第一章 導論本章主要說明研究動機、目的、範圍、假設、限制、架構等等。 第二章 設備更新之分析本章旨在介紹資產的效能種類；設備更新的意義、理由、延 遲更新的原因以及適時更新之利益。 第三章 設備更新理論本章主要分析早期的更新理論；經濟的更新政策；Terborgh的 更新理論；最佳更新政策與動態規劃；更新政策、生產係數與單位最小成本；更新政 策、產出政策與利潤最大化。 第四章 技術進步率之探討本章主要探討技術進步、新生產方法與科學進步之關係， 從產品的設計與生產面分析技術進步；決定技術進步率之因素；生產力與技術進步率 指標以及其評估等等。 第五章 資金限額分配與投資理論本章旨在分析資金限額分配；資金的需求與資金負 債表；長期資金限額分配與廠商理論；資金限額分配與最大利潤。 第六章 綜合理論之介紹。 第七章 實證研究。 第八章 結論。

本文的論述態度與研究範圍上，係以定期勞動契約為軸心，基於勞基法第九條乃是定期勞動契約的最根本的法源，所以本文擬從勞基法第九條定期契約的定義這個切入點著手，具備什麼樣的要素是屬於定期勞動契約，具備什麼樣的要素又是屬於不定期勞動契約，這個要素應該如何去作解釋；於定期勞動契約的定義之後，接著介紹目前定期勞動契約的類型，除了勞基法所規範的類型外，特別法上或實務上的類型亦在觀察之列。而區別定期勞動契約與不定期勞動契約的實益何在，法律關係之權利義務有何不同，本文也作一闡述，進而審視目前的實務操作的結果會是如何，到底合不合理，最後借鏡外國的立法例，為求配合現實的經濟環境，在立法論上或解釋論上來提出結論。 本論文摘要說明如下： 第一章為緒論，包括本論文之研究動機、研究目的及研究方法加以說明，藉以瞭解本論文題目的產生背景，並稍加說明各章節之內容。 第二章為我國勞動基準法上定期契約的定義，將從立法背景與理由切入，解析勞動基準法第九條，何謂「繼續性」，並舉出主管行政機關的判斷標準以及學說見解，來對定期契約的認定與種類作闡釋與論述。除此之外並對與定期勞動契約相關的議題：外籍勞工、國防役男、國會助理、公營移轉民營條例之定期人員、試用期等來作解析。 第三章為定期勞動契約的權利義務，從各個角度去剖析定期勞動契約雙方當事人的法律關係，包括法定更新、連續性定期契約、資遣、退休、年資累計等問題。 第四章為整理我國實務見解，在此章將對搜尋所得的有關定期契約判決作一分析整理，試圖勾勒出法院對於定期契約判斷標準的模式與界線。 第五章為介紹德國立法例，所謂他山之石，可以攻錯，德國關於定期勞動契約的制訂法演變共有三階段，而這其中的關鍵毋寧說是經濟因素的變遷，使得制訂法上因循變異，其日漸放寬定期勞動契約成立的限制，相較於我國，帶給我們何種啟示為探討，藉以提供我國法制比較之參考。 第六章為結論，本章將針對前面各章所得之結論，進行歸納與處理，總結本文所述，提出結論與建議。

都市的發展隨著時間而不斷地演變，都市內會不斷產生不能適應今日都市生活活動需求的地區，所以需要更新之地區會不斷的產生。從都市有限的土地資源來看，都市更新是要促進土地使用的合理化與使用強度的提高，所以都市更新是土地資源的一種再生型態。都市更新為現代台灣不動產開發之主流，為改善都市早期發展的舊城市，及促進都市的永續發展，都市更新將是未來都市發展政策的必然趨勢。然而，「都市更新不是目標，而是工具」。增進都市機能，改善生活環境，促進都市健全發展，才是都市更新的主要目的，惟應經由何種方式(工具)，方能順利達成上述目標，厥為都市更新所應關注之重點。而權利變換是實施都市更新的方式之一，本研究是從產權理論之產權結構的觀點出發來探討它在權利變換制度實務操作上的影響。 本論文主要在說明，從都市更新條例(以下簡稱本條例)第3條有關權利變換的定義來看，更新單元內之土地所有權人、合法建築物所有權人、他項權利人及實施者是一種「合夥」的關係，但依本條例第30、31條的規定，實施者則又成了代工者，然而在實務操作上實施者掌握了整個權利變換的控制權，在實施者追求利潤或利益極大化的前題下，實施者只好隱藏利潤於費用之中，以獲取剩餘利益。本研究以產權結構的理論為基礎，用已完成之案例來分析，以說明上述現象的存在事實，以為後續修法的參考。 本研究的論述重點，主要是在說明權利變換的生產要素經整合後組成了一個新的產權，而這個新產權是由參與權利變換的權利人所共有，而產權結構裡的控制權與剩餘收入權，是由實施者掌握了控制權，而土地所有權人則擁有剩餘收入權，在實施者與土地所有權人不能同時控制權與剩餘收入權的情形下，所產生的利益衝突現象，以致造成實施者與土地所有權人的利益目標或利益函數不一致，制度的設計應該是將資源分配的私下協議的障礙降至最低，換言之，應該要設計成實施者與土地所有權人的利益目標或利益函數一致，才會使實施者與土地所有權人為這個事業共同去努力，這樣才有助於都市更新事業的推動。 本研究透過理論與實證只是證明目前權利變換存在的不合理現象，至於權利變換的性質或定性應該是屬何種，例如：合夥、代理(承攬)或互易，則非本研究的範圍，有待後續的先進繼續探討。 / The development of urban is proceeding with the time, there are areas that can not accommodate the needs of urban life activities nowadays in the urban, thus those areas need to renew are continually generated. We could see from the view that land resource in the urban are limited, urban renewal help forward rationalize land use and raise the use intensity, thus urban renewal is one kind of revive types of land resource. Urban renewal is the mainstream in the development of modern Taiwan real estate; in order to improve the old town in the early urban development, and promote the sustainable urban development, urban renewal will be the consequential trend in the urban development policy in the future. However, “Urban renewal is not a goal, it is a tool.” The main goals of urban renewal shall be building up urban function, improving living environment and advancing well-balanced urban development. The emphasis of urban renewal shall be in which way (tool) to