隨著社會經濟之全球化發展，公司儼然已成為各國經濟活動之核心組織，掌握絕大多數之資源與財富，影響人民之生活至鉅。且隨著公司資金需求之愈趨龐大，股份有限公司乃成為現今主要之公司型態。我國公司法在繼受外國立法例過程中，對於股份有限公司之機關設計採取其分權、制衡之機關分立方式，以股東會為公司最高意思決定機關，董事會為公司業務執行機關，監察人為公司常設監察機關，其目的即在追求經營之效率與避免專權之弊害。然而在公司規模日趨龐大、商業環境瞬息萬變的今日，此種權限分配制度是否仍能夠有效地發揮制衡公司經營者之功能，已日漸受到挑戰與質疑，我國自民國八十七年以來發生一連串撼動企業界及金融界的「地雷股」事件即為最好之警訊。該等上市、上櫃公司之所以發生財務危機，綜觀其原因，除了肇始於外在經濟環境的催化外，其餘多肇因於人謀不臧。其經營者每每利用職務之便，犧牲廣大股東、債權人及利害關係人之權益，以掌控公司資金、財產及人力等資源之便，以圖利自身，導致公司經營發生危機，進而影響到整個金融系統。 針對該等問題，政府乃積極籌思解決之道，並於民國九十年大幅度修正公司法，一方面積極開放，明訂董事會職權、放寬董監選舉之方式、放寬董監資格限制，以尊重公司自治。另一方面有效管理，對於公司內部監控的制度加以適度之強化，以避免公司經營者濫用前述開放後所獲得之權限，而危害公司股東、債權人及利害關係人之權益，例如修訂或增訂董事當然解任之規定、董事缺額強制補選期限、增訂臨時管理人制度、降低股東代表訴訟之門檻等。台灣證券交易所股份有限公司及財團法人中華民國證券櫃檯買賣中心於民國九十一年十月四日共同制定上市、上櫃公司治理實務守則；證券交易所有價證券上市審查準則第九條亦於民國九十一年二月二十二日初次納入獨立董、監事之規定，以期提升企業之營運品質。 惟如何在積極開放下取得有效管理之平衡，實應記取過去企業風暴之教訓，並吸取他國立法經驗以為我國公司法制進一步改造之方向，因此本文乃針對民國八十七年以來所發生重大財務危機並引發社會高度關注之上市、上櫃公司為研究對象，歸納其發生財務危機之原因，並參酌外國法制，探討我國公司內部監控機制之問題，進而提出今後修法之方向與公司組織建構之建議如下： 一、提高董事間之制衡 (一)檢討並嚴格限制關係企業間交叉持股 (二)廢除公司法第二十七條第二項及第三項之規定 (三)廢除董事代理出席董事會制度 (四)全面引進獨立董事制度宜審慎考量 二、強化監察人之獨立性 (一)廢除公司法第二十七條第二項及第三項之規定 (二)檢討現行監察人之選任制度 (三)全面引進獨立監察人制度宜審慎考量 三、加強監察人之專業能力 (一)財報簽證會計師宜改由監察人聘任 (二)公司內部稽核人員宜改由監察人聘任 (三)強制規定公司監察人應通過一定之資格考核 四、引進股東提案制度以增加股東會監控權限 五、改進股東代表訴訟制度以增加少數股東監控權限　 六、強化檢舉制度 七、重建企業倫理 / As social and economic globalization continues to deepen, companies appear to have become the core units for economic activity in country after country, gaining control over the lion’s share of resources and wealth with profound effects on people’s lives. And, with companies’ demands for funds growing ever greater, companies limited by shares are firmly entrenched as the dominant corporate form. Taiwan’s Company Law has repeatedly borrowed from foreign legislative examples. In this process, corporate organs of companies limited by shares have been designed by adopting a decentralized compartmentalized approach, with the shareholders’ meeting as the highest decision-making organ, the board of directors as the organ that executes the business of the company, and the supervisors as the standing supervisory organ; the purpose of this being to seek operational efficiency while avoiding the evils of monopolized power. However, with today’s ever-larger corporations and constantly changing business climate, the idea that this sort of distributed authority system can still provide effective balance for the corporate leadership function is being challenged and questioned more every day. Perhaps the best warning has come from the string of incidents involving “landmine stock” companies that have rocked the corporate and financial communities in Taiwan since 1998. Looking at the overall explanation for why these publicly listed companies encountered financial crises, one sees that some crises were originally catalyzed by the external economic environment, but most originated in the shortcomings of individuals and their plans: the leadership of these companies sacrificed the interests of the shareholding public, creditors and other stakeholders, using their control over their companies’ funds, assets, manpower and other resources to divert them for their own personal profit, leading their companies into crisis and even impacting the entire financial system. The Government has been aggressively addressing these problems and looking for solutions, and in 2001 major amendments to the Company Law were made. On the one hand, the reforms were towards greater openness and flexibility: out of respect for corporate self-governance, the prerogatives of boards were clearly laid out, the methods for electing directors and supervisors were made more flexible than before, and the qualifications for membership less restrictive. On the other hand, they were also aimed at making management more effective, moderately strengthening companies’ internal controls in order to prevent corporate officers from abusing their authority, once their prerogatives were liberalized, thereby harming the interests of shareholders and others stakeholders. For example, the law was revised or amended to provide rules for the certain dismissal of a director and time limits on the mandatory election of directors to fill vacant seats on the board; an amendment on provisional managers was added, and the threshold was lowered for legal action by shareholders’ representatives. On October 4 2002, The Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation and the GreTai Securities Market (OTC) jointly established a code of practice for corporate governance; and on February 22 2002, Article 9 of “Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation Regulations for Review of Securities Listings” included for the first time rules providing for independent directors and supervisors, with the expectation that this would raise the quality of business operations. However, if the question is how to achieve balance between effective