再保險交易為國內產物保險業者經營業務及風險管理上不可或缺之工具，近年衍生融通資金及改善財務結構之財務面功能，並傳出國際知名保險業者不當運用之情事，而引起各國保險監理機關之重視，開始建立再保險完整之監理制度及詳細規範。就我國產險業而言，現行再保險交易分出業務之會計處理，可透過再保費支出、再保佣金收入、再保攤回賠款及提存未滿期保費準備減少數等會計科目，產生盈餘釋放數，進而操控公司財務報表。本研究擬探討我國產險公司是否會利用承作再保險交易從事盈餘管理。 本研究分別採用縱橫資料迴歸及分量迴歸兩種模型，以1994-2008年之國內12家產險公司為樣本，探討再保險交易量及再保險交易盈餘釋放數與盈餘管理動機之關聯。實證結果顯示我國產險公司，就資本市場動機而言，當期盈餘數愈低者，會避免虧損而從事愈多再保險交易或有愈高之盈餘釋放數，若當期盈餘低於前期愈多者，則有愈高之盈餘釋放數；就稅負動機而言，若為高稅負成本者，將從事較少再保險交易或有較低之盈餘釋放數；惟就監理動機而言，發現產險公司保單持有人盈餘與實收資本之45%的差距愈小者，反而從事愈少之再保險交易。 / Reinsurance is an indispensable tool for property-casualty insurers’ business operating and risk management. In recent years, reinsurance derived some financial functions such capital finance and financial structure improvement. Some of the world famous insurers had been found improper use of financial reinsurance, which caused regulators of various countries try to establish more supervisory systems and detailed standards to monitor such behavior. The present accounting procedures of reinsurance ceded-out business might release surplus through reinsurance premiums ceded, reinsurance commission earned, claims recovered from reinsures, and the decrease of unearned premium reserves, which release might give insurers to manipulate the financial reporting. Therefore, this research attempts to examine association between reinsurance arrangements and earnings management on Taiwan’s property-casualty insurers. This research applies panel data model and quantile regression model to test the reinsurance transactions and the surplus release associated with earnings management motivation. The data draw from12 property-casualty Taiwan’s insurers from 1994 to 2008. For capital market motivations, the evidence indicates that property-casualty insurers manage more reinsurance transactions or the higher surplus release to avoid losses, and manage the higher surplus release to avoid earnings decreases. For tax burden motivations, the result shows that the higher tax burden insurers have, the fewer insurers manage reinsurance transactions and the lower surplus release. However, for regulatory motivations, the empirical results indicate that the less difference between policyholders’ surplus and 45% of total capital has, the fewer reinsurance transactions are being managed.

本研究以我國1994年至2003年由四大會計師事務所查核簽證之上市上櫃公司為研究對象，探討會計師之產業專精與任期及其交互作用對於查核品質之影響，其中以裁決性應計數作為查核品質之代理變數，並同時採用會計師事務所及合夥會計師在特定產業之市場佔有率，作為產業專家之衡量指標。實證結果發現，產業專家可以限制受查客戶透過裁決性應計數從事盈餘管理，而以合夥會計師為基礎所計算之市場佔有率較會計師事務所為基礎所計算之市場佔有率，更能解釋審計品質的差異。在任期方面，研究結果顯示，會計師任期愈長愈能限制盈餘管理，而任期對於裁決性應計數絕對値之影響係反映於任期較長會計師之查核年資。但進一步檢測會計師對管理當局操弄盈餘向上或向下的態度是否隨著任期之增長而有所不同時，本研究發現，當管理當局操弄盈餘使其降低時，會計師任期增長愈能抑制管理當局向下操弄盈餘以預留未來盈餘空間；而在管理當局操弄盈餘使其增加時，會計師任期增長則沒有理由支持具查核品質。此外，在產業專家與任期之交互作用對查核品質影響方面，實證結果發現，產業專家會計師抑制盈餘管理的能力較非產業專家好，所以較不須要透過任期的增加來提升其偵測盈餘管理的能力。 / This study uses the sample comprised of listed and OTC firms in Taiwan during 1994-2003 and examines the effects of auditor industry specialization, auditor tenure and the interaction on audit quality. I use discretionary accruals as proxies for audit quality and industry specialization is measured in terms of both audit firm market share in an industry and auditor market share in an industry. My empirical results provide evidence that industry specialist auditors can restrict accruals-based earnings management and explain the differentiation of audit quality more than industry specialist audit firms. About auditor tenure, I find that absolute discretionary accruals decline with auditor tenure and tenure traced at the longer auditor tenure is superior to shorter auditor tenure. The results show that longer auditor tenure enhances audit quality. In addition, a further analysis shows that the clients have motivations on income-decreasing earnings management, auditors can limit management’s ability to create reserve to manage future earnings. But the clients have motivations on income-increasing earnings management, the study did not provide sufficient evidences to explain that audit quality is improved with tenure. Besides, the result of empirical analysis support my estimation about the interaction between auditor industry specialization and auditor tenure. The industry specialist auditors mitigate earnings management more than nonspecialist auditors and don’t enhance audit quality through extending auditor tenure.

