A partir do contexto de ampliação dos direitos da personalidade, muito tem se discutido a respeito deles com relação à pessoa jurídica. A maior parte da doutrina e a jurisprudência praticamente uníssona orientam-se pela possibilidade de extensão dos direitos à pessoa jurídica, com esteio no art. 52, do Código Civil, bem como na consagrada Súmula 227, do Superior Tribunal de Justiça, que estabelece a possibilidade de a pessoa jurídica sofrer danos morais. Como esses danos, segundo entendimento hoje corrente, decorrem da violação de direitos da personalidade, infere-se a pertinência de estabelecimento de relação entre a pessoa jurídica e os direitos da personalidade. O posicionamento esposado na presente tese, todavia, é radicalmente contrário ao que ora predomina, motivo pelo qual o trabalho versa especialmente sobre a demonstração do equívoco desta comparação, sob a inspiração de que os direitos da personalidade são mais do que uma mera categoria jurídica; são a glorificação do esplendor da alma humana, da qual decorre a dignidade que embasa o ordenamento jurídico. É em razão disso que é admissível o amparo dos direitos da personalidade ao nascituro e à pessoa já falecida, no que cabível, mas não à pessoa jurídica. Assim, o art. 52 do CC deve ser lido de maneira condizente com essa orientação. A fim de atingir o mencionado objetivo, dar-se-á especial atenção aos direitos subjetivos, modalidade dentro da qual se incluem os direitos da personalidade, bem como à evolução dos direitos da personalidade, partindo do direito romano em direção aos séculos XIX e XX, momento de verdadeiro desenvolvimento desses direitos, seguido pelas principais declarações de direitos posteriores à Segunda Guerra Mundial. Serão tratados, igualmente, aspectos atuais dos direitos da personalidade, e sua inserção dentro do Ordenamento Jurídico. Sobre a pessoa jurídica, abordar-se-ão sua formulação histórica e as diversas teses existentes para explicar a sua natureza jurídica. Finalmente, será destinado um capítulo específico à desmistificação dos supostos direitos da personalidade da pessoa jurídica, aludindo-se ao nome empresarial, honra na acepção objetiva, imagem, intimidade e sigilo industrial, direitos morais de autor e marca. / From the context of expansion of personality rights (a special kind of personal rights), much has been discussed about these rights with respect to legal entities. Most of doctrine and jurisprudence agree with the possibility of extending these rights to legal entities, with mainstay in art. 52 of the Civil Code and in the consecrated Súmula (Precedent) 227 of the Superior Court of Justice (STJ). This Súmula establishes the possibility of the legal entity suffering moral damages. As this moral damage, according to current understanding, derive from the violation of personality rights, its usually inferred the appropriateness of establishing relation between the legal entity and personality rights. The position espoused in this thesis, however, is radically contrary to what currently prevails, and thats the reason why the work revolves especially around the demonstration of the misconception of this comparison, under the inspiration that personality rights are more than just a legal category; theyre the glorification of the splendor of the human soul, which explains the dignity that underlies the legal system. It is because of this that personality rights are extended to unborn and deceased person, when applicable, but not to the legal entities. Thus the art. 52, CC, should be read in a manner consistent with this guidance. In order to achieve the mentioned goal, it will be given special attention to the personal rights, within which the rights of the personality are included, as well as the evolution of personality rights, starting from the Roman law towards the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, moment of true development of these rights, followed by the main declarations of human rights after the second world war. It will also be treated the current aspects of personality rights, and their inclusion within the Brazilian legal system. On the legal entities, it will be addressed its historical development and the various existing theories to explain its legal nature. Finally, the last chapter is intended to demystify the alleged personality rights of legal entities, alluding to: company name, objective honor, image, privacy and industrial secrets, copyright (moral rights) and trademark.

