自一九九九年投入大型TFT LCD之生產以來，台灣的TFT LCD產業急速成長為全球僅次於南韓的重要生產地。隨著產業聚落的形成，更引發零組件市場就地取材的驅勢。台灣控制IC廠商挾其研發經驗與半導體產業在產能上的支援下，甫一投入控制市場便造成主要大廠Genesis的嚴重威脅。為迫使台灣廠商安於已無利潤可言之低階產品市場，Genesis針對台灣之晶磊、晶捷、創品以及晨星等四家廠商提起一連串的專利訴訟行動，除於聯邦地院提出民事之侵權告訴，復於美國國際貿易委員會連續提出兩件侵權控訴。 臺灣被告廠商因連續訴訟而疲於奔命，除在業務上因此侵權疑慮而大幅滑落之外，亦有因支付龐大之律師費用而延誤研發投入時程，使其領先地位互易者。究其涉訟之主要原因有二，其一為對專利法制之認識不足，就專利屬地性之限制以及侵權救濟程序之發動要件之認識有所欠缺；其二則為專利部署情形欠佳，不論在數量以及所屬國上均不足以保障其研發成果於他國實施之正當性。 因在TFT LCD產業的下游產品中，美國仍為最重要的市場地，為使業者能避免再蹈覆轍，本文除就控制產業之競爭環境做基本說明外，即以美國之專利法制為主要介紹目標。內容包括專利之申請、維護以及救濟程序之因應策略。希望能有助於相關業者於專利規畫以及侵權爭議因應方式上之考量。

美國作為醫藥技術的領導者，為了確保其利益，並維持其領導地位，不斷在各種貿易談判場合，向世界各國施加壓力，要求提供醫藥品更強力的智慧財產保護。台灣當然也不例外，在加入跨太平洋戰略經濟夥伴關係協議 (Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, TPP)、簽訂臺美貿易暨投資架構協定 (Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, TIFA) 的壓力下，我國政府從2014年開始積極推動專利連結，雖然獲得美國商會肯定，但卻在國內業界卻引起十分強力的反彈。 專利連結，本質上只是核准前專利爭端解決程序 (Pre-Approval Patent Resolution Process) 的其中一個類型而已。核准前專利爭端解決程序，就是在特定產品上市核准的准駁中，把專利侵權問題作為准駁的考量。國際上類似的制度主要出現在人用藥品、動物藥品中，通常是在允許引據他人安全性、有效性資料的藥品中 (類新藥、學名藥)。 我國目前對類似制度的了解並不深，尤其缺乏對制度原生國－美國的全面性研究。本研究選擇以發展最早的藥品專利連結作為研究標的，並全面、深入分析其中每個機制的目的、立法/修法歷史 (含行政法規)、法院判決，探求其爭議的發展過程。在這個基礎上，本研究就引進的必要性、各種立法手段的選擇與優劣，提出「修正版柔性專利連結」，主要特徵在排除了自動停止核准期、重定核准日條款，使藥品審查和專利爭端大致維持獨立，並符合TPP的要求。希望本研究能夠幫助台灣建立一套明確、合理，且符合我國國情的核准前專利爭端解決程序。 / As the phamaceutical industry’s market leader, the United States continues to call for strengthening patent protection for pharmaceutical products during every trade negotiation, to preserve its national profit and leadership. Taiwan, being highly interested in joining “Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement” (TPP) and signing “Trade and Investment Framework Agreement” (TIFA) with the United States, Taiwan's government is actively promoting the “patent linkage” since 2014. Althougn the effort done by Taiwan's government is extremely welcomed by American Chamber of Commerce, the domestic industry, which is mainly organized with generic drug manufactors, has expressed their opposition resolutely. Patent linkage, as a kind of “pre-approval patent resolution process”, considers the possibility of patent infringement as a factor when issuing market approval. Such process are normally found in those countries that are trade partners of the United States, and espetially during the approval prosses of human-use drug products, animal drug products, which permits persons to rely on evidence or information concerning the safety and efficacy of a product that was previously approved. Our current knowledge of pre-approval patent resolution process is limited, especially on how it was oranginally created in the United States. This research will focus on the purpose, enactment, amendment, court decisions, development, and issues of patent linkage, the first-of-its-kind which is established in 1984. On this basis, the reseach will then look back to what Taiwan has faced now, and provides recommendations on whether there is necessity of introdution, how to adjust the prosses, and how to enforce it, without serious abuse. This research propose “revised soft patent linkage”, which excludes automatic stay and re-date remedy, generally keeps the independence between drug approval and patent infringement, and at the same time meets TPP requirement. The research hopes to help Taiwan establishing its own pre-approval patent resolution, fair, clear and meet the need of domestic and public the industry.

