如何使企業經營者善盡其責任，為公司治理之重要一環。在此議題上，除建立明確之責任規範，令企業經營者有所遵循外，在其違反法令侵害投資人或利害關係人之權益時，尚需建構一套健全有效之責任追究機制，始能克盡全功。 　　本論文基於上述之緣由，從董事與公司間之委任關係為出發，探討董事對內（公司）之責任，就其應盡之善良管理人注意義務與忠實義務，加以討論介紹。繼而探討董事對外之責任，以公司法第23條第2項規定為核心，論究其規範性質為侵權行為責任或法定責任，並討論其適用範圍。又證券交易法於95年1月11日修正增訂第14條之2至第14條之5關於獨立董事之規定，獨立董事之責任與一般董事之責任，有無差異，其責任有無減輕或免除之必要，本論文併加予探討。所謂「防止重於追究」，在董事發生違法行為時，如何能有效的予以制止，應為重要之課題。公司法第194條規定之股東制止請求權，同法第218條之2第2項規定之監察人制止請求權，為重要之規定。董事未聽勸阻，仍繼續違反法令及章程之行為，或董事之行為，已嚴重公司之權益，依公司法第212條規定股東會得決議，對其提起訴訟，依同法第213條規定除股東會另選代表之人外，由監察人代表公司提起。然而股東會多為大股東所把持，董事、監察人多為大股東所支持之人，欲令股東會決議對董事提起訴訟，有實際上之困難。因此，公司法第214條規定繼續一年以上，持有已發行股份總數百分之三以上股東，得請求監察人對董事提起訴訟，監察人於受請求之日起三十日內不提起訴訟時，請求之股東得為公司提起訴訟，此即為股東代表訴訟。但在我國實務上，股東代表訴訟寥寥可數，究其原因為制度上有重大之缺陷，本論文就此綜合各家學說，並參酌外國立法例，加以分析比較之。 　　自證券投資人及期貨交易人投資保護法於92年1月1日施行以來，證券投資人及期貨交易人保護中心依該法提起之團體訴訟，蓬勃發展。稍後民事訴訟法於92年2月7日亦修正公布，除修正選定當事人之規定外，並增定第44條之1至第44條之4關於多數人訴訟程序之規定。上開二法制，使同一事件之多數受害人，得利用同一訴訟程序對於加害者進行求償。惟該二法之規定，是否臻於完善，能否達其立法目的，又該二法規定上差異，當事人於程序上如何選擇與交錯運用，本論文試加以分析探討。 　　公司法之股東代表訴訟、證券投資人及期貨交易人保護法之團體訴訟及民事訴訟法之多數人訴訟程序之規定，建構對公司董事求償之機制。本論文試綜合各家學說、實務之見解及他國立法例，提出修正建議，期供將來修法及實務運作之參考。 / How to make the enterprise directors fulfill the duty is a significant issue for corporate governance. Other than building transparent principles for directors to follow, it’s necessary to establish a pluperfect and efficient mechanism for responsibility enquiry when the director violates the interest of investors or stakeholders in order to accomplish good corporate governance. 　　Based on above reasons, this thesis introduces the internal responsibility of directors and discusses the good faith and due diligence for directors. Also, this thesis presents the external responsibility of director and discusses the nature and scope of regulation, i.e. legal responsibility or tort, in light of Article 23 section II. The Securities and Exchange Act revised the Article 14-2 to Article14-5 on January.11, 2006. These articles stipulate the responsibility of independent director and other directors. This thesis further discusses whether there is difference between the responsibility of independent director and other directors, or the necessity to mitigate or exempt the duty of independent director. According to the Company Act Article 194, in case the board of directors decide, by resolution, to commit any act in violation of any law, ordinance or the company's Articles of Incorporation, any shareholder who has continuously held the shares of the company for a period of one year or longer may request the board of directors to discontinue such act. Article 218-2 stipulated, in case the board of directors or any director commits any act, in carrying out the business operations of the company, in a manner in violation of the laws, regulations, the Articles of Incorporation or the resolutions of the shareholders' meeting, the supervisors shall forthwith advise, by a notice, to the board of directors or the director, as the case may be, to cease such act. These two articles are important statutes for efficiently deterring the illegal conduct of director. According to the Company Act Article 212, the shareholders' meeting shall resolve to institute an action against a director when the director continues illegal conduct. In case of a lawsuit between the company and a director, the supervisor shall act on behalf of the company, unless otherwise provided by law; and the meeting of shareholders may also appoint some other person to act on behalf of the company in a lawsuit. Article 214 also stipulate, shareholder(s) who has/have been continuously holding 3% or more of the total number of the outstanding shares of the company over one year may request in writing the supervisors of the company to institute, for the company, an action against a director of the company. In case the supervisors fails to institute an action within 30 days after having received the request, then the shareholders shall file such request may institute the action for the company. However, the cases filed by shareholder are very rare in our courts. The thesis will analyze foreign legislation to resolve the deficiency of our system. After the Securities Investors and Futures Traders Protection Act became effective on January 1, 2003, Securities and Futures Investors Protection Center filed many class actions on behalf of investors. The Code of Civil Procedure amended and promulgated on February 7, 2003. The amendment revised the party selection clause and added Article 44-1 to 44-4 which is related to class action. The above amendments provide class action for large numbers of people whose cases involve common questions of law and/or fact. This thesis analyzes the difference between the above amendments and examine whether the legislative goal will be achieved by those statues. The statutes about class action instituted by representative of shareholders、 Securities Investors and Futures Traders Protection Center or other people set up the mechanism responsibility enquiry of director. This thesis analyzes various theories, case law and legislative regulations of other countries and provides suggestions for amending our law in future.

