Submitted by Pedro Barros (pedro.silvabarros@ufpe.br) on 2018-08-14T21:05:33Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 811 bytes, checksum: e39d27027a6cc9cb039ad269a5db8e34 (MD5) DISSERTAÇÃO Jefferson Luiz de França.pdf: 863428 bytes, checksum: 4c0acf795e36dbeba3ac8e2988765cae (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Alice Araujo (alice.caraujo@ufpe.br) on 2018-08-16T18:40:36Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 811 bytes, checksum: e39d27027a6cc9cb039ad269a5db8e34 (MD5) DISSERTAÇÃO Jefferson Luiz de França.pdf: 863428 bytes, checksum: 4c0acf795e36dbeba3ac8e2988765cae (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-16T18:40:36Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 811 bytes, checksum: e39d27027a6cc9cb039ad269a5db8e34 (MD5) DISSERTAÇÃO Jefferson Luiz de França.pdf: 863428 bytes, checksum: 4c0acf795e36dbeba3ac8e2988765cae (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-07-10 / Esta dissertação analisa o aborto a partir da teoria moral kantiana e dos deveres que temos para consigo mesmo e para com os outros, avaliando ainda a consistência de nossas convicções morais. A primeira parte da discussão se dá a partir da apresentação do cenário em que os discursos acerca da moralidade do aborto se constituem, considerando justificativas e categorias pelas quais o ato de matar pode ser moralmente justificável. Em seguida, revisamos alguns dos principais argumentos desenvolvidos na literatura, tanto contrários quanto favoráveis ao aborto, analisando-os criticamente. A segunda parte consiste em identificar como a filosofia moral kantiana pode contribuir no debate acerca da moralidade do aborto, expondo os argumentos desenvolvidos por Lara Denis e Harry Gensler e estabelecendo um acordo entre eles de modo a harmonizá-los no conjunto da teoria moral kantiana. / This dissertation analyzes the abortion from the Kantian moral theory and the duties we have to himself and to others, and to evaluate the consistency of our moral convictions. The first part of the discussion comes from the presentation of the scenario in which the discourse about the morality of abortion constitute, considering justifications and categories for which the act of killing can be morally justified. Then we reviewed some of the main arguments developed in the literature, both opposed as favourable to abortion, analyzing them critically. The second part is to identify how the Kantian moral philosophy may contribute to the debate about the morality of abortion, exposing the arguments developed by Lara Denis and Harry Gensler and establishing an agreement between them in order to harmonise them in the set of Kantian moral theory.

