台新金控購併彰化銀行可以說是台灣金融業擬以融資購併方式進行合併的第一案，本研究希望透過分析此個案，了解台新金控購併的目的、資金來源與後續合併換股可能衍生之議題，為未來公股釋出，以及金融整併提供可行之方法。 本文就融資購併理論架構說明起，以當前台灣金融政策與購併環境現況分析，這包括實際已發生的金融購併案件及金融購併法規探討，它突顯出台灣在金融合併處理上是保守的。 / / The M&A of Taishin Holdings Cooperation (THC) and Chang Hwa Bank (CHB) could be regarded as the first M&A (Merge and Acquisition) by LBO ( Leverage Buy-out) in Taiwan. This study, by analyzing this case, discusses the purpose, the funding source of THC and the issues after shares-exchange, which indicates the feasible methods for the release of the state holdings and the combination of the financial institutes in the future. The beginning of this study discusses the theory and the structure of LBO to analyze the financial policy and M&A environment in Taiwan at present, including practical M&A cases and legal problems etc., which reveals not very aggressive. /

本文以除權息前後累積異常報酬率為應變數，探討稅額扣抵比率及股權集中度對除權息前後累積異常報酬率的影響。研究對象為民國88年至96年間分配盈餘的國內上市公司，排除行業性質特殊之金融業，以普通最小平方法從事實證模型分析。主要實證結果彙整如下： 1.稅額扣抵比率與除權息前之累積異常報酬率呈顯著正相關，與除權息後之累積異常報酬率呈負相關，但較不顯著。此表示稅額扣抵比率的租稅因素影響在除權息前較為顯著，但在除權息後現象較不顯著。 2.股權集中度與除權息前後之累積異常報酬率的關係均未達統計上顯著水準。產生此實證結果的可能解釋有二：（1）非稅成本的考量；（2）本文以股權集中度衡量可能並未真正捕捉到個人投資人的所得稅率。 3.低稅額扣抵比率類的除權息前累積異常報酬率，較高稅額扣抵比率（基準）類樣本為低的現象，此與預期相符。但在其他加入類別虛擬變數的迴歸結果，並未發現在不同稅額扣抵比率或股權集中度下，會對除權息前後之累積異常報酬率有不同的影響。 4.公司規模及股價淨值比與除權息前後累積異常報酬率均呈顯著正向關係；股利殖利率與除權息前累積異常報酬率呈顯著正向關係，而與除權息後之累積異常報酬率呈顯著負向關係。電子業別與除權息前之累積異常報酬率呈顯著負向關係，而與除權息後之累積異常報酬率呈顯著正向關係。 在圖表的分析中，可看出高稅額扣抵比率或低股權集中度的樣本，其除權息前後累積異常報酬率波動較小，較不受除權息事件的影響。 / The main purpose of this paper is to examine, before and after the ex-dividend day, the impacts of imputation credits and ownership concentration on cumulative abnormal returns(CARs). In this paper , CARs before and after the ex-dividend day are used as the dependent variable. The data are collected from the domestic listed companies which had allocated the earnings from 1999 to 2006. Because of its special characteristics, the financial industry is excluded from the data. In order to analyze the impacts of imputation credits and ownership concentration on CARs , we used the ordinary least squares. The empirical results in this paper are summarized as follows: 1.The imputation credits have a significant positive impact on CARs before the ex-dividend day, but they don’t have a significant negative impact on CARs after the ex-dividend day. This phenomenon implies that the influence of tax factor before the ex-dividend day is more significant than that after the ex-dividend day. 2.The failure of finding a significant relation between ownership concentration and CARs of before and after the ex-dividend day maybe due to two reasons. Frist, investors may not take tax factor into account when they invest the stock. Second, the proxy variable for ownership concentration of this study may not fully capture the marginal income rate of individuals. 3.CARs before the ex-dividend day in listed company with lower imputation credit are lower than that in listed company with higher imputation credit, the empirical result matchs general intuition. But other regressions with dummy variables regarding the degree of the imputation credit and ownership concentration don’t find significant relation among the imputation credit, ownership concentration and CARs before and after the ex-dividend day. 4.The size of companies and the ratio of market price to their book value have a significant positive impact on CARs before and after the ex-dividend day. Dividend yield has a significant positive impact on CARs before the ex-dividend day, but a negative impact on CARs after the ex-dividend day. A dummy variable standing for electronic industry has a significant negative impact on CARs before the ex-dividend day, but positive impact on CARs after the ex-dividend day. In the analysis of diagrams, we find CARs before and after the ex-dividend day fluctuate less for companies with higher imputed credit or lower ownership concentration.