本研究旨在探討企業盈餘管理行為對其信用評等之影響，以Ordered Probit Model，探討台灣上市櫃(包含興櫃)企業之盈餘管理行為，對台灣經濟新報社(TEJ)的台灣企業信用風險指標(Taiwan Corporate Credit Risk Index, 簡稱TCRI)是否造成影響，並進一步觀察其影響為何。 本研究發現，企業之盈餘管理行會影響其信用評等，而且透過進一步之邊際影響分析，顯示企業盈餘管理對當期盈餘之影響，與信用評等之間存在著反向的關係，意味著，信用評等人員在使用財務報表，進行信用評等程序時，統計上會因為企業之盈餘管理行為而有處理上之差異；本研究另外發現就平均而言，盈餘增加(減少)之裁量性應計數影響TCRI下降機率的增加(減少)幅度，大於TCRI不變以及TCRI上升之機率變動幅度。 / This study investigates the influence of earnings management on credit rating. Using Ordered Probit Model, this study tests whether earnings management of listed companies (emerging stock included) effects Taiwan Corporate Credit Risk Index (TCRI). This study finds that earnings management does affect credit rating. In addition, it suggests that earnings with income-increasing discretionary accruals have more opportunity for getting downgradings than earnings with income-decreasing discretionary accruals through analysis of marginal effects. That is, the credit analysts treat earnings management in a different way when rating companies. Moreover, this study also finds that the marginal effects of income-increasing discretionary accruals of increasing opportunity for getting downgradings are larger than the marginal effects of opportunity for getting unchanged and upgradings. Similarly, the marginal effects of income-decreasing discretionary accruals of decreasing opportunity for getting downgradings are larger than the marginal effects of opportunity for getting unchanged and upgradings.

本研究以台灣468筆私募增資案，探討應計基礎和實質盈餘管理的決定因素，及盈餘管理對宣告效果的影響。我們發現當投資人類別分為內部人及外部人時，於私募增資前一年，兩者的盈餘管理程度有顯著地不同。並發現相較於應計基礎盈餘管理，實質盈餘管理與宣告效果呈顯著負相關。研究結果顯示與內部人的私募案相比，外部人的私募案，其盈餘管理程度較低，宣告時市場給予較高的異常報酬，且盈餘管理會顯著地負向影響宣告時的報酬。 / We employ 468 private placements in Taiwan to examine the determinants of accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management (REM), as well as the impact of earnings management on announcement returns. The results indicate that the type of investors affects earnings management prior to private placements. Compared with discretionary current accruals (DCA), REM is significantly and negatively related with announcement returns. Outsider placements are associated with lower earnings overstatement and higher announcement returns. Outsider placements also exhibit a significantly negative relation between earnings management and announcement returns.

