本文嘗試放寬 Black-Scholes 模型中對股價分配所做的假設，並利用風險中立評價法的觀念，推導出另一具有封閉解的評價公式。不同於以往的是，本文並不採取以過去的股票價格來做為模型中參數估計的依據，而是直接使用認購權證的市場價格去估計模型參數，希冀從權證價格中淬取出投資人心中所認為的股價分配，並進一步做為預測以後權證價格的資訊。 經過本文分別採取個股型的認購權證--大華 01 與類股型的認購權證-寶來 02 做為實證的資料，以評估新模型與 Black-Scholes 模型的表現後發現新模型在認購權證價格的解釋與預測上均有優於 Black-Sholes 模型的表現；且以大華 01 與寶來 02 的標的股票而言，其機率分配應該不符合對數常態分配的假設，在右尾處有胖尾的現象；以及將新模型使用在類股型的認購權證比將其使用在個股型認購權證於認購權證的價格解釋與預測尚可獲得較大的改善。 / The study tries to release the stock price distribution in Black-Scholes model, and use the risk-neutral valuation technique to construct another pricing formula which also has closed form. Then we use the warrants' market price to estimate the parameters in order to recovering the information contained in warrant price about market participant's perceptions of the distribution of the underlying asset. We choose two warrants' data to gauge our model. One is cathay01, another is polaris 02. In the application to the warrant market, we find that the new formula has a better performance than the Black-Scholes model, and the price distributions of the two warrants' underlining assets are not log-normal distribution, they both have a flat right-tail. We also find that using the new formula in polaris02 can have a better improvement in interpretation or forecasting warrants' price than using in chthay01.

當併購行為未經目標公司之經營階層同意時，目標公司之經營階層，是否得採取對抗敵意併購之防禦措施?由於經營階層在採取防禦措施並成功排除敵意併購下，將產生確保自身經營權之效果。從而，防禦措施之採取恐有涉及其自身之利害關係，是否得以任意採取防禦措施即生疑義。再者，防禦措施之採用，涉及該項措施相關領域之基礎規範，包括法律及行政命令之範疇，此等規範之內容，亦有釐清之必要。此外，縱使符合防禦措施所涉及各該相關法律領域之基礎規範，針對於防禦措施之適用本身，是否可能發展出不同於基礎規範之內容，包括防禦措施所應有之適當程序與規制內容。本文試圖對此作等問題，整理相關學說及實務見解，並提出個人之淺見。 本文共分為七章，分別闡述題目所涉及之若干議題。第一章為「緒論」，說明研究之基本理念與架構。第二章為敵意併購之概說，首先本文先對敵意併購之意義作一界定與說明，其次介紹敵意併購之類型，包括所謂有害企業價值之相關敵意併購類型。再者說明敵意併購與防禦措施之關聯，董事會於敵意併購發生時，是否應具有中立之義務，亦或得基於保護全體股東之利益而積極採取防禦措施，值得加以說明。此外，本文將一一介紹常見防禦措施之內容，其類型包括預防性之防禦措施與臨時性之防禦措施，並分析此二類防禦措施區分之實益。 第三章為防禦措施之妥當性問題。敵意併購關於不同當事人間之利益狀態，包括經營者與股東間、收購者與目標公司股東間，以及目標公司股東與利害關係人間之利害狀態等，實影響法律對於防禦措施規範之立場，宜先予分析。其次，分別介紹英國、歐盟、美國、日本，以及我國法制上對防禦措施規範之處理態度。 最後，整理我國學者在立法論上之意見及提出本文之淺見。 第四章為防禦措施於我國法下之可行性。本文將一一分析，於第二章所介紹外國所常出現之防禦措施，於我國法制下適用之可行性，包括黃金股、多數表決權特別股、黃金降落傘、銀降落傘、錫降落傘、白馬侍從、期限利益或授權之喪失、改變公司資本結構、鯊魚驅逐、員工持股計畫、白馬騎士、小精靈防衛戰、支付綠色郵件之贖金、目標公司買回股份，以及阻止或延緩股東會之召開等防禦措施。此外，我國實務於經營權爭奪上常見之定暫時狀態假處分，其意義與法制規範之內容，本文亦作一介紹，並分析其適用於公司經營權爭奪之運作情況。 第五章為日本法上毒藥丸之適用。日本過去因其特殊之交叉持股結構，及股東對公司之忠誠度遠高於歐美之故，敵意併購之發展未如美國，然而近年來日本亦開始出現敵意併購，同時發展出日式毒藥丸之運用，實值得作為我國之參考。首先，本文介紹日本法上關於新股預約權之意義及其相關之規範。其次，日本近年來所發生之三件對抗敵意併購之案件，包括日本放送事件、ニレコ(NIRECO)事件以及ブルドックソース(BULL-DOG SAUCE)事件，本文亦將一一介紹其事實之經過，並分析日本法院之見解。 第六章為毒藥丸於我國防禦措施之適用。毒藥丸為防禦措施中，最為傳統且典型之防禦措施，毒藥丸於我國法下適用之可行性，值得詳加琢磨。首先本文介紹認股權所呈現之各種型態，包括員工認股權憑證、認股權憑證、附認股權特別股、附認股權公司債、可轉換公司債等，並說明其於我國法下之規範內容。其次再進一步分析此等認股權型態之內容於我國作為防禦措施之可行性。 第七章為本文之結論。本文試圖提出防禦措施之妥當規範所應有之適當程序與內容，並分析於我國法下之運用，以作為本文之結論。

