This historical study focuses on the multilateral regulation of sugar to provide a broader institutional history of trade law. I argue that theories of development and tensions between the global North and South have always been central to the formation, function, and transformation of international trade institutions. Sugar consistently appears as a commodity throughout the history of modern trade law. The sugar trade provides an immediate way for us to work through larger questions of development, free trade, and economic world order. I examine the 1902 Brussels Sugar Convention, the 1937 International Sugar Agreement (ISA), and the 1977 ISA. These international agreements provide a narrative of the development ideas and concerns that were a central feature of the trade institutions that preceded the World Trade Organization. In the context of the sugar trade over the last century, very few challenged the idea of free trade. Instead, they debated over what free trade meant. The justification for free trade and the function of those international institutions charged to implement trade agreements has changed throughout history. Yet, despite multiple historical and doctrinal definitions of free trade, two dynamics remain consistent: trade law has always been configured by the relationship between policies of tariff reduction and market stabilization and has been defined by the tension between industrial and agricultural interests.

How do security communities develop in and through practice? For more than forty years, security relations between Russia and NATO member states were structured by the spectre of mutual assured destruction as symbolized by thousands of nuclear missiles targeted at each other. Less than a generation after the end of the Cold War, the possibility of military confrontation between these former enemies has considerably receded. Taking inspiration from Pierre Bourdieu, this dissertation develops a theory of practice of security communities that argues that on the ground of international politics, the social fact of peace emerges when security practitioners come to debate with diplomacy—the non-violent settlement of disputes—instead of about diplomacy. It is doxa, a relationship of immediate adherence to the order of things, that makes such a peaceful practical sense possible. In the empirical analysis, the dissertation reveals an intriguing paradox in the post-Cold War Russian-Atlantic relationship. On the one hand, over the last fifteen years Russia and NATO member states have solved each and every one of their disputes, including fierce ones over the double enlargement, by nonviolent means. Such a track record of peaceful change is testimony to security-communitybuilding processes. But on the other hand, diplomatic success was often bought at the price of a growing mistrust on the Russian side. As the Russian Great Power habitus resurfaced, hysteresis—a disconnect between players’ dispositions and their positions in the game—steadily increased to the point of inconclusive symbolic power struggles over the rules of the international security game and the roles that each player should play. A decade and a half after the end of the Cold War, Russian-Atlantic relations have left the terrain of military confrontation but have yet to settle on that of mature peace. Building on several dozen interviews with Russian and NATO security practitioners, the dissertation discovers that diplomacy has become a normal though not a self-evident practice in Russian-Atlantic dealings.

This historical study focuses on the multilateral regulation of sugar to provide a broader institutional history of trade law. I argue that theories of development and tensions between the global North and South have always been central to the formation, function, and transformation of international trade institutions. Sugar consistently appears as a commodity throughout the history of modern trade law. The sugar trade provides an immediate way for us to work through larger questions of development, free trade, and economic world order. I examine the 1902 Brussels Sugar Convention, the 1937 International Sugar Agreement (ISA), and the 1977 ISA. These international agreements provide a narrative of the development ideas and concerns that were a central feature of the trade institutions that preceded the World Trade Organization. In the context of the sugar trade over the last century, very few challenged the idea of free trade. Instead, they debated over what free trade meant. The justification for free trade and the function of those international institutions charged to implement trade agreements has changed throughout history. Yet, despite multiple historical and doctrinal definitions of free trade, two dynamics remain consistent: trade law has always been configured by the relationship between policies of tariff reduction and market stabilization and has been defined by the tension between industrial and agricultural interests.

Contemporary ad hoc United Nations Commissions of Inquiry (UN COIs) operate during or in the aftermath of many of the world’s worst conflicts. Over the years they have met with mixed success, and a good deal of criticism, yet are thought to provide a vital and unique benefit. Today, that benefit is seen either as the promotion of accountability for criminal wrongdoing, where quasi-criminal inquiries investigate whether war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide has taken place; or, it is seen as laying the foundation for transitional justice reforms, whereby UN COIs map the social, political, legal and even economic landscape and provide “holistic” transitional justice recommendations. Yet despite these lofty goals and the perceived importance of UN COIs, there is very little research on UN COIs. That which does exist tends not to question their purposes or seriously interrogate their procedures; instead, it focuses on incremental measures to improve UN COIs’ processes and legal analyses. This dissertation seeks to provide the basis of a theoretical, principled approach to the creation and work of UN COIs, a normative platform upon which human rights monitoring methods can expand and a continuity of investigatory practice can develop. By treating UN COIs as legal bodies with legal obligations, this dissertation draws on Fuller’s conception of legality and the theory of “interactional law-making” to question the very purposes for which UN COIs are seen to exist and the procedures by which they operate. It finds that neither the holistic transitional justice purpose nor the quasi- criminal purpose is legally or practically tenable. Instead, UN COIs should operate as post-conflict bodies, and delve deeply into a relatively narrow aspect of a systemic problem. A commitment to legality and interactional law-making can also offer a curative to the most salient criticisms of UN COI procedures by improving the credibility, reliability, and impartiality – the legitimacy – of their operations and how they are created.

