This work evaluates the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DoP), the document signed between the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), in Washington D.C. on 13 September 1993, as a case study of the bilateral management of an asymmetrical national-subnational conflict within the context of an international conflict resolution framework. The DoP represents progress in the international endeavour to realise a settlement of the wider Arab-lsraeli conflict, as signalled by the Madrid conference of 31 October 1991. The DoP ushered in a new era in Israeli-Palestinian relations. It is part of a process which, in essence, is the cornerstone of a formal mutual recognition pact which represents a reciprocal acknowledgement of legitimacy, a crucial first step towards finding a broad and permanent settlement. The DoP was only possible due to the abandonment of long-held mutually antagonistic and intransigent positions. Like all political documents, it represents a compromise. This study examines the complex nature and dynamics of the attempts at resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and reviews the DoP to investigate how it transpired, what it means, how it will be implemented, how far it can be used as a blueprint for future peacemaking, and offers an analysis of the findings in conclusion. This study also addresses the wider international ramifications and relationships which will be a prerequisite for the evaluation and analysis of the corresponding policies and responses by the major powers and actors from the international community within the framework of the 1991 Madrid Middle East Peace Conference. Chapter one examines the definition and contextualisation of the conflict resolution case study. Chapter two focuses on the establishment, purpose and development of the DoP, incorporating a thorough examination of the development of the secret Oslo backchannel, concluding with an analysis of the Oslo negotiations within the official Madrid framework as an example of conflict resolution. Chapter three provides an analysis of the DoP as an example of conflict resolution and critiques the meaning and purpose of the document. Chapter four provides an analysis of the implementation process of the initial years of the life of the DoP, incorporating the actual implementation of the DoP to 31st August 1997, including: the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area of May 1994; the World Bank aid programme; influential bilateral agreements by the two with third parties; the Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities of August 1994; the Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities of August 1995; the Israeli- Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip of September 1995; and the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron of January 1997. The final chapter concludes by evaluating the attempt by the two communities to shape a common future with an analysis in determining the effectiveness of the DoP both as an instrument for, and as an example of, conflict resolution.

Thesis (M.S.) -- Central Connecticut State University, 2008. / Thesis advisor: Ghassan El-Eid. "... in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in International Studies." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 80-83). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (M.A.)--Central Connecticut State University, 2004. / Thesis advisor: Norton Mezvinsky. " ... in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 78-81). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Johns Hopkins University, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 374-400). Also available on the Internet.

By virtue of their presence, observers alter what they are observing. Yet, the international soldiers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) did much more than observe events. From August 1949 until the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force in November 1956, the Western military officers assigned to UNTSO were compelled to take seriously the task of supervising the Arab-Israeli armistice, despite the unwillingness of all parties to accept an actual peace settlement. To the extent that a particular peacekeeping mission was successful – i.e., that peace was “kept” – what actually happened on the ground is usually considered far less important than broader politics. However, as efforts to forge a peace settlement failed one after another, UNTSO operations themselves became the most important mechanism for regional stability, particularly by providing a means by which otherwise implacable enemies could communicate with each other, thus helping to moderate the conflict. This communication played out against the backdrop of the dangerous early days of the Cold War, the crumbling of Western empires, and the emergence of the non-aligned movement. Analyses of the activities of the Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACs), the committees created to oversee the separate General Armistice Agreements signed between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, particularly those during the 1954 to 1956 tenure as UNTSO chief of staff of Canadian Major-General E.L.M. Burns, best evaluate both UNTSO effectiveness and Arab-Israeli interaction. / Thesis (Ph.D, History) -- Queen's University, 2009-05-28 14:21:45.625

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Duke University, 2008.

Thesis--Cambridge. / Ill. on inside front cover. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.) -- Central Connecticut State University, 2005. / Thesis advisor: Norton Mezvinsky. "... in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts in History." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 132-141). Also available via the World Wide Web.

The PFLP represents a violent Marxist trend among Palestinian political organizations. It is uncompromisingly hostile toward Israel, the industrialized West and the West's regional allies, and rejects any settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict which does not entail both Israel's elimination and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on all land it claims as Palestine. Until this occurs, the PFLP remains committed to armed conflict with its enemies. This study attempts to explain the PFLP's lagging position within the Palestinian national movement by comparing its policies with Fatah's. Unlike the PFLP, Fatah's overriding concern was to establish a Palestinian authority on any portion of 'liberated land' and consider the question of Israel's existence later. Fatah's selection of supporters was never conditioned upon ideological compatibility. It formed coalitions with all interested parties and accepted assistance from all willing providers. Most importantly, Fatah - as the PLO's dominant faction - transformed itself from an underground group to a quasi-government with diplomatic status and later, to leadership of the PNA in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Fatah's flexibility enabled it to survive regional and global changes. In the unipolar international order which followed the Soviet bloc's collapse in 1991, the PLO courted the United States and its allies, participated in the Arab-Israeli peace process, and was rewarded with authority over part of the Palestinian 'homeland'. The PFLP, spurning change, refused to act likewise. From its Damascus headquarters, it can currently do nothing without the Syrian government's approval and Syria, on the verge of a peace agreement with Israel, is unlikely to allow its protege to do more than issue statements. Only an imaginative and bold move by the PFLP, at this point, can restore the organization's prestige among its constituents and notoriety among its enemies.