本論文研究主題係針對生物技術專利的要件的探討外，更探討跨學科領域的結合所形成的專利制度，如何透過實務的見解來具體化專利的要件，本文希望嘗試透過探討法律層面的專利取得要件及專利審查基準的認定外，更進一步希望透過法院實務的見解，來具體化專利要件之內涵，架構其中一段完整生物技術專利要件之評估，除作為本論文探討的具體內容。

隨著台灣產業投入於技術的研發資源增加，近幾年台灣於美國專利商標局（USPTO）獲得之專利數也呈正比例上升；然而投入研發資源之「量」的增加以及獲得的專利數上升，並不代表研發成果「質」的等比例提升。這一點可從台灣企業及政府研發單位所獲得的專利，其國際專利引證率遠低於平均值，可見一般。 究其原因，一部分的問題在於台灣的企業（及政府研發單位）於最開始各相關資訊的搜集上不夠完全以及沒有一套良好的開發評估程序供其依循，這使得研發方向及標的的確立上有所偏差，而導致研發結果與商業需求有落差。 基於上述背景及動機之下，本研究的重點在於確立一套資訊收集及分析評估流程，以幫助台灣的企業（及政府研發單位）有效降低研發成本、提升研發方向的正確性，更進一步做為其決定研發策略的參考依據。 本研究之目的，即在於以產業分析、技術分析、專利地圖分析三個具邏輯順序性的外部分析為主軸，並結合組織本身核心技術、網絡關係等與組織相關之分析，來對組織的未來研發標的作一評估及策略建議。 本研究最後得到了以下的發現： 1. 市場□技術□專利之研發評估程序具有分析邏輯性。 2. 「市場需求研究」所找到的產品「需求功效」，可推導出達成功效可能的技術，並可藉此確立出專利分析時需要的「技術項目」。 3. 「市場需求」研究所找到的產品「需求功效」，可推導出達成「功效」所需要的「技術項目」，再以此去進行專利地圖的「技術/功效」二維關聯矩陣分析時，技術軸面項目與功效軸面項目兩者因具有因果性，故其相交關聯性極易判斷，也很容易明確定義出哪一個技術/功效相交關聯洞是有意義的、是可實際進行研發的。 4. 以產業市場□技術□專利三程序所完成的的「技術/功效」二維關聯矩陣圖，雖可容易的定義出哪一個技術/功效相交關聯洞是有意義的、是可實際進行研發的，但「哪一個可實際進行研發的技術/功效相交關聯洞具有較高關鍵性、重要性及有較高開發價值？」仍需藉由對技術及產業價值鍊熟悉的專家意見才可做出判斷。 5. 此方式組成的技術/功效二維關聯矩陣不但可看到目前已知的技術/功效相關聯部份（如本研究中的主要關鍵技術與主要關鍵功效相交處）專利佈局狀況，也可看出在未來的技術/功效相聯部份（如本研究中的主要輔助關鍵技術與輔助關鍵功效相交處）專利可能發展方向。 6. 產業市場分析、技術分析、專利地圖分析等三個組織外部分析須再配合組織原有的核心技術與網絡關係的評估，才可正確制定出組織未來研發的路徑及作為。 / Along with the enterprise and government investment increasing to the technical research ＆ development（R＆D） resources, Taiwan obtains the US patent number also to present the proportional rise in recent years; however, the investment of research ＆ development resources and the granted patent number are not proportional to the quality of research ＆ development achievement. This can be proved by the lower patent citation rate of Taiwan enterprises and the government research ＆ development institutes than the international mean value. Investigates its reasons, part of questions is that most of the enterprises (and government research ＆ development institutes) do not collect enough market information and do not have a set of good research ＆ development assessment procedure while the beginning of R＆D project in Taiwan. This causes that the research and development direction and target has a deviation, and causes that the research and development result and the commercial demand have the dropping variance. Based on the above background and the motive, this research key point lies in establish a flow of information collections and the analysis appraisal. It also helps Taiwan’s enterprises and government’s R＆D institutes effectively reduce the research and development cost, and promote research and development direction accuracy, further help for making the decision of research and development strategies. The goal of this research, namely lies in take the industrial analysis, the technical forecast, the patent map study three logic order exterior analysis as a main axle, and combine itself core technology and the network relations of organization to suggest organization's future target of research ＆ development. By this research, we discover 1. The R＆D appraisals procedure of market-technology-patent has analysis logic. 2. The marketing research finds the demands of consumers, and the demands of consumers may infer to the functions of products, and the functions of products may infer to the possible technology sources. 3. The possible technology sources may form the technical items of patent analysis matrix, and the functions of products may form the functional items of patent analysis matrix. 4. The two-dimensional technical/functional patent matrix completed by the market-technology-patent three procedures can easily define which technical/functional intersectional connection hole can be affiliated; however, to judge which technical/functional intersectional connection hole is more important still needs the advice of experts familiar to the technology and the industrial value chain. 5. The three organization exterior analyses of market analysis, technical analysis and patent map study have to coordinate the organization original core technology and the network relations appraisal.