achieve the above goals. Right transformation is one kind of ways to improve urban renewal, in this study we use the view from the structure of property rights in Property Theory to discuss its effects in the Right transformation system manipulation. This essay is mean to explain that form the Urban Renewal Act (The Act for short) clause 3 about right transformation definition, the land owner, legal building owner, other owner and implementer are kind of “partnership” relation in renewal unit, but according to the rules in The Act 30 and 32 clauses, implementer become OEM command the control right in the whole rights transformation in manipulation process, implementer pursuits benefit or in the premise of maximize profit, implementer has to hide the benefit behind the cost, to obtain the residual benefit. Property right structure theory is the basis of this study, analyzed by the finished case study to explain the above exist fact for the reference of amendment hereafter. The emphasis of this study is to explain there is a new property right generated after integrating the produce factors in rights transformation, and this new property right is co-owned by the oblige who participated the right transformation. As the control right and the residual income right in the right structure, the implementer command the control right and the land owner command the residual income right, when implementer and the land owner can not command the control right and the residual income right at the same time, the benefit conflict will make the different profit goal or the different profit function between the implementer and the land owner. The system should be designed to minimize the obstacle of private negotiated resource allocation. In other words, it should be designed as a same profit goal or function to make the implementer and the landowner to exert themselves for this career, thus make for the advance of the urban renewal career. Through the theory and real demonstration in this study is only to prove the existing unreasonable phenomena in rights transformation, as for the character or the qualitative of right transformation shall be, for example, partnership, agent（to take full charge of responsibility）or trade, is not in the study range, and need the fellow successor to discuss about .

我國早期發展之都市地區，隨時間經歷，無可避免地產生各種都市問題，因而有實施都市更新之必要。於現行法制下，除由政府主辦都市更新外，私人亦得自行實施都市更新，且一般認為政府應幫助私人進行都市更新，原因在於若無政府公權力介入，強迫相關權利人參與，將導致更新時程嚴重拖延，都市更新條例25條之1即明定得由實施者申請徵收少數不願參與都市更新者之土地或合法建築物。然而，政府公權力介入之程度與時機為何，亦應審慎考量。 由私人興辦都市更新事業，或許除了「私益」外，亦產生「公共利益」，惟此「公共利益」是否大至足以剝奪私人所有權之「私益」，則有待商榷。因而，政府有無權力為了辦理都市更新，以強制手段要求私人參與，甚至徵收不願參與更新者之財產，不無疑問。申言之，主要之問題在於都市更新是否具備足夠之公共利益，而具有剝奪私有財產之正當性；亦即運用徵收方式為辦理都市更新之私人實施者取得其無法以協議方式取得同意之土地，手段(徵收)是否適當，且目的(都市更新)有足以剝奪私人土地之正當性，有釐清及解決之必要。為探討此問題，本文由實施都市更新歷史悠久之美國加以取材，欲透過美國相關法制之研究，找出國內值得學習與借鏡之處。 本文第二章主要針對我國與美國關於都市更新及土地徵收法制之相關法制加以探討，並歸納我國與美國採徵收手段辦理都市更新時之相關規定。 研究發現我國與美國除更新、徵收程序之差異外，對於得以發動徵收之要件，我國係以「公共利益」稱之，美國則以「公共使用」加以規範，而判斷得否發動徵收之機構，於我國為內政部土地徵收審議委員會，美國則係由司法機關進行判斷。是故，第三章接著介紹美國採徵收手段之都市更新相關裁判概況與主要爭議問題點，並於第二至六節分別探討採徵收手段之都市更新相關判決之主要案例，最後於第七節將二至六節各判決案例中美國法院對於公共使用之判斷標準加以綜合分析。 第四章則對於我國以徵收方式實施都市更新之規範加以檢討，接著以第三章美國相關判決對公共利益之判斷基準為視點，探討我國之採徵收手段實施更新制度之適當性，以及得以徵收實施更新之情形為何。最後，第五章針對我國現行以徵收作為都市更新手段之規範提出改進方向，以提供都市更新條例及土地徵收條例修法之參考。