management and greater flexibility/liberalization, one must truly recall the lessons learned from the scandals of the past and absorb the legislative experience of other countries, then chart a path towards further reforms in Taiwan’s corporate law system. Therefore, this thesis shall take as the object of research the major financial crises that have occurred since 1998 and those public companies that have generated a high degree of concern within the society. It will summarize the reasons why their financial crises happened, refer in detail to other countries’ legal systems, and investigate problem with the corporate internal control system in Taiwan. It will further propose directions for legal reform and suggestions for structuring corporate organizations as follows: 1.Increase checks and balances among directors: a.Analyze and strictly limit transactions and crossholding of shares between related businesses; b.Discard the rules in items 2 and 3, Article 27 of the Company law; c.Discard system whereby one director may choose another as his/her representative at board meetings; and d.Give careful consideration to introducing independent board member system across the board. 2.Strengthen the independence of supervisors: a.Discard the rules in items 2 and 3, Article 27 of the Company Law; b.Analyze the current system for electing supervisors; and c.Give careful consideration to introducing independent supervisors system. 3.Improve the professional capabilities of supervisors: a.Analyze and strictly limit transactions and crossholding of shares between related businesses; b.Make the appointment of accountants to audit financial statements the responsibility of supervisors; and c.Make it a mandatory requirement that supervisors pass a qualifying examination. 4.Introduce a shareholder proposal system to increase shareholders’ control authority. 5.Improve the shareholders’ representative(legal) action system to increase the control authority of minority shareholders. 6.Strengthen system for bringing accusations. 7.Rebuild business ethics.

公司內部監控機制是影響公司營運成果的重要因素，我國公司內部監控設計包括股東會、監察人、董事會及經理階層等權責運作機制，其中，內部監控以往主要的模式係採監察人制度為主。監察人主要功能在於監督董事會等經營階層，並降低經營階層之代理成本問題。監察人應監督公司業務之執行，並得隨時調查公司業務及財務狀況，查核簿冊文件，並得請求董事會或經理人提出報告。因此，監察人功能發揮之良窳，往往對公司健全運作有深遠影響。 近年來，一些上市公司經營者的利益輸送、背信案件層出不窮，董事會濫權，監察功能不彰厥為主要原因。這些內部監控問題的產生，促使學界及實務界亟思提出改善之道，針對內部監控效能不彰，究其主要原因在於，監督者缺乏獨立性，監督者專業能力不足，大股東操弄董事會等問題無法有效解決。獨立董事制度，主要針對這些問題提出解決，在獨立董事制度引進且法制化之後，我國並未完全捨棄監察人制度，監察人制度及獨立董事，在公司法制上同時並存。獨立董事制度設置目的，在於制衡董事會中，代表控制股東利益之內部董事，發揮應有的監督功能，但是獨立董事及相關配套措施，在理論及實務上仍有許多問題存在，及不易克服之盲點。本文亦針對美、日、德等不同國家之公司內部監控模式提出比較研究，同時，對我國內部監控制度之改造，提出看法及建議。 / Internal corporate governance is an important factor affecting a company’s performance. The internal administrative structure in a company should be a system including the right restraint and the setting up of obligation among Shareholders' Meeting, Supervisors, Board of Directors and managers in Taiwan. The system of Supervisors is an important part of the corporation’s administrative structure, as well as a choice for corporation’s functional department to restrain the Board of Directors and to cut down the cost of agency. Supervisors shall supervise the execution of business operations of the company, and may at any time or from time to time investigate the business and financial conditions of the company, examine the accounting books and documents, and request the Board of Directors or managerial personnel to make reports thereon. The supervisory function will strongly affect the healthy development of the company. In recent years, several major problems have come into being in some of the public listed company, such as a director or managerial officer acting contrary to his duties or misappropriating company assets. These problems may result from abusing the power by Board of Directors or the director, and functionless Supervisors. A series of problems in corporation supervision urge us to try our best to resolve them, such as the lack of independent of Supervisors, lacking of supervisory ability, the main Shareholder’s controlling of Board of Directors etc. There are two Supervision system, the one-tire system and the two-tire system, in western stock company. After the Independent Director’s system has been introduced and legislated, the situation that two kind of supervision coexist has appeared in the structure of the company in Taiwan. It aims at using the independent status of the Independent Director to restrict inner directors who are for the holding shareholder’s benefits in Board of Directors. But the system of Independent Director still has many problems both in the theory and practice. This study also has comparative research on the corporation’s administrative structure in America, Japan and Germany. Meanwhile suggestions of how to improve the system of internal corporate governance are offered.

