I develop the Generalized Evolutionary Nash Equilibrium Estimator (GENEE) library. The tool is designed to provide a generic computational library for running genetic algorithms and individual evolutionary learning in economic decision-making environments. Most importantly, I have adapted the library to estimate equilibria bidding functions in auctions. I show it produces highly accurate estimates across a large class of auction environments with known solutions. I then apply GENEE to estimate the equilibria of two additional auctions with no known solutions: first-price sealed-bid common value auctions with multiple signals, and simultaneous first-price auctions with subadditive values

Obesity and overweight attributable deaths together are the second highest cause of death in the United States, according to the National Institute of Health. Obesity, diabetes, and heart disease also have an enormous economic cost to the American government and its citizens due to the rising cost of health care. The medical community agrees that preventive care, particularly diet, plays a crucial role in solving this health crisis. The Healthy, Hunger Free Kids Act of 2010 drastically changed the requirements of the National School Lunch Program in order to increase nutrition in school lunches. This thesis seeks to understand how improved health outcomes for children as well as adults. This paper analyzes previous research from the fields of Health and Behavioral Economics. It also conducts an empirical analysis of data from the California Health Interview Survey to understand the effects of the policy food on consumption of children and adults. Using theories from Behavioral Economics, the study hypothesizes that child and adult consumption of nutritious food increased following the implementation of this policy. The results of the empirical analysis do not entirely support the hypothesis that children’s and adult’s consumption of nutritious food increased. Food consumption is highly sensitive to a wide range of influences, and further empirical research accounting for these influences must be conducted to fully understand the potential benefits of public policy on health.

Behavioral economics is the integration of concepts from micro-economics into behavior analysis. Most of the research in behavioral economics has been done with non-human subjects and with drugs as reinforcers. This study represents an extension of previous research to assess money as a reinforcer with humans as subjects. The participants in this study solved math problems to earn money at various unit prices. Results indicate that demand of money adhered to the law of demand in that consumption decreased as unit prices increased. An underlying assumption is that consumption should be equivalent at different compositions of unit price. Replications of either the same or different compositions of unit price indicated that there were some discrepancies in consumption in this study.

This dissertation consists of three essays which make use of laboratory experiments in order to investigate how procedural or contextual factors impact human behavior. / Economics

This thesis examines the relationship between the type of crime of which an inmate is convicted, the change in oxytocin level, and the level of generosity of that inmate. The level of generosity is measured using a behavioral economics task called the Ultimatum Game. Studies of oxytocin have demonstrated that it is connected to generosity so it is illuminating to study it in conjunction with the generosity measure obtained in the Ultimatum Game. The results of the experiment indicate that there is no correlation between the type of crime of which an inmate is convicted and his generosity level.

An examination into dyadic trust relationships within an audit engagement team and development of a model to efficiently optimize trust.

Prior research on corporations finds that there exists a large unexplained firm-specific heterogeneity in corporate behaviors stemming from the effects of managers. This research identifies managerial personalities and tests their effects on corporate behaviors both experimentally and empirically. First, the effects of managerial personalities on corporate financing decisions are tested using a laboratory experiment with managers in South Korea. The laboratory experimental market is à la Modigliani and Miller but with two frictions, bankruptcy costs and corporate taxation. Leverage choices of managers with particular personality traits are compared against the optimal capital structure computed from the static trade-off theory. The results show that extravert managers choose higher leverage ratios, with the effect being financially meaningful although not statistically significant. Secondly, I identify extravert CEOs and empirically measure its effects on corporate financing choices using Chief Executive Officers’ avocation data and corporate financial data of public, nonfinancial US companies between 1992 and 2011. The results of mean comparisons by group, fixed effects regressions, difference-in-difference regressions, and changes of leverages around CEO turnovers show that extravert CEOs tend to issue risky debt more when accessing external finance and maintain higher leverage ratios than their peers. Thirdly, I test the effects of managerial extraversion on executive compensation. I first offer an empirical compensation model of managerial bargaining power, and then empirically tests the prediction by identifying a personality trait relevant to bargaining power using a novel set of managerial hobbies data. The results provide an evidence that CEO bargaining power has an increasing effect on CEO compensation.

League of Legends is one of the most played video games in the world with millions of hours played each year. I examine if both a player’s experience and level of familiarity with teammates within the League of Legends virtual environment have significant relationships with individual performance. Utilizing regression analysis I have concluded that individual experience does not have a statistically significant effect on individual performance and that individual familiarity has a statistically significant negative effect on individual performance.

Thesis advisor: Robert G. Murphy / Research has shown that individuals can be persuaded of a message in two ways: using a central (rational) approach, or through a peripheral (more “irrational”) approach in which irrelevant signals are seen as convincing. In addition, it is suggested that recent negative experiences cause individuals to favor the central route, whereas individuals in positive moods rely more heavily on the peripheral route. I extend these findings to the realm of financial advertising by presenting a simple model predicting that mutual funds will use more economically rational arguments when stock market returns have been low, and will cater to irrational inclinations when returns have been high. These predictions are supported by two case studies of print advertisements in Money and the Journal of Financial Planning from the period January 2003 to March 2009. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2009. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: College Honors Program. / Discipline: Economics Honors Program. / Discipline: Economics.

A basic problem for a rational choice theory of mass political action is to explain why average citizens would participate in such behavior, since they have nothing to gain by participating (they won’t receive compensation for participating but will receive the public good if they participate or not) but much to lose (it can be costly and harmful to participate). According to the rational theory, the incentive to participate must come from the expectation of receiving selective benefits; but since average citizens in a general case cannot expect substantial private material rewards, the relevant benefits must be psychological in nature. A public goods model is proposed stating that the value of revolution in terms of public goods can be a relevant incentive for participation. Using data from surveys conducted in Egypt, we investigate the relationship between participation in mass political action and measures of the incentives of public goods. Hypotheses of the public goods model are supported.