本研究採用個案研究方法，以德隆及復星兩大中國民營上市集團企業為對象，從最終控制者的觀點，針對股權結構及董事會組成分析中國民營集團企業之控股型態，以及公司治理指標衡量之議題進行探討。具體而言，本研究首先分析中國民營企業股權結構特性，發展大陸上市公司股份控制權、盈餘分配權及席次控制權的衡量方法，並比較兩個案集團在控股型態及公司治理模式上的異同。 研究結果顯示，德隆及復星企業集團（系）股權仍屬集中，集團旗下上市公司均有持股超過三成的單一大股東，且均透過金字塔之股權結構控制其集團企業，但交叉持股情形不明顯。其中，德隆系大都透過未上市公司取得集團內上市公司持股控制，復星系則大都透過集團內上市公司轉投資未上市公司，並經由各未上市公司再持股其他上市公司(屬間接互相持股性質)，取得股權控制。以傳統偏離指標（盈餘分配權與股份控制權之偏離）上，兩集團偏離程度相近；但以盈餘分配權與席次控制權或以席次控制權與股份控制權之偏離比率來衡量偏離程度時，德隆系偏離程度明顯高於復星系。此外，兩大集團均設有獨立董事，及由職工代表出任監事會；但分析結果亦顯示，法令雖規定應由職工代表監事席次，但集團內仍有部分上市公司未依法設置。 / Based on an ultimate controller(s) perspective and using a case study approach to two private business groups—DeLong and Fuson—in China, this research analyzes the ownership structure, board structure, and measurement of governance indicators of theses groups. In specific, this research first discuss the attributes of ownership structure of the individual business group, followed by the computation of voting rights, cash-flow rights, the degree of control through board seats (board-seat control), and the related deviation between theses control power owned by the ultimate controller. In addition, in-depth comparisons of governance features between these two groups are also performed. The analysis indicates that the concentration of ownership is relatively high for both DeLong and Fuson groups. There exits one single largest shareholder with more than 30% of shareholdings, and the formation of pyramidal ownership structure is also common for both groups. However, cross-holding is not obvious for either group. In DeLong, the ultimate owners exercise their voting control through their unlisted companies. In contrast, the ultimate owners of Fuson exercise their voting rights through unlisted companies that invested by the listed companies. The deviation between cash-flow rights and voting rights of these two business groups are similarm while the deviation between cash-flow rights and board-seat control and the deviation between voting rights and board-seat control is significantly higher for DeLong groups. Furthermore, the corporate boards of DeLong and Fuson groups are composed of both independent board directors and workers' representatives on the supervisory board. Although it is mandatory to have a minimum numbers of workers' representatives on the supervisory board, it is not uncommon to find the lack of full compliance to this requirement.