O sistema da moralidade proposto por Kant, o qual elimina toda a influência da matéria na determinação do caráter moral da ação, é objeto de estudos desde sua elaboração. Um aspecto que se apresenta problemático é o fato de que ao tomar inclinações como móbeis, isto é, como princípio subjetivo da vontade, as pessoas demonstram possuir interesse – empírico - pelos fins almejados, pela matéria da ação. Quando suprimida a matéria, restando apenas a forma da lei a ser observada, deve existir, também, uma espécie de móbil, este moral, que, no entanto não implica em contrariar o caráter não empírico da determinação racional. Tem-se então, uma situação complicada quanto ao interesse da pessoa na observância da lei moral, tendo em vista o caráter especial deste interesse; em termos Kantianos, o chamado interesse puro da razão. Kant introduz então o conceito de respeito por esta lei, e o considera como sendo um sentimento, portanto, ligado à sensibilidade, porém, não patologicamente produzido, mas, praticamente produzido. A partir da análise das obras kantianas, bem como de comentadores, entende-se que Kant dá o norte para a resolução da questão do móbil moral ao falar do sentimento de respeito. Porém, é necessário refletir se o sentimento de respeito, por si, é o móbil moral Kantiano. Além disso, é preciso explicar a possibilidade de existência de tal sentimento, ligado a sensibilidade, porém não produzido de forma patológica, e sim por uma representação a priori. A partir deste norte e destas reflexões chega-se à conclusão que uma análise conjunta do sentimento de respeito e da consciência da lei moral deve ser desenvolvida, pois, não parece interessante tratar ambos de maneira eliminatória, ou seja, ou o sentimento de respeito ou a consciência da lei moral como base da motivação moral. Para articular esses dois elementos motivacionais parte-se da posição de que se pode distinguir na determinação da vontade, dois fatores: fator conativo ou dinâmico e fator cognitivo. O primeiro consiste em um impulso, como um fator dinâmico em movimento, no sentido de que as pessoas querem, precisam, desejam, se interessam, já o segundo introduz-se tendo em vista que para a realização do aspecto dinâmico, ou seja, dos interesses, depende-se da representação de uma lei para guiar a ação, independentemente do caráter moral ou não desta lei. Caso moral, interesse puro, caso não moral, interesse empírico. Desta forma, baseando-se nesta teoria poder-se-ia pensar a análise conjunta do sentimento de respeito e a consciência da lei moral, já que a consciência da lei seria o guia, a regra, a consciência do princípio da moralidade, enquanto o sentimento de respeito seria o fator dinâmico que efetivaria o princípio da moralidade, seria o efeito que a lei, mediante a consciência dela, causa na sensibilidade. / The system of morality proposed by Kant, which eliminates any influence of matter in determining the moral character of the action, is studied since its preparation. One aspect that appears problematic is the fact that by taking inclinations as mobiles, ie, as a subjective principle of the will, people have shown interest - empirically - the objectives pursued by the matter of the action. When the matter suppressed, leaving only the shape of the law to be observed, there must be also a kind of mobile, this moral, which however does not imply counteract the non empirical rational determination. There is then a complicated situation regarding the person's interest in the observance of the moral law, in view of the special nature of this interest, in terms Kantians, called the pure interest of reason. Kant then introduces the concept of respect for this law, and considers as a sense, therefore, linked to sensitivity, but not pathologically produced but practically produced. From the Kantian analysis of the works, as well as commentators, it is understood that Kant gives the north to the resolution of the question of motive in speaking of the moral feeling of respect. However, it is necessary to reflect the sense of respect for themselves, is the Kantian moral motive. Also, explain the possibility of existence of such a feeling, on the sensitivity, but not produced in a pathological way, but by a representation a priori. From this northern and these reflections arrive at the conclusion that a joint analysis of the sense of respect and awareness of the moral law must be developed, because it does not seem so interesting treat both round, that is, or the feeling of respect or awareness of the moral law as the basis of moral motivation. To articulate these two elements motivational part is the position that can be distinguished in the determination of the will, two factors: factor or dynamic conative and cognitive factor. The first consists of a boost, as a dynamic factor in motion, in the sense that people want, need, desire, interested, while the second is introduced with a view to the realization that the dynamic aspect, namely the interests, depends from the representation of a law to guide the action, regardless of the moral character of this law or not. If moral, pure interest, if not moral, empirical interest. Thus, based on this theory it may be thought a joint analysis of the sense of respect and awareness of the moral law, as awareness of the law would guide the rule, the awareness of the principle of morality, while feeling respect would be the dynamic factor that efect the principle of morality, the effect would be that the law upon her consciousness, because the sensitivity.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-12T18:04:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 arquivo6815_1.pdf: 1146510 bytes, checksum: eb0fb3566cb8f640e377db627f5ba15a (MD5) license.txt: 1748 bytes, checksum: 8a4605be74aa9ea9d79846c1fba20a33 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2003 / Este trabalho pretende investigar a relação entre a religião e a moralidade no pensamento kantiano. Trata-se de uma proposta inovadora na medida em que pretende dissociar a moral da religião, contrariando o que fora feito pelos teólogos dogmáticos até Kant quando, afirmando provas racionais da existência de Deus, asseguravam N ele, o princípio de toda a moralidade. Kant, pelo contrário, não procurava na fé, na religião ou mesmo em Deus o fundamento da Moral, antes, busca assentá-la, segura e tão-somente, em princípios de razão. A crítica à religião, começa pela derrubada do argumento ontológico, para, em seguida, ser estabelecida como um serviço dos corações ou a observância dos verdadeiros deveres como mandamentos divinos. Dessa forma, assentada no conceito de dever, que requer o pressuposto da independência da vontade a meros princípios empíricos, portanto da liberdade, a Moral é a autonomia de uma vontade que se fundamenta enquanto princípio obrigante do arbítrio, que por dar a si mesmo a Lei, é essencialmente livre

