Since the mid-1980s, trade liberalisation has encouraged the growth of Australia’s international trade. The Australian wine industry has been successful in the world wine market, achieving a significant growth in production and export sales since the 1990s. In this context, this thesis attempts to provide a comprehensive analysis of the patterns and determinants of Australia’s international trade in wines for the period 1980-2004. The general aim of this thesis is to analyse the Australian wine industry based on the economic theories of inter-industry trade and intra-industry trade and to model wine export and import relationships. Indicators of Australia’s trade performance in wines in terms of trade specialisation index, export propensity, import penetration, and the ratio of exports to imports indicate that Australia has become a net-exporter and has experienced a specialisation in wine trade since 1987. This signifies a high degree of international trade competitiveness in Australia’s wines. The results of Balassa’s revealed comparative advantage index and Vollrath’s revealed competitive advantage indexes suggest that, among the wine producing countries, Australia has a comparative advantage and competitive advantage in wines. The significant year was 1987 when Australia first experienced comparative and competitive advantage. The important explanation for this turning point is Australia’s trade liberalisation policy in the mid-1980s. Based on econometric concepts of unit root and cointegration, the unrestricted error correction model is applied to analyse the determinants of Australia’s wine exports and imports separately in the models of export supply, export demand, and import demand. The results suggest that the relative price of wine exports and the long-run production capacity have had a positive influence on the supply of wine exports. However, Australia’s wine exports are not very responsive to changes in export price. Although the trade liberalisation shows a positive impact on the supply of wine exports, it is not statistically significant. Foreign demand for Australia’s wine exports has had a significant negative response to changes in the relative price of exports and a significant positive response to the depreciation of the Australian dollar in both the short run and long run. A low value of the price elasticity of foreign demand may reveal that Australia has some market power in relation to its exports of differentiated or unique wines to the world market. The demand for wine imports by Australia is inelastic with respect to the relative price of wine imports but more elastic to Australia’s income. The standard Grubel-Lloyd index is used to examine the extent of intra-industry trade of Australia and major world-wine trading countries. The index is also applied to Australia’s bilateral intra-industry trade in wines with its major trading countries. To measure the growth of intra-industry trade for Australia’s wines, the concept of marginal intra-industry trade is applied, together with Menon-Dixon’s approach. The results indicate that the world wine industry is more likely to be characterised by inter-industry trade which is based on the significance of comparative advantage and factor endowments rather than intra-industry trade. Australia has a relatively small intra-industry trade in wines. This is due to the fact that the values of Australia’s wine exports are very much higher than those of its imports. The extent of bilateral intra-industry trade in wines between Australia and its major trading partners is also small. However, the levels of bilateral intra-industry trade between Australia and New Zealand are relatively high. The growth of intra-industry trade in wines between Australia and most of the major wine-producing countries is due to the contributions of export growth to the growth in intra-industry trade, which imply that Australia is a net importer of wines from these countries. On the other hand, the percentage growth of intra-industry trade in wines between Australia and Germany, the U.S., the U.K., New Zealand, Canada, and Japan is due to the contributions of import growth to the growth in intra-industry trade, which imply that Australia is a net exporter of wines to these countries. The extent of Australia’s intra-industry trade with the rest of the world will be higher when the industry gains more scale economies. Contrary to the theoretical suggestions, product differentiations, degree of trade openness, and exchange rate have had negative relationships with Australia’s intra-industry trade in wines. With regard to Australia’s bilateral intra-industry trade with its nine major wine trading partners (France, Italy, Spain, Germany, the U.S., South Africa, New Zealand, the U.K. and Japan), the intensity of intra-industry trade in wines is statistically and positively related to the ratio of capital to labour, trade openness, common culture, and the regional trade arrangements. The policy implications of the analysis of the determinants of Australia’s intra-industry trade in wines are that the government policy should be oriented towards increases in the production capacity of the Australian wine industry in order to achieve higher economies of scale. In addition, the Australian government should promote regional economic integration and trade liberalisation involving wine trade between close and economically similar economies.