專利保險可分為「專利侵權責任保險」及「專利訴訟費用保險」。狹義之專利訴訟費用保險係指為專利權人、專屬被授權人、或經明確受託訴權之非專屬被授權人等規劃之保險。該些被保險人欲請求專利侵權損害賠償時，得向保險人請求給付律師費、訴訟費用或仲裁費用；惟有實務保單條款約定保險人得請求分配被保險人受領之損害賠償金，此約定是否能通過我國公序良俗條款之檢驗，不無疑義。至於專利侵權責任保險，係為潛在侵權人所規劃之保險。此類保險之承保範圍雖及於侵權損害賠償，但就我國保險法制而言，其實務保單條款仍有許多調整空間。其中最主要者，係被保險人所為確認專利無效等請求所生費用，於實務保單中受保險金額之限制；然其既具有損害避免或減輕之性質，於我國保險法，不僅保險人有償還責任，其償還數額與賠償金額合計即使超過保險金額，仍應償還。

本論文主要是在探討延展性權利金(reach-through royalty)條款的競爭法規制。首先，本文對於研究工具專利及延展性權利金條款的意義及概念作一說明，接著簡介目前各國之競爭法制與專利法制的權衡概況，並探討一些與延展性權利金條款有關之授權條款，以了解目前競爭法對於延展性權利金條款所可能導致之相關效應的評價，作為後續分析該條款適法性的基礎，再來整理美國實務及學說對於延展性權利金條款的看法，最後綜合檢討相關論述，提出本文見解。經研究後，本文認為，延展性權利金條款有其促進競爭效應(如提供風險分攤機制、幫助起始公司解決現金壓力問題以及提供授權雙方較佳的協商估價基礎)亦有其限制競爭效應(如降低被授權人研發誘因而有限制研發的效果及權利金堆疊效應)，因此一概禁止或一概允許此種條款皆非適當，而應視個案情形依合理原則的標準加以權衡，以決定系爭行為的適法性。 / The present article discusses the antitrust regulation for reach-through royalty provisions which mainly used in biotechnology research tool patent licensing. First, this article introduces the meanings of research tool patent and reach-through royalties. Second, it illustrates antitrust regulations for patent licensing in foreign countries specifically in U.S., European Union, together with R.O.C. and, furthermore, it also discusses provisions similar or related to reach-through royalties. Third, this article introduces the discussions about reach-through royalty provisions in U.S., including the NIH Guideline, case law regulations and other related discussions by scholars. Finally, the present article analyzes the effects of reach-through royalties more deeply based on the mentioned discussions and makes a suggestion for the regulation of reach-through royalties. This article argues: since reach-through royalties have both anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects, a total ban or allowance is not appropriate and a “rule of reason” inspection should be applied to such provisions for better efficiencies.

制定專利法的本意，不僅是給予發明人在一定期限內擁有一定限度的獨占權，以鼓勵發明人揭露新穎發明，亦在於提升科技發展、提高經濟成長，使社會大眾可從既有發明中再進行卓越科技研發，以節省社會研發成本。專利法賦予專利權人禁止任何未經授權之他人製造、使用、販賣、為販賣之要約，以及為上述目的進口該專利權技術之排他權利。但為達促進產業進步的目的，各國專利法並增列研究、實驗的免責條款(experimental use exception)來平衡專利權人及社會大眾的利益。研究實驗免責的前提必須對專利權人權益造成微量或是最低限度的干擾(de minimums)，即是希望對專利權人的權益造成最小傷害，同時又可以達到促進產業發展及鼓勵更多研發工作進行的目的。 我們將實驗免責條款分為二類，一種是純為好奇心，僅針對專利技術內容作實驗，研究如何改善該發明，此為狹義的實驗免責；第二種則是應用於醫藥產業，此類實驗並非改善發明內容，而是重覆實施其發明，再進行其他研究及實驗，可視為廣義的實驗免責，此即美國在1984年修正Hatch-Waxman法案之醫藥產業的實驗免責條款，只要是為提交FDA之相關實驗資料時，則可主張實驗免責，目的為使已享受二十年專利期之發明儘快成為公共財，以供大眾利用。 研究工具專利的實施方法即作為研究及實驗目的，醫藥產業上可以是生物材料，亦可以是篩選新藥方法。由於具有研究及實驗的特性，若在研究實驗免責條款下，非專利權人企圖以研究實驗免責方式來規避其侵權行為時，專利權人行使權利時，則可能遭遇不少困難。若研究工具專利又被主張為提交FDA相關資料之實驗免責時，此行為對於專利權人權益並非造成微量或是最低限度的損失，發明人未因該專利而獲益，又無法實施專利權，則會降低申請專利的意願。 專利權的效力，應給予專利權人較大權利使發明人願意揭露技術、促進社會科技進步，抑或是應給予較大實驗免責範圍，使研發機構不會受到專利權限制而阻礙社會科技發展的動力，此二種考量方向，如同位於天平的兩端，呈現兩難局面。目前法院實務案例則以執行研究工具專利會落入藥物開發之實驗免責規範為主要認定，但筆者認為應就實施研究工具專利的行為、內容、目的作一探討及了解，並顧及公平性，才是評估研究工具專利是否適用實驗免責條款之依據。 因此，專利權人應如何管理或應用其研究工具專利，並可真正執行專利權而不至落入實驗免責條款? 可由數個方向進行：一、產品形式保護研究工具專利：將研究工具的執行方式以產品形式包覆，以銷售產品的方式跳脫實驗免責之框架，未必需要經由專利授權的方式來取得利益；二、進行全球化佈局：於申請研究工具專利之前，分析其發明深度及可能競爭對手，並在可能進行製造、使用、行銷、及進口相關於此發明技術之國家申請專利，以未來如何執行及如何獲利作為考量全球佈局之策略；三、成立契約研發中心(contrast research organization，CRO)：當研究工具專利在執行專利權有困難，不易跳脫實驗免責範圍，則可使用營業秘密 (Trade Secret) 方式保護其發明，不以公開技術方式，而是應用研究工具成為新藥篩選中心，提供研發服務；四、授權國家單位：即是採用類似NIH之OTT模式，將研究工具專利權直接授權給政府，由政府支出其授權金並可擴展至更多研發機構。 至於非專利權人，如一般之研發機構，應如何利用研究工具專利，且不落入專利侵權的疑慮? 除了取得專利授權外，亦可採用：一、從已授權國家單位取得技術：即如同NIH之OTT模式，由已取得研究工具專利授權之政府單位進行非專屬授權，該發明具較合理之授權金，並可被更多研發機構善加利用；二、落入實驗免責範疇：針對研究工具專利之實質發明內容進行改良及應用，再利用其方式以進行其新藥研發實驗，則可適用於實驗免責的規定；三、交互授權(Cross-license)：使用研究工具專利之研發機構與原本專利權人合作，經由交互授權方式成為合作伙伴，則可達到雙贏；四、成立開放社群，共同分享技術：如多數國家成立之GenBank，或BIOS (Biological Innovation for Open Society)社群之概念，收集對人類具有重大意義之研究工具，如基因序列等，以開放原始碼(Open source)之社群相互分享，使後續研發工作更加快速及順暢。 除了上述方法外，專利法可仿照著作權法，增定合理使用（fair use）之相關規定，亦即除了試驗例外、第三人繼續使用權、私人領域內之非營利性使用外，賦予第三人一般而全面性的專利權合理使用範圍，或以自願性參與集體授權機制（voluntary collective rights licensing）以支付合理權利金，促進社會公益。實驗免責條款可使得發明人願意持續公開其發明，同時使新穎發明公諸於世，兼顧社會公益，促使社會經濟及產業的進步，使國家社會整體因研發創新而真正獲益。 / The original purpose of the patent law not only offers the exclusivity to the inventors in a limited periods and in a limited rights in order to inspire the inventors to disclose more novel inventions, but also encourages the development of the technology and increases the growth rate of economics to the publics. The more new inventions the inventors provide, the more cost of R&D will be saved in whole society. The right of the exclusivity for the patentee is when someone without authority from the patentee, he can’t makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented inventions, within the countries, or imports into the countries. But in order to enliven the industrial growth, the experimental use is added as a legal exception in many countries to balance the benefits of the patentee and the public interests. We should minimize interference to the patentee’ rights when the experimental use exception of the patents is claimed. We can divide the experimental use exception into two classes. One is the narrowly-defined experimental use exception only for the curiosity, for testing the content of the patents. The use aims to find out how to improve the inventions. The broadly-defined experimental use exception that is applied in the medical industry. This kind of use does not improve the technology of the invention, but repeat the invention again without changing any content. Such kind of broadly-defined experimental use exception is created after Hatch and Waxman Act in 1984. The experimental use exception in the medical industry is described that if the result of the experience is for submitting the drug information for the FDA examination, it is claimed non-infringement of the patent and protected by “safe harbor” of 35 USC 271 (e)(1). The purpose is to practice the inventions of the patents earlier and save the cost of R&D through public use. Research tool patent are used for the purpose of research and experiment and improves the speed of the experiment. In the medical industry, the research tool patent may be the biological material or the method of screening the new drug. Because of the experimental characteristics, the non-patentee may claim the experimental use exception and cause persecutions to the patentee. This kind of experimental use exception is not fair to the patentee and damage patentee’s benefit, especially in the research tool patentee. The patentee will not be able to receive the royalty from the non-patentee who claims the experimental use exception. As a result, it would reduce the will of filing such kind of patents. Should the effect of the patent right grant the patentee a broader right to patentees to encourage the inventors to release new technology which benefits the social and scientific progress? Or it should offer a large range of the experimental use exempt for the research institutes to encourage the using in the experimental use exception? It is difficult to judge which direction is better than the other one. The court are taking the side of the range of experimental use exception, allowing the research tool patents in the pre-clinical tests or experiment for submitting to FDA. This thesis proposes that there should be more criteria other than FDA, such as the purpose and the practical condition of use. Only when the whole situation and justice are taken into consideration will there be a suitable explanation of the experimental use exception. This thesis offers some suggestions concerning the management and application of research patent tools for the patentee and the non-patentee. It also assert that regulations about the fair use, such as experimental use exception, non-profit private use, voluntary collective rights licensing with rational royalty, can be added to the patent law to urge the patents to be put into practice. The reasonable experimental use exception can encourage the inventors to release his invention and the R&D departments to improve the technology more aggressively, realizing social and industrial advancement through the patent applications.