都市更新是未來台灣都市發展的重要方向。然由於政府人力、財力上的限制，故鼓勵私部門參與投資更新事業為近年來推動都市更新的重要手段。目前政府提供許多獎勵措施，以增加開發業者投資更新事業的意願，其中被學界及業界視為最有效的措施是建築容積獎勵，而政府提供獎勵措施的目的在於：增加開發業者投資更新事業利潤的同時，亦能促使其早日進行更新，以縮短更新時程。然目前相關研究中，並無研究直接就此政策是否能達其目的作一探討，故對建築容積獎勵是否能促使更新早日進行有所懷疑，因而欲加以探究，此為本研究之研究動機。 欲探討建築容積獎勵能否促使更新早日進行，須從開發業者何時進行更新案的角度出發，亦即探討不同容積獎勵值下開發業者的最適開發時機，而開發時機可藉由開發投資決策法則決定。目前由於當開發業者取得建築容積獎勵時，並無立即開發之規定，因此開發業者不需立即開發，而可等待至最佳開發時機再進行開發，而淨現值決策法則無法反應此種情形，故本論文將改採實質選擇權決策法則探討容積獎勵對開發時機的影響。 基於上述研究動機，本文之研究目的為(1)以實質選擇權的概念，探討開發業者的最適開發時機。(2)探討建築容積獎勵對於開發時機的影響，以瞭解現行都市更新政策是否得以提早更新窳陋地區。為針對上述研究目的進行探討，本論文將分別回顧私部門參與都市更新及實質選擇權的相關文獻，以瞭解私部們參與都市更新之成本、收益因子，以及如何應用實質選擇權的概念，求取最適開發時機，進而建構最適開發時機之模型，此外，蒐集更新個案與市場資料，進行個案模擬與敏感度分析，最後提出政策建議。 研究結果顯示：(1)更新案具選擇權價值。(2)當總收益與總成本的比值大於最佳開發時機的決策準則時，應立即進行開發。(3)建築容積獎勵的給予，將增加更新案的開發利潤，但對開發時機的影響不明顯。此外，影響最適開發時機的因素很多，本研究結果發現：(1)審議期間、資金成本及購地成本上升時，會提早進行更新案開發。(2)審議通過當期的銷售價格、房價預期成長、房價標準差增加時，會延遲開發更新案。(3)容積取得成本、建築成本預期成長、建築成本標準差對開發時機的影響不顯著。 基於本研究結果，本文提出政策性建議為(1)私部門在進行更新案的開發時，應考量選擇權價值，以獲取更大利潤。(2)如政府欲透過容積獎勵方式，促進早日更新，則應將建築容積獎勵隨等待時間增加而減少。(3)可考慮其他的獎勵措施以提供開發業者誘因，避免造成現行容積管制政策失靈。

「強制性財務預測」不但規範在何種情況下須發布財務預測，同時也規範在何種狀況下須作財務預測更新。不論第一次預測或更新均需經會計師核閱。因此，「強制性財務預測」比自願性揭露要審慎得多，但其資訊成本也高。盈餘預測的準確性為其是否有用的先決條件。一個高成本的規範，如其所產生資訊的準確性不高，則其必要性便存疑。本研究首先對此一問題加以探討。實證結果顯示， 「強制性財務預測」規範下的第一次盈餘預測和 「天真模型」(Naive Model)下的盈餘預測比較，其準確性較高。由此可推論「強制性財務預測規範」對盈餘預測資訊約有用性應有助益。 　　「財務預測更新」會增加資訊成本，而「財務預測更新與否」係依據「預測盈餘」與將來「公告盈餘」的差距來決定。「財務第一次預測準確性」影響「預測盈餘」，而「盈餘操縱」則影響「公告盈餘」。因此，「財務第一次預測準確性」、「盈餘操縱」均與 「財務預測更新與否」有關，而且「盈餘操縱」的需要性亦受「財務第一次預測準確性」的影響。本研究以單因子多變量變異數分析對此一問題加以實證。結果顯示，「財務預測未更新組」的「財務第一次預測準確性」較高，但其「盈餘操縱」情形亦較嚴重。 　　受規範公司的「盈餘操縱」會影響「預測更新」成本，因而其經濟實質。投資人投資這類股票，其投資報酬的影響因素為何？本研究以「行業別股價指數變動」代表總體面及行業面因素，以「當期盈餘」代表個別公司面因素，以「盈餘操縱」代表「財務預測成本」，並以迴歸分析探討各因素對股票投資報酬的影響。實證結果顯示，「行業別股價指數變動」、「當期盈餘」、「盈餘操縱」與「股票投資報酬」均呈正相關。 　　「盈餘操縱」除與「財務預測更新」的資訊成本有關外，尚可能影響其他契約成本。本研究懷疑「盈餘操縱」會因「財務預測曾否更新」而有不同的目的。本研究以虛擬變數迴歸分析為工具，探討「盈餘操縱」對股價變動的影響力是否會因「財務預測更新與否」而不同？實證結果顯示，「盈餘操縱」對股價變動的影響力並不因「財務預測更新與否」而不同。 　　此外，「使用一般公認會計原則的經驗」應有助於相對準確性的提升。本研究實證「盈餘第一次預測準確性」的同時，額外針對這個問題加以實證，結果顯示「非新上市年度樣本」的盈餘第一次預測準確性優於「新上市年度樣本」。此一結論應能給證管會若干鼓舞，只要持續推動「強制性財務預測規範」，「盈餘預測準確性」將因受規範公司經驗的累積而提升，預測資訊約有用性會因而加強。

都市更新權利變換運作過程中的土地權利人與實施者的關係，是現代經濟活動典型的專業分工委託代理關係。土地權利人與實施者基於都市更新法制下相關的權利義務契約，執行都市更新事業，由於訊息不對稱、目標不一致與風險偏好之差異，實施者基於機會主義的決策或行動，經常不利於土地權利人的利益，於是產生代理問題、增加代理成本，雙方無法產生高度互信的基礎，而成為都市更新延宕與成效不彰的主因。本論文從土地權利人與實施者之間，於都市更新條例機制下的互動契約中，探討分析雙方之委託代理關係，並從土地權利人的角度設計監督方式，以維護土地權利人的權益，促進都市更新事業之實施。 當土地權利人與實施者，共同於一都市更新單元，組成生產團隊時，土地權利人初期擁有較強的提議與同意之控制權，隨著實施者握有超過都市更新法定之同意書門檻後，實施者掌握較強的執行控制權，土地權利人擁有較弱的監督控制權。又現行都市更新權利變換的價值分配，是實施者投入共同負擔費用，並以更新完成後之土地與建築物部分折價抵付，其餘土地及建築物則分配與原土地所有權人，因此土地權利人得到大部分的剩餘索取權。這樣的控制權與剩餘索取權分離狀態下，其權利變換價值分配模式，是否為適當的產權安排？對於都市更新參與人能否有所激勵？能否促進都市更新之推動效率？是本論文主要的探討分析重點。 此外，同一更新單元之土地權利人與實施者，具有短期且為一次性合作的特性，依現行都市更新法律規範，交易雙方以簽訂同意書做為實施都市更新事業的關鍵契約，由於契約簽定後，交易雙方所投入的特殊投資比例不相同，因而普遍引起期初契約簽署的遲疑，甚而契約簽定後，仍有權利義務不明確之爭議。本論文透過不完全契約理論的思維，探討分析土地權利人與實施者的契約關係與特殊投資關係，並建議一個新的交易契約模式，以降低雙方之機會主義行為，進而希能促進都市更新事業之推動。 / In the process of rights transformation of urban renewal, the relationships between land owners and the implementers are the typical Principal-Agent Relationship in modern economic activities. Based on the related rights and obligations under the regulations of urban renewal, land owners and the implementers execute urban renewal business. Due to the differences of asymmetric information, inconsistent goals, and risk preference, the decision-making and/or actions of implementers based on the opportunism, will often unfavorable to the benefits of land owners. Therefore, the problem of Principal-Agent Relationship arises that increases agent cost. Both sides cannot generate the foundation of highly mutual trust, and thus creates the major reason of delaying and inefficiency for urban renewal. This paper studies and analyzes the Principal-Agent Relationship of both land owners and the implementers from both sides with their interaction of contract under unban renewal regulation mechanism, and further from the land owners perspective to design ways of monitoring to protect rights and benefits of land owners, to facilitate the implementation of urban renewal business. When the land owners and the implementers organize as a「Production Team」on a very urban renewal unit, the land owners initially hold stronger control rights on both proposing step and agreement step; along the implementers hold agreement letters exceeding the official threshold of urban renewal regulations, they will control better execution rights, and the landowners hold weaker surveillance control rights. The current value allocation of rights transformation for urban renewal employs common sharing of expenses with the implementers. After deducting the common sharing of the discounted price substitute payment of the land and buildings after the rights transformation, the remaining lands and buildings shall be allocated to the original landowners according to the rights value proportion before each piece of land rights was transformed. In so doing, the land owners obtain most of the residual claim. Under such separation of the control rights and the residual claim, whether the value allocation of the rights transformation is as suitable arrangement for property rights? Will it be the incentives to the urban renewal participants? Whether it will facilitate the efficiency of urban renewal promotion? These are the main points of the analysis of this paper. Land owners and the implementers with the same Renewal Unit retain a short-term and once-for-all cooperative nature. According to the regulations of current Urban Renewal Act, both parties of the transaction by signing an agreement as the key contract of implementing urban renewal business. After signing up the contract, due to the different ratio of specific investment input by both sides of the transaction, the initial contract thus normally has been delaying or doubtfully signed. Even worse, after eventually signing the contract, there are still uncertain disputes on rights and obligations. Via the thoughts of Incomplete Contracts Theory, this paper not only analyzes the contractual relationship and the specific investment relationship of land owners and the implementers, but also recommends a new transaction contract model to decrease the opportunism behaviors of both sides, and further more, to facilitate the implement of urban renewal business.