歷年來台灣金融體系結構一直大幅度蛻變轉型中，尤其自銀行法於一九八九年修正並通過開放民營以來，銀行家數已快速增加，票券金融公司、投信公司、投顧公司、證券商、證券金融公司等亦快速開放成長。 近年我國金融體系又產生另一波趨勢，合併與策略聯盟風氣盛行，迄今國內已成立十四家金融控股公司，未來其彼此間應仍有再進一步整合之可能。惟金融控股公司之成立雖意味著金融產品多樣化、經營規模大型化與國際化之走向，但因金融機構於資本整合之後，其於經濟體系中之重要性亦不斷向上竄升，從而金融控股公司之內部監控與外部監理似亦應受到同等之重視，否則金融機構可以利用少數的股本掌握大量資產，槓桿倍數不小，恐將容易發生弊端。 復觀目前國內金融控股公司對其子公司持股之概況，吾人發現其共同特點，亦即金控公司僅負責對轄下子公司之指揮協調，自身並未實際經營業務，且各家金控公司殆皆持有其子公司百分之百股份。於此情況下，傳統股份有限公司內部監控機制所受之衝擊與因應為何，爰為本文所欲探究之核心。

2006年1月11日公布之證券交易法修正條文，正式將「獨立董事」、「審計委員會」等制度納入我國公開發行公司法制中，因此，我國目前公開發行公司的董事會，可分為三種型態：第一種是傳統的董事會，不設獨立董事，僅設董事會及監察人；第二種是設立獨立董事，且同時設有監察人；第三種類型則是有董事會及審計委員會，但無監察人。 這樣劇烈的變革，毫無疑問地，勢必將對我國公司治理法制中內部監控機關之設置帶來深刻的影響。譬如說：獨立董事與監察人二者並用，是否在組織機制層面上會疊床架屋，其相互間之權責會否不易界定而混淆不清，進而相互推諉？監察人和審計委員會之間是否為可相互取代之制度？二者設計的目的、監控方法和範圍在本質上有何異同？又如何的設計才能確保其「獨立性」和監控機能的有效發揮，但又不致陷入只會除弊不會興利的刻板印象？2006年修正之證券交易法的相關條文，其優劣為何，是否尚有不足之處仍待補充？本文即以此為研究方向，進行探討，惟鑑於國內研究監察人之專著專文已汗牛充棟，故本文著重於介紹此次證券交易法所正式引進之審計委員會制度在美國法下之相關規範及運作情形，並就引進獨立董事和審計委員會制度須搭配之相關配套措施及監察人制度之改善等相關問題提出淺見。 針對以上三種模式，本文認為，在模式二下的獨立董事，有責無權，頂多只能在董事會中扮演「諍友」的角色，其力量之極限亦僅止於透過公開其「諍言」來引起外部力量對公司之注意與監督。此種逐步、分階段實施獨立董事制度之設計，雖然優點是對企業之衝擊較小，但壞處是使得獨立董事制度的健全性，仍有很大的進步空間 。蓋立法者若真希望獨立董事能發揮其監督功能，則至少要讓其權責相符，如此一來功能性委員會之運作配合便是不能少的，且尚須使獨立董事能占董事會及功能性委員會之多數，才能使其較無懼地發揮監督之功能，此亦為國外法制之發展趨勢 。因此，此種既非純粹雙軌制亦非純粹單軌制之過渡階段的模式二設計，將來修法時實宜予以廢除，改由公司從經過修法補強完備之模式一（即水平式雙軌制）或模式三（即單軌制）中，依公司本身之需求，選擇適用其一，如此一來不但可避免現行架構上之混亂，亦符「公司自治」之法理。 而關於現行模式一下尚存如監察人之專業性、獨立性不足，欠缺對內、外審計單位之人事權及相關權責執行規定不夠細緻與選任方式不甚理想等缺失部分，本文建議可透過確立監察人獨立性資格；改善監察人提名、選任、報酬決定機制；賦予監察人辭任時之意見陳述權及引進監察人會等方式加以改進。 至於模式三之部分，本文則建議透過明確劃分董事會、管理階層及審計委員會之責任範圍；引進獨立董事責任免除或減輕之機制；明文要求公司應同時設置提名委員會及報酬委員會；加重對金融犯罪之處罰與設立專責法庭及禁止違反相關規定者轉任至其他發行公司擔任董事或經理人和引進預警機制等方法，以補強現制未臻完美之處，期使單軌制能真正於我國法制中落地生根、成長茁壯。