我國財務會計準則委員會於2004年7月1日發佈財務會計準則第35號公報《資產減損之會計處理準則》，此號公報允許公司可選擇於2004年提前認列資產減損，且公司擁有認列資產減損金額之裁量權。當公司擁有認列資產減損時點與金額的裁量權時，資產減損之認列可能成為一項新的盈餘管理工具。由於我國公司的代理問題是起因於控制股東剝削外部股東之財富，故本研究擬探討控制股東之股權結構與公司提前認列資產減損之關聯性。 / 本研究以2004年年報與2005年第一季季報宣告資產減損的上市櫃公司為研究對象。研究目的有三，首先探討控制股東之控制權偏離現金流量權引發的代理問題，是否會影響公司提前認列資產減損的可能性與金額。其次探討公司的控制股東持股質押的現象，是否會加深公司的代理問題，因而影響公司提前認列資產減損的可能性與認列減損的金額。最後本研究將探討市場對於宣告資產減損資訊的反應，是否會受到公司治理結構不同所影響。 / 研究結果發現，控制股東之控制權偏離現金流量權幅度愈大的公司，提前認列資產減損的可能性愈大，但是與提前認列資產減損的金額無顯著的關聯性。其次，控制股東有持股質押的公司，提前認列資產減損的可能性與金額皆愈大。最後，本研究並未發現股票市場對於不同公司治理結構的公司宣告資產減損的訊息有不同的反應。 / Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No.35 “Accounting for Assets Impairments” was released on July first of 2004. The provision of this Statement should be effective for quarterly financial statements ending on or after first quarter of 2005, but earlier application on the forth quarter of 2004 is encouraged. In Taiwan, the agency problem arises from the divergence between controlling owner’ voting right and cash flow right. Thus the regulation on the early adoption provides controlling owner with stronger incentive to manage reported earnings by manipulating the recognition timing and amount of write-off of impaired assets. / The primary objective of this paper is examine the association ownership structures, measured as the control divergence and the percentage of collateralized stock by controlling owners, and the likelihood of the early adoption of SFAS No. 35 and amount of assets impairments. Second, we further examine whether market valuation on assets impairment systematically varies depending on the agency problem level. / The results show that, as predicted, firms with greater control divergence and greater percentage of collateralized stock by controlling owners are more likely to early recognize impartment of assts. In addition, we find that the amount of asset impairment is associated with the percentage of collateralized stock by controlling owners, as predicted, but is not related to the control divergence. Finally, contrary to our prediction, we find no evidence that the market reaction to the announcement of asset impairments is significantly associated with the corporate governance structures.

我國自民國89年8月開始實施庫藏股制度至今，庫藏股制度在國內資本市場發展雖時間不長，但已被企業普遍運用；而國內當初庫藏股制度是在東南亞金融風暴、股市低迷之際所通過，因此其護盤寓意明顯，且國內外庫藏股相關文獻都支持庫藏股的宣告確實有助於股價的表現；倘若以近一、二年言，國內企業發展因韓國及中國大陸的崛起，加上國內政府對大陸投資上限遲遲未鬆開，因此產業發展受限，但公司實施庫藏股家數卻呈現方興未艾的榮景，因此本研究進行以下的實證及結果： 一、在「庫藏股實施目的與股權結構及產業類股之關連性」方面： (一)支持公司董監事及大股東持股比率越高者，公司庫藏股採用目的三(維護股東權益，辦理減資)的比例越高。 (二)支持電子事業庫藏股採用目的一(為公司員工認股權證等之股票來源)的比率高過非電子事業。 二、在「實施庫藏股前後之經營績效比較」方面： (一)支持實施庫藏股公司於實施後之經營績效並無顯著優於實施前。 (二)支持實施庫藏股公司於實施後之經營績效並無顯著優於未實施之對照組公司。 (三)支持採用實施目的一(為公司員工認股權證等之股票來源)之公司實施後之經營績效並無顯著優於未實施之對照組公司。 (四)支持採用實施目的三(維護股東權益，辦理減資)之公司實施後之經營績效並無顯著優於未實施之對照組公司。 以上實證結果，國內庫藏股選擇實施目的之動機支持「經營者誘因假說」，而就實施前後經營績效實證結果並不支持「企業價值低估假說」。