In the face of escalating health care expenditure, OECD countries are turning to a variety of cost-containment strategies. This thesis analyses three such mechanisms. In Part I, I consider the use of coinsurance to limit the demand for health care. Because coinsurance reduces the elasticity of demand with respect to the price of health care, consumers facing low coinsurance rates may be charged a higher price by doctors. Such discriminatory pricing enables the doctor to extract surplus created in the insurance market, and therefore reduces the effectiveness of coinsurance. I show that in equilibrium, some consumers remain uninsured. I also show how this problem is solved if the doctor and insurer enter into managed care style arrangements. Such arrangements improve insurer and doctor profitability, and restore complete insurance market coverage. In Part II, I consider the design of fundholding schemes which encourage doctors to restrict expensive treatment to severely ill patients. I show that such schemes may be undermined by a patient-doctor side contract. In the face of such patient-doctor collusion, the fundholding scheme may be made collusion-proof by increasing its "power". I show that the optimal collusion-proof scheme may pay the doctor more than his reservation wage. An alternative solution to patient-doctor collusion is to use a partial fundholding scheme that requires some additional co-payment from the patient. Part III analyses New Zealand's internal market reforms. Introduced in 1993, the reforms involved the separation of funding and provision of health care, and were intended to simulate a competitive market environment, thereby improving the incentives of government owned health care providers to be efficient. On the supply side, I look at the internal restructuring of hospitals into private-sector clones. I argue that this commercialisation failed to take account of informational issues within the hospital. On the demand-side, I examine the suitability of internal markets for eliciting optimal innovation from the hospital sector. Again, I find that a standard argument, namely that increased competition leads to innovation, is questionable in the context of the internal market. / Whole document restricted, but available by request, use the feedback form to request access.

In the face of escalating health care expenditure, OECD countries are turning to a variety of cost-containment strategies. This thesis analyses three such mechanisms. In Part I, I consider the use of coinsurance to limit the demand for health care. Because coinsurance reduces the elasticity of demand with respect to the price of health care, consumers facing low coinsurance rates may be charged a higher price by doctors. Such discriminatory pricing enables the doctor to extract surplus created in the insurance market, and therefore reduces the effectiveness of coinsurance. I show that in equilibrium, some consumers remain uninsured. I also show how this problem is solved if the doctor and insurer enter into managed care style arrangements. Such arrangements improve insurer and doctor profitability, and restore complete insurance market coverage. In Part II, I consider the design of fundholding schemes which encourage doctors to restrict expensive treatment to severely ill patients. I show that such schemes may be undermined by a patient-doctor side contract. In the face of such patient-doctor collusion, the fundholding scheme may be made collusion-proof by increasing its "power". I show that the optimal collusion-proof scheme may pay the doctor more than his reservation wage. An alternative solution to patient-doctor collusion is to use a partial fundholding scheme that requires some additional co-payment from the patient. Part III analyses New Zealand's internal market reforms. Introduced in 1993, the reforms involved the separation of funding and provision of health care, and were intended to simulate a competitive market environment, thereby improving the incentives of government owned health care providers to be efficient. On the supply side, I look at the internal restructuring of hospitals into private-sector clones. I argue that this commercialisation failed to take account of informational issues within the hospital. On the demand-side, I examine the suitability of internal markets for eliciting optimal innovation from the hospital sector. Again, I find that a standard argument, namely that increased competition leads to innovation, is questionable in the context of the internal market. / Whole document restricted, but available by request, use the feedback form to request access.

No description available.

In the face of escalating health care expenditure, OECD countries are turning to a variety of cost-containment strategies. This thesis analyses three such mechanisms. In Part I, I consider the use of coinsurance to limit the demand for health care. Because coinsurance reduces the elasticity of demand with respect to the price of health care, consumers facing low coinsurance rates may be charged a higher price by doctors. Such discriminatory pricing enables the doctor to extract surplus created in the insurance market, and therefore reduces the effectiveness of coinsurance. I show that in equilibrium, some consumers remain uninsured. I also show how this problem is solved if the doctor and insurer enter into managed care style arrangements. Such arrangements improve insurer and doctor profitability, and restore complete insurance market coverage. In Part II, I consider the design of fundholding schemes which encourage doctors to restrict expensive treatment to severely ill patients. I show that such schemes may be undermined by a patient-doctor side contract. In the face of such patient-doctor collusion, the fundholding scheme may be made collusion-proof by increasing its "power". I show that the optimal collusion-proof scheme may pay the doctor more than his reservation wage. An alternative solution to patient-doctor collusion is to use a partial fundholding scheme that requires some additional co-payment from the patient. Part III analyses New Zealand's internal market reforms. Introduced in 1993, the reforms involved the separation of funding and provision of health care, and were intended to simulate a competitive market environment, thereby improving the incentives of government owned health care providers to be efficient. On the supply side, I look at the internal restructuring of hospitals into private-sector clones. I argue that this commercialisation failed to take account of informational issues within the hospital. On the demand-side, I examine the suitability of internal markets for eliciting optimal innovation from the hospital sector. Again, I find that a standard argument, namely that increased competition leads to innovation, is questionable in the context of the internal market. / Whole document restricted, but available by request, use the feedback form to request access.