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-12T18:05:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 arquivo862_1.pdf: 638242 bytes, checksum: 477ca979615a1d8628ac3e38630d96b4 (MD5) license.txt: 1748 bytes, checksum: 8a4605be74aa9ea9d79846c1fba20a33 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006 / Esse trabalho se insere na perspectiva fundacionista kantiana, particularmente no que diz respeito às três leis de Newton. Em sua obra de 1786, Princípios Metafísicos da Ciência da Natureza, Kant empreende a tarefa de fundamentar a física mecânica através de princípios metafísicos. Nosso objetivo nessa dissertação foi abordar essa obra especificamente em seu terceiro capítulo onde Kant trata dos axiomas do movimento de Newton. Nessa dissertação elucidamos a argumentação kantiana na fundamentação das primeira e terceira leis de Newton e, ao final, mostramos a insuficiência da abordagem de Kant com respeito à segunda lei de Newton

The purpose of this thesis is to compare a different conception of time in Kant's and Bergson's work and demonstrate the role of their conceptions within their philosophical projects. Time in Kant's work is both a pure a priori intuition represented as an infinite multitude of a priori successive moments and a form in which an empirical manifold appears. Manifold of pure intuition of time is united by an act of understanding and its objective unity makes synthetic a priori knowledge possible. Bergson, on the other hand, stood up against the idea of infinite divisibility of a time line. Homogenous time of mathematics considers only atemporal moments and it cannot conceive a temporal interval having time duration between two points. A pure duration therefore has to be a heterogeneous development of specific time matter, not a homogenous form in which empirical matter is quantitatively ordered as if it were without change and as an external part of change. Unity of time is therefore not quantitative but qualitative. Heterogeneous development is also on many levels permeated with homogeneity. This idea, at first sight contradictory, has to be explained by Bergson without retreating to the concept of homogenous time. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)

This dissertation explores Kant’s theory of perceptual experience. A reconstruction of Kant’s conception of perceptual synthesis is pursued through an examination of two interpretations given by Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell. The two interpretations defended by Sellars and McDowell emphasize on the conceptual synthesis of the understanding in shaping the sensory consciousness. Also, the two interpretations seek to articulate a conception of external constraint in perceptual activity that is answerable to independent reality. The external constraint is necessary to explain the occurrence of perceptual experience. The manifold of sense is considered as an external constraint in perceptual synthesis. Sellars takes sheer receptivity as providing this constraining element in perceptual experience, whereas McDowell argues that sensations as informed by the understanding can sufficiently provide this constraining content. After examining both interpretations, I will argue that Sellars and McDowell incorrectly take external constraint as appropriated by the concepts of the understanding. To defend this claim, I will reconstruct Kant’s conception of perceptual experience by demonstrating that Kant posits the manifold of sensations as independent of the operation of the understanding. The manifold of sensations constrains the conceptual content of experience through the synthesis of apprehension. In this synthesis, the manifold of sensations resists the figurative synthesis of imagination from being re-constituted through the extensive forms of space and time.

康德的主體理論不但為西方的理性主義開出了一個新的領域，在近代中國儒學 的研究中更被視為一個重要的樞紐。康德的主體理論除了為日後相關的討論提 供了穩固的框架外，他對一些重要概念──諸如理性、道德的必然性等──的 反省和釐清，更為當世的相關討論帶來了突破性的發展和影響。當然，其道德 主體理論也有不少困難。本文分成四章，基於上述各點展開討論。 第一章為前言，旨在闡明康德對其它道德理論的抨擊，以顯康德對道德的看法 之獨特處。 第二章對康德的道德主體理論作系統性的闡釋。由康德的最高道德原則出發， 闡明當中的關鍵概念，例如：道德的無條件性與普遍性，從而帶出主體所具備 的實踐理性及自律性。康德於捍衛道德的普遍性及肯定人之主體性方面，成就 無容置疑。但另一方面，在其系統中，道德法則只能呈現為命令，亦不允許情 感的滲雜。康德的這種主體觀並非沒有困難。 本文的第三章則指出康德道德理論對主體的一些前設，並透過比較康德與王陽 明的道德理論，揭示康德的道德主體觀並非在所有文化下都為人接受。最後， 本章亦希望帶出道德主體觀與道德境界的密切關係，以點出不同道德主體觀的 意義。全文最後以第四章作結。

