王啓義. / 手稿本(cops. 2 & 3 複印本) / Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學硏究院哲學學部. / Shou gao ben (cops. 2 & 3 fu yin ben) / Includes bibliographical references: leaves 211-216. / Wang Qiyi. / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue yan jiu yuan zhe xue xue bu. / 簡寫表 --- p.i / 序言 --- p.ii / 總述 --- p.iv / Chapter 第I篇 --- 維根斯坦的語言觀 / Chapter 第1章 --- 早期維根斯坦的語言理論 / Chapter 1.1 --- 概述 --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- 對象 --- p.4 / Chapter 1.3 --- 基本命題 --- p.10 / Chapter 1.4 --- 《論叢》語言理論的基本假定 --- p.15 / Chapter 1.41 --- 基本假定的思想根源──費里格和羅素 --- p.16 / Chapter 1.42 --- 四個基本假定 --- p.25 / Chapter 1.5 --- 圖像論 --- p.33 / Chapter 1.6 --- 真值函元篇 --- p.43 / Chapter 1.7 --- 總結 --- p.48 / Chapter 第2章 --- 後期維根斯坦的語言觀 / Chapter 2.1 --- 概述 --- p.50 / Chapter 2.2 --- 《論叢》批判 --- p.52 / Chapter 2.21 --- 對意義確定性的批評 --- p.53 / Chapter 2.22 --- 對分析和單純的批評 --- p.56 / Chapter 2.3 --- 語言遊戲 --- p.61 / Chapter 2.31 --- 一個新的進路 --- p.61 / Chapter 2.32 --- 脈絡和意義 --- p.65 / Chapter 2.4 --- 語言規則 --- p.71 / Chapter 2.41 --- 語言遊戲和規則 --- p.78 / Chapter 2.42 --- 文法規則和烹飪學規則 --- p.84 / Chapter 2.5 --- 對語言有何本質？的總結性回答 --- p.89 / Chapter 第II篇 --- 維根斯坦的後設哲學 / Chapter 第3章 --- 早期維根斯坦的後設哲學 / Chapter 3.1 --- 概述 --- p.94 / Chapter 3.2 --- 語言的界限 --- p.98 / Chapter 3.21 --- 可說的總和──科學命題的總和 --- p.98 / Chapter 3.22 --- 不可說的東西 --- p.101 / Chapter 3.3 --- 哲學批判 --- p.107 / Chapter 3.31 --- 哲學命題──悖謬 --- p.107 / Chapter 3.32 --- 哲學問題──偽似問題 --- p.110 / Chapter 3.4 --- 作為語言批判的哲學 --- p.115 / Chapter 3.41 --- 《論叢》哲學觀的核心論點 --- p.115 / Chapter 3.42 --- 語言批判 --- p.117 / Chapter 3.43 --- 哲學的正確方法 --- p.121 / Chapter 3.5 --- 釐清和評估 --- p.123 / Chapter 3.51 --- 早期維根斯坦反形上學嗎? --- p.123 / Chapter 3.52 --- 一個本質主義的錯誤 --- p.127 / Chapter 3.53 --- 早期維根斯坦的洞見 --- p.132 / Chapter 第4章 --- 後期維根斯坦的後設哲學 / Chapter 4.1 --- 對早期的反省 --- p.141 / Chapter 4.2 --- 哲學困惑的根源 --- p.145 / Chapter 4.21 --- 哲學困惑與表面深層文法的區分 --- p.147 / Chapter 4.22 --- 哲學困惑和文法經驗命題的區分 --- p.156 / Chapter 4.3 --- 哲學是治療困惑 --- p.169 / Chapter 4.4 --- 新方法 --- p.175 / Chapter 4.5 --- 誤解和辨正 --- p.181 / Chapter 4.51 --- 哲學探究──概念探究 --- p.182 / Chapter 4.52 --- 誤用與形上學語言遊戲 --- p.186 / Chapter 4.53 --- 哲學分析與系統性語言理論 --- p.193 / Chapter 4.6 --- 失落了問題 --- p.198 / 附註 --- p.202 / 參考書目 --- p.211

陳啓恩. / 據手稿本複印. / Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學, 1988. / Ju shou gao ben fu yin. / Includes bibliographical references: leaves 86-88. / Chen Qi'en. / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 1988. / 前言 / Chapter 第一章 --- 維根斯坦的前期哲學──作為了解他的後期哲學的背景 --- p.3 / Chapter 第二章 --- 維根斯坦對前期哲學的批判 --- p.25 / Chapter 第三章 --- 維根斯坦的語言工具觀 --- p.46 / Chapter 第四章 --- 維根斯坦的心靈哲學 --- p.58 / Chapter 第五章 --- 維根斯坦的哲學觀與方法論 --- p.77 / 註釋 --- p.83 / 參考資料 --- p.86

by Cheung Chan-Fai. / Thesis (M.Ph.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong. / Bibliography: leaves 63-83.