In the face of escalating health care expenditure, OECD countries are turning to a variety of cost-containment strategies. This thesis analyses three such mechanisms. In Part I, I consider the use of coinsurance to limit the demand for health care. Because coinsurance reduces the elasticity of demand with respect to the price of health care, consumers facing low coinsurance rates may be charged a higher price by doctors. Such discriminatory pricing enables the doctor to extract surplus created in the insurance market, and therefore reduces the effectiveness of coinsurance. I show that in equilibrium, some consumers remain uninsured. I also show how this problem is solved if the doctor and insurer enter into managed care style arrangements. Such arrangements improve insurer and doctor profitability, and restore complete insurance market coverage. In Part II, I consider the design of fundholding schemes which encourage doctors to restrict expensive treatment to severely ill patients. I show that such schemes may be undermined by a patient-doctor side contract. In the face of such patient-doctor collusion, the fundholding scheme may be made collusion-proof by increasing its "power". I show that the optimal collusion-proof scheme may pay the doctor more than his reservation wage. An alternative solution to patient-doctor collusion is to use a partial fundholding scheme that requires some additional co-payment from the patient. Part III analyses New Zealand's internal market reforms. Introduced in 1993, the reforms involved the separation of funding and provision of health care, and were intended to simulate a competitive market environment, thereby improving the incentives of government owned health care providers to be efficient. On the supply side, I look at the internal restructuring of hospitals into private-sector clones. I argue that this commercialisation failed to take account of informational issues within the hospital. On the demand-side, I examine the suitability of internal markets for eliciting optimal innovation from the hospital sector. Again, I find that a standard argument, namely that increased competition leads to innovation, is questionable in the context of the internal market. / Whole document restricted, but available by request, use the feedback form to request access.

No description available.

In the face of escalating health care expenditure, OECD countries are turning to a variety of cost-containment strategies. This thesis analyses three such mechanisms. In Part I, I consider the use of coinsurance to limit the demand for health care. Because coinsurance reduces the elasticity of demand with respect to the price of health care, consumers facing low coinsurance rates may be charged a higher price by doctors. Such discriminatory pricing enables the doctor to extract surplus created in the insurance market, and therefore reduces the effectiveness of coinsurance. I show that in equilibrium, some consumers remain uninsured. I also show how this problem is solved if the doctor and insurer enter into managed care style arrangements. Such arrangements improve insurer and doctor profitability, and restore complete insurance market coverage. In Part II, I consider the design of fundholding schemes which encourage doctors to restrict expensive treatment to severely ill patients. I show that such schemes may be undermined by a patient-doctor side contract. In the face of such patient-doctor collusion, the fundholding scheme may be made collusion-proof by increasing its "power". I show that the optimal collusion-proof scheme may pay the doctor more than his reservation wage. An alternative solution to patient-doctor collusion is to use a partial fundholding scheme that requires some additional co-payment from the patient. Part III analyses New Zealand's internal market reforms. Introduced in 1993, the reforms involved the separation of funding and provision of health care, and were intended to simulate a competitive market environment, thereby improving the incentives of government owned health care providers to be efficient. On the supply side, I look at the internal restructuring of hospitals into private-sector clones. I argue that this commercialisation failed to take account of informational issues within the hospital. On the demand-side, I examine the suitability of internal markets for eliciting optimal innovation from the hospital sector. Again, I find that a standard argument, namely that increased competition leads to innovation, is questionable in the context of the internal market. / Whole document restricted, but available by request, use the feedback form to request access.

This study examines which monetary aggregates, namely nominal M0, M1 and M2, can be used by the People’s Bank of China to conduct monetary policy. The model includes real M0, M1 and M2 as the dependent variable respectively and their determinants, such as real income, real inflation rate, and real rate of one-year saving deposit. Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius’s (1990) procedures are used to estimate the long-run relationship between the monetary aggregates and their variables. Short-run model is applied to M0, M1 and M2 respectively to see whether the error term is negative to validate the significance of the long-run relationship using the Ordinary Least Square estimation.

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China has experienced ten business cyclical fluctuations. The economic growth was characterized by erratic ups and downs which lasted for several decades. With the economic reform and opening up to the outside world in 1978 as part of Deng Xiaoping’s market-oriented policy, the Chinese economy grew exponentially and the volatility of the GDP growth rate declined significantly. The macroeconomic control policies in the 1980s prevented large fluctuations in the country’s economic development, and smoothed the output volatility further. This study examines the output volatility in China and our result reveals the standard deviation of quarterly output growth rate has declined dramatically. Using the CUSUM squares test and the Quandt-Andrews breakpoint test to identify unknown structure breaks, we identified two structural breaks: 1994:1 towards destabilization and 1998:1 towards stabilization. We then examine the stochastic process for GDP and the result shows that the decrease in volatility can be traced primarily to a decrease in the standard deviation of output shocks. Following this, we reached two other conclusions. First, there is a strong relationship between movements in output volatility and the movements in inflation volatility. Both output and inflation volatilities increased significantly during the third and fourth quarter of 1994 and both dropped sharply after 1996, which followed a similar path over the period. Second, using the standard decomposition of GDP, the decrease in output volatility can be traced to a decrease in the volatility of consumption, investment, and net export, especially rural consumption expenditure and residential investment.