本文針對金融海嘯時期,信用風險大幅擴張的階段,藉由大股東持股比例、 銀行持股比例、政府持股比例分析其對於各家大型金融機構的信用風險之影響, 本文主要採用 Bloomberg 資料庫以及 Bankscope 資料庫,期間涵蓋 2003 年至 2013 年全球資本排名前 60 的大型金融機構的季資料,並透過縱橫資料的技術來分析 股權結構與信用風險之間的相關性。 結論顯示在危機發生的期間時,政府對於大型金融機構的信用風險存在顯著 的抑制效果,本文接著依照過去文獻對投資人的股權保護程度加以分類後,發現 與過去分析總風險和股權結構之間的關係之結果並不相同,以往的結果顯示,保 護程度比較差的國家中,政府對於公司的風險以及公司決策會存在比較大的影響 力,並會進而降低公司的風險,然而本文得到的結果是投資人股權保護程度比較 強的區域裡面,政府對於降低大型金融機構的信用風險會有著比較顯著的影響 性。 / In this thesis, we investigate the level of credit risk taking concerning the ownership structure in large complex financial institutions during the sub-prime crisis period. We use quarterly data of the top 60 large financial institutions based on Bloomberg and Bankscope, covering the interval from 2003 to 2013. From our results, we show that there is negative relationship between the level of risk and government ownership on banks. Furthermore, if we categorize the banks regarding its investor protection, our findings support that government ownership on banks has a significant effect in countries where it provides stronger protection to investors during financial crisis. Different from previous works, which states that in country with less investor protection, government ownership on banks has more influence power, here we arrive at an opposite result. We conclude that increasing government ownership can significantly reduce the level of credit risk on banks.

大陸近二十幾年來經濟轉型的成功與經濟持續的大幅成長，世人有目共睹，但過程中同時伴隨著嚴重的城鄉經濟發展的不均衡、貧富差距的擴大及行政官僚體系的腐敗等影響後續經濟發展的隱憂，這似乎是經濟轉型過程的必然現象。本研究嚐試以大陸資本市場尤其是證券發行審議制度為背景，來探討其資本市場轉型與腐敗之間的相關問題。台灣經濟發展雖然早於大陸，但最近同樣發生有高層及行政監管上的腐敗個案，或許可以藉由對大陸市場轉型與腐敗關係的研究，提供我國有關行政監管與金融腐敗防制的參考。 本研究第二章，首先，就有關政府應否干預壟斷，所謂哈佛學派與芝加哥學派的不同見解加以分析；其次，就影響制度轉型的路徑依賴因素試作探討，並舉三個故事加以說明路徑依賴現象；最後，探討影響多數經濟轉型國家極為深遠的所謂華盛頓共識。第三章，分析探討經濟轉型、金融監管及金融腐敗之間的關係。第四章，就大陸資本市場、國有企業、證券市場、證券監管等轉型演進與腐敗問題加以分析。第五章，分別分析有關高層腐敗、公有企業私有化及證券監管的三個案例。第六章，就大陸資本市場的轉型與腐敗問題，提出結論與建議。 在法律必然不完備的前提下，行政監管雖然有其存在的必要性，但絕對的權力必然伴隨著絕對的腐敗，尤其在市場轉型過程，由於公權力的增加、公權力制衡力量的不足、制度銜接上的不週延、官員期望報酬的落差等因素，都會造成市場轉型期間腐敗現象的增加。大陸資本市場的轉型，即出現中國證監會權力的過度擴張與對其制衡力量的不足，造成其資本市場尋租腐敗現象的普遍化，進而影響資本市場品質與發展。就有關大陸資本市場的發展與金融腐敗現象的防制，必須擺脫其市場轉型的路徑依賴束縛，限縮行政監管權力，提昇市場自律，加強中介機構功能，提昇監管機關獨立性，健全法制規範，建立激勵機制。其實大陸資本市場存在的問題，在台灣未必不是問題，分析探討大陸問題或許可以給我們一個檢討改善的方向。