中國大陸於2001年12月11日加入WTO後陸續開放人壽保險市場，目前中國大陸人壽保險市場之公司股權結構可分成中資公司、合資公司與外資公司三種類型，由於外資公司僅限於美國友邦人壽一家公司，本研究針對中資公司與合資公司分析其股權結構對於經營績效之相互關係，採用2005中國保險年鑑之公開財務資訊，分析2004年中國大陸壽險公司在不同股權結構(中資壽險公司與合資壽險公司)下對其經營績效之影響，共計有合資壽險公司18家及中資壽險公司8家，依實證研究結果顯示： (1)中國大陸人壽保險公司之營運規模與保費收入與股權結構存在顯著相關，中資公司(2004年平均公司資產規模99,929百萬人民幣、保費收入25,616百萬人民幣)相較於合資公司(2004年平均公司資產規模1,241百萬人民幣、保費收入202百萬人民幣)擁有顯著的公司規模與保費收入； (2)股權結構顯著影響中國大陸人壽保險公司之資產報酬率與股東權益報酬，中資公司(2004年平均ROA為-1.45%、ROE為-4.28%)相較於合資公司(2004年平均ROA為-10.26%、ROE為-22.85%)擁有顯著較高的資產報酬率與股東權益報酬。 受限於中國大陸歷年財務資訊揭露之透明度與完整性，會計制度損益認列之差異，本研究之實證分析著重於2004年中國大陸壽險公司之財務報表資訊，檢視保險公司於2004年之橫斷面經營績效，提供後續長期時間序列之研究參考。

P2P借貸及股權模式群眾募資(即所謂金融回報型群眾募資)在過去五年間快速地成長，被認為係使中小企業及新創公司可有效率籌資之工具。為維持其制度之功能-籌資之效率性，在對籌資公司或平台之規範強督不宜過高，以降低其法規遵循成本。惟由於投資P2P借貸及股權模式群眾募資伴隨許多種類之風險，故在降低對籌資公司或平台之法規遵循負擔時，投資人保護之問題亦不可忽視，如何在此二者間達成平衡，為監管上之重要議題。 本文首先介紹在P2P借貸或股權模式已有發展或正在發展之美國、英國以及日本之規範概況。其次，在我國法部分，先就我國之股權模式群眾募資規範之發展為介紹，並參照比較法之規範為評析。其後，則就我國若引進P2P借貸制度，在我國既有法制如銀行法上可能碰到之問題及規範方向為分析。 在股權模式部分，櫃買中心在2014年1月開始營運功能相似之創櫃板。於2015年，金管會宣布證券經紀商經主管機關核准後，可經營股權性質群眾募資平台(後稱民營平台)，二者均受櫃買中心所發布之法規命令所規範。創櫃板與民營平台在功能及規範上有其相似之處，當二者在未來採雙軌並行時，可能有市場區隔及風險控制不足與櫃買中心在主導創櫃板同時，亦作為民營平台之監管者之利益衝突等問題。再者，在各自制度之問題上，二者亦有共通之處。關於投資人保護部分，第一，投資人可否適用相關規範為救濟，除證交法之反詐欺條款外，目前尚不明確。其次，關於投資限額之規範，則有計算與驗證限額之方式與轉售限制之規範必要性及周邊問題等之討論。關於籌資公司，則有籌資限額規範之寬嚴問題及僅可發行普通股之規範等之討論。在平台業者之規範，在民營平台部分，有關於平台業者准入規範、名義股東制度之可行性、單一業務經營及重大禁止行為等問題之討論。 在P2P借貸制度部分，關於我國法制，本文認為在各該模式是否使平台甚而借用人有構成銀行法收受存款之問題未能被釐清之前，P2P借貸制度恐無法被順利引進，可能須透過銀行法之修正，並輔以主管機關之解釋始能解決此一問題。關於對P2P借貸平台之規範，P2P借貸平台是否被定位為金融機構之一環，亦可能影響其應遵循之法律或規範為何。惟本文認為為促進P2P借貸平台之發展，即使主管機關將其定位為金融機構之一環，亦需適當設置例外，藉此可避免繁重之法規遵循成本讓使P2P借貸之制度失其設計之原意。關於貸與人之保護，在救濟途徑、投資限額、風險之評估與預告、中間帳戶之監管、資訊揭露、平台是否應提存準備金及設置意外準備基金、貸與人是否適用存款保險制度以及平台倒閉時對流通在外借款之處理機制等，亦應設置相關規範，惟亦應注意貸與人保護與上述平台法規遵循成本之平衡問題。在法規之規範方式上，本文則認為P2P借貸之商業模式可能乃與傳統借貸之商業模式有所落差，而平台之定位亦可能與傳統金融機構有所不同，故認為宜單獨就P2P借貸修訂專法或至少由主管機關單獨訂定法規命令，較為妥適。 / P2P lending and equity crowdfunding (so called “financial return crowdfunding,” FR crowdfunding for short), having grown rapidly in the last 5 years, are considered as an efficient vehicle for funding small and medium enterprises as well as start-ups. For maintaining the function of FR crowdfunding that is the efficiency of raising fund, it’s not appropriate to put strong regulations on the enterprises needing fund and the platforms of FR crowdfunding. However, because investing in FR crowdfunding associates with several types of risks, while reducing the burdens of the enterprises or platforms on compliance with the regulations, the issue of investor protection also cannot be ignored. How to balance between these two topics mentioned above is an important issue on the regulations of FR crowdfunding. Firstly, this article introduces the regulations on FR crowdfunding in U.S., Britain and Japan where P2P lending or equity crowdfunding has developed or is developing. Secondly, in the regulation of Taiwan, the article presents the regulation on equity crowdfunding of Taiwan first and make some comments, referred to the foreign regulations mentioned