本研究之目的在於探討公司治理機制對盈餘保守性之影響。在經營權及所有權分離的情況下，代理問題因此而生，公司適當的採用保守原則可以緩和代理成本的問題。同樣的，公司治理機制之強弱與治理風險的高低也與代理成本息息相關，因此，本研究藉由檢視盈餘對訊息反映之不對稱性與公司治理機制間之關係，以探討治理機制是否會影響公司盈餘之保守性，本研究亦探討近年來我國整體外在訴訟環境之轉變，對於公司盈餘保守性之影響。 本研究結果顯示，我國公司盈餘之保守性隨著外部法律環境漸趨嚴格，而日益增高。在先天治理風險較高的情況下，例如：董監質押比率、大股東持股比率愈高，公司盈餘之保守程度愈高。另一方面，董事及經理人整體權益誘因較高的情況下，盈餘保守程度較低。在外部治理機制方面，機構投資人持股愈高，盈餘偏向不保守；負債比率較高之公司，其盈餘則偏向保守。在董事會治理機制對盈餘保守性之影響方面，除董事會規模愈大，盈餘愈趨保守外，監察人規模及獨立董監對盈餘保守性之影響並不顯著。 整體而言，我國公司運用保守原則來緩和代理問題的情況確實存在。但我國公司治理機制對盈餘保守性之影響，可能主要來自於先天治理風險之差異，後天治理機制之影響效果則尚不顯著。 / Past research shows that accounting conservatism produces earnings that reflect bad news faster than good news. This study investigates the role of accounting conservatism in corporate governance. More specifically, we use several variables, including board and ownership structures, outside shareholders and independent director and supervisor, to assess a company’s characteristics in corporate governance. Our results show that the sensitivity of earnings to bad news is significantly higher (lower) for strong (weak) governance risk firms and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings is significantly higher for the sample firms in recent year. More specifically, we find that (i) the number of board directors, the percentage of outside directors’ shareholdings and the pledge rate of directors’ shareholdings are positively related to conservatism, and (ii) the percentage of institutional ownership is negatively related to conservatism. There is no evidence to support that a company’s independent directors and supervisors can improve the conservatism in its earnings. Our results hold after controlling for firm size, growth opportunities, industry, and audit quality. Overall, our results are consistent with the notion in Watts (2003) that accounting conservatism plays a role in corporate governance.