The aim of this thesis is to defend T.H. Marshall’s conception of social citizenship. I argue that it can be defended both against the New Rights’ rejection of social democracy and against the Third Way re-formulation of social democracy, by Anthony Giddens and others, which rejects the goal of social equality. My defence of social citizenship is conducted at the level of meta-theoretical argument concerning the nature of justification. More specifically, I make use of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics, which I argue is a conservative meta-theory and which I distinguish from enlightenment and radical meta-theories. For Gadamer, the rational capacity required for justification presupposes a shared tradition which it actively establishes through mutual learning. I distinguish this from Jurgen Habermas’ and Martha Nussbaum’s enlightenment positions, where rational capacity is prior to practice, and from Michel Foucult’s radical position, where rational capacity is established through subjugation and resistance. Marshal argues that this proposals for social equality are justified from within the tradition of citizenship and must therefore be revised in new situations. I argue that the meta-theoretical position assumed here in Marshall’s social citizenship corresponds to hermeneutics. I also argue that the revision Marshall calls for can be justified as a hermeneutic reformulation of social citizenship. It must be pursued as a process of mutual learning so as to establish social equality in relations of mutual learning. Further, I argue that in the reformulation of social citizenship hermeneutics can be revised so as to account for the necessity of social equality for rational capacity. I argue that conceptions of citizenship must proceed from assumptions concerning the nature of justification. However, it is through enabling the rational capacity of citizens that these meta-theoretical assumptions will be fully realised.

State sovereignty is being challenged by a variety of factors, ranging from globalisation, to the increasing importance of non-state actors, to the new modalities of force at the international level. But perhaps the most important challenge to sovereignty is that posed by democracy. Democracy dominates international society to such an extent that it has provoked arguments that democratic processes and content are necessary in such areas as self-determination, recognition of states, and more generally, through a right to democratic governance under international law. This work develops the implications of the challenge of democracy to sovereignty in three arguments. The first, rejecting the trend of much current scholarship, is simply that sovereignty is a valuable legal construct, one that can, and should, be preserved. The second argument is that sovereignty can overcome its present challenges because by its very nature it is a flexible, dynamic, and evolving concept. Sovereignty, both in practice and theory, has represented different things at different times, and continues to react and adapt to new developments. The third argument is that sovereignty is developing in ways that make it more compatible with democracy. This latter argument is particularly contentious, and requires detailed examination of the nature of the three concepts at the heart of this work, namely, statehood, democracy and sovereignty. Several chapters engage in this detailed analysis. After a brief definitional chapter, the concept of statehood and the challenges facing the modern state are examined. Democracy is the focus of the following two chapters, one of which defines it and sets out its substance, and the other examines its theoretical and practical justifications. Five chapters concentrating on sovereignty follow. The first looks at absolutist, the second at contractarian (social contract), and the third at more modern theories of sovereignty. Then the three concepts of statehood, democracy and sovereignty are distinguished and re-assessed, before a democratic conception of sovereignty is set forth.

For most governments, facilitating economic growth is a top priority. Sometimes, in their pursuit of this objective, governments interfere with private property. Often, they do so by indirect means, for instance through their power to regulate permitted land uses or by adjusting the tax code. However, many governments are also prepared to use their power of eminent domain in the pursuit of economic development. That is, they sometimes compel private owners to give up their property to make way for a new owner that is expected to put the property to a more economically profitable use. This thesis asks how the law should respond to government actions of this kind, often referred to as economic development takings. The thesis makes two main contributions in this regard. First, in Part I, it proposes a theoretical foundation for reasoning about the legitimacy of economic development takings, including an assessment of possible standards for judicial review. Moreover, the thesis links the legitimacy question to the work done by Elinor Ostrom and others on sustainable management of common pool resources. Specifically, it is argued that using institutions for local self-governance to manage development potentials as common pool resources can potentially undercut arguments in favour of using eminent domain for economic development. Then, in Part II, the thesis puts the theory to the test by considering takings of property for hydropower development in Norway. It is argued that current eminent domain practices appear illegitimate, according to the normative theory developed in Part I. At the same time, the Norwegian system of land consolidation offers an alternative to eminent domain that is already being used extensively to facilitate community-led hydropower projects. The thesis investigates this as an example of how to design self-governance arrangements to increase the democratic legitimacy of decision-making regarding property and economic development.

Theorizing Justice for a Realistic Utopia: The Methodological ImplicationsMany political theorists agree that practical recommendations are a valuable attribute of a theory of justice. For some theorists, who I refer to as Realistic Utopians, this means that they should aim to develop principles of justice to govern the constituents of a moderately idealised society. In this thesis I establish the methodological implications of the Realistic Utopian approach and identify their unifying theme. The Realistic Utopian approach to developing principles of justice has received widespread support in the literature. Considering an idealised society allows theorists to pursue aspirational recommendations of justice, whilst the moderate nature of the idealisations ensures that those recommendations are in some sense practical. Their aim represents the idea that it is important to develop principles that describe how just we can possibly be. The popularity of this aim has resulted in many theorists adopting a broadly similar approach. It permits theorists to use idealisations in their deliberations, but requires these idealisations to be limited by feasibility constraints. In this thesis I explain the core commitment shared by all RU theorists, distinguish the RU approach to justice from alternative approaches, and then defend three additional methodological requirements that RU theorists must adopt. Each of these three additional methodological requirements is entailed by the shared core commitment to develop principles to govern a moderately idealised society, and each imposes more stringent requirements on the methodology than proponents of the view typically acknowledge. The first says that context forms a part of the grounds for some substantive principles of justice; the second requires that principles be stable for the right reasons; and the third that they be legitimately implementable. I do not claim that this list is exhaustive—there may be further methodological requirements that particular RU theorists choose to adopt in addition to those set out here. My claim is that the three requirements I identify impose restrictions on suitable methodologies for developing principles of justice that must be respected by any theorist who wants these principles to apply to a moderately idealised utopia. The idea that the grounds of justice should be sensitive to the views of those to whom the principles may eventually apply unifies these requirements. Although Realistic Utopian principles of justice are not designed to apply immediately, the methodology requires they be designed with a particular context in mind. Meeting this requirement via sensitivity to the views of those within the context allows theorists to meet all three methodological requirements simultaneously.

