if we suppose that (P4) is the case, a reasonable starting point. The results indicate that both general views of the meaning of the claim that we unavoidably believe in external objects, the skeptical naturalism and the skeptical realism, arrives at unsatisfactory outcomes because they ignore that problem. Finally, concludes that there's not, actually, an inconsistency in Hume's theory of belief in external objects because it's not the case that we can't conceive external objects. This conception of external existences arises out of a sentiment or natural instinct of the mind.

Revelation is God's Word addressed to the human being and so speaks of God in relation to the person and the world. Revelation can therefore only be fully understood, proclaimed and lived through an encounter with the world and its conceptions. To understand the evolution of human consciousness and the creation of the soul, we look to the sources of revelation (scripture and tradition) in dialogue with secular anthropology. The latter's paradigm of development and growth is not foreign to the former's understanding of conversion and growth in grace . The image of God, which characterises the human person, is shown to be an emergent likeness, which is created and drawn to its fullness by God. This accounts for Pius XII' s insistence that the soul is created immediately by God, who is responsible for the physical dynamics that bring forth consciousness and the personal dynamics that empower the human soul to develop. / Philosophy Practical andSystematic Theology / M.Th (Systematic Theology)

Esta dissertação pretende mostrar que a tese de Hume de que nós estamos inevitavelmente determinados a crer na existência de objetos externos tem a circunscrição de seu significado condicionada à identificação e à resolução de uma inconsistência presente na teoria humeana da crença inevitável em objetos externos. Essa inconsistência se expressa pela incompatibilidade entre a tese de que (P1) nós inevitavelmente cremos em objetos externos e a tese de que (P2) não podemos conceber objetos externos. Essas teses são incompatíveis se se considera que, para Hume, (P4) não podemos crer em algo que não podemos conceber. Esse problema só emerge se se supõe um uso unívoco da expressão "objeto externo" por parte de Hume em (P1) e (P2), e se se supõe que (P4) é o caso para Hume, o que se mostra ser um ponto de partida razoável. Os resultados indicam que as duas interpretações gerais do significado da tese de que nós inevitavelmente cremos em objetos externos, o naturalismo cético e o realismo cético, chegam a conclusões insatisfatórias porque ignoram esse problema. Por fim, conclui que não há, de fato, uma inconsistência na teoria humeana da crença em objetos externos porque não é o caso que não possamos ter uma concepção de objetos externos para Hume. Essa concepção se origina de um sentimento ou instinto original da mente. / This paper aims to show that Hume's claim that we are unavoidably determined to believe in the existence of external objects has the delimitation of our meaning conditioned to the identification and resolution of an inconsistency present in Hume's theory of the unavoidable belief in external objects. This inconsistency expresses itself by the incompatibility between the claim that (P1) we unavoidably believe in external objects and the claim that (P2) we can't conceive external objects. These claims are incompatible if we recognize that Hume claims as well that (P4) we can't believe in something that we can't conceive. This problem arises only if we suppose that Hume univocally uses the expression "external object" in (P1) and (P2), and if we suppose that (P4) is the case, a reasonable starting point. The results indicate that both general views of the meaning of the claim that we unavoidably believe in external objects, the skeptical naturalism and the skeptical realism, arrives at unsatisfactory outcomes because they ignore that problem. Finally, concludes that there's not, actually, an inconsistency in Hume's theory of belief in external objects because it's not the case that we can't conceive external objects. This conception of external existences arises out of a sentiment or natural instinct of the mind.