Esta pesquisa busca analisar a influência da tributação e da governança corporativa sobre as políticas de dividendos das companhias de capital aberto brasileiras no período de 1986 a 2011, através de estimações Probit e Tobit com dados em painel. Particularmente no Brasil houve diversas mudanças na legislação tributária dentro do período analisado, sendo assim uma boa oportunidade para esse estudo. Os resultados empíricos sugerem que: a) quando houve aumento no Lucro Por Ação, o percentual do lucro distribuído em forma de proventos foi maior nos períodos em que não houve incidência de tributação e menor quando houve incidência de tributação; b) companhias estatais distribuíram menos dividendos do que companhias privadas; c) companhias que distribuíram dividendos também distribuíram Juros Sobre Capital Próprio; d) companhias que possuem governança corporativa tendem a distribuir mais dividendos. / This paper investigates the influence of taxes and corporate governance on dividend policy of Brazilian public companies in the years 1986 to 2011, using panel data Probit and Tobit estimation. There are several tax law changes particularly in Brazil within the period analyzed, creating a good opportunity to study dividend policy. Empirical results suggests that (a) when Earnings Per Share increased, the percentage of profits distributed in the form of dividends was higher in periods in which there was no incidence of taxation and lower when there was incidence of taxation; (b) state owned companies paid less dividends than private companies; (c) companies that paid dividends also paid Interest On Equity Capital; (d) companies under corporate governance best practices tend to pay more dividends.

This paper investigates determinants of payout levels and payout composition in multinational corporations and domestic corporations and how payout differs between the two, as well as the effect of a country’s legal tradition on payout, on a worldwide sample. My main findings are that multinational corporations’ total payout is slightly lower than domestic corporations’ payout when taking into account a country’s legal tradition affects. No support is found that multinationals and domestic corporations differ in payout composition and payout composition is not changing over time, according to my results. My findings are partly consistent with theories on how ownership structures and agency problems affect payout policy. Still, the puzzle in unsolved.

This paper examines the effect of corporate governance quality on firms’ payout policy. We analyze a global sample of 3,904 firms (25,773 firm-year observations) over the period 2002-2016. I find that corporate governance quality is positively related to payout ratios, consistent with the perspective of the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986) and the outcome dividend model (LLSV, 2000). Moreover, consistent with findings of Mitton (2004) the positive relationship between firm’s corporate governance and dividend payout mainly holds for countries with strong shareholder or creditor protection, suggesting that firm-level corporate governance and country-level protection rights are complements rather than substitutes. This study also shows that firms with high corporate governance quality are less likely to disburse cash to their shareholders when controlling for country-level shareholder rights. Furthermore, this study contributes to the existing literature by investigating share repurchases and finds that well governed firms distribute less cash through share repurchases and total payout when they experience high growth opportunities. Moreover, the results suggest that countries that experience stronger shareholder and creditor rights reduce the positive impact that corporate governance quality has on share repurchases and total payout.

This study is an empirical examination of a new theory that links dividends to institutional ownership in a framework of both information signaling and agency costs. Under this theory put forth by Allen, Bernardo and Welch in 2000, dividends are paid out to attract tax-favored institutional investors, thereby signaling good firm quality and/or more efficient monitoring. This is based on the premise that institutions are considered sophisticated investors with superior ability and stronger incentive to be informed about the firm quality compared to retail investors. On the agency level, institutional investors display monitoring capabilities, and can detect and correct managerial pitfalls, thus their presence serves as an assurance that the firm will remain well run. The study provides a comprehensive analysis of the implications of the theory by testing various aspects of the relationship between dividends and institutional holdings. Unlike the prevalent literature on this topic, I give specific attention to the different types of institutional investors and their incentives to invest in dividend paying stocks. Moreover, I analyze the signaling and the agency effects on the market reaction to dividend initiations within the framework proposed by the theory. Finally, I test the smoothing effect institutions have on dividends by examining the firm's propensity to increase dividends given the level of institutional ownership. I find institutional holders to respond positively to dividend initiation announcements as they adjust their portfolios by buying or increasing their holdings of the dividend paying stock following the announcement. I also find that this response is displayed more strongly among tax-favored institutions. My test results also reveal that positive abnormal returns to dividend initiation announcements are a decreasing function of institutional holdings in the dividend initiating firm, and that this mitigating effect of institutional ownership on the market reaction to dividend initiations is stronger for firms with higher information asymmetry and more potential for agency problems. This evidence lends some degree of support to the tested theory. Additional support to lies in the test results of its smoothing hypothesis which reveal that as institutional ownership increases, the propensity of firms to increase dividends decreases.