面對全球性之金融風暴危機對投資人與金融市場帶來劇烈的影響，各界開始呼籲查核報告應提供閱表者更多主要企業經營風險及不確定資訊，而英國為了因應國際審計觀念轉變的趨勢，參考國際審計準則自訂ISA 700 (UK and Ireland)以改善傳統查核報告型態未能揭露足夠查核相關資訊之缺點。新式查核報告中影響層面最廣的部分即為關鍵查核事項(key audit matter)之說明，故本研究以裁量性應計項目與非保守會計師查核意見做為審計品質之代理變數，探討關鍵查核事項與會計師審計品質水準間之關聯性。研究結果顯示，關鍵查核事項之揭露能降低管理者透過裁量性應計項目美化財務報表之可能性，亦即提升審計品質水準；但在非保守會計師查核意見代理變數項下，並未發現增加關鍵查核事項段落能影響會計師出具非保守查核意見之決策；另外，本研究亦未發現關鍵查核事項揭露數量與審計品質水準之正向關聯性。

本研究以1980年至2015年美國及加拿大上市公司為研究對象，探討具有會計專長之執行長（CEO）與外界反應的關係。在探討外界反應之前，本文先檢視具有會計專長之CEO對於盈餘品質的影響，透過此結果，推論專業人士（包含會計師與分析師）與市場投資人之反應。本研究預期，當CEO具有會計專長時，會使盈餘品質降低，故審計風險隨之提高，導致審計公費增加，且分析師的追隨意願降低，同時也將影響市場投資人的反應。 研究結果發現，具會計專長CEO與盈餘管理、審計公費、公司累積異常報酬呈現顯著正相關，與分析師追隨數則為顯著負相關，顯示當CEO具有會計專長時，因有盈餘操控的情況，所以審計公費提高、分析師追隨數減少；但市場投資人或許無法體認盈餘操控的事實，故仍相信具有會計專長之CEO，有可能為公司帶來正面的影響。 / This study investigates the relationship between CEOs with accounting expertise and external reactions of investors, auditors and analysts. The sample firms used in this study are all the stock-listed companies in America and Canada during 1980-2015. Before examining such external reactions, this paper explores the association between CEOs with accounting expertise and earnings quality, which help us to obtain an explanation why auditors, analysts and investors have such reactions. The empirical results show that CEOs with accounting expertise manage earnings more aggressively than CEOs without such expertise. As a consequence, the firms with such CEOs will be charged higher audit fees and have less analyst following. However, investors might not recognize this fact; they still believe that CEOs with accounting expertise will have a positive influence on firms. Our findings could offer a reference for a company looking for a CEO that could bring accounting quality.

摘要 本文主要檢視中國大陸連續虧損公司面臨下市緩衝機制壓力時之盈餘管理行為。本文所謂的下市緩衝機制係指特別處理(簡稱ST)與特別轉讓(簡稱PT)的管制。具體而言，ST管制要求連續兩年虧損的公司，必須冠上ST標記，漲跌幅限制為5%(一般股票為10%)，中報需審計；PT管制要求連續三年虧損的公司，必須冠上PT標記，同樣有停板限制，僅允許週五交易。ST與PT管制設計原意係希望提高整體市場新陳代謝與營造理性投資的環境，但盈餘基礎的本質與保守的配套措施反而衍生盈餘管理與投機炒股。此下市緩衝機制實質之經濟後果為管制機關與投資大眾高度關注，但過去相關研究相當有限，本文希望藉由下列研究問題的探索以補充文獻缺口。 第一，中國大陸上市公司面臨下市緩衝機制漸進懲處時，管理當局如何進行盈餘管理以因應連續虧損門檻？第二，各群虧損公司次年扭虧次數與盈餘管理行為差異為何？第三，零損失的法規門檻如何引發盈餘分配的特殊型態；操控前盈餘與盈餘管理關係為何？ 依據1998年至2000年267家虧損公司樣本，實證結果簡要彙總如下：第一，虧損公司裁決性應計數字(營業外所得)顯著降低盈餘，特別在虧損第一個年度，此結果顯示管理當局意圖儲存盈餘以因應未來更嚴格制裁之緩衝。第二，ST股與PT股盈餘劇烈震盪，其盈餘型態分別呈現V字型與W字型。第三，1998與1999年連續三年虧損的公司次年扭虧百分比小於其他虧損公司；但2000年結果相反。主要理由乃中國證監會於2001年2月22日要求PT股在未來一年扭虧(過去為三年)，否則必須下市。第四，虧損公司次年盈餘分配集中於略高於零損失門檻的區間，隱含實質小虧的公司預支未來盈餘，實質大盈的公司儲存本期盈餘的可能性。第五，虧損公司次年扭虧時，操控前盈餘與盈餘管理呈現負向關係，且操控前盈餘越小的組別其盈餘管理越大。但持續虧損公司操控前盈餘與盈餘管理的關係並沒有系統性的結論。 本文實證結果顯示，中國大陸下市緩衝機制由於仰賴會計基礎管制，衍生相當普遍的盈餘管理行為。建議中國證監會應在下市決策中考量非盈餘資訊，投資大眾亦應關注盈餘以外的訊息以避免功能固著的迷失。 / Abstract This study investigates earnings management of Chinese listed companies subject to delisting buffer mechanism for reporting losses for consecutive years. The delisting buffer mechanism in China means Special Treatment (ST) and Particular Transfer (PT) regulations. Specifically, it requires that companies with two and three consecutive losses be labeled as ST shares and PT shares respectively. ST shares are subject to 5% price limits (one half of common shares) and their interim reports should be audited. PT shares are also subject to price limits and they are allowed be traded only on Friday. Although these regulations originally aim to maintain market’s metabolism and foster rational investment environment, their earnings-based nature and conservative schemes are likely to induce pervasive earnings management and speculation. Their economic consequences are a source of concern by regulators and investors, but previous study is relatively limited. Thus, this paper explores the following research questions to fill this void. First, how do Chinese listed firms manage earnings in response to consecutive loss thresholds, while facing the progressive sanctions of the delisting buffer mechanism? Second, what differences in positive earnings frequencies and earnings management exist among different group of loss firms in the following year? Third, how does the zero-loss regulatory threshold induce specific types of earnings distribution, and what relationship can be found between pre-managed earnings and earnings management? Based on a sample of 267 loss firms from 1998 to 2000, the empirical results are briefly summarized as follows. First, discretionary accruals (nonoperating income) of loss firms show significant earnings decreases, especially in the initial loss year, which is consistent with managerial incentives to save earnings for future more severe regulations’ cushion. Second, ST shares and PT shares experience large earnings volatility, and the patterns of ST shares and PT shares’ earnings generally look like V and W respectively. Third, percentage of positive earnings of firms with 3-year losses in the following year is less than that of other loss firms in 1998 and 1999, but more than in 2000. The underlying reason is the Chinese Securities Regulatory Committee requires PT shares have positive earnings within the next year rather than next three years after Feb 22, 2001, otherwise they are delisted. Fourth, earnings distribution of loss firms heavily clusters slightly above zero-loss threshold in the following year, which implies firms with small latent losses likely to borrow future earnings and firms with large latent earnings likely to save current earnings. Fifth, the pre-managed earnings and earnings management for loss firms reporting profits in the following year are negatively correlated. Furthermore, the smaller the pre-managed earnings are, the larger the earnings management is. However, the data reveal no systematic relationship between pre-managed earnings and earnings management for firms with persistent losses. Overall, the empirical results indicate that China’s delisting buffer mechanism, relying mainly on accounting-based regulation, induces pervasive earnings management. The findings therefore suggest that the Chinese Securities Regulatory Committee should consider non-earnings information into delisting decisions and investors look beyond bottom-line to avoid functional fixation.