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Le thème de ce mémoire de Maîtrise en droit est « La dignité humaine: limite à la brevetabilité du corps humain». Dans ce travail, nous avons tenté d'apporter une contribution à un débat des plus importants de ce début du 21 e siècle. Deux parties composent ce mémoire. La première partie vise à présenter la thématique de la brevetabilité du corps humain. Elle fait l'analyse non seulement des normes juridiques interdisant la brevetabilité du corps humain, mais aussi elle se penche sur le corps humain comme source d'inventions brevetables. Dans la première sous-section, notre analyse porte sur l'étude des documents normatifs d'intérêt international, régional et national. Le modèle et les normes de la Communauté européenne ont largement retenu notre attention alors que le cas des États-Unis, du Canada et surtout de la France nous servait de guide de réflexion pour mieux comprendre l'état du droit au Canada. Par une argumentation serrée nous avons conclu cette partie en affirmant que le corps humain n'est pas brevetable. La prohibition de la brevetabilité du corps humain s'impose comme universelle. La dignité humaine a constitué un élément déterminant de cette prohibition. Ce qui nous a permis, dans la deuxième sous-section de considérer le brevetage de l'ADN. Après avoir présenté les trois critères juridiques de la brevetabilité, à savoir la nouveauté, l'utilité et l'inventivité, nous avons appliqué ces critères à l'ADN. Il s'est avéré que c'est à bon droit que la plupart des pays accordent le brevet sur l'ADN. Mais cet état de droit pose des problèmes sur le plan des valeurs éthiques. Il a notamment comme conséquence de relativiser la dignité humaine. Ces dernières considérations éthiques nous ont conduits à étendre à l'ADN les critères juridiques de la brevetabilité vus dans la première partie. Pour nous prononcer adéquatement sur ce sujet combien délicat, il a fallu considérer la question de la brevetabilité de l'ADN chez les vivants, depuis l'affaire Chakrabarty en 1980, aux États-Unis, en passant par la Directive européenne de 1998, l'affaire Harvard College au Canada jusqu'à Myriad Genetics Inc. En droit, la brevetabilité de l'ADN ne fait plus de doute. Mais elle continue de soulever des « gènes» sur le plan éthique. L'inquiétude que suscite la pente glissante nous a amenés, dans la deuxième partie, à nous pencher sur la brevetabilité dans son rapport avec la dignité humaine. La première sous-section se voulait une analyse permettant de montrer que la dignité humaine est une valeur absolue et inconditionnelle. Si nous considérons cette valeur comme absolue, il devient impossible de breveter le corps humain dans son ensemble. Par contre, en brevetant l'ADN humain, nos institutions se trouvent à relativiser la dignité humaine. C'est ce que la deuxième sous-section tendait à montrer. Soulignons que cette deuxième sous-section a été conçue également comme une conclusion. Elle s'articule autour notamment de la dignité humaine comme principe de précaution. / "Patentability of the Human Body and of DNA through a comparative, ethical and legal study" is at the heart of a crucial debate of our time regarding the effect of biotechnology on human nature. Hereby, we have attempted to bring a contribution to the debate. In the first part of our work, we developed the concept and the legal criterion of patentability. We then presented a comparative study based on normative documents from international, regional and national sources. Based on the norms defined by the European community, as well as documents from the US, Canada and France, it is clear that the human body is not patentable. In fact, this prohibition appears to be widely recognized. At the core of such a prohibition lies the concept of human dignity, a concept that we proceed to analyze both legally and ethically. It follows that the idea of patenting a human body violates human dignity as well as the integrity and freedom of the person. However, the same cannot be said about the patentability of the DNA. By applying the legal .criteria prevalent to patentability of "human parts," as they appear in Sections 1 and 4 of our thesis, and after considering the debate raised by Chakrabarty in the US, the European Directive of 1998, the Harvard College case in Canada and that of Myriad Genetics, one sees that patentability of the DNA is accepted legally in spite of its ambivalent statutes and the ethical issues. There is no conclusion as this matter is an ongoing subject of public and individual concern. To avoid sliding down a road leading to the patentability of the human body as a whole, one searches for safeguards, such as the "plastic" concept of human dignity.