With particular constructive epistemological and political goals strategically in view, this thesis undertakes a critically analytical comparison of key aspects of the thought of Thomas Nagel and the ‘intellectual stream’ of the apophatic tradition originating from the works of Pseudo-Dionysius. In drawing on Nagel, an American ‘analytical’ philosopher, as a primary source, it seeks, in more general terms, to contribute in unique ways to a recent broader renewal of interest in Pseudo-Dionysius for contemporary philosophical and theological concerns. Substantially and specifically, however, in taking the role of detachment in both primary interlocutors as its central guiding focus, the thesis uncovers several fundamental and mutually illuminating orientational and structural resonances between the two, not least among which is a demonstration of the indispensable interwovenness and integration of the epistemological, ethical and political domains in both. Through this integration the thesis seeks further to show in new ways and along fresh trajectories not only the essential ‘this-worldly’ or socially engaged orientation at the heart of detachment, but also the full rational accountability of detachment in both Nagel and Dionysius. Despite their striking similarities, however, crucial differences will be found between the two, most especially in the ‘extent’ of the detachment allowed or demanded by each: differences which will be shown to have an especially important bearing when considering Nagel’s political theory. Whilst the ‘liberal egalitarianism’ yielded by Nagel’s programme is grounded in a ‘two standpoints’ model of detachment – a model which must retain an element of the ‘personal standpoint’ along with the detached ‘impersonal standpoint’ – the ‘radical’ detachment of Dionysian apophaticism (for which Meister Eckhart will be the later exemplar), demands a full ‘erasure’ of the personal perspective, thereby yielding what we shall be calling a ‘kenotic egalitarianism’, key commitments and characteristics of which will be explored at the conclusion.

This thesis uses Nancy Fraser’s theory of justice and participation as a tool of critical analysis to critique transitional justice initiatives in Sierra Leone. The decade long civil war in Sierra Leone was one marked by some of the most violent and heinous violations of human rights in the twentieth century. Since the end of the conflict the nation has been regularly highlighted for endemic poverty and unemployment. In Fraser’s theoretical framework of justice, these phenomena are not mutually exclusive; the endemic poverty – or injustice of maldistribution – is directly related to, and mutually supporting of, violent outbreaks and cultural segregations – or the injustice of misrecognition. Regardless, or perhaps because of, the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, a truth and reconciliation commission and numerous grassroots development projects, both misrecognition and maldistribution remain prominent in Sierra Leonean society. This thesis argues that institutions of transitional justice in Sierra Leone have failed to engage with or understand root causes of civil strife or hostilities and as such have led to the development of inappropriate measures for resolving conflict in Sierra Leone. As a result the current research argues, mechanisms of transitional justice in their capacity as justice mechanisms, serve to re-establish and further entrench injustices that initially led to the civil conflict. As a means of overcoming this cycle of injustice, this thesis discusses the necessity of situating transitional justice mechanisms locally, engaging comprehensively with local perspectives of both the injustice suffered and the justice mechanisms implemented. The voice of local populations must be heard and materially realized if the judicial endeavours that will shape their future lives are to be relevant and binding.

This thesis provides a Butler-Ettingerian account of political subjectivity framed in terms of Derrida's democracy to-come. Levinas, Derrida and Ettinger can each be seen to consider the role and effects of'the beyond of the political in the political'. Levinas thinks of it in terms of transcendence, Derrida in terms of hauntology and Ettinger in terms of a transubjective level to subjectivity. Ettinger's is the most useful formulation because she provides parallel ways to thinking difference, desire, and signifying processes which are not structured in terms of language and cognitive knowledge, binary forms of difference, and desire for a 'whole' or transparent self. Within Ettinger's matrixial theory subjectivity is multi-levelled and incorporates two forms of difference, one of which is structured around a binary I/not-I logic, and the other of which is a difference-in-jointness and relates to the co-emergence of partial subjectivities characterised by severally, jointness-in-separation and distance-inproximity. I examine how these forms of difference contribute to an expanded account of sociality within which ambiguity within interhuman relations is an accepted part of social and political life and which enables responsiveness and futurity. Judith Butler provides an account of the conditions of social and political life which necessitate responsiveness. Butler demonstrates that corporeal vulnerability, the differential distribution of material and perceptual precarity, convergent temporalities and unchosen modes of cohabitation necessitate a re-thinking of ethics as a relational practice. Furthermore she stresses the importance of cultural translation so that our sense of obligation extends beyond any form of commonality. I contrast the reading of the Levinasian ethical relation which Ettinger and Butler each provide in order to demonstrate their different accounts of responsiveness and Ettinger's use of a feminine principle. I conclude that a Butler-Ettingerian account of political subjectivity is most suited to living with ambiguity and enabling futurity and responsiveness.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.