企業的創新已經進入到應用專利權進行策略佈局的階段，因此綜合研發投入和專利產出的創新效率便成為關注企業競爭力的重要指標。而影響創新效率的關鍵在於企業決策者的策略意圖，但由於新興國家法規體制尚不完備，與決策者相關的公司治理因素成為創新效率的核心議題。為深入瞭解其中的連結，本研究以中國的上市公司為研究對象，並從外資投資者的角度探討股權結構與創新效率之間的關係。研究結果發現外資股對於創新效率有正向影響，若與國有股同時存在，原有的正向影響則會減弱；但當國有股私有化的程度愈高，外資股所受的干擾降低，對創新效率的正向影響便愈大；另外法人股的存在則更能增進外資股提升企業的創新效率。 / Nowadays, enterprises regard patents as a key strategy to enhance its innovation capability. Therefore, innovative efficiency (IE), measured as the relation between R&D expenditures and patents granted, becomes an important index to observe corporate competitiveness. Ownership structures could affect the outcome of IE as shareholders are ultimate decision makers. However, this may be a more serious issue in emerging countries, as they generally have weak legal environments and shareholders do not fully understand the details of firms’ innovation efforts. This study explores this issue based on a sample of Chinese listed companies and examines the extent to which ownership structures, especially foreign shareholders, are associated with the IE of publicly listed firms in China. The results indicate that IE is positively associated with the foreign shareholdings, while this relation turns negative when there are state shareholdings. As state shareholding have negative effects on IE and could interfere the role of foreign shareholdings in improving a company’s innovation activities, the results also suggest that the level of state shareholding privatization improves the association between IE and foreign shareholding. Moreover, the relation between IE and the foreign shareholding is more pronounced if institutional shareholdings exist.

本研究以大同集團為個案研究對象，從決策及資源分配掌控者觀點定義該集團企業之最終控制者，首先分析大同集團企業之董監結構及股權結構，並針對該集團之公司治理議題作探討，亦對相關之法令缺失，提出改善及政策建議。 研究結果顯示，大同集團企業之最終控制者林蔚山家族係透過交叉持股及掌握董事會席次控制權等控制途徑掌控集團企業，其集團內十一家公開發行以上公司的平均直接持股率、股份控制權、盈餘分配權分別為1.17%、21.83%、1.07%，但平均席次控制權則高達61.85%，股份控制權（席次控制權）與盈餘分配權偏離差之平均值則達20.76%（60.79%），席次控制權與盈餘分配權之偏離倍數為178.01倍，亦即最終控制者可以一單位的出資獲取178單位以席次控制力衡量的實質控制力。大同集團企業席次控制權與盈餘分配權嚴重偏離之個案研究發現，符合經營者之經營誘因不足，而財富侵佔動機較強之學術假設。此外，本研究探討該集團企業掏空資產案件、大幅減資、投資通達國際之相關財務資訊透明度，針對大同集團之股權結構與董監組成分析，提出公司治理相關議題討論。最後，本研究針對公司治理相關法令，提出改善及政策建議。 關鍵詞：集團企業、股權結構、公司治理、席次控制權 / This study employs the Tatung business group as our sample and defines the ultimate owner as the entity with ultimate influence over major decisions regarding the operation, management, and allocation of company resources. We first analyze the characteristics of different boards of directors and corporate ownership structure of the Tatung business group. Corporate governance related issues are then identified, followed by discussions on the deficiencies of relevant regulations and suggestions for improvements on government policies. The analysis indicates that cross-holdings, pyramid structure and seat control over the board members are approaches applied by the Lin Family to actively control the Tatung business group. An analysis on the measurement of voting rights, cash flow rights and board seat-control shows that direct shareholding, voting rights and cash flow rights are on average 1.17%, 21.83% and 1.07%, respectively, while the board seat-control ratio is 61.85%. The average deviation between voting right (board seat-control) and cash flow rights is 20.76% (60.79%). The number of board seats controlled by the owner is 178.01 times greater than cash flow rights. In other words, the ultimate owner gets approximately 178 units of controlling power through one unit of capital input. To the extent that ownership and control is highly deviated, a weaker disciplinary effect and a stronger entrenchment effect can be expected. In addition, in this study of the Tatung business group, we examine the emptied assets case, significant capital reduction, and the transparency of financial information of investment in Nature Worldwide Technology Corporation. For the corporate ownership structure and the characteristics of different boards of directors of the Tatung business group, we identify the critical issues regarding corporate governance. Finally, discussions on the deficiencies of relevant regulations and suggestions for improvements on government policies are provided. Keywords: Business group; Corporate ownership structure; Corporate governance; Board seat-control.