本研究透過代理理論並考量內生性因素來探討高階主管薪酬結構與企業研發支出間之關聯性。實證結果指出權益型薪酬與股票紅利佔個人總薪酬之比率均對研發支出有正向影響，此顯示出高階主管為增加股票紅利的價值，故會重視研發支出所帶來的效益，也較不會有刪減研發費用等短視行為。在股票紅利方面，當經理人持股比率越高時，其利益會和股東越趨於一致，故企業可以不用透過股份基礎報酬來減少經理人的短視行為，此論點支持利益收斂假說，因此企業應該重視經理人薪酬制度，進而設計出一套合理的薪酬制度來增加高階主管之工作誘因，並增進經理人與股東間共同的利益目標，用以減少代理問題與監督成本。 最後，本研究亦探討在2008年實施員工分紅費用化後，台灣企業是否會因應員工分紅費用化，而改變高階主管薪酬之結構。經由實證結果可知在員工分紅費用化之後，企業會因認列較多的薪資費用而降低盈餘，致使股價下跌且亦讓每股盈餘大幅稀釋，故會減少公司股份的價值，因而發放給高階主管較少之員工認股權、股票紅利與權益型之股份基礎的報酬，轉而給予較多現金基礎的報酬。 / This paper examines the interaction between corporate executive compensation structure and R&D investment decisions during year 2005 to 2008. Considering the endogenesis between compensation and R&D expenditure, that I use two–stage limited method. The empirical results indicate that the percentage of equity-based compensation and stock bonuses to total executive compensation exhibits positive influences on R&D investments, which support the hypotheses that the executives are rewarded based on changes in the stock price to induce a long-term focus on R&D investments. Besides, in respect of the percentage of stock bonuses, the result demonstrates that managerial ownership helps to align manager’s interest with the interest with of stockholder; therefore, corporations decrease the use of equity-based compensation to curb the myopic investment behavior, which supports the convergence of interest hypothesis. This suggests that corporations should design their executive compensation policy appropriately to motivate managers, and improve the alignments between managements and stockholders. Finally, the empirical results also show that after the mandating expensing of employee bonus expense in 2008, corporations recognize that equity-based compensation reduces earnings and dilutes shares price and earnings per share; thus, corporations use more cash-based compensation than equity-based compensation, such as stock option and stock bonus.