過去在農業社會，訴訟往往發生在一對一的個人之中，但是近年來因科技進步、工商業發達，隨之而來的各種公害現象及大量生產銷售方法而產生之消費、產品問題，一旦發生紛爭，即可能有成千上萬的受害人，以往一對一之消費模式所產生之消費爭議，已漸漸為集團性之紛爭所取代。同一原因事實，可能只是對一個人造成損害；也可能對多數人產生侵害。而一對一之消費爭議，雖然可以循傳統之民事爭訟程序來解決紛爭，但若屬集團性之爭議，以傳統之民事訴訟來解決紛爭，功能上即稍顯不足。 我國雖先後修正公布民事訴訟法第44條之1 至第44條之3，及消費者保護法、證券投資人及期貨交易人保護法等訴訟制度，以期解決小額多數人之糾紛類型，然制度良意雖佳，卻也面臨設計上不盡周全、欠缺誘發機制及使用率低之困境，相較於美國集團訴訟的案件量以及對社會、政策之影響力，顯然我國相關集體訴訟制度仍有改進之空間。有鑑於此，本文即以我國私法上所規定之集體訴訟型態為範團，以文獻分析之方法，蒐集國內有關集體訴訟之相關文獻，並參酌美國有關集體訴訟制度規定、發展之立法例，以瞭解我國集體訴訟之法理基礎；並從我國民事訴訟法之選定當事人制度、消保法之團體訴訟及投保法之團體訴訟等制度出發，探討多數人紛爭事件之解決所依循之訴訟法理何在，並從中瞭解多數紛爭當事人之權利救濟，如何在兼顧保障當事人訴訟權保障之前提下，能獲致紛爭解決一次性之要求。

隨著企業經營規模日趨複雜、專業化，股東因人數眾多、股東意見不一，在面臨公司所有與經營分離所產生的代理成本控制上，實有困難。一般小股東因持股過低，對於公司經營事務只能消極以待，若對公司經營成果不滿意，只能選擇華爾街準則(Wall Street Walk or Vote with Feet)，而賣掉股票，甚難對管理階層進行更進一步的影響。相較之下，機構投資人基於其人力及資源優勢，能深入參與公司治理、監督管理階層，進而提昇公司經營績效，增進股東投資價值，此即為機構投資人積極主義。 本篇論文探討機構投資人行使股東權以促進公司治理發展。首先討論機構投資人積極主義之兩大基礎支柱－其一，良好公司治理確能對公司績效表現有所助益，其二機構投資人促進公司治理乃其善盡受託義務之體現。 由於美國機構投資人主義高度成熟發展，而國內機構投資人積極主義仍屬起步階段，本篇論文即以比較研究法，探討美國機構投資人行使股東權如股東提案、委託書投票、直接與管理階層溝通、發布黑名單、團體訴訟與股東提名董事草案等，及分析說明我國公司治理相關條文與機構投資人行使表決權時所會遭逢之困境。 此外，本論文經由案例研究，深入蒐集資料並訪談兩個在促進公司治理領域夙負盛名的退休基金-美國威斯康辛州投資委員會與加拿大安大略省教師退休計畫，從而細膩地觀察美國及加拿大機構投資人積極主義之發展、瓶頸與挑戰。 最後，本論文提出促進機構投資人提出公司治理及表決權行使政策、鼓勵機構投資人於股東提案權與表決權等議案進行合作及建置對機構投資人餐與公司治理友善之法規環境等建議，期能對於我國機構投資人積極主義之發展有所助益。 / The increase in institutional funds has been extraordinarily rapid. Comparing with the minority shareholders, the institutional shareholders’ size and expertise can minimize the collective choice problem and agency costs. Their resources enable them to investigate and monitor management in corporate governance field. This is the “Institutional Shareholder Activism“. This article discusses the institutional shareholder’s enhancement of corporate governance. It explores from the two backbones of the Institutional Shareholder Activism: Firstly, the correlation between corporate governance and corporate performance, and secondly, fiduciary duties of the Institutional Shareholder. It makes two conclusions: Good corporate governance certainly helps protect shareholder interests, and contributes to superior long-term economic performance, and institutional shareholders can comply with fiduciary duties by enhancing corporate governance. Furthermore, due to America institutional shareholder activism is highly developed, while Taiwan institutional shareholder activism is not developed. This paper compares America institutional shareholder activism with Taiwan’s. It discusses America institutional shareholder activism in many aspects, such as shareholder proposal, proxy solicitation, vote, direct negotiation with the corporate management, focus list, class action, security holder director nominations bill etc. Then, it analyses some of Taiwan’s corporate governance related articles such as shareholder proposal and security holder director nominations, and some difficulties which the pension fund and the security investment trust fund face when they vote as shareholders. Moreover, through case study, this paper analyses two prestigious pension funds: State of Wisconsin Investment Board (SWIB) and The Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (OTPP), and investigates their stages of development and current operation and future challenges in the corporate governance field. At last, this paper provides some suggestions and inspirits the institutional shareholder activism in our country.