本論文希望透過股權分散的變化，來預測下週或是下月的股價報酬率。因為，假設流通在外股數不變下，當股份從眾多持有少量股票的散戶，集中至持有大量股票的大股東或法人時，集保總人數會下降。而我們認為可以透過觀察集保總人數的變動率，來推測法人及大戶整題而言對該股票的預期方向，因為交易往往伴隨著成本，假設投資人為理性下，法人及大戶會買進或賣出股票往往是因資訊的流入，使得他們認為需要調整持股部位。 透過迴歸模型中的普通最小平方法，當週集保人數減少1%，下週股價報酬率平均而言顯著上升0.055%，年化後的報酬率為2.86%。而當月集保人數減少1%，下個月股價報酬率平均而言顯著上升0.074%，年化後的報酬率為0.89%。由上述結果，可以推斷集保總人數的變化，在統計上會顯著影響下週或下月的股價報酬率。另外，欲瞭解此指標是否適用於所有產業，發現使用上需避開造紙工業及資訊服務業，因該產業之迴歸分析結果為顯著正相關，無法與原先的假設推斷一致。 / Several researches discuss the predictability of the movement of institutional investors and major shareholders because they probably have better ability to analyze the stock or to gather relevant information. However, it is difficult to observe what they are doing especially major shareholder that don’t have obligation to disclose their holding rate. As a result, we wonder if the change in shareholders’ number implies the view of major players in stock markets. The empirical result demonstrates that decrease in shareholders’ number accompanied by positive stock return next period in a significant level which is in accordance with the economic intuition that we suppose the total number of shareholders could reflect the transition of stock shares from many individual investors to some major shareholders. Furthermore, there are systematic cross-industrial differences in the stock return reactions to the prior change of shareholders’ number. In spite of that, all of the industries with negative relationship reach significant level but the industries with positive relationship don’t.

本論文從員工認股權制度之意義和功能出發，了解該制度之基本構成要件、優點，實施該制對公司、員工、股東三方之影響，以及探討員工認股權契約之性質及內容。有關員工認股權制度之基本規範，包括：認股權人之資格條件、決策機關、認股價格、認股條件、等待期間和權利行使期間等本文亦逐一探討，並以我國制度為出發點，參考外國立法例上之相關規定，探討這些規範之妥適性。 員工認股權憑證之發行須依處理準則之規定為之，惟員工認股權憑證不得轉讓，其性質已和證券交易法上之其他有價證券有所差異，且員工認股權憑證之發行對象為公司員工，發行目的係作為員工薪酬，也和其他有價證券以投資大眾為對象、以募集資金為目的不同，基於這些性質上之差異，證交法介入之需要性已然降低，則員工認股權憑證是否有依循處理準則發行之必要性？ 美、日二國公司法中有關認股權之規定並不多，而賦予企業依其需要設計適合該公司之制度，但另於稅法中針對符合特定條件之認股權予以租稅上之優惠。反觀我國卻在處理準則中對於員工認股權制度之作了完整之規範，此種方式是否壓縮了員工認股權制度之彈性？ 員工認股權憑證發展自認股權憑證，但基於作為對員工長期性之誘因報酬制度，在特性上已和認股權憑證有所差異，本文將討論二者之異同。同時也探討員工認股權憑證和認購（售）權證、選擇權契約等制度之差異。除了新引進之員工認股權制度外，公司法上尚有員工分紅制度、員工分紅入股制度、員工新股優先承購權等其他員工激勵或員工持股制度，這些制度和員工認股權制度有那些差異及其適用時機本文也將一一討論。

首章敘明研究之動機與目的。第二章則論及法律上的公司觀念，該章所討論的觀念有 ヾ公司係個人之組合；ゝ公司係分離而獨立的個體；ゞ公司係一群法律關係；々公司 係一經濟個體。第三章乃討論經濟學上的公司觀念，其中除有將普通股東及管理當局 視為企業家者外，尚有其他觀念。第四章討論會計上的公司觀念，其中包括所有主論 、個體論、基金論及企業論，此外，還提及較不重要的剩餘權益論及指揮官論。第五 章論及公司不同觀念對股權證券交易處理與分析的影響，就中涉及股份的發行，及庫 藏股的買賣和其他增減變動。第六章討論公司觀念對債權證券交易處理與分析的影響 ，內容包括公司債之發行、收回及轉換。第七章則論述公司觀念對所得衡量及分配的 會計處理之影響，其中論及股利，利息及所得稅等問題，最後一章則為結論與建議。