就現階段的企業經營型態而言，專業人才的良窳以及培育訓練可能遠勝於公司有形資產的多寡，這種情形在高科技產業尤其明顯。企業為了留住優秀人才，必須提供許多激勵措施。就我國企業而言，最普遍的激勵措施是員工分紅配股制度。然而，在此制度下，容易產生員工短視近利的缺失。歐美等國較常採行所謂的股票選擇權制度，由於此種制度具有激勵未來的特性，屬於「長期的激勵因子」，更能使員工與股東的利益趨於一致。因此，財政部為順應高科技產業的需求，於民國八十九年准許上市公司實施員工股票選擇權制度，此制度開放後，勢必影響到我國企業對於員工長短期激勵誘因的最適決策。 　本文的主要目的在於利用訊息理論中的「代理模型」，探討股東與員工雙方在「訊息不對稱」下，股東如何設計最適的員工激勵契約。站在股東極大化期望財富的立場，建構一套綜合現金、股票以及股票選擇權的理論模型，並經由模型運算推演，試圖達到下列的研究目的：(1) 在長短期激勵誘因契約下，分別推導出最適員工誘因強度、最適基本薪資以及最適員工努力水準；(2) 比較長短期激勵誘因的最適員工努力水準，驗證股票選擇權制度是否具有提高員工努力程度的激勵效果；(3) 站在股東與員工各自追求期望財富極大化的立場，探討雙方對長短期誘因制度的偏好。 　經由模型分析，可得到以下幾點結論：(1) 員工努力程度不受長短期激勵誘因的影響，股票選擇權的作用或許只在於留住人才以及加深員工對公司的忠誠度；(2) 股東在擬定最適長短期激勵誘因強度時，必須考量公司股本大小、員工對風險的趨避態度、努力投入的成本係數以及景氣波動對公司未來收益的影響；(3) 影響員工最適認股權證比率的大小，除了上述提到的因素外，還包括認股權證的避險比率，股東可以藉由觀察公司股價的高低，以協助長短期激勵誘因的決策擬定；(4) 股東與員工基於期望財富極大化的立場，對於長短期誘因契約的偏好會產生利益不一致的現象，雙方面臨的是一場無法達到雙贏局面的零合遊戲。

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鑒於轉投資收益占公司收益比重日形增加，且紡織業為一成熟期產業 ，頻頻地從事於轉投資活動，遂引起本研究的研究動機。 本研究的目 的是希望能對紡織業上市公司轉投資活動作一全面瞭解，並試圖找出會系 統化地影響轉投資活動的一些公司特質。 本研究結果發現公司屬於第 一類上市公司或第二類上市公司、公司屬於前兩百大企業集團或不屬於集 團、公司負債比率的高低、總經理持股比率的高低、公司近年來本業是否 曾虧損，都是會系統化影響公司轉投資活動的因子。 另外，從事轉投 資的動機方面最主要是因本業衰退，再者是希望能進入高報酬行業；而轉 投資又分三大類：垂直整合型、相關多角化型、非相關多角化型，從事這 三類型的轉投資其在實務上的考量因素都大致與理論所言符合；而在垂直 整合型轉投資與相關多角化型轉投資上，公司傾向於持有較高的股份。在 非相關多角化上，多數的公司都想跨入營建業、投資業、證券業、商銀、 創業投資業、資訊電子業等。至於選擇轉投資的對象時，首重被投資公司 的產品的市場可行性分析與投資的回收期間，而在事後的績效評估上，則 重投資報酬率與被投資公司的成長潛力；又當被投資公司獲利情形大好或 大壞時，或被投資公司的股票將要上市或上櫃時，投資公司都可能突然大 幅的增加或減少持股。

高階主管薪酬計畫與股權結構是解決公司代理問題的重要機制，代理理論提出以績效決定酬勞的制度，可提供高階主管努力誘因，促使股東與高階主管之間的目標一致；同時股權結構也會影響高階主管的努力，進而對公司的。故本研究旨在探討我國上市公司股權集中度、酬勞計畫與公司經營績效之關係，並利用模式推導相關的命題與假說。 本研究利用混合迴歸就四年度主管薪酬資料加以分析，Scheffe檢定檢驗高階主管的持股比例與薪酬計畫的關係，實證結果整理如下： １、董事長持股比例與薪酬無關，總經理持股比例與薪酬有關。 ２、公司價值與董事會持股比例呈非線性的關係。 ３、機構投資人偏向效率監督假說。 ４、總經理薪酬計畫中的項目比薪酬水準的高低重要。 ５、公司經營績效與高階主管薪酬呈正相關 / In agency theory, executive compensation contracts and ownership structures provide primary mechanisms for solving agency problems. Top executive compensation linked to performance can align the incentives of firms'' top executive with firms''stockholder. Ownership structure can influce the effort of the top executive. The main purpose of this study is to examine the relationship among top executive compensation　scheme, ownership structure and firm performance for listed companies in Taiwan, and use modelling to develop related propositions and hypotheses. Pooling regressions using four years'' pool data and Scheffe test are performed to test hypothese, Empirical results are summarized as follows: 1.The holdings of chairman has nothing to do with the level of compsation and that of CEO has something to do with. 2.The non-linear relationship between firm value and holdings of board of directors. 3.The role of institution tends to be efficinet monitoring hypothesis. 4.Incentive component of CEO compensation scheme tends to be more important than level of that sheme. 5.Firm performance is positively associated with top executive''s cash compensation.