above. Afterwards, the article analyzes the problems, encountered on the existing laws, such as the Banking Law, and studies how to regulate P2P lending, if P2P lending is introduced to Taiwan. In the section of the equity crowdfunding, Taipei Exchange (GreTai Securities Market) started Incubation Board for Startup and Acceleration Firms (GISA) in January 2014 whose function is similar to that of the equity crowdfunding platforms. In 2015, Financial Supervisory Commission declared that securities brokers are permitted to operate platforms of equity crowdfunding (called private platforms hereinafter) once the securities brokers are authorized by the competent authority. Both GISA and private platforms are regulated by the regulations issued by Taipei Exchange. The functions and the regulation structures of GISA and private platforms are similar. When GISA and private platforms operate in a double-track way in the future, there are some problems like the insufficiency of market segmentation and risk control. Because upon the regulations, Taipei Exchange also supervises the private platforms, there exists a problem of interest conflict. Moreover, the regulations of GISA and private platforms also have common issues. About the protection of investor, firstly, whether the remedy regulations of other laws could apply for the investors of GISA and private platforms, except for the anti-fraud regulation of Securities and Exchange Act, is not clear so far. Secondly, there are also some discussions on the regulation of investment cap like the approach to calculate and verify the cap, the necessity of the measure of resale limitation, etc. About the enterprises raising fund on the GISA or private platforms, there are some discussions on whether the cap of raising fund should be higher and whether those enterprises should be permitted to offer preferred stock to raise fund, etc. About the platform, concerning to the regulations on the private platforms, there are some discussions on the industry access regulation, the feasibility of nominee structure, the operation of single business and the acts prohibited by the regulation, etc. In the section of the P2P lending, the article notes that before the problem, whether the borrowers or the platforms under different business models be considered as doing the business of accepting deposits under the Banking Law, could be clarified, it’s afraid that P2P lending cannot be introduced to Taiwan smoothly. This problem could be solved by the amendment of the current Banking Law or by the legal interpretations issued by the competent authority of Banking Law. About the regulations to the P2P lending platforms, whether the P2P lending platforms are considered as a financial institution affects which laws or regulations the P2P lending platforms might obey. However, for promoting the development of P2P lending, the