台北都會區正在面臨轉型，由於老舊建築的生活機能不佳、公共設施也不足，加上安全防災不齊全，所以民間和政府都積極參與都市更新，讓市容煥然一新。這不單只是硬體上拆除重建或建築翻新而已，而是要展現各地方獨特風格形式與魅力，進一步帶動經濟活力，提供下一波成長的競爭力，讓城市每個角落呈現更多創意的嶄新面貌。面對此一目的，本研究希望從此一方向進行探索性研究，探討在都市重生過程中，有時限的閒置空間如何再作利用，帶給企業或機關學校延展性的資源，產生競爭優勢，並且讓空間到期之後，還能順利讓空間重生，提供城市成長的競爭力。 關於再生空間，國內外均有許多實例以文創產業活化閒置空間的案例，但此類再生空間都是以永續經營發展為目標，對於有時限的空間再利用，則鮮少著墨，因此本研究希望了解(1)空間經營組織該如何以文創事業導入都市再生過程中的閒置土地? (2)以文創事業導入都市再生過程中的閒置土地再生空間樣貌為何? (3)空間經營組織在經營再生空間之後，如何建立核心資源?本研究藉由文獻次級資料與報章雜誌的回顧分析，並以都市再生空間為基礎發展出個案研究的基礎架構。選擇之代表研究對象為尚處初步階段的案例，包括城中藝術街區和127公店，希望透過本研究，能給台北都會區發展轉型實務與學術的發展。 本研究初步結論包括：(1) 各組織在動態網絡中，擷取彼此優勢，互賴繁衍生長。(2) 對於使用有年限的再生空間，文創事業不以一般營利為主要導向，給予產業更多靈感。(3)文創事業體的成長是空間經營組織的核心資源。本論文最後進一步提出實務上待克服之地方及後續研究上的建議。 / Due to poor life function of the old buildings, including shortage of public facilities, incomplete security disaster prevention system, and Taipei metropolitan area is force to face urban regeneration which is encouraged by local government and locals. As to the process of urban regeneration, this does not just demolish the old building or reconstruction on the renovation itself, but to show the form of local unique style and charm, to further promote economic vitality by providing growth competitiveness. Therefore, this study wants to be a base for following research in this topic. There are lots of examples of reusing vacant spaces among domestic and foreign countries, but the goal of managing these spaces is making them sustainable. As for reusing time-limited space, the discussion is not mentioned a lot. The purpose of this study is to understand (1) how do organizations that run the vacant spaces cooperate with culture creative industries during urban regeneration process? And what are their relations? (2) What are the space characteristics during culture and creative industry into urban regeneration process? (3) What are the benefits for the organization participating in urban regeneration, and how can the organizations build core resource such as core competence? Through reviewing of secondary data such as literature newspapers and magazines, this study derives the research structure. The cases of this study are still in the initial stage, including UrbanCore Arts Block and store no. 127. This study is hoping to give Taipei metropolitan area practical and academic development in urban regeneration process. The study finds: By cooperation with culture and creative business, companies and organizations learn to develop human resources as the main target. Also, as for time-limited space, cultural and creative business is not lean to consumer-oriented, but to give industry more inspiration. Finally, the growth of cultural creative business is also the core resource for the organizations that run the vacant space. In the end, this paper further proposes difficulties on local practice and recommendations on the follow-up study.