本論文以國內2001-2005年之上市櫃公司為研究對象，針對其轉投資層數與股權結構型態進行台灣集團企業股權結構複雜度與企業經營關聯性之研究。有別於集團企業之實證研究，一般均以比較集團與單一企業經營績效與公司價值，來間接推論集團化相關理論之合理性。本論文嘗試直接從形成集團企業之經濟因素著手，探討股權結構複雜度對於企業交易成本、融資成本與決策控制力等經營層面之影響，以期能更深入瞭解集團企業之成本與效益。實證結果顯示，集團企業股權結構複雜度之效益無法反映於較低之交易成本，但可反映於較低之融資利息成本。本論文之實證發現，集團企業形成複雜股權結構主要係基於財務而非營運之考量。最後在決策控制力方面，分析結果顯示，複雜股權結構與股份控制權有顯著的正向關係，為「東亞國家之最終控制者，傾向於透過金字塔結構或交叉持股，以較低現金流量極大化控制權」之說法，提供實證證據。 / We explore the relationship between the complexity of a business group’s ownership structure and operation by using a sample of Taiwanese companies listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange and Over the Counter during 2001-2005. Instead of using Tobin’s q or ROA, we begin with the economic background of business group directly and discuss how the complexity of ownership structure influences the benefits and costs of business operation, such as operation cost, financing cost and ultimate control. Our empirical analysis indicates that the influence of complexity of ownership structure in operation cost is uncertain. According to related research in Taiwan, the main purpose of complexity of ownership structure is not for operation but for financing or restrictions of laws. This may be result in the insignificant effect on operating cost. Second, we find a positive and significant effect on financing cost. This result also supports the arguments about the purpose of complexity of ownership structure. Finally, our analysis offers empirical evidences that control is typically enhanced by pyramid structures and cross-holdings among firms in East Asian countries.

