This thesis uses the war crimes investigations carried out by the Wehrmacht between 1939-1945 to explore the creation and development of the narrative which the Nazi regime constructed to justify its war of aggression, conquest, and extermination. This source has been sorely underused and provides deep insight into the regime's official narrative - a narrative which seems fundamentally at odds with its true aims and its murderous actions. It claimed that the Reich was waging a war in self-defence and for humanitarian reasons. These justifications were designed to convince both the German population and international audiences. The regime did not simply lie, however, but gathered empirical evidence which it then used selectively to legitimise the war. By reconstructing this process, the thesis aims to understand the degree to which the regime was able to make its arguments convincing. This allows us to better understand how it was possible to mobilise so many ordinary Germans to support and fight the war and, indeed, to perpetrate horrendous crimes. In particular, this thesis seeks to explore the tension between the official narrative and the Reich's own crimes, arguing that these two were not diametrically opposed, but that there was a direct justificatory link between them. Crucial in this context was the degree to which the regime could portray its criminal actions as a response to those of the enemy. In doing so, this thesis develops on a historiography which has acknowledged the importance of the regime's justificatory framework, but which has yet to study the foundations on which this was based and how it developed over the course of the war. In short, this is a study of the German narrative of victimhood which underpinned the brutal war of extermination.

This thesis argues that the image as circulated within society has changed from what is broadly conceived of as a mass media society to that of an information society or a rhizomatic condition. This discontinuity is linked to changes that have taken place both within technology and the 'communications systems' that make up the media. This is theorized as a move from the 'mobilization of images' to the 'weaponization of images' and it takes the following form: the mobilization of images is connected to a twentieth century notion of propaganda and the rise of a mass society; whereas the weaponizing of images is understood as emerging through a networked/rhizomatic society connected with new media. It has also resulted in a paradigm shift from techno-war to image warfare. More specifically, this thesis is about exploring how American and British governments and militaries are failing to manage image warfare because they are operating with an outdated understanding that it is possible to 'control' images; whereas Al Qaeda appears to be understanding image warfare better. What I seek to show in this thesis is the disjuncture between this outdated idea of 'controlling' images (which Western governments and media continue to use) and a more dispersed or deterritorialized idea about how images operate in a rhizomatic condition. I explore this via my three conceptual terms: 'image munitions', 'counter-image munitions', 'remediation battles', with specific reference to the war on terror and specifically through four thematic case studies - political communications, suicides, executions and abuses - which allow exploration of different parts of this new theatre of war. In the conclusion I reflect on the implications of this analysis for understandings of contemporary and future warfare.

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This submission includes two studies, based primarily on the use of historical archives, of the Afghan wars from 1978 and the Iraq War from 2003. Breeding Ground: Afghanistan and the Origins of Islamist Terrorism (2011) is a study of various layers of the Afghan conflict: the 1978 communist coup; the 1979 Soviet invasion and America’s proxy war against the Soviet occupying forces in the 1980s; and the rise of the Taliban in the 1990s. It shows how Islamist groups allied to the West against Soviet and Afghan communism turned into enemies of the United States, with consequences including the September 11, 2001 attacks, President George W. Bush’s retaliation against the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the invasion of Iraq. Overcoming the Bush Legacy in Iraq and Afghanistan (2010) is an analysis of the George W. Bush presidency in terms of its “war on terror.” The books thus study the Afghan and Iraqi conflicts in the context of United States foreign policy, with particular emphasis on the interests, actions and motives of actors in the conflicts and the interactions between internal and external actors. The central argument is that these factors contributed to the development of a “culture of violence,” defined as that “condition in which violence permeates all levels of society and becomes part of human thinking, behavior and way of life,” and how this provided space for “terrorist” groups to operate.

The understanding of terrorism has thus far been determined not by some independent line of inquiry but instead by a strong interplay between conflicting moral positions. Treated sometimes as a method or tactic and at other times as a distinct form of violence, the true nature of terrorism remains elusive, while a failure to understand it has squarely been blamed on the moral problem. The conceptual and theoretical debate in the field of terrorism studies as a result has not progressed in any meaningful way. Issues that were associated with terrorism when a formal inquiry into the problem was first launched still remain unresolved. Basic questions as to whether terrorism generates fear and if it is possible to identify its victim or perpetrator continue to plague the terrorism discourse. Meanwhile matters that are crucial, such as the widespread tendency to treat terrorism as a tactic, strategy or ideology and the essentially contested character of terrorism scholarship are either ignored or erroneously taken for granted. This thesis will show that our inability to define terrorism is not due to the moral problem as it is made out to be but because of our failure to understand the true nature of terrorism. To accomplish this task, it not only analyzes issues that are regularly contested but also discusses in detail the ones that are trivialized and overlooked. It ultimately concludes that terrorism primarily plays only an auxiliary or a facilitatory role and therefore the key to defining it and understanding its true nature lies in its utility and function.