在知識經濟時代，智慧財產權在企業發展與競爭力提升上具有相當影響力，其重要性已不言可喻。近年來越來越多的關注焦點落在技術標準的發展上，蓋技術標準是技術成果的規範化、規則化，對企業而言，唯有引領標準，掌握制定規則的權力，才能形成真正的競爭優勢，否則就可能永遠受制於人。而對產業整體而言，技術標準對經濟及科技之發展有相當貢獻，蓋一旦標準形成，產品與零組件間相容性問題就可被解決，製造商之生產成本也可降低。一般認為技術標準的形成是大勢所趨且有利多於弊的效果，然在技術標準的制定與後續相關專利的實施過程，卻可能衍生出許多與反托拉斯法相關之爭議。美國司法部與聯邦交易委員會曾在1995年共同發表「智慧財產授權之反托拉斯準則」，表達對智慧財產權授權行為可能引發競爭法問題之看法，在相隔十二年後，於2007年4月間，又共同發表了「反托拉斯法執行與智慧財產權報告」，當中對技術標準與專利聯盟所牽涉的競爭法議題做了深入探討。 技術標準制定過程中引貣競爭法上疑義的行為態樣有專利劫持及抵制技術標準制定之情形。美國聯邦交易委員會已於2006年8月Rambus一案中，確立專利劫持行為違反聯邦交易委員會法第五條與休曼法第二條規定，聯邦上訴巡迴法院也於2007年6月Qualcomm v. Broadcom一案中，表示專利權人違反FRAND授權原則將形同從事專利劫持之效果，構成休曼法第二條規定之違反。至於抵制技術標準制定情形，法院已於2006年2月在Golden Bridge Technology v. Nokia一案中表示確有違反休曼法第一條規定之見解。 目前各技術標準組織紛紛藉由:1.制定揭露政策，亦即要求成員揭露與欲採定為標準之技術相關之專利權，或2.訂定FRAND政策，要求成員同意未來將在符合公平、合理且無歧視原則下進行授權等方式，以避免專利劫持情形發生。惟由 於技術標準組織除在了解相關技術是否存在專利權之外，需進一步知悉未來專利授權條件，以做為是否將特定專利技術採為技術標準之參考，再加上FRAND字義上不易做成精確解釋，易生文義操弄之空間，仍無法解決專利劫持之問題，因此近期部分技術標準組織漸發展出事先授權條件揭露之政策，例如VITA及IEEE組織，要求欲參與技術標準制定之成員，必須事先揭露將來擬授權金額之上限或授權條件的最嚴苛限度。此外也有論者提出事先多方進行授權條件協商之可行性。 關於事先單方揭露授權條件政策之適法性，美國反托拉斯主管機關已表明不予質疑之立場，並肯定事先單方揭露授權條件有促進技術標準制定效率之優點。至於在事先多方協商授權條件政策方面，反托拉斯主管機關雖強調其對於技術標準組織是否應進行事先協商授權條件並未設立立場，但基本上仍肯定事先授權條件協商具減少專利劫持並達到促進競爭效果之優點，故傾向適用合理原則作為判斷是否違反反托拉斯法規定的依據。惟若專利權人以事先協商授權條件作為掩護，實際上共同約定以標準技術製造生產之下游產品的銷售價格(naked price fixing)，此時仍難逃被認定構成當然違法行為。 在藉由專利聯盟實施技術標準之過程，亦可能有構成競爭法上聯合行為與獨占行為之情形發生。相關引發違法疑慮之行為態樣包括:專利聯盟中包含替代性專利、競爭性敏感資訊之流通、排除他人加入專利聯盟、專屬授權、回饋授權、權利金約定、拒絕部分授權等。惟應注意的是，美國法院及反托拉斯主管機關認為，有鑑於專利聯盟具促進授權活動進行效率之特性，有助於技術提升及產業發展，因此傾向以合理原則判斷專利聯盟限制條款約定之合法性，而不當然認為此等行為態樣違反反托拉斯法相關規定。 在台灣喧騰一時的飛利浦光碟案主要亦是涉及技術標準實施過程產生是否違反公平交易法之疑義，九十六年四月間最高行政法院作出最終判決，纏訟已久的紛爭於是落幕。對於本案衍生問題思考，首先，本文認為公平會或許應審慎思考是否進一步制定有關技術標準與專利聯盟之特別處理準則。公平會似可參酌美國等先進國家之例，詳細規範技術標準的制定與發展，及專利聯盟的形成、對參與者的限制、關鍵性專利的決定、授權管理、授權條件的審查等各項問題。其次，在技術市場的界定與聯合行為的認定上，應回歸專利技術內容與專利技術間的關係加以分析；存在互補關係之技術，彼此間沒有制衡或牽制力量，不應被劃定在同一技術市場，也就不會成立聯合行為。而在獨占地位的認定上，應認為只要擁有製造某一產品之部分關鍵性專利技術，足以專利法所賦予之權利牽制他人對該產品之製造、銷售等行為，而該產品在相關產品市場可被認為具獨占地位，即應可認定專利技術擁有者之獨占地位成立。最後，在獨占地位濫用之救濟措施方面，公平會應依公平法第41條規定，妥善運用法律所賦予之裁量權限，縝密思索對於該當具體事案最為合理、適當的救濟措施，給予當事人最直接有效的救濟，而非僅消極地命令其不得繼續從事違法行為或處以罰鍰，對於事態之解決，並無法有效發揮回復市場競爭應有狀態之公平法規範目的。美國聯邦交易委員會於Rambus案及其他相關案例中極富創意地提出消極、積極的更正措施交錯運用模式，當可作為我國公平會未來對類似案件處理之參考。 為了成功地制定技術標準以引領產業發展，本文認為，有志於參與技術標準活動業者，在這個主要由歐美大廠主導技術標準制定的產業環境中，應注意歐美等國法規範內容與法院、相關主管機關之實務見解，才能知悉特定行為之法律風險以避免誤觸法網，並適當主張自己的權利。其次，可善用技術標準組織政策訂定方式解決專利劫持問題。再者，在技術標準制定之高度角力競爭下，必須培育跨領域人才參與技術授權談判才能增加脫穎而出之機會。而若欲藉由成立專利聯盟方式進行專利交互授權或對外授權，專利聯盟的組成與授權進行至少應符合本 文第七章所歸納的幾個基本要件，始不易產生違反競爭法之疑慮。至於在被控專利侵權業者方面，在面對專利侵權訴訟而進行訴訟攻防時，可朝專利權人參與技術標準或專利聯盟活動的行為是否違反反托拉斯法規定之方向加以思考，以冀增加勝訴之機會。 / In this era of knowledge-economy, intellectual property plays an important role in business developments. The significance of standard setting is thus much emphasized in recent years. It is generally recognized that standard setting brings many benefits to industries, such as costdown of manufacturing process and improvement of product compatibility, and patent pools can help to decrease transaction costs of licensing negotiations and to mitigate royalty stacking problems. However, disputes regarding the violation of antitrust law can be caused in the process of setting standards and the formation and the operation of patent pools. The U.S. DOJ and the U.S. FTC has discussed about antitrust issues related to standard setting and patent pools in “Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property” in April 1995 and “Antitrust Enforcement And Intellectual Property Right：Promoting Innovation and Competition” in April 2007. Patent holdup and group boycott are controversial in standard setting. In August 2006, the U.S. FTC ruled in In re Rambus that patent holdup would violate section 2 of the Sherman Act and section 5 of the FTC Act. In June 2007, the Federal Circuit also ruled in Qualcomm v. Broadcom that patent owner who has broken one’s previous commitment on FRAND licensing would violate section 2 of the Sherman Act. As to group boycott, the court