本研究以1999年至2005年中國上市公司財務資料，探討影響中國上市公司有效稅率之決定因素。本文的實證結果發現中國全體上市公司樣本的平均有效稅率僅達14.14%，遠低於中國稅法規定33%的名目稅率，顯示上市公司普遍享有區域及行業優渥的租稅優惠，實際所得稅負並不高。其中以海南市、上海市的有效稅率最低，而西部偏遠地區的有效稅率為最高，顯示區域間租稅負擔不均之現象。採掘業公司平均有效稅率高達25%，農林牧漁業及信息技術業的平均有效稅率在10%以下，也反映產業間的稅負分配受到政府產業發展的租稅獎勵政策之影響。此外，近年中國會計制度積極與國際會計準則趨同，企業依財會準則所計提之資產減損準備在稅務上不能列報扣除，使公司須繳納較高之有效稅率。 本研究也發現中國上市公司的股權結構與其有效稅率間具有顯著的相關性，國家持股比率較高者，租稅規劃意願低，有效稅率較高；而外資持股比率較高者及有發行B股或H股的公司，享有較多的租稅優惠及有較積極的租稅規劃傾向，有效稅率則較低。最後，本文也發現一些重要的中國企業特性、財稅差異項目與公司有效稅率關聯性之實證證據，中國上市公司的企業規模與有效稅率間，呈現正向關係，符合政治成本假說。獲利愈高的公司，其有效稅率也亦高。公司資本資產密度與財務槓桿的稅盾效果並不顯著，研究支出之投入與有效稅率呈負相關。營業費用比率較高之企業，受到稅法對於多項費用列報限額標準之影響，如罰款支出、贊助費、非公益、救濟性捐贈支出、廣告費、宣傳費、業務招待費以及職工薪金等，也有較高之有效稅率。企業獲配股利所得及依權益法認列的投資收益較多者，在稅法上毋須列入課稅所得之金額較高，故其有效稅率較低。上述中國上市公司的企業特性與有效稅率之關聯性，提供了中國企業經營的租稅成本深受中國會計、租稅制度、公司特性以及商業環境影響之實證證據。 / This study investigates the effects of Chinese accounting standards and tax system on the corporate effective tax rates (ETRs) of china listed companies. Despite that the statutory tax rate of China income tax law is 33%, we found the average ETR of China listed companies is only about 14.14% during our sample period spanning from 1999 to 2005, suggesting that most listed companies across various areas and industries may enjoy substantial tax incentives. The empirical results show that the companies in Shanghai and Hainan have lower average ETRs then those in other areas. Especially, the agriculture, forestry, herding, fishery industries and the information technology industries have the lowest average ETRs of below 10%, possibly due to that Chinese government provides substantial tax incentives for both industries. Further, to converge with the international accounting standards, China gradually phased-in the accounting for asset impairments in 1998 and 2001, requiring listed companies to recognize the impairment losses when the fair values of assets are below their book values. However, the unrealized asset impairment losses are not deductible in filing income tax returns, resulting in that firms reporting greater asset impairment losses in financial statements are more likely to bear higher ETRs, ceteris paribus. In addition, we also found there is a significant relationship between China companies’ ownership structure and corporate ETRs. Ceteris paribus, companies having greater state-shares are more likely to have greater ETRs while companies having greater foreign institute-shares and companies issuing B-shares or H-shares are more likely to have lower ETRs. Finally, we also documented evidence on the relationship between Chinese firms’ characteristics and corporate ETRs. Chinese large firms are more likely to have greater ETRs, supporing the political cost hypothesis. Due to several limitations on claiming operating expenses to be tax-deductible items, firms with greater operating expenses are more likely to have greater non-tax-deductible expenditures and hence tend to have higher ETRs. Finally, to alleviate double taxation on dividend income, dividend income received by the investment companies is tax-exempt to the extent that the invested companies have paid corporate income tax on the dividends distributed to the investment companies, and unrealized investment income accrued by the equity method is not taxable income to the investment companies until distributed to them. Consequently, firms having greater dividend income and investment income accrued by the equity method are more likely to have lower ETRs. Moreover we also find that the tax reform in 2002 make average ETRs increasing. The companies listing in Shenzhen Stock Exchange have lower average ETRs then those in Shanghai Stock Exchange. The results of this study provide empirical evidence on that the Chinese accounting standards and tax systems have a significant impact on the tax costs and distribution of tax burdens of Chinese listed companies.

本研究以遞延所得稅費用作為衡量盈餘管理之代理變數，探討遞延所得稅費用及其組成項目與避免報導虧損行為間之關聯性，並加入股權結構、獨立董監及審計品質，檢視公司治理特性是否可有效降低管理當局利用遞延所得稅費用之會計處理達成避免報導虧損行為的傾向。 本研究之實證結果顯示，遞延所得稅費用及其具裁決性之組成項目如與銷貨有關的遞延所得稅費用、未實現費用產生的遞延所得稅費用及與資產評價科目有關的遞延所得稅費用，均與避免報導虧損行為間存在顯著的關聯性，顯示管理當局利用裁量性遞延所得稅費用之認列及沖轉來調整盈餘，以達成特定的盈餘目標。本研究發現，遞延所得稅費用項目在裁量性應計項目外，對管理當局避免報導虧損之行為，提供了增額的解釋能力。此外，本研究發現公司治理變數與避免報導虧損之行為不存在顯著為負的關係，僅機構投資人持股與獨立董監席次比率對降低管理當局透過遞延所得稅費用項目達成避免報導虧損之行為，具有邊際的增額解釋能力。 / We assess the usefulness of deferred tax expense (DTE) in detecting earnings management. We investigate the relation between changes in deferred tax liability components using data hand-collected from firm’s income tax footnote disclosures and avoid reporting a loss. We also explore the relationship between the structure of ownership, the independent members of broad, audit quality and the usefulness of deferred tax expense (DTE) in detecting earnings management. Our empirical results show the changes in the net deferred tax liability (DTL) component related to sales accruals, revenue and expense accruals and reserves can be used to detect earnings management to avoid an earnings loss. We evaluate the deferred tax expense can be used to meet the earnings target: to avoid reporting a loss. Deferred tax expense is incrementally useful to modified Jones model abnormal accruals in detecting earnings management to avoid a loss. Our empirical results show institutional investors and the independent members of broad have negative relationship with earning management.