我國現有的員工入股制度共有三種，包括了員工分紅入股、員工認股選擇權與員工優先認股權。員工分紅入股屬於短期誘因激勵制度，而學理上員工認股選擇權則屬於長期誘因激勵制度。又員工優先認股權在實施上較不靈活且假上近年來股市低迷在國內現金增資之公司數銳減，故其激勵效果較不受重視。本研究係以Panel Data的資料型態對於上述三種員工入股制度如何影響公司價值與績效進行迴歸分析。 本研究之實證結果發現： 1. 現金紅利與股票紅利對於Tobin’s 與ROE皆有顯著正向的影響。若同時發放現金與股票紅利激勵效果更佳。採用市價作為計算員工股票紅利之基礎，始能正確反映出股票紅利對員工之激勵效果公司為資訊科技產業，此一因素會讓市價衡量之股票紅利對Tobin’s Q的影響變大並不會因為公司為資訊科技產業，而使其現金紅利使員工有較強誘因之增加公司價值。資訊科技產業公司，其實施員工分紅制度並不會讓員工提昇公司之績效。 2. 員工認股選擇權似乎並不能使公司員工產生誘因讓公司持續成長以增加公司之價值與績效。可能原因係因為公司採用發行新股方式，讓員工執行認股選擇權，可能會稀釋股價造成反激勵效果。實施雙軌制（兼實施員工分紅與員工認股選擇權）之公司，員工認股選擇權，對Tobin’s Q並沒有一致地顯著影響。而不管是現金紅利或是股票紅利，其對Tobin’s Q有顯著正向的影響。實施雙軌制公司，其員工現金紅利對ROE有顯著的正向影響。員工股票紅利與員工認股選擇權對於ROE則沒有顯著的影響。若公司為資訊科技產業，其實施員工認股選擇權對TBQ的影響並未較其他公司顯著地大。實施員工認股選擇權之公司，並不會因為其屬於資訊科技產業，而產生較高的淨值報酬率。 3. 員工優先認股權，對於TBQ或ROE而言，確實有正向顯著的影響。 實施雙軌制的公司，無論是員工紅利或員工優先認股權對於Tobin‘s Q與ROE的影響皆不顯著。可能的解釋是員工股票紅利與現金增資的股票所產生的稀釋效果較大。公司為資訊科技產業而實施員工優先認股權時，並不會比非資訊科技產業有較大且顯著的激勵效果。若採用員工當次現金增資得認購比率當作激勵變數，結果仍然與上述相似。

在中國大陸的法律環境中，外商私募股權基金是較新的議題，它同時牽涉了「外商投資」與「私募股權投資」兩個領域。因此，就外商私募股權基金而言，其為中國大陸在國外法律繼受嬗變後，再於法律雙軌制下的二次嬗變。 外商私募股權基金，是指由外國投資者注資或者外國投資者管理的私募股權基金。因此，它的市場屬性為「外國直接投資」、「國際金融服務」。 由於中國大陸對外商採取「外資法群」進行規範，而並沒有一部外商法典做集中、統一的規定。因此，彼此間存在一定程度的分散、重複、衝突等問題。再加上中國大陸對外商、內資採取雙軌制立法，故法律規範雖有創新但也常有彼此扞格或不足之處。也因此造成運作上的幾個問題：外匯管制、投資待遇、雙軌制、地方政府隨意的政策、實務操作的衝突(投資協議、有限合夥)、及優先股的欠缺。 財經法律因應經濟市場而生，惟經濟市場逐年改變。外商私募股權基金既是經濟市場的產物，就無法透過行政力量加以限制，也無需透過偏頗政策揠苗助長。僅需創造一個平等的法治環境，讓市場自行運作。 本文探討中國大陸對外商私募股權基金相關法規的發展現狀、投資障礙與內外資衝突等議題。除對如何完善立法略盡棉薄之力外，並希冀能提供台灣投資者於前進中國大陸時有所參考。 / In the legal environment of China, the foreign private equity fund is a relatively new issue, it involves two areas of "foreign investment" and "private equity investment” simultaneously. Therefore, with respect to the foreign private equity fund, it is subject to transmutation of foreign laws and subsequently the second transmutation under the dual system of laws in China. The foreign private equity funds refer to the private equity funds injected by foreign investors or managed by foreign investors. Therefore, its market attribute to the "foreign direct investment", "international financial service." Although China has adopted a series of laws to regulate foreign enterprises, there is not one foreign investment code as centralized and unified regulation. Thus, there exists a certain degree of dispersion, overlap, conflict problems among them. Along with the duel system of legislation adopted for foreign enterprises and domestic investments, there are often discrepancies or deficiencies