盈餘對公司來說是最簡單、最直接之績效衡量指標，故盈餘之報導對公司相當重要，也因此過去有關盈餘管理及損益平穩化行為之相關研究將重點放在報導水準受到各種因素、各類利害關係人之影響。公司之控制權掌握在股東手中，因此股東對盈餘報導之影響不容忽視；但股東（同時也是投資人）之投資目的及投資策略不盡相同，對盈餘之影響亦可能不同。此外，同產業之公司間會因投資人對其所做之相對績效評估而有相互競爭之行為，致使同產業之行為可能有趨向一致之情況，不同產業則可能不同。 　　本研究以民國八十三年至民國八十八年為研究期間，針對我國上市公司研究其損益平穩化行為，從股權結構觀點（以長、短期投資之股東持股比率）探討其與公司損益平穩化行為之關係，藉以瞭解投資人之投資目的不同對公司長期盈餘之趨勢有何關聯性。其次，針對我國電子產業與非電子產業進行產業效果之研究，探討損益平穩化行為之不同是否與產業有關，以及電子產業損益平穩化之傾向。 　　實證結果發現：(1)公司之平穩化行為與股權結構有顯著關聯性；(2)當公司長期投資之股東持股比率愈高時，公司傾向不採行損益平穩化；(3)當公司短期投資之股東持股比率愈高時，公司愈傾向平穩化其損益；(4)產業因素與我國上市公司損益平穩化行為有顯著關聯性，不同產業之平穩化行為不同，且電子資訊產業傾向不從事損益平穩化。 / Earnings is the simplest and most straightforward indicator of a company's performance. Therefore, earnings reporting could be a crucial concern for an investor's decision-making. There are a lot of researches regarding earnings management and income smoothing focused on how the role of stakeholders and other possible factors would affect the accuracy of a company's earnings reporting. For most companies, their shareholders control the core business activities, and thus it is hard to ignore their impact on the earnings performance. However, due to the discrepancy of investing policies and activities of different types of investor, the extent to which the types of shareholders could influence a company's earnings can be varied. Besides, since companies in the same industry always compete for better performance resulted from investors' relative performance evaluation, there is also a trend that the companies in the same industry would behavior in a similar way when reporting their earnings. 　　In order to prove that there's a significant relationship between a company's trend of reported earnings and its shareholders' investing goals, this thesis collects the overall market data from 1994 to 1999 and then examines each company's income smoothing behavior. In addition to testing whether a company's decision to exerting income smoothing is contributed to the portions of long-term and shot-term shareholders, this thesis also tries to identify whether the industry effect exists among the electronic industry and other industries that can make different industries have discrepant income smoothing behaviors, and find the electronic industry's income smoothing intent. 　　The empirical results document that: (1) A company's income smoothing behavior is significantly related to its ownership structure; (2) A company with larger portion of long-term shareholders tends to not adopt income smoothing strategy; (3) A company with larger portion of short-term shareholders tends to adopt income smoothing strategy; (4) The industry effect is significantly related to companies’ income smoothing behaviors. Different industry has different pattern of income smoothing behavior. The companies in the electronic industry tend to not adopt income smoothing strategy.

本研究以力霸集團為個案研究對象，從決策及資源分配掌控者觀點定義該集團企業之最終控制者，首先分析力霸集團企業之董監結構及股權結構，並針對該集團之公司治理機制說明對內部控制議題及財務舞弊之影響。 研究結果顯示，力霸集團企業之最終控制者王又曾家族係透過交叉持股及掌握董事會席次控制權等控制途徑掌控集團企業，其集團內七家公開發行以上公司的平均直接持股率、股份控制權、盈餘分配權分別為7.72%、28.92%、6.81%，但平均席次控制權則高達95.33%，股份控制權（席次控制權）與盈餘分配權偏離差之平均值則達22.11%（88.52%）。力霸集團企業席次控制權與盈餘分配權嚴重偏離之個案研究發現，符合經營者之經營誘因不足，而財富侵佔動機較強之學術假設。此外，該集團企業亦嚴重違反內部控制制度中控制環境、風險評估、控制作業、資訊與溝通，以及監督機制等主要原則，造成投資人權益的重大損失。最後，本研究針對內部控制制度之有效性、公司治理機制、會計師責任，以及金融監理功能四層面，提出討論及建議。 / Using the Rebar Business Group as the case of this study, the present research first analyzes the ownership structures of the member firms from an ultimate controller perspective. Internal control related issues are then identified, followed by a discussion on the effect of corporate governance on internal control weakness and fraudulent reporting. The analysis indicates that cross-holding, pyramid structure and seat control over the board members are venues utilized by the Wang Family to actively control Rebar Business Group. An analysis on the measurement of voting right, cash flow right and board seat-control shows that direct shareholding, voting rights, cash flow rights are on average 7.72%, 28.92%, 6.81%, while the board seat-control ratio is 95.33%. The deviation between voting right (board seat-control) and cash flow rights is 22.11% (88.52%). To the extent that ownership and control is highly deviated, a weaker disciplinary effect and a stronger entrenchment effect can be expected. In addition, this research also finds that all principles buttressed in building a sound internal control system are violated. Finally, suggestions for improvements on internal control system and policies are provided.