企業往往會利用財務活動之變更，或是權衡性會計項目之操縱，來達到美化帳面盈餘之目的。而「銀行業」更因其產業特殊性，一直以來這種盈餘管理之幅度均高於其他產業；但是除了產業別之差異會影響盈餘管理程度之外，時間演進所造成的產業環境改變，以及個別企業體「公司治理」優劣程度，亦有可能造成經營階層進行盈餘操縱之動機的強弱差異。 本研究建立銀行業四大財務決策：放款、票券買賣、壞帳費用提列以及股利發放之聯立方程式，並使用台灣地區36家上市櫃商業銀行的財務報表資料，實證分析上述財務行為間的互動關係。本文首先利用時間面之切割，分析1991-1996、1997-2001年間銀行業盈餘管理程度之差異；其後更利用La Porta et. al.,（1999）所提出的股權偏離概念作為衡量銀行管理當局的道德風險指標，依此檢測「盈餘管理」程度是否因為道德風險的提升而隨之增加。實證結果顯示在1991-1996年間，非操弄性（原始）盈餘越高的銀行，反而會再增加票券買賣利益與降低壞帳費用提列，進一步提高營業利益；然而，原始盈餘為負的銀行，損益平滑化的現象顯著。在加入道德風險指標後，可以發現利用票券買賣進行盈餘管理，是銀行界普遍的狀況，而盈餘管理的程度會隨著道德風險的增加而提升，但是原始盈餘為負的銀行則較不傾向利用票券的買賣進行盈餘管理。在壞帳費用提列方面，可以發現銀行普遍利用壞帳費用的提列來進行損益平滑化的動作，但是道德風險之差異卻對原始盈餘為負的銀行之影響較為明顯。

本論文主要是應用過去探討盈餘反應係數（ERC）的研究模型，驗證公司與分析師預測值間正負預測誤差的方向性與幅度對於市場反應之影響；並且在公司持續一致存在正/負向誤差的情況之下，探討市場對於此種趨勢的反應，並進一步以實證結果分析影響經理人員進行盈餘管理的可能原因。主要的研究問題有三： (1)當公司超出分析師預測時，市場獎勵公司的程度，是否更甚於當公司未達分析師預測時，市場懲罰公司的程度? (2)在控制未預期盈餘（unexpected earnings）的幅度之下，當公司超出分析師預測時，市場獎勵公司的程度，是否更甚於當公司未達分析師預測時，市場懲罰公司的程度? (3)當公司存在持續一致報導正/負向預測誤差趨勢的情況下，市場對於公司的此種趨勢給與的獎勵或懲罰的性質及程度為何? 本研究係以在台灣證券市場上市公司為研究對象，研究期間為民國77年至民國90年共計14年。研究方法分別使用Pooled regression與Annual regression兩種迴歸模式分別對樣本觀察值進行複迴歸。共計三個迴歸模型，六個迴歸結果。 本研究結果如下： 一、在是否超過分析師預測方面，當公司超過分析師預測時所得到的市場獎勵程度，並不一定大於當公司未能達到分析師預測時所得到市場懲罰的程度。因此就此部分之結論而言，公司為了得到市場獎勵而從事盈餘管理與公司為了逃避市場懲罰因素而從事盈餘管理，兩種行為之動機程度並無明顯差別。 二、倘若在控制未預期盈餘的幅度的情況之下，當公司超過分析師預測時所得到的市場獎勵程度，則是顯著的大於當公司未能達到分析師預測時所得到市場懲罰的程度。因此就本研究此部分之結論而言，公司為了得到市場獎勵的盈餘管理動機程度甚於避免受到市場懲罰之盈餘管理動機程度。 三、在是否存在持續一致報導正/負向預測誤差趨勢方面，可區分為兩部分說明： （1）對於有持續一致未達分析師預測趨勢的公司而言： 持續一致未達的未預期盈餘部分（系統因子），市場會對該系統化部分之行為失去信心而給予其懲罰。 然而，非一致性未達的未預期盈餘部分（非系統因子），相較於其他沒有持續一致未達分析師預測趨勢之公司，市場則不一定會對該部分之行為失去信心而給予其超額懲罰。意即因非系統未達之部分所得到的市場懲罰，並不一定大於沒有持續一致未達分析師預測趨勢之公司。 （2）對於有持續一致超出分析師預測之趨勢的公司而言： 持續一致超出的未預期盈餘部分（系統因子），市場不一定會將該系統化部分之行為視為經理人員從事盈餘管理之結果而給予懲罰。 然而，非一致性超出的未預期盈餘部分（非系統因子），相較於其他未能持續一致超出分析師預測之公司，市場則亦不一定予以實質肯定並給予其超額獎勵。意即因非系統超出之部分所得到的市場獎勵，並不一定大於未能持續一致超出分析師預測的公司。 / This study investigates whether the market rewards（penalizes）firms for beating（missing）analysts’ earnings forecasts. Specifically, we examine the market response to positive and negative forecast errors. In addition, we examine whether the sensitivity of stock prices to positive or negative forecast errors is affected by the firms’ history of consistently beating or missing analysts’ forecasts. In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on three issues: (1) is there a differential market response to the level of unexpected earnings for firms that beat analysts’ forecasts versus those that do not? (2) does the market respond to whether firms beat or miss analysts’ forecasts independent of the magnitude of the forecast error? (3) whether the market gives rewards or penalties for firms with a historical tendency to report positive / negative forecast errors? The results indicate that the earnings multiple applied to positive unexpected earnings is not significantly greater than for negative unexpected earnings. However, we find that after controlling for the magnitude of the forecast error, the market penalty for missing forecasts is significantly greater in absolute terms than the response to beating forecasts. Finally we find that for the firms that consistently beat analysts’ forecasts, the market doesn’t give penalties to the systematic component of the forecast error, and doesn’t give excess rewards to the unsystematic component. But for the firms that consistently miss analysts’ forecasts, the market gives penalties to the systematic component of the forecast error, and doesn’t give excess penalties to the unsystematic component.