都市更新是維持都市品質提昇機能與促進都市合理發展的重要方式，也是台灣都市發展的重要方向，為維持都市持續的生命力透過都市更新的拆除重建，就地整建及保存維護等方法，促使都市土地重新有效利用，避免低度使用、誤用或濫用，解決隨著都市化所帶來的問題，如交通擁擠、公共設施不足及空氣污染等都市內部不經濟現象，以改善居住環境及復甦都市機能。 然而政府人力、財力上有所限制，乃鼓勵私部門參與投資更新事業，提供許多獎勵措施，以增加開發業者投入意願，其中被學界及業界視為最有效的措施是建築容積獎勵。 我國土地使用規劃管制制度，分為都市計畫土地及非都市土地兩大體系，以往土地使用規劃及變更係由政府部門主導；近年來，由於經濟發展及都市快速擴展，導致民間對於土地開發的需求日益殷切，因此，現行我國土地使用變更機制，已由以往只有政府部門主導規劃方得變更，漸進為民間亦可提出變更申請。 現行都市更新之獎勵措施：建築容積獎勵、建築容積移轉、稅捐減免等等；回饋係指對於土地變更行為依外部成本內部化理念要求之變更負擔義務，以及依漲價歸公理念要求之變更增值利益回饋。回饋項目包括土地、代金、計畫道路用地、開闢計畫道路、興建公園廣場、樓地板面積等。 本研究個案為中泰賓館，係台北市著名之觀光旅館，目前歇業中，中泰賓館是歷史悠久的五星級國際觀光飯店，因年代久遠，整體土地開發利用度低，閒置土地面積龐大，在綜合考量經營環境市場變化等因素，將以開發閒置土地並充分發揮土地使用效益，調整產業經濟結構與多元化發展商機，重新開創中泰賓館的經營新風貌，提升整體經營效益，目前配合政府將基地變更為金融服務專用區，提供金融區相關之服務性設施與空間。 本案基地是敦化南北路特定專用區的一部分，位於敦北民生金融專用區南京東路金融商圈交接處也是敦化南北路特定專用區內，目前可善加利用的大面積未開發土地，若能妥善規劃提供金融特定專用區欠缺的相關服務性設施與空間，將可以提供良好的活動環境，並提升金融特定專用區功能。 基於本案土地未充分有效使用沒有地盡其利，影響經濟效益，乃透過都市計畫變更程序，重新定位為金融服務專用區，達成「人性化之計劃與建設」、「永續化之利用經營與發展」；一方面可充分發揮土地應有效益，另一方面可藉此突破中泰賓館受限於舊有建築硬體瓶頸，再次開發為國內最頂級國際觀光旅館，完成中泰的歷史性新任務。 本案開發，將產生政府、社會大眾與開發業者三個部分的計畫效益，而回饋項目包括土地、代金、計畫道路用地、開闢計畫道路、興建公園廣場、樓地板面積等，實際整個都市變更開發案所付出之代價高達2,127,336（千元），開發業者所承擔似乎太過沉重，風險與利潤實應需詳加考量，求取平衡。 都市更新，必須提升地區環境品質，使更新後的地區環境，能讓居民更安心、環境更有魅力、地區更有活力、居民更有互動的未來像（future vision ），所以更新地區之規劃基準，必須擬定合理的回饋方案，兼顧社會公平原則，並保障開發業者權益，建立協商機制與注意回饋時點，降低各個開發案所存在之差異性，容積獎勵不可缺乏原則，才能確保環境品質。 關鍵字：都市更新、獎勵措施、回饋項目、中泰賓館、金融服務專用區 Urban Renewal、Reward Measures、Feedback Item、Mandarina Crown Hotel、 Financial Service Special Zone

2012年3月28日爆發的文林苑事件，北市府對於王家的合法獨立建物執行強制拆除，該建物無礙公共安全，且由外觀上看來並無都更之必要。王家與其支持者誓死抵抗，同意戶因原有房屋早被拆除而返家無期亦備受煎熬，預售屋的買主亦稱自己才是真正受害者，同時間政府與實施者皆堅稱一切都是「依法行事」:依照「都市更新條例」。文林苑事件引起的質疑與辯論迄今未歇，公權力之發動是否與重要公益失去連結？都更法制之設計與運作是否向建商不當傾斜？民眾之權利救濟於實體或程序上是否有不當障礙？ 2013年4月26日，司法院釋字第709號解釋宣告都更條例若干條款不符憲法要求之正當行政程序，相關機關應就違憲部分檢討修正。值此修法之際，正是對都更體制全面體檢的良好時機。本文將聚焦於民辦都更模式，依都更條例的多階段行政程序設計，深入檢視各階段中政府行政行為之法律性質與救濟途徑、分析造成重大爭議之條款所牽動之公法或私法關係、探究法規之實體與程序規定是否合宜、並歸納實務判決對於都更法律之適用與解釋原則，冀能提供修法之適切建議。 整體觀之，無論是採協議合建或是權利變換方式，民辦都更體制所採取的多階段行政程序，於一開始自行劃定更新單元時就與重要公益失去有效連結，而於「事業計畫」與「權利變換計畫」階段就個案之公益性與必要性亦無具體之檢驗標準。隨著程序之遞進，對於不同意者之基本權限制逐漸加深，但對不同意者權利之保護卻逐漸弱化，甚至在執行階段導致不同意者之財產權與居住自由被完全剝奪。此種法制之設計思維亦反映在實際運作上，政府傾向與實施者站在同一立場，在「大多數人之私益等於公共利益」與「加速都更」此理所當然之脈絡下，不同意者之權益經常被忽略，且被迫負擔不成比例的不良後果。 確實，就不同意者之權益保障，都更體制之設計於各階段中無論在實體與程序方面均有欠缺之處，尤其是執行階段，實施者得借用公權力之設計更讓整個都更體制朝實施者偏斜而去，致不同意者與實施者間所產生之私權關係嚴重失衡。而於行政救濟方面，法院傾向尊重審議會之判斷餘地而採寬鬆立場，故就行政行為對地主權益之侵害是否合理與正當，似易錯失再度檢驗之機會。 本文主要建議，政府劃定更新地區時，應確保民眾之程序參與並明白揭示其救濟之道；於事業計畫核定前，宜准許地主撤銷同意書；於權利變換階段，應增設同意機制，估價師之選定與委任宜讓地主參與，審議核復之救濟程序應予明文釐清；於執行階段，因強拆與強徵手段不符公益與比例原則，恐不宜適用於民辦都更案件。 總括而言，現行都更之法律體制一律以單純「國家與人民」之公法二維思維來規範都更事務，自對當事人間私益之權衡欠缺考量。尤其民辦都更主要涉及以私法為本質的私權關係，此種因循公法框架之制度設計，更無法平衡兼顧各方私益之調和。本文亦贊同，都更之實施應以公辦都更為主要之模式，俾能與上位的都市計畫產生有效的連結，並較可能基於公益之理由而發動公權力。至於民間發動之都更，因多以追逐私益為主要目的，政府之介入既無法確保權利人間利益之公平分配，又無法提供與公益之有效連結，在無都更必要性與急迫性之情形，則以回歸傳統私法自治之範疇，經全體同意為宜。 惟重要的是，無論是民辦與公辦都更，應訂定具體之公益檢驗標準，並區分都更之必要性與急迫性，以分級制度適用寬嚴不同的程序，且應於各階段設計針對個別建物公益性與必要性之評估機制。尤其，強制拆除與強制徵收都必須節制為最後手段，僅宜運用在情況最為急迫嚴重之案例。如此，始能期待各方當事人與社會大眾同享都更之果實。 / On 28 March 2012, the Taipei City Government exercised its authority to evict the homeowners and tear down the buildings, which were legally and exclusively owned by the Wang family refusing to take part in the urban renewal project. Neither did the buildings pose any existing threat to public safety, nor did it show any urgent need for urban renewal. Thus, the so-called “Wen-Lin Yuan Incident” sparked a series of confrontation: The Wang family and its supporters vowed to defend homes with their lives； the 36 households taking part in the project hoped to speed up the construction, because their houses have long been demolished by developer； the buyers of the pre-sale houses said they were also the innocent victims； meanwhile the private developer and the city government insisted that their handling in this case has been adhering to the law-The