Inom finansiell ekonomi finns en seglivad teori om att utdelningsändringar innehåller information om framtida ekonomiska resultat. Aktiemarknaden reagerar i enlighet med teorin på så vis att aktiekursen stiger när utdelningen höjs, och tvärtom, vilket har dokumenterats i ett flertal studier. Bakom aktiemarknadens reaktion på den ändrade utdelningen borde det finnas ett positivt samband mellan utdelningsändringar och framtida ekonomiska resultat. Problemet är att förekomsten av ett sådant samband är högst tveksam; tidigare empiriska studier har trots flerfaldiga försök inte funnit övertygande argument för förekomsten av ett samband mellan utdelningsändringar och framtida ekonomiska resultat. Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka om det finns ett positiv samband mellan utdelningsändringar och framtida resultat och lönsamhet. Det empiriska underlaget är företag på Nasdaq Stockholm under perioden 1999–2018. Sambandet eftersöks med hjälp av en regressionsmodell i vilken vi kontrollerar för det icke-linjära beteendeet hos resultat och lönsamhet. Vi finner ett par statistiskt signifikanta resultat som påvisar samband mellan sänkta utdelningar och framtida resultat och lönsamhet; dessa är dock så pass små att de saknar ekonomisk relevans. Vårt resultat är således i linje med tidigare empiriska studier och stödjer därmed inte teori om utdelningssignalering. / Within the area of corporate finance, there exists a persistent theory that revolves around the idea that changes in terms of corporate dividend may yield information regarding future financial results. The stock market is known to fluctuate in accordance with this theory by ways of indicating increased share prices in close correspondence to increased dividend, and vice versa, which has also been documented in several previous studies. This relation between the stock market’s reaction to the change in dividend should by all accounts point to a positive correlation between dividend changes and future financial results. Yet, this relation has to this point been proved to be highly doubtful. Previous empirical studies have not been able to find any convincing arguments that such a relationship exists. The purpose of this essay is to investigate if there in fact exists a relationship between dividend changes and future earnings and profitability. The empirical data for this study consists of the companies listed on the Nasdaq Stockholm during the period of 1999 to 2018. This proposed relationship has been investigated by the use of a regression model, in which we have examined the known non-linear behaviour of earnings and profitability. By this method we have found a few results of statistical significance that do seem to indicate a relation, between lowered dividend and future financial outcomes. However, while still statistically significant, these results are not economically significant. Our results are therefore considered to be in line with previous research and does not offer any further support for the proposed theory of the dividend signaling hypothesis.

一套能使企業成長與股東期望之間達到最適當均衡的股利政策對企業內、外部而言均是攸關且重要的資訊。決策者必須全面考量企業特性、經營環境之變化及股東的期盼，以規劃其股利政策；所以了解企業所處之成長階段及經營環境，對制定適當且均衡的股利政策是相當重要的。 本研究以民國七十九年至民國八十八年間，我國化工業、紡織業及電子業之上市公司為研究對象，首先劃分企業生命週期，並將股利政策定義為股利發放水準、股利發放形式及股利發放水準平穩程度等三個構面。本研究透過文獻探討，了解企業在各個生命週期階段所顯現的不同特性對股利政策的可能影響，再針對我國企業的股利發放實務作一了解，以分析其差異。 研究結果顯示，在股利發放水準方面，除了化工業之外，紡織業與電子業上市公司考量所處之生命週期階段，進而規劃適當股利政策的情形並不普遍。就股利發放形式而言，由實證結果可知，無論身處成長期或成熟期，化工業、紡織業以及電子業上市公司均偏好發放股票股利。至於股利發放水準平穩程度，紡織業以及電子業上市公司於成熟期時，總股利發放水準較處於成長期時穩定。 本研究之實證結果，隱喻企業管理當局可能並不瞭解其本身所處生命週期階段及相關經營背景；也可能是因為管理當局尚未能理解企業生命週期與股利政策間之關聯性及重要性，或者可能是管理當局必須遷就投資人之所好。由研究結果亦可得知，股利政策似與產業所面對的經營環境及營運架構有所關聯，企業之股利政策會因產業的不同而有所差異。 / A dividend policy that balanced the needs for firm growth and stockholders conveys important information for both managements and investors. Characteristics and operating environment of an organization and expectations of its shareholders are critical determinants for developing such dividend policies. The knowledge about the life-cycle stage a firm is currently at and its dividend policy planned accordingly is therefore essential for financial decisions and future growth of a firm. Focused on companies listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange in chemical, textile and electronics industries over the period of 1990 to 1999, this thesis empirically tests the association between the business life-cycle stages of the sample firms and their dividend policies. Specifically, this study examines the dividend policy in terms of level, form and stability of dividend payout levels. With respect to the level of dividend payout, the empirical evidence shows that the strong association between the life-cycle stage and dividend policy is evident in chemical industry. As to the form of dividend payout, the results indicate that across all stages of business life cycle and all three industries, firms are found to have a preference for distributing stock dividends rather than cash dividends. Moreover, the empirical findings suggest that as compared to mature stages, firms in textile and electronics industries are found to be associated with greater variance in total level of dividend payout at their growth stages. However, there is no significant cross-stage difference in variance of dividend payout level found for firms in chemical industry. The overall empirical evidence implies that firms studied in this thesis may concern a stable dividend payout policy is more important for an on-going operation. Exertion in making clear distinction about their business life-cycle stages is less essential. It is possible that management doesn’t realize a necessary linkage between business life-cycle stage and dividend policy. It is also likely that firms are simply satisfying the shareholders’preference for stock dividends distribution. In addition, the cross-industry differences in dividend policy practices found may result from the differences in characteristics and operating environment confronted by organizations.

