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"Language as Disclosure in Five Modernist American Works" comprises a series of Heideggerian readings of James's The Turn of the Screw, Williams's In the American Grain, Faulkner's As I Lay Dying, Hemingway's Death in the Afternoon, and Barth's Lost in the Funhouse. Each text is taken as a single and separate performance of poetic language. The readings do not interpret or explain the texts but attempt to follow them in a thinking, to map what shows up and in what relations. The attempt is to get past the roadblock of "ambiguity" that characterizes modernist texts, not by deciding the undecidable but by exploring it. The dissertation explores the nature or function of language. In James literality works to indicate, to evoke, to found and maintain as well as to violate or subvert a human order. Language borders and opposes the abyss in the story, and it is at this border and in this conflict that reality originates. Williams too revises the notion of origin as he proposes a new "method" of "composition" whereby a poet in the act of asserting and proving himself sets forth not only his own potency but that of his ground, his locality, his period and his time. In the Faulkner story representative language has become disconnected from life, is irrelevant, ineffectual, dysfunctional. However, in spite of its explicit indictment of words, the work discloses a new ontology, a new standard of value, and an originary function for words. In the Hemingway story language or the work of art (the bullfight, here) is the site, the occasion, and the agency in and by which "facts," things that actually happen, rise into appearance upon the horizon of death. In these modernist works we find the function of language to be, in some sense, disclosure. With the Barth story we pass into a milder postmodern atmosphere, but we find the same antagonists, language and not-language. Ostensibly language is impotent; thematically the rational paradigm is overwhelmed by objectivity. I claim, however, that language diminished and exposed is still working by modernist standards to provoke into view the potentiality that representative language cannot express.

Informe de Seminario para optar al grado de Licenciado en Filosofía

Informe de Seminario para optar al grado de Licenciado en Filosofía / Lo que nos interesa destacar del “nada que decir” no es la expresión “que decir” (la cual podría perfectamente ser reemplazada por “que explicar”, “que escribir”, “que contar”, etc.), sino esa extraña palabra que habitualmente entendemos simplemente en el sentido de “no”. Cuando suponemos que para ser consecuentes con el “nada que decir” habría que dejar las páginas en blanco, estamos pensando el término “nada” en ese sentido que habitualmente solemos asignarle – el de la negación -, por lo cual el “nada que decir” se nos vuelve idéntico a “no decir”. No se trata aquí de rechazar de buenas a primeras ese sentido de la palabra “nada”; se trata más bien de llevar la expresión “nada que decir” a una situación en la cual se la vivencie realmente, en la cual cobre plena significación a causa de sentírsela como verdad. Es cierto que la frase funciona en muchos y muy diversos contextos: podemos replicar “nada que decir” frente a alguien que nos pregunte sobre un tema en particular, donde el tema puede ser cualquiera. Se trata de nada que decir ante alguien que nos pide explicaciones por alguna controvertida decisión nuestra, por ejemplo. En ese caso, puede que repliquemos “nada que decir” porque simplemente no queremos dar explicación alguna al respecto. Los ejemplos podrían ser muy variados, desde luego, pero siempre estarían referidos a un tema particular frente al cual uno decidiera callar, no decir.

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Thesis advisor: Susan M. Shell / Title: Martin Heidegger's Critique of Freedom Author: Charles Robinson Advisor: Professor Susan Shell Boston College Political Science Department This is a study of thought and politics of Martin Heidegger. It presents an examination of his understanding of freedom, principally as he expressed it in Being and Time, but also considers some of his subsequent essays and lectures, as well as his Rectorate Address. Ever since Heidegger's public embrace of National Socialism, his defenders and critics have argued about the possible relation between his thinking and his infamous political commitments. While many of his critics have linked his commitments to an alleged lack of understanding of freedom, some of his scholarly defenders have sought to present interpretations of his concept of freedom at odds with his infamous politics, in order to separate his thought from any association with Nazism. The conclusions of these critics and defenders of Heidegger are both mistaken: in Being and Time Heidegger sought the meaning of being in the authentic experience of human self-determination revealed by the conscience, which he worked out as "forward running resolve." It was this militant concept of freedom that grounded his project for a destined community of battle to be championed by a free corps of freedom fighters, and led him to embrace, in the very name of freedom, the tyranny of Hitler's new Reich. The study of Heidegger's concept of authentic freedom reveals that, far from lacking any understanding of freedom, it was rather a central theme and concern of his philosophical efforts, and that his infamous political commitments were indeed its necessary and coherent practical consequence. Heidegger's thought thus poses a more trenchant and pressing challenge to liberal (and leftist) politics than many of his critics and defenders appreciate. There have been comparatively few sustained thematic treatments of Heidegger's understanding of freedom in English. This study accordingly hopes to contribute to an understanding of this central theme of Heidegger's philosophical efforts, which not only reveals their necessary connection to his politics, but also promises to improve our access to the coherent intelligibility of his thought as a whole. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2009. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