Urban Renewal Act. The debates and questions ignited in this dispute have sustained and continued till now: Does the exercise of official authority well connect with the purpose of important public interest? Are the Urban Renewal Act and the related regulations designed and used to favor developers? Is there unreasonable substantive or procedural obstacles on legal remedies for residents? On 26 April 2013, the Justices of the Constitutional Court issued J.Y. Interpretation No. 709, which declared some provisions of the Urban Renewal Act do not comply with the due process in administrative procedures required by the Constitution and the unconstitutional parts of the provisions should be reviewed and amended by the relevant authorities. It’s time to fully re-examine the current urban renewal laws. Based on the multiphase-administrative-procedural model, the Urban Renewal Act governs and facilitates the renewal projects initiated by both private and public sector. This thesis focuses solely on the issues of private-initiated renewal projects. Within each phase, by examining in detail the legal nature and remedies of government decisions or actions, analyzing how controversial statutes influencing the relationship between individuals and the government and the relationship between individuals, exploring if the substantive or procedural provisions are appropriate, and generalizing legal principles enunciated and embodied in judicial decisions, hope this thesis can make meaningful suggestions for the amendment of the law. From an overall perspective, no matter what the method taken- “Rights Transformation” or “Joint Construction Agreement”, starting from the early phase of “business summary”, in which the law allows property owners to designate the renewal units by themselves, the legal system on the private-initiated urban renewal causes great risk of losing effective connection to an important public-interest purpose. Moreover, in the “business plan” and “rights- transformation plan” phases, the law lacks clear standards or criteria to check if the specific case meets the proportionality principle and whether the public interest is best served. As each phase involves different government decisions, the restrictions on the property right of dissenting owners grow bigger, yet the mechanism for their rights protection becomes weaker, eventually in the final “execution” phase, the dissenting owners could be completely deprived of their property right and freedom of residence. When it comes to the practical application, following this legal structure’s line of reasoning, the administrative agency tends to act in concert with implementer (mostly private developer), both parties interpret public interest as the sum of most private interests and aim at speeding up the whole process, so that the dissenting property owners’ rights are usually overlooked and the dissents are forced to shoulder a disproportionate share of the negative effects. Actually, for the property owners refusing to join the project, the law fails to provide proper protection no matter substantively or procedurally. Especially in the “execution” phase, the implementers are entitled to request the government to demolish or expropriate the property. Thus, through the indirect transfer of public power to the implementer, the law impairs the supposed-to-be-fair balance between the rights of the property owners and the rights of the implementer. On the other hand, in administrative judicial proceedings, given that administrative courts often defer to the discretion of expert committee set up by administrative agency for the review of renewal projects, it is unsurprising that the courts tend to adopt