本研究以Miller與Modigliani(1958, 1961)的資本結構無關論與股利無關 論為研究背景，再以Myers(1974)的理論與Partington(1985) 的資金流量 等式為基礎，探討上市公司投資、舉債與股利決策間是否具有互動關係， 研究期間為民國七十七年至民國八十一年，樣本為國內上市公司，共 249家，研究方法除了針對各決策設計不同的方程式之外，並以三階段最 小平方法來進行聯立模型的實證，同時針對上市公司的高階財務主管寄發 問卷，以進一步了解此三大決策間實際互動的現象。經由三階段最小平方 法與問卷調查的結果可知，投資與舉債決策間具有互動關係，此結果與MM 所提出的資本結構無關論不同，亦即投資決策並未獨立於融資決策，兩者 應同時決定。至於投資與股利決策間，亦存有互動關係，即投資計劃之進 行與現金股利發放間存有資金競用的現象，而有96％的上市公司在評估投 資計劃時，會同時考慮股利政策。至於現金股利與舉債決策間，其互動關 係並不明顯。而上市公司在舉債時，能否提供擔保品給貸款者與現有負債 契約對於舉債的限制為最重要的考慮因素，而僅有將近三成的上市公司會 改變負債比率來維持固定的股利支付。另外，其他對於投資、股利與舉債 決策有影響的因素尚有：投資方程式中，前期舉債額對投資的影響亦顯著 為正，可知上市公司會將資金作長期的規劃。舉債方程式中， Jensen(1986)自由現金流量對於上市公司舉債的影響顯著為負，可知 Jensen所提出的假說可以成立，亦即舉債後，由於公司必須支付負債的利 息與本金，故公司會注意資金之運用，進而增加公司對資金使用上的效率 。股利方程式中，前期股利支付的係數顯著為正，顯示上市公司對於現金 股利的發放將參照公司去年度的股利水準，並且少有減發股利的現象。由 上述結果可以得知投資與股利決策、投資與舉債決策間存有互動關係，並 未如MM(1958, 1961)所言，投資與股利決策、投資與舉債決策間係獨立之 決策，由本研究發現這些決策應同時決定。另外，股利與舉債決策間的互 動關係並不明顯。

本研究蒐集民國71年至民國81年共11年間新上市公司其首度發放股利的股票作為樣本，試圖以首度發放股利的樣本進行股利研究，而藉此樣本選擇技巧可找出不受市場預期影響的「純綷事件」樣本，由此可觀察出較完全的股利效果。 　　本研究採用事件研究法，並以市場模式及調整市場模式作為均衡預期報酬模式，以避免單一模式可能造成的「定性錯誤」，進而討論以下三個問題： 　　1.股票股利及現金股利的股利效果是否有差異。 　　2.多頭市場時期及空頭市場時期的股利效果是否有差異。 　　3.第一類股及第二類股的股利效果是否有差異。 　　本研究在進行實證分析之後得到下列幾項結論： 　　1.以新上市公司且首度發放股利的股票作為樣本，較之其他研究有較高的異常報酬。 　　2.股票股利較之現金股利有較高的異常報酬，可推論台灣股市投資人偏好股票股利。 　　3.空頭時期股利發放的異常報酬高於報酬高於多頭時期。 　　4.第一類股較之第二類股有較高的異常報酬，且股價較穩定。