article thought even if P2P lending platforms are considered as a financial institution, it’s necessary to set exceptions appropriately on it. By doing that, the purpose of P2P lending might not be destroyed by the heavy burden of compliance of regulations. About the protection of lenders, the regulations on P2P lending should include the issues on remedies of P2P lenders, investor investment cap, rating and precaution of risk, the supervision on the account of fund raised from lenders, information disclosure, whether the platforms should deposit reserves and set contingency fund, whether P2P lenders are protected by the deposit insurance, and the mechanism to deal with the loans still outstanding in case of the platform failure. However, the issue of balancing the lenders protection and the cost of regulatory compliance of the platforms still need to be considered. About how to regulate P2P lending, the article thinks that the business model of P2P lending is different from traditional lending model and that the P2P platforms are also different from the traditional financial institutions. Consequently, the article thinks that it’s appropriate to make laws or regulations singly for P2P lending.

在公司績效的決定因素的研究中，本研究採用Marginal q作為衡量企業投資效率的指標，發現內部人持股比例與公司經營績效間之關係綜合「利益收斂說」以及「掠奪性假說」兩種效果，隨內部人持股比例呈倒U字形先增後減的非線性關係。其他控制變數方面：機構投資人能擔任監督管理者的角色、有效降低代理成本增進公司價值；規模對公司績效大致呈正面影響，惟效果並不顯著；在Tobin's q模型，研發活動支出比例對公司績效有正面的影響；在Marginal q模型，研究發展支出比例對公司績效影響不顯著。本研究亦考量董監質押比例的影響，結果顯示，公司績效僅與董監質押行為負相關與質押比例則無顯著關係。本研究亦採用一個新的衡量內部人持股變數—平均每位董事/監察人持股，該變數亦能精確衡量內部人持股。考量模型內生性的問題後，內部人持股比例與公司績效之關係，並未因此改變。 / We investigate the determinants of the performance of the firm measured by Tobin's q and Marginal q in our study, and find a curvilinear relation between firm value and insider ownership. The traditional measure, Tobin's q, suffers from several drawbacks. Among which the endogeneity is the most serious one which may cause the relationship spurious. As for other controlling variables, we found that institutional investors are able to supervise the management effectively, which implies lower agency cost. The size of the firm is contributive to the value of the firm; however, the influence is not significant. R&D has positive and significant impacts on Tobin's q as we expect. There is less reason to expect a positive relationship between R&D and Marginal q. Indeed, we didn’t find any significant relation in our regression result. We also include the mortgage ratio of the insiders in our study. We conclude that performance is related to whether the insiders mortgage or not. The extent of mortgage doesn’t matter. We construct a new variable –average insider ownership– which could also measure the extent of insider holding well. Considering the possibility of endogeneity, the relation between insider ownership and performance of the firm is still consistent with the result of our study.