隨著經濟自由主義時代來臨，面對全球性的競爭及各國市場逐漸開放，公營事業民營化已是各國政府的重要財經政策之一。過去有關民營化對企業經營績效影響之研究頗為豐富，其中國外文獻大多贊成民營化對企業經營績效有顯著提昇之影響，然而國內相關文獻之研究結果，則較為紛歧。本文以西元1989年我國正式推動民營化政策以來，採用釋股方式完成移轉民營之21家上市公司為研究對象，來探討民營化企業獲利能力及經營績效的影響因素。由實證結果得知，政府持股比率、專業機構投資人持股比率、經理人持股比率、獨立董事人數、員工股票分紅等因素，對公司經營績效呈顯著正相關；然而董監事持股比率、董事會規模等因素，則對公司經營績效呈顯著負相關。 / In the era of economic liberalization and globalization, privatization has become one of the most important economic policies around the world. During the past two decades, most studies have indicated that the performance of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) has improved after they were privatized. However, studies on SOEs of Taiwan have received controversial results. The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of ownership structure and board composition on the performance of privatized firms in Taiwan that experienced full or partial privatization through public share offerings during the period 1989 to 2008. The results show that the ratio of government holdings, the ratio of institutional investors holdings, the ratio of managers holdings, the number of independent directors and share option schemes have significantly positive effects on firm performances. The results also suggest that the scale of board of directors and the ratio of directors holdings have significantly negative effects.

過去相關文獻從公司治理的角度、股權結構的角度、所有權與經營權分離及代理問題的角度等等來探討董監事持股對公司經營績效的關係，而與其他研究不同者，本研究係從董監持股成數差異數的角度，分析董監持股與公司經營績效的關係。 本研究以2005年到2011年在台灣證券交易所上市之一般產業公司為研究樣本，在控制公司治理與公司特性相關變數，以資產報酬率、股東權益報酬率、每股盈餘EPS衡量公司績效，探討董監持股與規定持股成數之差異數對公司績效之影響。實證結果發現，董監事持股成數超過規定持股成數之公司，其公司經營績效較佳。分析結果可能表示，董監持股比例高，因為其自身的財富與公司財務運作之結果關係密切，監督管理者的動機會較強，而使得公司表現較佳，支持董監事持股比例高於公開發行成數規定之公司，其經營績效較佳之研究假說。換言之，本研究發現符合立法者期望透過較多之董監持股，增強其對公司努力經營及監督管理之動機，以達到提升公司經營績效之目的。 / Most previous studies focus on the effect of ownership structure on firm performance. Different from studies from other countries, the institutional setting in Taiwan concerning minimal board members shareholdings required by the “Rules and Review Procedures for Director and Supervisor Share Ownership Ratios at Public Companies (the Rules henceforth)” provides a unique research opportunity to examine the effect of the Rules on firm performance. Based on a sample of general industry firms listed in Taiwan Stocks Exchange over the period of 2005 to 2011, this study investigates whether companies with board members holdings more shares than required shareholdings by the Rules have better firm performance. This study employs return on assets, return on common stockholders’ equity and earnings per share as measures for firm performance, and difference in shareholdings over the required shareholdings as the primary explanatory variable. After controlling for governance related and firm characteristic related variables, the empirical results indicate that firms with positive differences in board ownership from the required shareholdings by the Rules have better performance. This empirical evidence implies that the legislative purpose of the Rules—enhance firm performance through the alignment of ownership interest— is supported.