At the beginning of the Cold War, the gathering of intelligence on the Soviet Union's current and future military capability seemed a near-impossibility. Soviet high-level communications were secure against decryption. Agent networks in the USSR were very difficult to establish and of uncertain reliability. Aerial reconnaissance of warrelated targets in the Soviet Union was risky and could only be occasional. But valuable intelligence was gathered in the years 1945-55 on the USSR's frantic arms build-up, thanks to its policy towards Germans and their country. Its exploitation of Germans and its Zone of Germany in its war-related research and development and the reconstruction of its war-related industries gave British Intelligence penetrable targets in the Soviet Zone and gave great numbers of Germans sought-after information on the USSR itself. The ease of recruiting age nts in East Germany and the flight (including enticed defections) of refugees from it allowed research and development projects and uranium.-mining operations there to be penetrated. Intelligence of Soviet weapons development and of the quality of Soviet military technology was obtained. The mass interrogation of prisoners-of-war returned by the Soviets to the British Occupation Zone in the late 1940s yielded a wealth of valuable information on war-related construction and the locations of numerous intelligence targets in the Soviet Union: most importantly, those of atomic and chemical plants, aircraft and aero-engine factories, airfields, rocket development centres and other installations. When, in the period 1949-58, some 3,000 deported German scientists , engineers and technicians were sent back to their homeland from the USSR, promising sources among them were enticed West and interrogated for their knowledge of the Soviets' research and development projects. The cream of the information they provided was crucial intelligence on the locations of atomic plants and laboratories and uranium deposits; useful information on structural weaknesses in the Soviet system of scientific and economic management; expert (if out-of-date) assessments of the quality of Soviet accomplishments in atomic science, electronics and other fields; and well-informed indications as to possible lines of development in guided missile and aircraft design. One Soviet scientific defector in Germany provided similar information which influenced British perceptions of the Soviet Union's scientific potential and missile development plans. Refugees entering the British Zone from East Germany, intercepted letters and monitored telecommunications, informal contacts and, of course, secret agents all made significant contributions to the gathering of scientific and technical intelligence in Germany too. The British passed to the Americans much of the intelligence they acquired in Germany and the installations identified and located by German sources were overtlown by spyplanes in the 1950s and particularly by U-2s in the latter half of-the decade. Priceless information was obtained, which establi shed that the USSR's war-related scientific research and development and its actual military capability were both inferior to those of the West. Thus the Germans enabled Soviet security to be deeply penetrated and helped to stabilize the Cold War. They are the missing link between Ultra and the U-2.

This study attempts to explain why some countries experience multiple civil wars while others who have experienced a civil war build long-term stability from the rubble of conflict. The explanation of why civil war recurs focuses on the collective action problem, centering on the rebel leaders' ability to solve the Rebel's Dilemma. I further argue that once the Rebel's Dilemma has been solved once it is much easier for rebel leaders to solve it again and again. The empirical finds suggest that the political situation resulting from the first war plays a strong role in the solutions to the collective action problem and thus the long-term stability following a civil war. Namely, the level of democracy, partition and third party enforcement of the peace all affect the ability of the rebel leaders to solve the collective action problem and the likelihood of another civil war.

While the origin of the Arab Spring is well documented in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria, the role of press photography in presenting these conflicts is not. Images taken during a conflict often follow a particular narrative that comes to define how we remember a conflict. Considering that Syria is composed of a heterogeneous, ethno-religious mix located at the center of intense regional and international rivalries, understanding the cause of the uprising and the trajectory of the conflict require a careful study of the socio-political history of Syria as well as her regional and international relations. The aim of this study is to demonstrate how photographs taken of the Syrian Civil War that earned critical acclaim from photographic institutions mythologize the war. Semiotics provides a template for the interpretation of images that may be related to the underlying cultural forces shaping the conflict. Myth provides the forms in the presentation of archetypes in the images that we are able to readily identify so rendering the images relevant and recognizable to the viewer. The mythologizing of images of war has been used since Frank Capa created an “aesthetic ideal” during the Spanish Civil War and been re-appropriated during subsequent conflicts of the 20th and 21st centuries especially the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003. This study uses a semiotic and mythological approach to analyze the winning photographs as selected by the National Press Photographers Association, World Press Photographers Association and Pulitzer Prize awarded during the course of the Syrian conflict. The myths of the “victim” and “underdog” were the two most commonly applied myths to the civilians and the Syrian rebels, who were portrayed as the “lovable losers” in the conflict. These narratives differ from previous depictions of the two previous Gulf Wars in their empathetic depiction of the civilian population and of the rebels. If maintaining the status quo is one of the enduring functions of myth then the underdog myth perpetuates voyeuristic participation in the conflict without requiring the discomfort of the removal of the Assad regime.

This study examined press freedom in Saudi Arabia coverage in two study periods, which are the Gulf and Yemen wars. Six Saudi newspapers, which represent Saudi regions, have been content analyzed. They are: Al Riyadh, Al Yaum, Al Nadwah, Mecca, Okaz, and Al Jazirah. The major questions are: What are the most salient issues Saudi newspapers dealt with in their editorials during the study period? What are the differences between the two periods of study? And what are the differences between the editorial features of the Gulf and Yemen wars? The normative theory-press freedom theory was conducted for this study. The results support the lack of press freedom during the Gulf War. In contrast, some newspapers have significantly improved their performance during the Yemen War, using a higher level of press freedom.

This thesis addresses the importance of the American Civil War to nineteenth-century European military education, and its influence on British staff officer training prior to World War I. It focuses on Garnet Wolseley, a Civil War observer who eventually became Commander in Chief of the Forces of the British Army. In that position, he continued to write about the war he had observed a quarter-century earlier, and was instrumental in according the Civil War a key role in officer training. Indeed, he placed Stonewall Jackson historian G.F.R. Henderson in a key military professorship. The thesis examines Wolseley’s career and writings, as well as the extent to which the Civil War was studied at the Senior Staff College, in Camberly, after Wolseley’s influence had waned. Analysis of the curriculum from the College archives demonstrates that study of the Civil War diminished rapidly in the ten years prior to World War I.