本研究透過不同股權結構來探討傳統代理問題與核心代理問題對於研發支出投入程度之影響。 本研究將具有金字塔結構或交叉持股結構之企業分類為股權集中之企業，而將不具有金字塔結構或交叉持股結構之企業分類為股權分散之企業。實證分析顯示，在股權分散情況下，傳統代理問題的降低有助於研發支出之提升。其中，董事長兼任總經理、經理人持股比率、董監事持股比率、大股東持股比率、法人持股比率及獨立董事席次比率皆對研發支出之投入有正相關影響。在股權集中情況下，核心代理問題的降低也有助於研發支出之投入。 此外，相較於股權分散之企業，股權集中之企業有著較高的研發支出投入，代表股權集中之企業較有辦法投入較多資源於研發支出上。而透過交乘項之實證分析後，發現相對於股權集中之企業，若股權分散之企業的傳統代理問題能降低，那麼會更有效地提高研發支出以提升企業經營績效。同理也得知，在相對於股權分散之企業，股權集中之企業之核心代理問題若能降低，那麼會更有效地提高研發支出以提升公司價值。 / Based on ownership structures, this study investigates the effects of type I and type II agency problem on R&D expenses for innovation investments. This study classifies both pyramid ownership structure and cross-holding ownership structure as ownership-concentrated structure while others ownership-dispersed structure. The empirical results indicate that under ownership-dispersed structure, the reduction in type I agency problems increases research and development (R&D) expenses in innovation investments. The ways that reduce type I agency problem and boost innovation investments include CEO duality, executive ownership, corporate ownership, block ownership, institutional ownership, and the percentage of board seats held by independent directors. Under the case of ownership-concentrated structure, reduction in type II agency problems lead to increase in R&D expenses for innovation investments. Moreover, comparing with ownership dispersed firms, the ownership concentrated firms spend more in R&D expenses. However, if the dispersed ownership firms can decrease type I agency problems then they spend more in R&D relative to the ownership concentrated firms. By the same token, comparing with ownership-dispersed firms, the reduction in type II agency problems of ownership-concentrated firms will more effectively increase R&D expenses to raise the company value.

員工認股權之發行，可降低企業代理成本，並達激勵員工之效果。過去研究指出，公司股權結構及董事會組成特性的不同，將對員工認股權獎酬政策產生影響。據此，本研究以員工認股權證發行比例及員工認股權價值，作為衡量員工認股權獎酬指標，並以民國九十年至九十五年間發行員工認股權之台灣上市櫃公司為樣本，探討員工認股權與公司治理間之關聯性。實證結果顯示如下： 一、董監事持股率與員工認股權獎酬無顯著關係。 二、經理人持股率與員工認股權價值呈顯著負相關。 三、內部董事持股率與員工認股權證發放比例及價值皆具有顯著正相關，並與後者呈先增後減之倒U型關係。 四、機構投資人持股率與員工認股權證發行比例呈顯著負相關，與價值呈顯著正向關係。 五、董事會規模與員工認股權證發放比例及價值皆呈顯著正相關。 六、董事長兼任總經理及獨立董事席次比例皆對員工認股權價值具顯負相關。 / Employee stock option plans are often used to alleviate agency cost and to serve as a tool for motivation. Previous studies have indicated that different ownership structure and composition of board members have impact on employee stock option compensation policy. Accordingly, this study used the ratio of stock option granted to the common shares outstanding and the market value of the total option shares granted as the indication of stock option compensation to test whether employee stock option plans are related in some way to corporate governance. Sample firms are selected from listed companies in Taiwan Stock Exchange and OTC firms granting stock options during the period of 2001 to 2006. Empirical results are as follows: 1.There is no significant relationship between the percentage of stock holdings of board members and employee stock option plan. 2.The percentage of top management stock holdings is negatively associated with the market value of employee stock option with statistical significance. 3.Internal directors’ stock holding ratio is positively associated with the employee stock option ratio and market value. Specifically, the relation between the internal directors’ stock holding ratio and the market value of the employee stock option is convex. 4.The institutional investors’ stock holding ratio is negatively associated with employee stock option ratio but positively associated with market value of employee stock option. 5.The board size is positively associated with both the ratio and market value of the employee stock option. 6.Both the duality of Chairman/CEO and the percentage of independent directors are negatively associated with the market value of employee stock option.