Esta pesquisa visa analisar a interpretação da Alegoria da Caverna, trecho da obra A república, de Platão, feita por Martin Heidegger, filósofo alemão. A pesquisa procura evidenciar a originalidade da interpretação que Heidegger fez deste famoso trecho da obra de Platão e o que nela foi desvendado pelo filósofo alemão: a mudança na determinação da essência da verdade. Confrontaremos as interpretações correntes da Alegoria da Caverna feita por diversos intérpretes da obra de Platão, inclusive por Hans Kelsen, em cuja obra encontramos a influência da filosofia platônica. Na interpretação de Heidegger sobre a Alegoria da Caverna deparamo-nos com a noção de aletheia (desvelamento) como a essência da verdade, elaborada dessa forma pelos pensadores gregos originários. / Cette recherche vise à analyser l\'interprétation de l\'Allégorie de la Caverne, u um extrait de l\'oeuvre La République, de Platon, réalisé par Martin Heidegger, philosophe allemand. La recherche vise à mettre en évidence l\'originalité de l\'interprétation que Heidegger fait de ce passage célèbre de l\'oeuvre de Platon et de ce qu\'elle a été dévoilée par le philosophe allemand: le changement dans la détermination de l\'essence de la vérité. Confronterons les interprétations actuelles de l\'Allégorie de la Caverne faite par divers interprètes de l\'oeuvre de Platon, y compris par Hans Kelsen, aux l oeuvre de laquelle nous trouvons l\'influence de la philosophie platonicienne. Pour l\'interprétation de Heidegger sur l\'Allégorie de la Caverne, nous rencontrons la notion de aletheia (dévoilement) comme l\'essence de la vérité, établi de cette manière par les penseurs grecs d\'origine

¿Qué es el pensamiento débil? Lo primero que podemos decir es que bajo ese nombre es como generalmente se caracteriza a la propuesta filosófico-hermenéutica de Gianni Vattimo, autor que cuenta con una vasta obra ensayística, a lo largo de la cual expone y aclara los distintos elementos constitutivos con los cuales se articula su propuesta y precisa los alcances de la misma. Pero si, a modo de introducción, queremos hacer una breve –y muy general– caracterización de su planteamiento filosófico, podemos decir que el pensamiento débil es una propuesta filosófica edificante1 , que, partiendo de una concepción nihilista de la historia y una renuncia a las categorías fuertes de la tradición filosófica occidental, propone una ontología débil y un proyecto secular que plantea dar cabida a la diversidad y que, por lo mismo, previene contra las tentaciones de asumir nuevas formas de fundacionalismo, brindando así la clave para evitar la violencia que trae consigo toda estructura metafísica. Precisamente, en relación a éste último punto, podemos señalar la que quizá sea la característica más desafiante de este proyecto filosófico: Gianni Vattimo nos presenta su propuesta como un proyecto emancipador, en el sentido de que busca tener consecuencias prácticas – políticas– en relación a un problema de fondo que, a partir de su análisis teórico, se ve claramente surgir: el problema de la noción metafísica-representacionalista de la verdad y la violencia que se manifiesta a partir de ella. / Tesis

