目前的中國大陸鄉鎮出現了一些狀況，如鄉鎮負債嚴重、幹部貪污腐敗、幹部群眾之間的緊張關係等，因此鄉鎮長的直接選舉改革是否真能解決中國大陸鄉鎮當前的問題呢？是否能因為村民委員會直選的成功逐漸推導出鄉鎮長直選也會成功呢？鄉鎮長直接選舉在中國大陸是否可行呢？基層直接選舉是否能擴大至全國鄉、鎮一級呢？這些的確是值得我們認真思考的大問題，也是引起筆者研究興趣之所在。

本文初始，筆者提出一個要解答的困惑：為什麼中國大陸地方的政治改革，其模式與幅度都不是「全國一盤棋」？本文將「地方」設定在「省級」，並將「政治改革」設定為「基層首長選制」與「行政三分制」，去分析在為何少數的省份，出現較大規模的政治改革。筆者試圖建構「政績─派系」模式，去解釋省委書記是如何推動中國大陸的政改。 在「政績」的面向，由於各地「初始條件」的考量，使得省委書記相繼追求「和諧社會」或「小康社會」的「政績」。「基層首長選制」有助於前者的完成，「行政三分制」的推進和後者有關。這說明各地政改的形式，為何出現互異。另一個因素是「派系關係」。和「最高領導人」存在「派系關係」的省級領導，因為能降低「硬制度」改革的風險，因此更容易在全省推動「大規模」的政改。 以2002之後的四川，和2008年之後的廣東，分別是經濟發展不佳與良好之地，政治改革的兩個代表案例。四川省委書記張學忠、廣東省委書記汪洋，都是胡錦濤的嫡系，使得兩省的政改力度冠居全國。但由於兩省的經濟環境迥異，使得張學忠、汪洋，分別推動「基層首長選制」和「行政三分制」。但筆者也指出，於分離主義盛行的西部省份，在「穩定壓倒一切」的思量下，該省並不會推動過多政改。即便省委書記是「最高領導人」的派系，亦是如此。筆者相信，將解釋層級聚焦在省級領導，並結合「政績」與「派系」因素，最能解釋省級為何會發動大規模的激進政改。  此外，筆者納入江蘇的個案，其主因是該省的政改途徑過於殊異。江蘇的經濟發展在中國名列前茅，與廣東類似，但該省卻走向「基層首長選制」改革。筆者認為，胡錦濤有意在東部省份，豎立一個「和諧社會」的推行樣版，因此提高江蘇推動「和諧社會」政績的效用函數，以鼓勵省委書記李源潮繼續在江蘇改革「基層首長選制」。換言之，江蘇的案例完全不能說明經濟發展與民主化的聯繫，它反而再現了黨國體制的國家能力中央對省級的絕對控制。 / The beginning of this article, we offer a question: why the range and pattern of political reform in Mainland China are not the same? For replying the question, we focus on the provincial level, and discuss the two categories of reform—the elective reform of local leader and separation of the three administrative powers ─ the most important and sensitive institutions of all the political reform for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). We try to generate the “Faction-Performance” Model, and use it to explain the provincial reforms. The theory covers two main points. First, these province leaders depend on the initial condition of economic development, to choose the reform’s pattern. At the no richness provinces, leaders wish to push the personnel system reform; on the other hand, leaders tend to practice administrative reform on the affluent provinces. Second, all the province leaders that enforce the radical political reforms are the top leader’s faction. The reason is that the patron-clientship may decrease the risk of political reform. We give two examples Sichuan and Guangdong, to prove the aboving inferences. Sichuan is the late developmental area, existing the unstable society, and the provincial leaders want to reach for the performance of the harmonious society. Besides, the provincial secretary of the CCP Committee, Zhang Xuezhong, ever had the colleague relationship with Hu Jintao. Zhang would be regarded as the clique of Hu. In the condition, after Zhang assumed the official, he pushed the large scale of the elective reform of local leader in Sichuan. On the contrary, Guangdong has the good economical growth. The administrative reform has been the important issue for the province. When Wangyang took on the provincial secretary, he pushed the large scale of the separation of the three administrative powers. Checking his background, we find Wangyang is the Communist Youth League (CYL) cadre—the faction of Hu. For the two cases, Zhang Xuezhong and Wangyang are all the faction of Hu. So, the two examples can confirm my hypothesis. Besides, the dissertation focuses on the Giangsu as a deviant case, to discuss why the large scale of elective reform of local leaders occurring on the wealth province. There are enough evidences to show that Hu Jintao inspired Li Yuanchao to advance the reform. Hu adjusted the performance utility function of the Giangsu and made the provincial leaders to accomplish the “harmonious society” in the area. The case represents the ability of party-state system ─ central committee has the absolute power to adjust and control the political reforms in provinces.

自1990年代中起國大陸經濟發展欣欣向榮之際，城市治理議題則圍繞在國家如何平抑發展中可能的基層動亂。本研究選取中國大陸經濟發展前沿城市的上海基層社區--居民委員會選舉作為觀察主題，直接選舉的推動是否會影響社區政治中黨國的單一獨斷？學習效果(learning effects)的理論預設是，隨著選舉演練次數和民眾政治參與的增加，會引發「批判公民」(critical citizens)意識的興起。這樣的理論預設是否能在上海基層選舉中看到？ 本研究觀察2003年到2012年的居委會換屆選舉。發現近年來，社區民眾對黨國的挑戰並未因為選舉限制的不斷增強而退卻，反之，民眾會利用選舉過程來挑戰官方威權或是作為社區事務發聲的管道。社區民眾如何在嚴酷的制度環境中發起對當權者的政治挑戰？本文將從居委會選舉中的選舉競爭，分析民眾挑戰執政當權所使用的資源稟賦。最後，通過基層競選觀察獲得的啟發是，民眾權利意識的提升，使得黨國忠誠不再凌駕一切。開放直接選舉的制度效果，如現代化理論所昭示的，存在學習效應並且在中產階級社區最為明顯。 / Undergoing the dramatic development of economic and social change in China, local governments pay great strength on the issue of governance for preventing any potential contentious activities. Facing the challenges of local governance, the Chinese governments adopt “Direct elections" for reducing the tension between state and society. In Urban city, direct elections as an important political reform, have been initiated in Residential Committee. Under the CCP party-state system, the local elections have been under severe surveillance. The negative result sharply deduces citizens’ political efficacy, especially on the manner of the participating in voting and political confidence towards local governments. However, in recent years, we observed that some Residential Committees in Shanghai experienced electoral competitions. In these cases, citizens organized the campaign to challenge the authority. The main questions are below: why Chinese people challenge the local authority? And how do they mobilize the campaign? Finally, how should we evaluate these political subjects? Based on these experiences, I conclude that the social-economical development may bring positive consequences on Chinese political reform.