opinioned in Golden Bridge Technology v. Nokia that group boycott in the process of setting standard could be per se illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Many standard setting organizations (SSOs) have tried to avoid patent holdup by making patent disclosure and FRAND licensing policies. Recently some SSOs have implemented policies of ex ante unilateral announcement of licensing terms by patent holders or ex ante multilateral licensing negotiation between patent holders and SSO members to deal with patent holdup problems. These ex ante approaches facilitate competition between patent holders on licensing terms and allow SSOs to gain more information on patents. In light of the competitive effects these ex ante approaches generate, FTC and DOJ declared that they will review related policies and conduct under the rule of reason. But any efforts to reduce competition by using ex ante disclosure or negotiation process as a cover to fix downstream prices of products would be reviewed a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The standard patent licensing by patent pools could also give rise to cautions of violating antitrust law. Certain behavior in patent pools can be deemed controversial, such as including substitute patents, exchanges of competitively sensitive information, exclusive membership, exclusive license, grantback license, package license, and so on. The DOJ and the FTC expressed that they will examine similar behavior in patent pools under the rule of reason, since patent pools provide a more efficient way for patent licensing, which help to improve technology qualities and industry developments. The case, Philips v. Fair Trade Commission, R.O.C., also involved some disputes of violating Fair Trade Act. From the case, the thesis claims that first, there is a need for FTC to enact a guideline regarding standard setting and patent pools for the industries to follow. Second, while defining technology markets and concerted actions, one should analyze the relationship between patents. Complementary patents belong to different technology markets, so it would be impossible for complementary patent owners to collude with each other. Third, to identify monopolization, the thesis asserts that the patent owner of technology essential for certain product will acquire monopoly positions in certain product market, and thus will be deemed as monopolists in the related technology market. Last but not the least, the thesis proposes that the FTC should not only passively prohibit the abuse of monopoly position and issue punishments, but also come up with some proper solutions, such as compulsory license, to actively maintain fair competition in the market. Some measures delineated by the U.S. FTC in In re Rambus can be referred for future cases in Taiwan. To successfully participate in standard setting and patent pool activities, the thesis proposes certain suggestions. First, because most SSOs are led by U.S. and European enterprises and most SSOs are subject to U.S. and European legal jurisdiction, it is important to follow up to U.S. and European law and legal developments to avoid legal risks. Second, properly structuring SSO patent policies might enable SSOs to mitigate patent holdup problems. Third, the cultivation of inter-disciplinary professionals of technology, law, finance, and business management can be significant for industries in the standard setting competition. The thesis as well indicates several principles that might help to avoid the risks of violation of antitrust law during the formation and operation of patent pools. On the other hand, those who are accused of patent infringement might gain a better chance to win the lawsuit, if the violations of antitrust of patent owners in standard setting and patent pools are taken into consideration.