L'idée principale qui sous-tend cette thèse est que la façon dont un peuple construit, absorbe et travaille son mémoire, compris dans sa dimension socio-politique, est essentiel pour la caractérisation, la reconnaissance et la définition de l'espace de politique, sociale et, par conséquent, juridique. Chaque mémoire, chaque oubli, chaque histoire racontée en public par un peuple a le pouvoir d'influencer l'espace politique vécue par ces personnes et leurs promesses en fin de compte le lien pour l'avenir. Avant le scénario brésilien (nettement inégale, injuste, oppressive), cette thèse a été construit à partir d'une réflexion basée sur les questions suivantes: les effets et les conséquences d'un travail de mémoire collective dans cette réalité politique et sa projection pour l'avenir; la reconnaissance du passé, afin de rétablir la justice sociale et la réhabilitation des victimes, en offrant une visibilité et un rôle social; le rôle du récit (en particulier du point de vue de la victime) dans leur dimension politique et éthique; la reconnaissance de la tradition qui a été reçu et le rejet dans l'avenir. / The central idea underlying this thesis is that the way a people constructs, absorbs and works their memory, understood in its socio-political dimension, is fundamental for the characterization, recognition and definition of the space of political, social and Consequently, legal in this community. Every memory, every forgetfulness, every history narrated in public by a people has the power to condition the political space experienced by these people and ends up by linking their promises for the future. In view of the Brazilian scenario (markedly unequal, unjust, oppressive), the present thesis was constructed based on a reflection based on the following questions: the effects and consequences of collective memory work on the present political reality and its projection for the future; The recognition of the past, in order to restore the social rehabilitation and justice of the victims, allowing their visibility and social protagonism; The role of the narrative (especially from a perspective of the victim) in its political and ethical dimension; The recognition of the tradition that was received and the liberation for the future. / A ideia central, que subjaz essa tese, é de que a forma como um povo constrói, absorve e trabalha sua memória, entendida em sua dimensão sócio-política, é fundamental para a caracterização, reconhecimento e definição do espaço das relações políticas, sociais e, consequentemente, jurídicas desta comunidade. Toda lembrança, todo esquecimento, toda história narrada em público por um povo tem o poder de condicionar o espaço político vivenciado por esse povo e acaba por vincular suas promessas para o futuro. Diante do cenário brasileiro (marcadamente desigual, injusto, opressor), a presente tese foi construída a partir de uma reflexão pautada nas seguintes questões: os efeitos e consequências de um trabalho de memória coletiva na realidade política presente e na sua projeção para o futuro; o reconhecimento do passado, de forma a restituir a reabilitação social e a justiça das vítimas, possibilitando sua visibilidade e protagonismo social; o papel da narrativa (especialmente desde um olhar da vítima) em sua dimensão política e ética; o reconhecimento da tradição que foi recebida e a libertação para o futuro.