Leung Ka-wing. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 198-211). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / INTRODUCTION --- p.3 / Chapter CHAPTER ONE --- THE POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR THE REFORMULATION OF PHILOSOPHY: THE RELATION OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY --- p.8 / Chapter §1.1 --- Philosophy and Science in Ancient Greek --- p.9 / Chapter §1.2 --- Christian Theology and the First Philosophy --- p.15 / Chapter §1.3 --- Hegel's Formulation of Philosophy --- p.18 / Chapter §1.4 --- The Estrangement of Philosophy and Science --- p.21 / Chapter §1.5 --- Reformulation of Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century --- p.24 / Chapter 1.5.1 --- Positivism --- p.26 / Chapter 1.5.2 --- Neo-Kantianism --- p.31 / Chapter 1.5.3 --- Phenomenology --- p.35 / Chapter CHAPTER TWO --- PHILOSOPHY AS PRIMAL SCIENCE --- p.43 / Chapter §2.1 --- Remark on the Division of Heidegger's Periods of Thinking --- p.44 / Chapter §2.2 --- The Background of the Kreigsnotsemester --- p.50 / Chapter §2.3 --- Philosophy and Worldviews --- p.54 / Chapter §2.4 --- Philosophy and Particular Sciences --- p.59 / Chapter §2.5 --- "The “Knowledge of Objects"" as the Subject-matter of Philosophy" --- p.63 / Chapter §2.6 --- The Problematic of Axioms --- p.65 / Chapter §2.7 --- The Teleological´ؤcritical Method of the Southwest German School of the Neo-Kantianism --- p.68 / Chapter §2.8 --- A New Approach to the Psychical --- p.71 / Chapter §2.9 --- The Problematic of Lived´ؤexperience --- p.78 / Chapter §2.10 --- The Method for the Science of Lived´ؤexperiencein general --- p.83 / Chapter CHAPTER THREE --- FROM LIFE TO BEING: THE ELEVATION OF THE BEING´ؤQUESTION TO THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF PHILOSOPHY --- p.92 / Chapter §3.1 --- Heidegger's First Confrontation with the Being- question --- p.94 / Chapter §3.2 --- Life and Philosophy --- p.98 / Chapter §3.3 --- The Incompatibility of Life and Science --- p.103 / Chapter §3.4 --- "The Venture of ""Destruction""" --- p.108 / Chapter §3.5 --- "“The Being of the Factical Life"" as the Problematic of Philosophy" --- p.114 / Chapter §3.6 --- The Problematic of Time --- p.126 / Chapter CHAPTER FOUR --- BEING´ؤUNDERSTANDING AND TEMPORALITY: THE FORMULATION OF PHILOSOPHY IN SEIN UND ZEIT --- p.133 / Chapter §4.1 --- Philosophy as Ontology --- p.133 / Chapter §4.2 --- The Priority of Human Dasein in the Being- question --- p.139 / Chapter §4.3 --- The Transformation of the Being´ؤquestion --- p.147 / Chapter §4.4 --- The Being-constitution of Dasein --- p.155 / Chapter §4. 5 --- The Problematic of Temporality --- p.165 / Chapter §4.6 --- The Structure of Understanding and the Horizonal Schema of the Ecstase of Zeitlichkeit --- p.168 / Chapter §4.7 --- The Failure of the Program of Sein und Zeit --- p.clxxxi / CONCLUDING REMARKS --- p.185 / Chapter I. --- On Existence --- p.cxci / Chapter II. --- on Understanding --- p.192 / Chapter III. --- on Historicality --- p.195 / BIBIOGRAPHY --- p.198 / Chapter I. --- Works by Heidegger and corresponding English translations --- p.198 / Chapter II. --- Other references: --- p.202