本研究範疇是整體太陽電池產業，由於此產業鏈結性強，故從最上游原物料到最下游的系統安裝及應用產品均包含於本研究中，但主要是以產業中的關鍵製造元件「太陽能電池」為主。太陽電池產業的興盛，可以從近幾年來看出端倪，期望能從台灣目前正在起步的太陽能電池的智慧財產相關專利佈局與措施作一些研究與建言外，也希望能將一套未來新興產業（再生能源產業或永續發展產業）智財專利分析與佈局的方法論，實際驗證及修正其可行性。藉由此次從智慧財產角度的研究，了解今天以及未來太陽能發電的機會與趨勢。 首先對太陽電池的上、中、下游做一個較完整的現況與產業分析，以及太陽電池現在與未來的應用面，再針對太陽電池目前全世界的技術趨勢做介紹，由於大部分專利技術關鍵是太陽電池的製程，因此，所有專利技術拆解的方向，都在於此。 針對太陽電池材料本身，區分現世代與次世代太陽電池技術，如矽晶圓、非晶矽（a-Si）、微晶矽(μc-Si)、碲化鎘(CdTe)、CIS/CIGS(銅銦硒化物)、DSCC等，再將目前矽晶圓與薄膜類生產的較新技術研究與發表作歸類，找出可以代表的關鍵字，將這些關鍵字作文字分解，放置於專利索引的Title、Abstract、Claims上，再依已核發的專利的時間、Assignee的國家、專利編號、Assignee的名字等，作出一套分析的表格，方便我們對太陽光電的專利分析與技術拆解作一個整體性的解說，也希望能替台灣目前研發作一些建言。 從現世代太陽電池的各國專利的分析與比較，可以看出全世界目前在USPTO所申請通過分析的情形，也可以看出日本與德國在單晶矽及多晶矽中專利佈局的方式，而在各公司的專利分析，對於全球第一產量SHARP的佈局，及其他前五名公司的佈局情形，再對照到我國現在的所有廠商，例如茂迪或益通，幾乎在專利佈局為零，而都是利用所有製程的Know-How，以產品的效率、成本來打天下，這在大陸也是如此。 次世代太陽電池的分析裏，可以看出美國各家研究機構與廠商進軍市場的決心，矽薄膜太陽電池目前的專利佈局雖然已經被大致分配了幾種分類，但是在薄膜製程的前面材料研發部份，以及化合物及有機染料薄膜太陽電池部分，真的是百家爭鳴。但由於商業化還有一大段距離，國內的廠商或研發單位應該可以再投入這方面的人力物力，或是與美日廠商在研發段的策略聯盟，才不會淪落到只能和大陸拼成本及製程優勢而已。 設計專利的重視，大約需要更多的太陽電池產品應用後才會見到，但是，在那之前，應該要有相關的設計專利佈局，針對要面對大量需求的市場，例如美國及歐洲，才能在許多商業談判或是技術發展上有一席地位。 以未來20年的角度來看，太陽電池產業每年兩位數的成長，遲早都有訴訟的可能性發生，並非一昧地改良轉換效率或代工就能相安無事，本論文就太陽電池專利部署、技術分解及相關於新式樣專利(Design Patent)等來做研究探討，並且以美國專利局的專利申請為研究範疇。 本論文研究不包含各國政策、各公司財務等對專利或是技術的影響，主要是以目前矽晶圓太陽電池製造的較新技術，與薄膜太陽電池的研發走向，來作為技術拆解的參考，輔以相關全球PV的資訊來對照比較，論文內引用的數據資訊，也盡量與許多報導輔以對照，以IT IS、PV NEWS、PHOTON INTERNATIONAL等較為公信力的雜誌期刊提供的最新研究資訊為主。 關鍵字：太陽電池產業、太陽電池、專利技術拆解、專利佈局、矽晶圓、矽薄膜太陽電池

為了專利法制現代化，美國、中國大陸與台灣均進行專利修法，並修訂損害賠償計算。本文試圖以三者修法目的為思考評析損害賠償計算之修訂，並類型化分析三者相關規範。本文探討美國司法實務所發展的分攤法則及整體市場價值法則，而在建立更有效率之專利制度的目標下，美國專利法第284條並不適合納入上述法則。本文歸納美國專利懲罰性損害賠償制度之三種認定故意的標準。第一，傳統的故意侵害論，Underwater Devices案「充分注意之確切義務」之標準為故意侵害設立了一個較低的門檻，比較類似過失。第二，Seagate案的故意侵害論，為客觀的輕率。第三，專利改革的故意侵害論，三種故意樣態下之客觀的輕率；但可能因此限制法官的裁量權。中國大陸在提高自主創新能力與建設創新型國家之知識產權戰略目標下，第三次專利法修正將於2009年施行。新專利法第65條將現行最高人民法院司法解釋規定的定額賠償提高到專利法層次，且提高法定額度。從訴訟成本考量，由法院定額不失為較經濟的方法；然而，此方法亦有可能會有因非根據證據而落入主觀判斷賠償數額的缺點。新專利法第65條並明訂賠償數額還應當包括權利人為制止侵權行為所支付的合理開支，惟其計量方法仍不明確。雖然新專利法沒有納入懲罰性損害賠償，於提高法定賠償額度與加重其他相關民事與行政責任之配套修改下，新專利法有提高侵權人金錢負擔的效果，應有較大的嚇阻功能，進而鼓勵創新。台灣在因應國內科技政策與國際規範發展，及配合智慧財產法院設立的背景下，提出專利法修正草案，其中建議現行專利法第85條新增「以相當於實施該發明專利所得收取之權利金數額為其損害」規定。然而，針對權利金的合理性及是否以合理權利金作為補償底限，修正草案並沒有明確規定。此外，修正草案建議刪除懲罰性損害賠償，以回歸我國民事損害賠償制度。台灣專利侵害民事訴訟的成本與賠償金額並不高，也沒有敗訴方負擔對方律師費用的規定，在專利侵害全面除罪化之後，懲罰性損害賠償對侵害人可能形成一種「實質上額外的風險」，而非「僅是一種商業上的成本」，因而有其一定的功能意義。以專利法促進產業發展的目的考量，若沒有相關配套措施，實可考慮繼續保留現行懲罰性損害賠償制度。 / For modernization of patent laws, the United States, China and Taiwan are undergoing patent reform, each amending its damages provision. This thesis categorized forms of damages calculation in three countries, and tried to analyze its amendment from the perspective of patent reform in each country. This thesis analyzed the possible impact of specifying the apportionment rule and entire market value rule in Section 284, 35 United State Code. In addition, three standards of willful infringement with enhanced damages were concluded. First, the traditional willfulness doctrine in Underwater Devices case is the affirmative duty of due care which sets a lower threshold of willing infringement that is more akin to negligence. Second, willfulness in Seagate case requires at least an objective recklessness. Third, willfulness in Patent Reform Act of 2009 requires an objective recklessness in three different conditions; such proposal may restrict the discretion of the court. With national intellectual property strategy to improve the domestic capacity of innovation and to build an innovative country, the third amendment to Patent Act of the People's Republic of China becomes in effect in 2009. Article 65 in the new Chinese Patent Act codifies the statutory damages in the range of RMB 10,000 to 1,000,000, compared to the current range of RMB 5,000 to 500,000 provided by the Supreme People’s Court judicial interpretation. In the perspective of litigation costs, statutory damages award may be a more economic approach but subjective judgment could have implication caused by lack of factual evidence for damages calculation. Article 65 also codifies that the amount of compensation shall include reasonable cost for ceasing patent infringement by the right holder, however, how to measure the reasonable cost is not clear. Although the new Chinese Patent Act does not include punitive damages, the maximum statutory damages, other related civil liability and administrative penalty are increased. Such amendments may increase the pecuniary burden of the infringer and expect to lead to more deterrent effect on patent infringement and encourage innovation. In the context of international regulation change, national technology policy change and establishment of professional Intellectual Property Court, comprehensive review of Taiwanese Patent Act is ongoing. The proposed bill adds “equivalent amount of royalty for implementing the patent invention as damages” into Article 85 of current Taiwanese Patent Act. However, it is not clearly codified that a reasonable royalty must be justified and such royalty calculation is to set a floor for damages award. The proposed bill abandons punitive damages for willful infringement. In such proposal, the result of willful infringement may not be a substantial additional risk but only a cost of doing business, because the litigation cost and damages award are not so high, and there is no attorney fee award or criminal penalty in Taiwanese patent regulation system. Hence, reconsideration of retaining punitive damages is suggested.