Si le concept de dignité de la personne humaine occupe une position privilégiée au frontispice de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union Européenne, il est longtemps resté absent de l’ordre juridique communautaire. Les premières Communautés, organisations d’intégration économique ne se réfèrent pas au concept malgré leur vocation humaine, portée par les objectifs de paix et de progrès social. C’est sous l’impulsion du juge et du législateur de l’Union, que le concept est reconnu puis consacré, d’abord par le droit dérivé puis par le droit primaire. L’analyse des sources du concept et de son processus d’intégration permet de déterminer avec rigueur et justesse les fonctionnalités de la dignité de la personne au sein de l’Union. Le droit est en effet dynamique et les institutions de l’Union recourent au concept de dignité selon une finalité orientée. Polyfonctionnelle, la dignité de la personne humaine joue, à l’image de ses sources, un rôle fondateur déterminant sur le continent européen. Objectivement, elle constitue le fondement du paradigme européen et détermine la substance et les frontières de son ordre juridique. Subjectivement, le concept revêt une fonction protectrice de la personne humaine et de ses droits fondamentaux. Son inscription au sein des traités marque espérons-le, un tournant humaniste de l’organisation européenne. / Human dignity is a key element in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Yet, EU law has long failed to incorporate the concept of human dignity. Europeans founded the European Community to promote peace and social progress. The European Community focused on economic integration first as a mean to reach this goal, however. The Union’s judge and legislator later helped turn attention to human dignity: secondary legislation then primary law integrated the concept. We analyze how human dignity developed as a concept. We also analyze its integration into law. Doing so allows assessing carefully what role human dignity plays in the EU. Law is dynamic. EU institutions use the concept of human dignity to reach specific goals. Human dignity serves several functions. Like its sources, dignity plays a seminal role in Europe. Objectively, dignity is the basis of the European paradigm. Dignity defines the content and limits of the legal order. Subjectively, dignity protects human beings and their fundamental rights. Including human dignity into European treaties hopefully signals a humanistic shift in how Europe works. / Auch wenn das Menschenwürdekonzept eine besondere Position in der Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union innehat, war dieses Konzept lange Zeit abwesend in der EU-Rechtsordnung. Die ersten EU-Mitgliedsländer hatten den Frieden und den sozialen Fortschritt als Ziel, Organisationen, die die wirtschaftliche Integration zur Aufgabe hatten, bezogen sich nicht auf das Menschenwürdekonzept trotz ihrer menschlichen Neigung. Auf Veranlassung des Richters und Gesetzgebers der Union wurde das Konzept zunächst anerkannt und setzte sich dann durch, zunächst im Sekundärrecht, dann im primären Gemeinschaftsrecht. Eine Analyse der Quellen des Würdekonzepts und des Integrationsprozesses erlauben es, mit Strenge und Schärfe die Aufgaben der Würde im EU-Recht zu bestimmen. In der Tat ist das Recht dynamisch und die Einrichtungen der EU beziehen sich auf das Würdekonzept nach einer orientierten Zielgerichtetheit. Multifunktional spielt das Menschenwürdekonzept, folgt man seinen Quellen, eine Gründungsrolle, die auf Europa festgelegt ist. Objektiv stellt sie Grundlage des europäischen Paradigma dar und legt die Substanz und die Grenzen der juristischen Ordnung fest. Subjektiv betrachtet beinhaltet das Konzept eine Schutzfunktion des Menschen und seiner Grundrechte. Die Eintragung des Menschenwürdekonzepts innerhalb des EU-Vertrags markiert, so lässt sich hoffen, einen humanistischen Wendepunkt der Europäischen Union.

Submitted by Ana Valéria de Jesus Moura (anavaleria_131@hotmail.com) on 2018-04-30T14:00:46Z No. of bitstreams: 1 VICENTE DA CUNHA PASSOS JÚNIOR.pdf: 1833783 bytes, checksum: 6ca43e7c9f248f4a89ee437a368daa84 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ana Valéria de Jesus Moura (anavaleria_131@hotmail.com) on 2018-04-30T14:11:28Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 VICENTE DA CUNHA PASSOS JÚNIOR.pdf: 1833783 bytes, checksum: 6ca43e7c9f248f4a89ee437a368daa84 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-04-30T14:11:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 VICENTE DA CUNHA PASSOS JÚNIOR.pdf: 1833783 bytes, checksum: 6ca43e7c9f248f4a89ee437a368daa84 (MD5) / O tema da presente pesquisa é a possibilidade de aplicação do princípio da solidariedade para a ampliação do conceito de superendividamento. Assim, o objetivo deste trabalho foi perquirir se o princípio da solidariedade extraído da Constituição Federal de 1988 seria capaz de ampliar o conceito de superendividamento, diante da importância dessa situação e pela constância desse problema em tempos de crises econômicas. Para tanto, a pesquisa foi dividida em três partes. Na primeira discorreu-se sobre as modificações ocorridas na teoria geral dos contratos, abordando o atual papel dos princípios contratuais na sociedade, tendo