between the legal requirements, although they have been innovated. This resulted in several operational problems: foreign exchange controls, investment treatments, duel system, arbitrary policies of local governments, conflict in practices (investment agreement, limited partnership), and the lack of preference shares. Financial laws are established in response to the market economy, but the economic market changes every year. Since the foreign private equity funds are the production of the market economy, they cannot be restricted only by the administrative power, and they don’t need partial polices to pull up. They only require creating an equal legal environment to make the market operate under its own mechanism. This paper discovers the issues with respect to the current development status of related regulations on the foreign private equity funds, foreign investment barriers and conflicts between domestic and foreign investment in China. In addition to make a little contribution to improve the legislation, it’s also expected to provide reference to Taiwan investors for developing business in China.

本研究以財報重編為財報品質之代理變數，探討自由現金流量是否對內部股權結構與財報品質的關係具有調節效果，期望藉助對於自由現金流量調節效果之了解，以利報表閱讀者更適當地解讀財報訊息，瞭解財報之品質。 實證結果顯示，自由現金流量對內部股權結構與財報品質間確實具有顯著的調節效果，尤其是董、監持股率與董事兼任經理人這兩項因素對於財報品質之關係，很受到自由現金流量之影響。自由現金流量本身與財報重編呈顯著負相關，自由現金流量愈高，財報重編的可能性愈低。但自由現金流量所引發的代理問題，反而可能對董、監持股率、董事兼任經理人與財報品質間的關係產生負面的調節效果，即財報重編的可能性顯著提高。但自由現金流量對於經理人持股率與財報品質間的關係不具有顯著的調節效果。 / This study examines whether free cash flow has the moderating effect on the relation between ownership structure and financial reporting quality, using financial restatements as a proxy for financial reporting quality. This study tries to interpret earnings information more appropriately through more understanding on the moderating effect of free cash flow. The study shows that free cash flow exactly has the moderating effect on the relation between ownership structure and financial reporting quality, especially for stocks holding ratio by directors and supervisors and CEO duality. Firms having more free cash flow are less likely to restate statements. However, free cash flow might trigger agency problem, which might having negative moderating effects, causing higher possibilities to restate statements. Otherwise, the finding of this study shows that there is no significantly moderating effect on the relation between managerial ownership and financial reporting quality.