本文旨在探討當公司員工認股權憑證發行時點不固定時，管理階層是否會傾向將認股權憑證發行時點安排於公司股價低點，藉以增加認股權憑證之價值。本研究以2001年～2006年219家國內上市櫃公司518個員工認股權憑證為樣本，採用事件研究法來計算標準化累積平均異常報酬率(SCAR)，藉以判斷事件的發生對於股價的影響。 研究結果發現，員工認股權憑證發行日前存有股價下跌的現象，而在發行日到達了最低點，發行日之後股價漸漸回升，顯示公司的員工認股權憑證發行日確實有落在公司股價低點；此外，於員工認股權憑證發行日前宣告的季盈餘資訊內涵顯示出為壞消息的現象。然而，當董事長有權對認股權憑證發行日做決定，同時又取得認股權憑證者，會更有動機其將認股權憑證發行日訂在股價低點的現象並不顯著。

近年來，市場低利率環境、證券市場之高報酬率吸引歐美私募基金業者蜂擁進入亞洲新興資本市場。在2001年時就有相關報告指出中國大陸已存在數千家私募基金，2009年「創業板」推出，幾十家由私募基金投資的企業相繼掛牌上市，私募基金在中國大陸的發展如火如茶。近年來因為其彈性之營運模式，已逐漸吸引全球資本市場之焦點。惟亞洲新興市場目前法律針對私募基金之相關規定，相較於歐美等發展較完備之資本市場，無論於私募基金之法律架構、私募基金之監理模式以及私募基金較常見之交易模式如公開收購、融資收購等，相關之法律規範仍尚待建立。 中國大陸對私募股權投資基金不論是中央各部會之間或是地方政府，近年來均分別推出多項法令，雖然有不少創新突破，但也有扞格及不足之處，本文針對中國大陸私募股權投資基金相關法規，探討私募股權投資基金的發展現狀及問題。 / According to the relevant report in 2001,there were thousands of Private Funds in Mainland China. In 2009, there were tens of Private Funds invested companies got public listed successfully due to the emerging of growth enterprise market. The development of private fund in China is getting quicker and more prosperous. However, in the contrary to the rapid growth in private fund markets, the government legislation in such fields is far away from effectiveness. China still lacks of a unified, effective Private Fund monitoring system. This dissertation tried to provide advises on establishing and perfecting the monitoring system for Chinese Private Equity Fund by analyzing the development, operational risk and the necessity of monitoring system .Also it tried to conduct researches on the overseas legislation on the Monitoring the Private Equity Fund, so that to better protecting the investors, to maintain the safety of the market, and to accelerate the healthy development of Chinese Private Equity Fund.

近年來，文化創意產業已經成為全球各國競相發展的軟實力重要產業，特別是在英國引領全球風潮，韓國異軍突起之後，臺灣近十年來也積極將施政重心放在文創產業的發展與提升之上。然而，文創中小微型新創事業基於先天本質上具有需求不確定性高、創作者重創意而忽略經濟性、不易與資金持有者溝通等特性，加上臺灣市場規模較小，新創事業失敗風險較高，且政府的政策、法規，亦未能充分發揮作用，故普遍面臨籌資困境。經本研究從證券化可分散風險、利潤共享、增加宣傳機會、提供穩定長期民間資金之角度出發，參考外國立法例及進行個案比較分析，本研究認為股權型群眾募資較適合臺灣文創中小微型新創事業，建議除了現行相關籌資政策、法規仍應進行調整外，也應鬆綁民間成立股權型群眾募資平臺，並採取風險控管之機制。最後，就長遠來看，兩岸應可考慮就股權型群眾募資進行合作，俾使臺灣業者利用現有之軟實力優勢，能夠結合中國大陸的市場及資金，共同邁向雙贏。 / In recent years, cultural and creative industries have become an important soft power around the world, especially after UK leading the global trend and South Korea’s emerging success. Taiwan is also actively focusing on the development of cultural and creative industries over the past decade. However, the micro, small and medium-size startups in cultural and creative industries are usually characterized with high uncertainty for demands, creators ignoring the economy, and hard to communicate with the capital holders. In addition, given Taiwan’s smaller markets, high risk of startups, and the ineffective government’s policies and regulations, fundraising difficulties are generally confronted. This study aims to focus on the securitization for its benefits: risk arrangement, profit sharing, more promotional opportunities and long-term private fund. By referencing to foreign regulations and conducting comparative analysis of related cases, this study concluded that the equity crowdfunding is the better solution for Taiwan’s cultural and creative startups. As a result, it is recommended that the financing policies and regulations should be modified, and should allow the establishment of private equity crowdfunding platform and adopt risk control mechanisms. Moreover, in the long run, Taiwan and Mainland China should consider seeking cooperation for equity crowdfunding to combine Taiwan’s soft power advantage with the fund and market of Mainland China, jointly moving towards a win-win situation.