administrative agency’s litigation interpretation. Thus, when property owners’ fundamental constitutional rights are infringed, the administrative action may not be under adequate scrutiny by courts. This thesis proposes that: in the first phase when designating the renewal area, the administrative agency should ensure an open and transparent public participation, and after decision made, especially for those most affected in the renewal area, including property owners and residents, the legal remedy should be clearly specified in the law； before the “business plan” approved and announced by administrative agency, property owners should be allowed to withdraw their letter of consent unconditionally； in “rights- transformation plan” phase, the consent mechanism should be added into the process, property owners should be entitled to participate in selecting and entrusting real estate appraisers, the special “disagreement inspection procedure” should be well-clarified and defined in law； in the last “execution” phase, the use of forced demolition or expropriation as a legal instrument to take private property for private-initiated renewal projects, cannot be justified under the principle of proportionality and public interest. Thus, the related unconstitutional regulations need to be modified. In short, the current urban renewal laws are designed under the framework of governing the relationships between government and individuals. As for the relationship between individuals, especially in the now dominating private-initiated mode, this original design is inherently flawed to balance the diverse and competing interests among different private parties. In essence, all urban renewal projects should conform to the overall urban plan adopted and formulated by the city government. Besides, the use of authority and power can be legitimate only when implementing public purpose and public benefits. Given that the government-initiated mode is more likely to be consistent with the comprehensive urban plan and be aligned with public interest, this thesis suggests that government take the responsibility to lead and initiate most urban renewal projects. As for the private-initiated mode, which mostly driven by short-term private profits, the current government intervention can neither ensure equitable distribution of benefit among stakeholders, nor can it provide a significant link to public interest, thus, better leave it to the traditional realm of private law, that is, if there is no necessity or urgency, reconstruction shall require the consent of all property owners. If the public and private modes are to be maintained and co-exist in the urban renewal system, both laws should contain concrete guidelines and standards on factors that should be taken into account in determining if the designation of renewal areas or units is in pursuit of important public interest. Besides, a priority rating system should be established based on the degree of need and urgency to categorize the different procedural implementation, aiming to ensure a direct correlation between the degree of government intervention and the degree of need and urgency. Furthermore, an assessment tool of the necessity and proportionality is required to be built in each phase, thus to help administrative agency decide whether in the particular case, the public interest outweighs the interests adversely affected. In all cases, the use of eminent domain and forced demolition should be reserved as the last resort for the most serious conditions. Hopefully, by the aforementioned amendments, the promised fruits of urban renewal can be available not only to the parties involved but also to the general public.