李少芬 = On Wittgenstein's conception of 'Form of life' and its implications on the problems of foundation of rationality / Lee Siu-fan. / 論文(神學碩士) -- 香港中文大學硏究院哲學學部, 1997. / 參考文獻: leaves [94-100]. / Li Shaofen = On Wittgenstein's conception of 'Form of life' and its implications on the problems of foundation of rationality / Lee Siu-fan. / 撮要 / 體例說明與略語表 / Chapter 1. --- 引言 --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- 目標與方法 --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- 論旨 --- p.4 / Chapter 1.2.1 --- 「生命形式」的意義 --- p.4 / Chapter 1.2.2 --- 「生命形式」在維根斯坦哲學中的位置 --- p.8 / Chapter 1.2.3 --- 「生命形式」的現代哲學意涵 --- p.9 / Chapter 1.3 --- 全文結構 --- p.10 / Chapter 2. --- 維根斯坦的「生命形式」 --- p.11 / Chapter 2.1 --- 維根斯坦生平及哲學簡介 --- p.11 / Chapter 2.2 --- 「生命形式」槪念之提出 --- p.13 / Chapter 3. --- 語言遊戲´ؤ´ؤ語言的實踐性質 --- p.17 / Chapter 3.1 --- 奧古斯丁的語言觀 --- p.17 / Chapter 3.2 --- 維根斯坦的批評 --- p.19 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- 全面性 --- p.19 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- 基本性 --- p.20 / Chapter 3.3 --- 語言的實踐性質與「生命形式」槪念 --- p.24 / Chapter 4. --- 遵從規則´ؤ´ؤ語言的建構條件 --- p.27 / Chapter 4.1 --- 序言：規則問題的背景 --- p.27 / Chapter 4.2 --- 規則的產生條件 --- p.30 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- 規則的詮釋 --- p.32 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- 何謂依據規則行事？ --- p.37 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- 對規則特性的解釋 --- p.40 / Chapter 4.3 --- 遵從規則與「生命形式」的關係 --- p.42 / Chapter 5. --- 論確定性´ؤ´ؤ証立的文法與理性基礎 --- p.44 / Chapter 5.1 --- 序言：摩爾的論証 --- p.44 / Chapter 5.2 --- 《論確定性》簡介 --- p.48 / Chapter 5.3 --- 用法與應用情境：兩種哲學方法 --- p.49 / Chapter 5.3.1 --- 否定法 --- p.49 / Chapter 5.3.2 --- 語境治療法 --- p.50 / Chapter 5.4 --- 語言系統 --- p.52 / Chapter 5.4.1 --- 語言的自主性 --- p.54 / Chapter 5.4.2 --- 命題的不同角色 --- p.59 / Chapter 5.5 --- 基要命題的特性 --- p.62 / Chapter 5.5.1 --- 基要命題的眞實性：証立的文法與行動的首要性 --- p.62 / Chapter 5.5.2 --- 基要命題的系統性 --- p.70 / Chapter 5.5.3 --- 基要命題的來源與轉變 --- p.71 / Chapter 5.6 --- 基要命題、確定性與「生命形式」 --- p.77 / Chapter 6. --- 總論：「生命形式」與理性基礎 --- p.79 / Chapter 6.1 --- 「生命形式」在維根斯坦哲學中的角色 --- p.79 / Chapter 6.2 --- 「生命形式」對理性基礎問題的啓發 --- p.86 / Chapter 6.2.1 --- 描述事實：人類理性的運作 --- p.86 / Chapter 6.2.2 --- 中止論述：哲學最終只能止於描述 --- p.87 / Chapter 6.3 --- 結語 --- p.91 / 參攷書目