Wong Kin Keung. / Thesis submitted in: December 2004. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 167-171). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Abbreviations --- p.iv / Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1. --- Prelude: the Two Broadly Generalized Theses of Dilthey's Project --- p.9 / Chapter (a) --- Thesis I: Behind Life Thought Cannot Go --- p.11 / Chapter (b) --- Thesis II: To Understand Life in terms of itself --- p.19 / Chapter 2. --- Toward the Original Givenness of Life --- p.25 / Chapter (a) --- Erlebnis as the Nexus of Facts of Consciousness --- p.25 / Chapter (b) --- The Relational Dimension of life --- p.29 / Chapter i) --- the Psychic Structural Nexus of Erlebnis --- p.29 / Chapter ii) --- the Objective World with Respect to Life-concern --- p.32 / Chapter (c) --- The Temporal-dynamic Dimension of Life --- p.36 / Chapter i) --- the Purposive Efficacy and Immanent Teleology --- p.36 / Chapter ii) --- the Temporal Dynamism of Life-course --- p.38 / Chapter 3. --- Toward an Epistemic Hermeneutics --- p.41 / Chapter (a) --- Reflexive Awareness as a kind of Pre-reflective Living-awareness' --- p.41 / Chapter (b) --- Meaning as the Part-whole relation of Life-nexus --- p.45 / Chapter (c) --- The Method of Verstehen --- p.47 / Chapter i) --- from Elementary Forms of Understanding --- p.50 / Chapter ii) --- to Higher Forms of Understanding --- p.52 / Chapter 4. --- Heidegger's Appropriation of Dilthey's Philosophy in KNS 1919 and Early Lecture Courses --- p.61 / Chapter 5. --- The Neo-Kantian Challenges --- p.72 / Chapter 6. --- The Hidden Diltheyan Sources in ´بthe Phenomenological Beginnings' --- p.79 / Chapter (a) --- The Phenomenological Beginnings' --- p.79 / Chapter i) --- Phenomenological disclosure of the sphere of lived experience --- p.79 / Chapter ii) --- The theoretical infringement upon lived experience --- p.87 / Chapter (b) --- The Hidden Diltheyan Sources --- p.94 / Chapter i) --- the immanent teleology of life' in KNS --- p.94 / Chapter ii) --- life and world --- p.97 / Chapter iii) --- self and the existential moments of life --- p.101 / Chapter 7. --- The Hidden Diltheyan Sources in ´بthe Hermeneutic Breakthrough' --- p.113 / Chapter (a) --- The Hermeneutic Breakthrough' --- p.113 / Chapter i) --- the genesis of the theoretical from the pre-theoretical domain of lived experience and the corresponding moments of cognizing --- p.113 / Chapter ii) --- in search of the hermeneutic intuition --- p.117 / Chapter (b) --- The Hidden Diltheyan Sources --- p.121 / Chapter i) --- the structural unity of 'the knowing' and 'the known' --- p.132 / Chapter ii) --- expressive formation of concepts --- p.139 / Chapter iii) --- formal indication --- p.144 / Chapter 8. --- Conclusion --- p.152 / Bibliography --- p.167

El presente trabajo aborda la relación entre la noción de libertad y la posibilidad de una “ética” en el pensamiento de Martin Heidegger. Para ello, en el primer capítulo se realiza precisiones acerca de nociones que Heidegger re-interpreta de la tradición filosófica: verdad (ἀληθεία), libertad, λόγος. Esta re-interpretación se asume no como un recurso innecesario de hermetismo, sino como la consecuencia del proyecto radical de Heidegger ante la pregunta por el sentido del ser (Seinsfrage) y el olvido de la tradición en la confusión entre ser y ente. En el segundo capítulo, haremos hincapié en los conceptos de libertad expuestos por autores modernos como: Leibniz, Schelling y Kant. Luego, presentamos la posición de Heidegger, quien considera a los conceptos de libertad de los anteriores pensadores como acercamientos impropios o inauténticos (uneigentlich) a la pregunta por la esencia de la libertad. Así, pues, Heidegger presenta la noción auténtica de libertad como dejar-ser (sein lassen). Finalmente, en el tercer y último capítulo, discutimos y presentamos nuestras consideraciones en contra de la posición de Franco Volpi que considera a Ser y Tiempo como una versión moderna de los conceptos prácticos de Aristóteles. Luego, presentamos nuestra posición que asume la posibilidad de una “ética mística” en el pensamiento de Heidegger, sostenida en la distinción entre pensar meditativo y pensar calculativo, una nueva “definición del ser humano” y la comprensión auténtica de la serenidad (Gelassenheit). / Tesis