em vista que o superendividamento é significativamente causado por relações contratuais, especialmente as de fornecimento de crédito ou, até mesmo em outros tipos de contrato que comprometam sua capacidade de honrar seus compromissos. Na segunda parte, analisou-se a situação do hiperconsumo e o superendividamento, com o objetivo de demonstrar quais as relações que existem entre tais figuras, e apresentando qual o posicionamento doutrinário sobre o superendividamento, já que será proposta a ampliação do conceito deste instituto. Por fim, no último capítulo, buscou-se demonstrar que o princípio da solidariedade, com amparo no princípio da dignidade humana e preocupado com a preservação do mínimo existencial, pode servir de fundamento para a ampliação do conceito de superendividamento, para que outras pessoas possam receber a tutela legal protetiva de seus direitos em situações ainda não admitidas pela doutrina nem pelo Projeto de Lei 3.515/2015 que trata do tema, razão pela qual sugerimos a ampliação do conceito para o superendividamento. / The present research's theme is the possibility of expansion of the concept of over-indebtedness by the application of the principle of solidarity. Therefore, the objective of this paper was to inquire if the principle of solidarity extracted from Brazil's Constitution of 1988 is apt to extend the concept of over-indebtedness, considering the importance of the situation and the constancy that it occurs during economic crisis. To archive so, the research was divided in three parts. The first discussed about the modifications that happened to the contract theory, approaching the current role from the contractual principles in society, contemplating that the over-indebtedness is significantly caused by contractual relations, especially as credits supply or, even by contracts that compromise the ability to honor its obligations. At the second part, was analyzed the hyperconsumerism and the over-indebtedness, aiming to demonstrate the relation between the figures, and displaying what is the doctrinal position about over-indebtedness, since there will be proposed a extension of its concept. Lastly, in the final piece, was attempted to show that the principle of solidarity, as an assistance in the principle of the human dignity and the concern about the preservation of the minimum existential, can be used as foundation for an expansion of the concept of over-indebtedness, so that other people can receive the legal protection of their rights in situations not yet admitted not even by Bill nº 3515/2015 that contains the theme, reason that suggests extends the concept for over-indebtedness.

Doctor Legum - LLD / The research problem of this study is the jurisprudential inconsistency in the application of the right in section 26(3) of the South African Constitution's Bill of Rights. The inconsistency is due to inadequate conceptualisation of the substantive requirements of meaningful engagement (ME) by the South African Constitutional Court (ConCourt). The central argument is that the development of a community engagement model based on the substantive requirements of ME will enhance the application of section 26(3). This study commences by illustrating the disempowering nature to the squatters of the apartheid evictions in South Africa. To tighten influx control, the apartheid regime introduced a battery of laws that disempowered the squatters. The apartheid-induced disempowerment of the squatters penetrated into the democratic dispensation. In the examination of the normative context of evictions post-1994, this study identifies six primary drivers for substantive involvement of the occupiers during evictions. The six primary drivers seek to address the disempowering trajectory during evictions.

The present article aims to provide a historical review about the rise of the International Labour Organization and its evolution over time to reach to the position where it is today, and his work as protector of the worker as a human being worthy and not the machine. / En el presente artículo se pretende realizar una revisión histórica acerca del surgimiento de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, así como su evolución con el paso del tiempo hasta llegar a la posición en la que se encuentra hoy en día, y su labor como protector del trabajador en tanto ser humano digno y no de la máquina.

The present article analyses the problems that occur in the contemporary world about the access to employment for persons with disabilities. Thus, beginning with the definition of disability and describing the support that has the Peruvian State to assume a social role, the article advances to describe the main ways of promotion of this kind of employment and the measures implemented in this matter. / El presente artículo hace un análisis sobre los problemas que se presentan en el mundo contemporáneo respecto a la promoción de acceso al empleo para personas con discapacidad. Así, partiendo de definir el concepto de discapacidad y describiendo el sustento que tiene el estado peruano para sumir el rol social, el artículo pasa a describir las principales formas de promoción de dicho empleo y las medidas que han sido implementadas por el estado peruano en esta materia.