archives@tulane.edu / Kant’s practical philosophy has two ideals, but Kant seems mostly silent on the connection between them: namely the Just State and the Kingdom of Ends. Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason certainly gives a semblance of an answer, in claiming that we, as a community of humans, require the Just State in order to bring about (or ‘think of ourselves as in’) the Kingdom of Ends. However, Kant seems to also make it clear that every individual is capable of ethical reasoning prior to the civil condition (i.e., prior to the Just State). I argue that ethics is necessary for right, and thus that right is sufficient for ethics. The necessity of ethics is found in the creation of the Just State to begin with (and thus the system of right, itself, cannot exist without the pre-existing ethical faculty). The sufficiency of right is discovered through a kind of practice of the use of our practical reasoning (which I call ‘practical practice’) through balancing the important tension between cosmopolitan right and civil right, such that we become better at balancing an analogous tension between love and respect. Thus, in this dissertation, I argue that our individual attempt to achieve the Just State is sufficient (but not necessary) for considering ourselves self-legislating members of the Kingdom of Ends. / 1 / Julian Katz

archives@tulane.edu / I have composed my dissertation out of three distinct but related essays with each working, as the title of the work would indicate, to return philosophy to life. The first two essays seek this by challenging and offering alternatives to philosophical theories that would keep philosophers from fully engaging with life in its fundamental teleological being. The third essay works from the philosophical idea of Eros to bring about this engagement. In the first essay “A Science of Consciousness – Physicalism or Phenomenology?” I enter what I describe as a dialectic in philosophy in its seeking the realization of the scientific ideal within its practice. As I observe in the essay, two opposing schools of thought within philosophy claim the mantle of this ideal, physicalist theory and phenomenology. I examine both in terms of two fundamental criteria of science – basic logicality and empirical substantiation. Upon these criteria, I argue that phenomenology with its basis in life itself, deserves the mantle and so a new respect within the philosophical community going forward. In the second essay, “An Epistemology of Life,” I engage critically with Immanuel Kant’s epistemology as found in Critique of The Power of Judgment and in Critique of Pure Reason. In particular, I challenge Kant’s claim in Judgment that the constitution of our cognitive faculties precludes an intuition of life’s teleological being, the necessary basis, Kant argues, for our making determinant judgments about life. To make my case, I offer evidence to the contrary from the world of life itself. I then examine Kant’s understandings of the noumenal, the transcendental aesthetic and of our epistemic intuition of causal being and bring forward alternatives. In the final essay “At Any Time the Heart Awakes!” I undertake a philosophical engagement with life through a children’s song and introductory philosophical essay for instructors. I have written these in the hope of bringing a first awakening within children of the philosophical ideal of love spoken to in Plato’s Symposium. In addition to Plato, I reference Aristotle, Kant, Kierkegaard and The Buddha as sources for the song’s content and methodology. / 0 / Keith J. Silverman

archives@tulane.edu / The most commonly ignored doctrine in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is his defense of his own critical methodology. This dissertation analyzes Kant’s statements on method in the “Discipline of Pure Reason” and a series of lectures from the 1760s and 1770s to prepare the way for a reinterpretation of the argumentative strategy of the Critique and its emancipatory aims. Reconsidering its argumentative strategy also requires reconsidering its substantive claims and achievements. “Discipline” is Kant’s name for the method that elevates the natural predisposition to metaphysics (“metaphysica naturalis”) to the secure status of science (“metaphysica generalis”) because the discipline accounts for the inescapable historicity of pure reason, achieving a revolution in rational history by making use of that historicity while eliminating its worst consequences. After disciplining the tumultuous unrest Kant finds everywhere in reason’s historical search for self- knowledge, reason can finally enter a period of “perpetual peace in philosophy.” Given Kant’s reservations about political revolution, this dissertation asks how the revolutionary turn in rational history is meant to enable peace. After Kant makes headway on the question of reason’s end by considering the dispute between ancient and modern philosophy, he considers the aprioricity of space, time, and the categories from a similarly historical perspective. This dissertation argues that Kantian reason is historical in such a way that it requires the negative legislation of critical discipline to reach the status of science, a result that contributes to the discussion about Kant’s thoughts on revolution. / 1 / Zachary Calhoun