近年來，台灣在經濟結構的巨幅轉型下，已喪失了原有比較優認股權證具 有類似選擇權的特性--以小博大及有限風險，因此對個人而言，是一項吸 引人的理財工具；而對公司而言，是籌措資金的重要管道之一。本研究的 目的在於： 1.深入探討各認股權證評價模式，並比較其間之異同。 2.以 國內上市公司為實例研討，並運用電腦模擬，藉以找出在何種情形之下， 較適合國內企業的評價模式。 3.建議投資人可選擇一適當的評價模式來 反映真實的認股權證價值，以進行套利的活動。 4.日後政府核淮發行附 認股權證公司債時，供政府有關單位及發行公司對認股權證評價之參考。 本研究第壹章為描述研究動機與目的，說明對認股權證的研究範圍，解釋 本研究的研究限制，並簡述本研究的章節安排情形。第貳章為文獻棎討的 部份，首先對認股權證及附認股權證債券的特性做一介紹，其次對選擇權 理論做一探討，再其次對認股權證的各個評價模式做一探討，最後對國內 外有關認股權證評價模式的實證部份做一檢視。第參章是研究設計的部份 ，本研究的研究架構在本章有詳盡的說明，包括所欲研究的評價模式、資 料的蒐集、研究樣本的簡介、研究中操作性名詞的定義、及所欲使用電腦 模擬的方法。第肆章是實證結果的整理、分析與解釋，用電腦模擬方法， 對個案公司進行實例研討，並對各個評價模式做敏感性分析。第伍章是結 論與建議，由第肆章的實證分析，找出最適合國內企業的評價模式，並據 以提出對主管機關、發行公司、投資人及後續研究的建議。

本研究針對民國91到95之間，台灣發行員工認股權憑證之上市上櫃公司進行調查，利用羅吉特迴歸模型進行分析，希望能夠透過員工認股權憑證設計與公司治理變數之間的關聯性研究，找出能夠反映員工認股權憑證設計是否偏向管理當局的公司治理變數，並且提供政府與投資人未來在政策制訂與決策上的一些參考依據。 本研究使用「外部股東持股>5%總和」、「政府持有」、「盈餘股份偏離比」、「董事會規模」、「外部董監事」作為公司治理變數；分析結果發現在「盈餘股份偏離比」的部分，於樣本觀察期間，都呈現正向關係，並且於93、94年達到顯著。盈餘股份偏離比越大的時候，一般象徵著盈餘權的不對等，同時也隱含公司治理風險，因此由上述結果本研究推論，當盈餘股份偏離比擴大時員工認股選擇權的設計方式將更朝向管理當局的偏好靠近。支持管理權力假說的看法；當進一步利用同樣的方法針對含公司特性控制變數的迴歸結果進行跨期的一致性分析時，發現盈餘股份偏離比以及董事會規模的顯著性雙雙提高，盈餘股份偏離比依舊為正相關董事會規模也呈現正相關。

本文研究之目的為探討中國大陸股權分置改革對價支付方式之影響因素，企圖彌補過去僅針對股權分置改革中對價比率之探討，以對中國大陸股權分置改革有更完整之瞭解。過去研究發現股權結構、公司之規模、價值以及是否同時發行B股或H股等因素將影響對價之比率，而本研究實證結果發現，非流通股之持股比率、公司之規模、公司之價值、公司支付現金之能力以及公司是否同時發行B股或H股，皆會對中國大陸A 股上市公司選擇股權分置改革對價支付之方式造成影響。本研究之發現將對中國大陸股權分置改革之對價有更完整之瞭解。 / The study investigates the influence factors of the consideration model in reform of non-trading stock in China. According the past findings, structure of stockholder,the scale of company, the value of company, as well as whether issue B or H stock at the same time, will affects the consideration ratio. In this research, the non-trading stock ratio, the scale of the company, the value of the company,the ability of cash payment, as well as whether issue B or H stock at the same time, will affects the consideration model. Discovery this research will make us more complete understand the reform of non-trading stock in China.