劉保禧. / "2008年11月". / "2008 nian 11 yue". / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 106-109). / Abstracts in Chinese and English. / Liu Baoxi. / 摘要 --- p.i / 導論 --- p.1 / Chapter 第一章: --- 自我問題與此在詮釋 --- p.7 / Chapter 1.1 --- 自我問題與存在問題 --- p.7 / Chapter 1.2 --- 此在分析與哲學人類學 --- p.13 / Chapter 1.2.1 --- 存活與一己性：本己或非本己的條件 --- p.15 / Chapter 1.3 --- 詮釋(學)作爲自我問題的線索 --- p.20 / Chapter 1.3.1 --- 領悟 --- p.21 / Chapter 1.3.2 --- 解釋 --- p.24 / Chapter 1.3.3 --- 兩種解釋與兩種詮釋(學) --- p.28 / Chapter 1.3.4 --- 詮釋循環 --- p.29 / Chapter 1.4 --- 小結：存在論差異的循環性質 --- p.31 / Chapter 第二章: --- 世界與日常狀態 --- p.33 / Chapter 2.1 --- 在世界之中存在 --- p.34 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- 周圍世界與用具 --- p.35 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- 世界的詮釋槪念 --- p.37 / Chapter 2.2 --- 日常狀態 --- p.38 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- 「首先並經常」 --- p.40 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- 共在 --- p.41 / Chapter 2.2.3 --- 常人 --- p.46 / Chapter 2.2.4 --- 沉淪 --- p.49 / Chapter 2.2.5 --- 日常狀態與存活模態 --- p.54 / Chapter 2.2.6 --- 日常狀態與自我問題 --- p.59 / Chapter 2.3 --- 小結：此在自我的三元結構 --- p.61 / Chapter 第三章： --- 關切與決斷 --- p.64 / Chapter 3.1 --- 關切 --- p.65 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- 關切、世界與日常狀態 --- p.67 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- 關切與自我性 --- p.70 / Chapter 3.2 --- 決斷 --- p.79 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- 決斷與憂虞 --- p.80 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- 決斷與先行 --- p.84 / Chapter 3.2.3 --- 決斷與詮釋處境 --- p.90 / Chapter 3.3 --- 小結：本己狀態「之後」？ --- p.97 / Chapter 第四章: --- 結論 --- p.100 / Chapter 4.1 --- 本文之貢獻 --- p.100 / Chapter 4.2 --- 檢討與後續討論 --- p.103 / 參考書目 --- p.106

No description available.

The argument of this thesis is that Heideggerian individuation does not constitute another form of solipsism and is not incongruent with Heidegger???s account of Mitsein (beingwith). By demonstrating how individuation is bound up with Mitsein I will also argue that this concept of individuation contains an ethics, conceived here as responsibility for one???s Being/existence that nevertheless implicates others. By tracing the trajectory of Heidegger???s thinking from Being and Time to the later text, Time and Being, I want to suggest that the meditation on Being and its relation to Dasein as an individual contains an ethical moment. Ethics, not conceived of as a series of proscriptions, in terms of the Kantian Categorical Imperative for example. Nor ethics conceived in terms of an obligation to and responsibility for another, as in Levinasian ethics, but an ethics in terms of responsibility for existence, and more specifically, for one???s own existence. The ethical moment in Heidegger, I argue, is not one as ambitious as changing the world or assuming infinite and numerous obligations on behalf of others. It is, rather, a question of changing oneself. It is a question of assuming responsibility in response to the call of Being. I will show how, given that Dasein is always Mitsein, others are situated in such an ethics. Central to the thesis is an examination of the relation between indivduation and Mitsein. While Heidegger is always careful to distinguish his form of individuation from other accounts of individuation or solipsism, such as those of Rene Descartes, Immanuel Kant or Edmund Husserl???s, Heidegger???s conception of solipsism and its relation to his account of Mitsein remains somewhat obscure. As a consequence, there are several problems that this concept raises, all of which have been the subject of much debate. At the centre of this debate is the apparent tension between the concept of individuation and the notion that ontologically, Dasein is also a Mitsein. This tension has led to a number of interpretations, which either argue that the concept of individuation is inconsistent with the notion of Mitsein, or that it constitutes yet another instance of Cartesian subjectivity and that as a consequence, it is inherently unethical. This thesis contributes to this debate by submitting that the concept of individuation, while primary or central to Heidegger???s ontology, is not in tension with his account of Mitsein. I use Jean-Luc Nancy???s paradoxical logic of the singular to argue for this claim. I suggest that it is precisely this concept of individuation that can inform an ethics and theory of political action on account of the emphasis on individual responsibility. The second part of my argument, also made with the aid of Nancy, is that this can inform an ethics and a theory of political action, not at level of making moral judgements, or yielding standards of right and wrong, but at the level of individual and by implication, collective responsibility for one???s own existence. Given that there is no real separation between the ontic and ontological levels in Heidegger???s work, a taking responsibility at the level of one???s own Being will invariably play itself out ontically in factical life in terms of moral responsibility and judgement. I explore the concrete political implications of this through an examination of Heidegger???s account of freedom. I argue that Heidegger???s removal of freedom from the ontology of self-presence and his alternative conception of it provides us with a way of thinking freedom not in terms of a specific set of rights, but as a mode of being-in-theworld and as the basis for collective political action. I use the work of Hannah Arendt to develop a theory of political action, freedom and judgment from this revisionary conception of freedom.

Kloster Glonn, an officer in the Bavarian National Police, describes the events of November 8, 1923 known as the Beer Hall Putsch.

No description available.