現今，世界經濟脈動迅速，科技發展日新月異，如何在瞬息萬變的趨勢洪流中掠取先機，端賴自身競爭力強弱而定。然而管理當局短視行為的發生，卻易損及企業的競爭優勢，甚至對企業未來有不利影響。造成管理當局短視之因源於多方面，來自資本市場投資人的影響即為其一。而資本市場中，機構投資人往往是大家注目的焦點，因此本研究乃對機構投資人持股比例與管理當局短視行為的關係進行探討，並期望能對公司治理制度的擬定上有所助益。 本研究以民國八十四年至民國九十年為研究期間，針對我國上市公司研究其管理當局短視行為與機構投資人持股比例間的關係，並探究在電子與非電子產業間兩者關係是否相同。此外，本研究亦比較機構投資人與個人投資者，各自持股比例與管理當局短視行為的相關情形，進以探尋真正能發揮監理機制的投資人類別。 實證結果顯示：(1)管理當局短視行為與機構投資人持股比例高低有顯著之負向關係，而與個人投資者持股比例間則有顯著的正向關係。(2)在非電子產業中，機構投資人持股與管理當局短視行為呈顯著負向關係，而電子產業中兩者則無顯著關係。(3)管理當局短視行為與機構投資人持股比例變動的幅度有顯著之負向關係，而與個人投資者持股比例變動則有顯著的正向關係。(4)在非電子股產業方面，機構投資人持股比例變動幅度與管理短視行為間無顯著關係；但在電子產業中，則兩者間呈現顯著之負向關係。 / Nowadays, the economy situation is changing so fast and the development of new technology has altered with each passing day. To be ahead of their competitors, firms must sharpen their competitive edge. However, management myopia often damage their competitive advantages and would do harm to the firms in the future. The phenomenon of management myopia is derived from many reason, one of them is the effect of the investors in the capital market. Furthermore, participants in the capital market always pay attention to the behavior of institution investors. Thus, this research explores the relationships between the ownership of institution investors and management myopic. We hope it would be beneficial to the enactment of the system of corporate governance. This research focuses on the relationship between the myopic behavior of management and the ownership of institution investors of the listed companies in Taiwan Stock Exchange from 1995 to 2001. It also explores if the relationship is the same in both electronic industry and non-electronic industries. Besides, the study also compares the effect of the ownership of individual or institution investors on the management myopia in order to point out the type of investors that can provide monitory function clearly. The empirical study indicates that (1) there is a significant negative relationship between the myopic behavior of management and the ownership of institution investors. Conversely, there is a significant positive relationship between the myopic behavior of management and the ownership of individual investors. (2) In the electronic industry, the relationship between the ownership of institution investors and the myopic behavior of management is not significant. However, it is significant negative in other industries. (3) The change of percentage of ownership of institution investors has significant negative relationship with the management myopia. However, it is opposite to the individual investors. (4) No significant relationship between the institution investors and the management myopic in non-electronic industries. But in the electronic industry, it is significant negative.