Contemporary ad hoc United Nations Commissions of Inquiry (UN COIs) operate during or in the aftermath of many of the world’s worst conflicts. Over the years they have met with mixed success, and a good deal of criticism, yet are thought to provide a vital and unique benefit. Today, that benefit is seen either as the promotion of accountability for criminal wrongdoing, where quasi-criminal inquiries investigate whether war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide has taken place; or, it is seen as laying the foundation for transitional justice reforms, whereby UN COIs map the social, political, legal and even economic landscape and provide “holistic” transitional justice recommendations. Yet despite these lofty goals and the perceived importance of UN COIs, there is very little research on UN COIs. That which does exist tends not to question their purposes or seriously interrogate their procedures; instead, it focuses on incremental measures to improve UN COIs’ processes and legal analyses. This dissertation seeks to provide the basis of a theoretical, principled approach to the creation and work of UN COIs, a normative platform upon which human rights monitoring methods can expand and a continuity of investigatory practice can develop. By treating UN COIs as legal bodies with legal obligations, this dissertation draws on Fuller’s conception of legality and the theory of “interactional law-making” to question the very purposes for which UN COIs are seen to exist and the procedures by which they operate. It finds that neither the holistic transitional justice purpose nor the quasi- criminal purpose is legally or practically tenable. Instead, UN COIs should operate as post-conflict bodies, and delve deeply into a relatively narrow aspect of a systemic problem. A commitment to legality and interactional law-making can also offer a curative to the most salient criticisms of UN COI procedures by improving the credibility, reliability, and impartiality – the legitimacy – of their operations and how they are created.

Between 1957 and 1963, both Anglo-American discussions of nuclear cooperation and the wider debate on nuclear strategy within NATO were often dominated by the question of whether Britain’s deterrent would be amalgamated or integrated into a wider NATO or European force, such as the proposed MLF (Multilateral Force). This dissertation discusses the development and impact of competing British and American proposals for “nuclear sharing” within the context of European economic and political integration as well as that of discussions within NATO of the appropriate strategy for the alliance in an age of mutual nuclear vulnerability between the superpowers. Particular attention is paid to the context of successive nuclear crises in world politics during this period, from Sputnik to the Soviet ultimatum over Berlin through the Cuban missile crisis. The divergent opinions among the leaders of the major powers over the appropriate responses to these crises shaped the debate over nuclear sharing and form a previously neglected dimension of this topic.

Between 1957 and 1963, both Anglo-American discussions of nuclear cooperation and the wider debate on nuclear strategy within NATO were often dominated by the question of whether Britain’s deterrent would be amalgamated or integrated into a wider NATO or European force, such as the proposed MLF (Multilateral Force). This dissertation discusses the development and impact of competing British and American proposals for “nuclear sharing” within the context of European economic and political integration as well as that of discussions within NATO of the appropriate strategy for the alliance in an age of mutual nuclear vulnerability between the superpowers. Particular attention is paid to the context of successive nuclear crises in world politics during this period, from Sputnik to the Soviet ultimatum over Berlin through the Cuban missile crisis. The divergent opinions among the leaders of the major powers over the appropriate responses to these crises shaped the debate over nuclear sharing and form a previously neglected dimension of this topic.

The Human Rights Act 1998 incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights. With incorporation, Parliament and the government of the United Kingdom believed that human rights would reflect British values, there would increase support for human rights and a human rights culture would develop. However, the goals of incorporation did not occur. One reason for the failure of the Human Rights Act 1998 is the UK courts interpretation of section 2(1). Courts in the United Kingdom have been unwilling to provide more extensive and less extensive protection of rights than Strasbourg. The effect of the court’s interpretation has been public, political and media backlash. Consequently, to resolve this problem, there must be a reinterpretation of section 2(1).

The dissertation examines one of the most remarkable and controversial developments in the recent history of European integration, namely the institutionalization of a regional policy regime to manage the continent’s frontiers. By adopting this regime (known in policy circles as ‘Schengen’), European governments have in fact relinquished part of their sovereign authority over the politically sensitive issue of border control, thereby challenging what for a long time was the dominant national approach to policy-making in this domain. In order to account for the regime’s emergence and success, a constructivist analytical framework centred on the notion of ‘cultures of border control’ is advanced. From this perspective, the adoption of a regional approach to govern Europe’s frontiers is the result of the evolution of a nationalist (‘Westphalian’) culture—or set of background assumptions and related practices about borders shared by a given policy community—into a post-nationalist one (‘Schengen’). The cultural evolutionary argument elaborated in the dissertation captures the unique political dynamics that have characterized border control in Europe in the last two decades and offers a more nuanced account of recent developments than those available in the existing European Studies literature. It can also shed light on current trends defining European politics beyond border control (e.g., Europe’s policy towards its neighbours) and on other attempts to regionalize border control outside Europe (e.g., the proposal for a North American security perimeter).

The Human Rights Act 1998 incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights. With incorporation, Parliament and the government of the United Kingdom believed that human rights would reflect British values, there would increase support for human rights and a human rights culture would develop. However, the goals of incorporation did not occur. One reason for the failure of the Human Rights Act 1998 is the UK courts interpretation of section 2(1). Courts in the United Kingdom have been unwilling to provide more extensive and less extensive protection of rights than Strasbourg. The effect of the court’s interpretation has been public, political and media backlash. Consequently, to resolve this problem, there must be a reinterpretation of section 2(1).