<p>Background: In newspaper articles, we can nowadays read headlines as"Stop the robbing!"and"They pay extra tax through rent". A column in Göteborgsposten describes enormous amounts of money, pouring between municipal companies. Numerous of local newspapers have started to pay attention to their municipal companies and the transfer of profits from municipal housing enterprises and electric power companies. What are upsetting these journalists then? Both Hyresgästföreningen (The Swedish tenants’ association) and Boverket (The Swedish National Housing Board) indicate that the fiscal purpose of transactions within the group no longer is primary for municipalities. They allege that the transactions are improperly exploited by transferring inappropriate amounts of money from municipal housing enterprises. </p><p>Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to map transactions between municipal group companies and also evaluate if they are consistent with the accounting regulation in the domain. Delimitation: The case study will have a geographical delimitation by only including the group of Linköpings Stadshus. The study will only include the years during 1997-2003. The transactions that will be examined are group contributions, shareholders’ contribution and dividend. The case study will also process the interest expense of the parent company because of the promissory note loan that was raised from the municipality of Linköping in connection with the formation of the group. </p><p>Realisation: In the form of a case study, the thesis was realised through the collection of annual reports, obtained from the companies concerned. These data was complemented through qualitative interviews with representatives from the parent company and the municipality. The complementation was made to increase the comprehension of the problems. </p><p>Results: The municipality is primarily using competition and focus in result as important factors when trying to imitate private companies. This does not harmonize with the purpose of the municipal transactions. It is also clear that municipal groups may be composing strategies dealing with empty the subsidiary companies out on capital. This applies particularly to electric power companies. In the case study, compared to a payment of tax, Tekniska Verken has not recovered enough shareholders’ contribution. With that, these companies financial position is clearly deteriorating compared to if they would pay tax. Regulations of housing enterprises were not created until 1999. That means that violations of the regulations were not possible before that either. Obviously, the groups were using this opportunity, and the dividend that has been discussed in the case study, is a clear example of the municipality not giving priority to the clients of the housing enterprise. Though, it is important to point out the legality of a dividend of that kind.</p>

En riktad utdelning innebär att en eller flera aktieägare helt eller delvis avstår sin rätt till utdelning till förmån för en annan aktieägare. Beskattningen av utdelningar sker i allmänhet i enlighet med 42:12 Inkomstskattelagen (IL), som stadgar att den som har rätt till en utdelning när denna kan disponeras även skall beskattas för densamma. Paragrafen är tillämplig på riktade utdelningar och torde vid en första anblick innebära att det är aktieägaren som mottar den riktade utdelningen som är skattskyldig till utdelningsbeloppet. En av de grundläggande principerna inom aktiebolagsrätten som aktualiseras vid vinstutdelning i ett aktiebolag är likhetsprincipen, som innebär att alla aktier har samma rätt i bolaget. En riktad utdelning innebär att en eller flera aktieägare får en större utdelning än vad som betingas av dennes aktieinnehav. Således kan en riktad utdelning innebära ett avsteg från likhetsprincipen. Likhetsprincipen utgör ett skydd för aktieägarna och skall därför upprätthållas. Avsteg är dock möjliga men kräver samtliga aktieägares samtycke. Hur påverkar då likhetsprincipen och andra civilrättsliga regler beskattningen av en riktad utdelning? För att besvara denna fråga måste man först utreda vilket förhållande skatterätten har till civilrätten. Normalt sett följer skatterätten civilrätten, d v s rättshandlingar som accepteras inom civilrätten ligger även till grund för den skattemässiga bedömningen, vilket torde innebära att riktade utdelningar som genomförts på ett enligt civilrätten godtagbart sätt skall ligga till grund för beskattningen. Rättsläget är dock oklart och det är tänkbart att man skatterättsligt inte godtar transaktionen utan istället beskattar aktieägaren och därmed bortser från överlåtelsen. Detta synsätt skulle kunna motiveras av att den riktade utdelningen ses som en disposition av den aktieägare som avstår utdelning och att det därför är denna person och inte mottagaren som skall beskattas. Syftet med uppsatsen är att utreda vilka inkomstskatterättsliga konsekvenser en riktad utdelning ger upphov till, dels för den person som avstår utdelning, dels för den person som mottar den riktade utdelningen.