This thesis examines the dimension of normative power in Germany's foreign policy and the extent to which the contours of a changing German international identity have transformed the parameters of that normative power. It studies how foreign policy has moved between a logic of appropriateness and a logic of consequentialism in Germany's motivations for political action. The thesis is informed by social constructivism and liberal institutionalism, in that it starts from the premise that German foreign policy is inherently shaped by identity and institutions. Whereas most academic work emphasizes continuity in foreign policy after unification, this thesis argues that Germany's foreign policy has changed significantly between 1997 and 2007. This happened because policy-makers reformulated Germany's international identity thereby shaping a new framework tor foreign policy. This remaking of identity diminished the country's predominantly normative orientation and reinforced a more utilitarian approach for foreign policy-making. The thesis attempts to show how this remaking of identity was conducted and how identity change preceded the shift in the realm of foreign policy. The empirical part of the thesis compares the foreign policies of the governments of Chancellors Helmut Kohl, Gerhard Schroder and Angela Merkel in the period from 1997 to 2007. To do so it examines four case studies which are representative of the transformation in German post-unification foreign policy: Germany's new security policy; the Europeanization of Germany's European policy regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); bilateral relationships with France and the United States, and Germany's quest for permanent membership of the UN Security Council. These four policy domains all involve fundamental choices about Germany's foreign policy identity, and the nature of Germany's normative power at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

The six German political foundations, backed by substantial public funds, have several hundreds of foreign offices around the globe and more than 2000 staff members. As specific manifestations of the German political landscape, the Stiftungen are affiliated to the German political parties at the German Bundestag. This thesis researches the international activity of the German political foundations and their position within international relations theory. It juxtaposes the rationalists and constructivists approaches on the state and non-state relationship and the possible impact of transnational actors. After having identified the German political foundations as transnational actors, a model of public diplomacy is used to systematically study the foundations’ transnational interaction processes. The model integrates different public diplomacy approaches and is based on the assumption of public diplomacy as a diplomatic process in a network environment, where transnational actors and states are equally important and where values and ideas are emphasised. At the same time, it considers propaganda activity, a criticism sometimes voiced by foreign governments with regard to the foundations’ undertakings. The foundations’ democracy assistance as well as their conflict management ambitions are explored, as collaborative or catalytic public diplomacy forms. In two case studies, one on the Rule of law program of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Southeast Europe and another on the activities of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Southern Thailand, the strategies of ideational diffusion processes and networking, the soft power resources and social relationship building of the political foundations are investigated. This theoretically informed empirical study aims at first contributing to the object of the German political foundations’ international undertakings which has been subject to little research so far. Second, it connects IR theory on transnational actors as well as the literature on public diplomacy to these activities. Finally, the thesis identifies the Stiftungen as reproducers of the German civilian power identity by implementing abroad major parts of German policy.

Germany’s support for the Eastern enlargement of the European Union was a key factor in the successful completion of this idea in 2004. Germany’s policy towards the enlargement was, however, ambivalent and for this reason perceived as controversial. This thesis examines and explains the reasons of this paradox. German policy makers endorsed the idea of the Eastern enlargement of the EU for the reasons deriving from the national identity, based on a history-related narrative, and from the fact of the successful unification of Germany. As Chancellor Helmut Kohl captured it — the unification of Germany and the unification of Europe were two sides of the same coin. Eastern enlargement was, however, a novel idea and was changing the existing European order and concepts of the European integration. It faced therefore powerful constraints both in the shape of still existing, though declining, Cold War structural grip, as well as of the conflicting with the enlargement interests of other member state of the EU and domestic economic preferences and interests. It caught German policy makers between powerful and mutually conflicting challenges and faced them with a need to choose strategic priorities for the foreign policy. The choice was continuity of multilateralism, the principle of the foreign policy of the West Germany. This choice turned the enlargement policy into one of the premises of the grand strategy of the German Europapolitik. Examining the ambivalence in the enlargement policy allows not only to explain its causes but also to observe a process of changing the concept of the European integration. This doctoral thesis is a result of the research conducted at the London School of Economics and Political Science under the supervision of Prof. William Wallace and Dr. Ulrich Sedelmeier.