Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:30:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Fabio de Vasconcellos Menna.pdf: 1466294 bytes, checksum: 2b9da1700cc73753d0d4ed73a2331da4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-06-14 / This dissertation intends to analyze the conflict resolution way called Arbitration, due to the need of intensifying the application of the devices foreseen in the Law of Arbitration (Law nº. 9.307/96), that aim to limit the Arbitration procedures without removing what it has as fundamental, that is, the freedom of convention of the parts and the choice for the judgement form, by equality before law or legal right. A brief revision of literature concerning the history of the Arbitration is made, with focus in Brazil and in the juridical nature of that institute, approaching constitutional and arbitrable principles, in order to make possible the relationship among them, mainly with respect to the resulting crisis in the Judiciary. Based on the relationship among principles, themes as equality before law, matter of public order, autonomy of parts will before the due legal process and compulsory nature or not of the referee to adopt the linked summary. The mark of this work is seeking for a better understanding about the advantages of Arbitration, among them the decongestion of the Judiciary, and forms of guaranteeing to one that opted for that solving conflicts way the juridical safety / Esta dissertação pretende analisar a forma de resolução de conflitos conhecida por Arbitragem, diante da necessidade de intensificar a aplicação dos dispositivos previstos na Lei de Arbitragem (Lei nº 9.307/96), que visam limitar o procedimento arbitral sem lhe tirar aquilo que é fundamental, isto é, a liberdade de convenção das partes e a escolha pela forma de julgamento, por equidade ou de direito. É feita uma breve revisão da literatura acerca da história da Arbitragem, com foco no Brasil, e de sua natureza jurídica, abordando os princípios constitucionais e os princípios da Arbitragem a fim de viabilizar a relação entre eles, principalmente no que tange à crise resultante no Judiciário. Com base na relação entre os princípios, serão tratados temas como equidade, matéria de ordem pública, autonomia da vontade da parte diante do devido processo legal e obrigatoriedade ou não de o árbitro adotar a súmula vinculante. O escopo deste trabalho é buscar melhor compreensão sobre as vantagens da Arbitragem, entre as quais o descongestionamento do Judiciário, e formas de garantir aos que optam por esse meio de resolução de conflitos a segurança jurídica

O presente trabalho tem por objeto o fenômeno dos procedimentos paralelos em arbitragem internacional, uma realidade decorrente do aumento dos fluxos econômicos e relações comerciais entre empresas originárias de diferentes países ou entre empresas e entes estatais originários de diferentes países. Essa multiplicidade de procedimentos se traduz na existência de duas arbitragens entre as mesmas partes, sobre a mesma relação jurídica e decorrente da mesma cláusula compromissória; de duas ou mais arbitragens relativas a um grupo de contratos, com diferentes cláusulas compromissórias, envolvendo as mesmas partes; ou ainda uma arbitragem e uma ação judiciais simultâneas relativas à mesma relação jurídica, entre as mesmas partes, decorrente de cláusula compromissória e cláusula de eleição de foro respectivamente. A arbitragem de investimento, sobretudo, é campo fértil para essa proliferação de procedimentos paralelos oriundos do mesmo investimento, envolvendo investidores diretos ou seus acionistas, com base em tratados bilaterais de investimento (TBIs) ou em contratos. Entretanto, sendo a arbitragem o mecanismo de solução de controvérsias comumente utilizado em contratos internacionais, surgem questões complexas para a regulação dessa problemática. A fim de sistematizar o estudo e responder às indagações sobre a maneira de solucionar e regular os efeitos negativos dos procedimentos paralelos (por exemplo, o risco de decisões contraditórias, a multiplicidade de procedimentos contra o mesmo réu e o excessivo custo despendido nesses procedimentos), dividimos o trabalho da seguinte maneira. Preliminarmente, o tema é introduzido pela conceituação dos procedimentos paralelos e de seus tipos, conflitantes e não-conflitantes. Posteriormente, divide-se o trabalho em duas partes. Na Primeira Parte, são examinados os clássicos princípios da litispendência (Capítulo I) e da coisa julgada (Capítulo II) como medidas para evitar o risco de procedimentos paralelos entre as mesmas partes, mesma causa de pedir e mesmo pedido adotados em países de Civil Law e suas variáveis em países de Common Law, tais como forum non conveniens para a hipótese de litispendência e pleas of estoppel para os efeitos da coisa julgada. Na Segunda Parte, é analisada a possibilidade ou não da transposição da litispendência (Capítulo I) e da coisa julgada (Capítulo II) à arbitragem internacional, além de outros mecanismos mitigadores dos efeitos decorrentes dos procedimentos paralelos em arbitragem internacional, como a conexão de procedimentos e o joinder de uma nova parte; e, em arbitragem de investimento, waiver, fork in the road clause e parallel treaty arbitrations (Capítulo III). / This thesis aims to analyze the phenomenon of parallel proceedings in international arbitration, a reality that emerges from the increase in economic activity and business transactions among companies from different countries or among companies and State entities whose business places are located in different countries. This multiplicity of proceedings can be manifested in a number of scenarios: the existence of two arbitrations between the same parties concerning the same legal relationship and arising out of the same arbitration agreement; two or more arbitrations related to a group of contracts, providing for different arbitration agreements, involving the same parties; or even an arbitration and a court action based on an arbitration agreement and a choice of fórum clause, respectively, simultaneously pending related to the same legal relationship, between the same parties. Investment arbitration, especially, is a breeding ground for the proliferation of parallel proceedings arising out of the same investment, involving direct investors or their shareholders, based on bilateral investment treaties (BITs) or on contracts. However, the regulation of such problematic scenarios raises complex questions, since arbitration is the mechanism for settlement of disputes commonly used in international contracts. In order to systematize this study and to answer questions of how to overcome and regulate the negative effects of parallel proceedings (such as the risk of contradictory decisions, the multiplicity of proceedings against the same respondent and the high costs incurred in these proceedings), this thesis is divided as follows: Preliminarily, the subject matter is introduced by the definition of parallel proceedings and its different types, such as conflicting and non-conflicting parallel proceedings. Subsequently, this thesis is divided into two parts. In the First Part, the classical principles of lis pendens (Chapter I) and res judicata (Chapter II) will be examined as measures to avoid the risk of parallel proceedings between the same parties, the same cause of action and the same object as adopted in the Civil Law countries and its variations in Common Law countries, such as forum non conveniens to the hypothesis of lis pendens and pleas of estoppel to the res judicata effects. The Second Part presents an analysis of the possibility of the transposition of lis pendens (Chapter I) and res judicata (Chapter II) to the field of international arbitration, as well as other mechanisms to mitigate the effects related to parallel proceedings in international arbitration for instance, the consolidation of two arbitrations and joinder of a new party to the arbitration and, in investment arbitration, waiver, fork in the road clause and parallel treaty arbitrations (Chapter III).

Cette thèse analyse la question relative au cas où, dans l'arbitrage international en matière d'investissements, dont le but principal est l'application des normes visées à la protection des investisseurs, l’État défendeur soutient que l'investissement pour lequel la protection est demandée a été obtenu au moyen d'une forme de criminalité. Dans ce contexte, la défense de l'illégalité soulevée par les État dans les contentieux d'investissement est de plus en plus courante. Cette défense fonctionne selon le schéma suivant : un État hôte enfreint les dispositions de fond que le droit international accorde aux investissements effectués dans un pays étranger, par exemple en expropriant un investisseur étranger de son investissement sans indemnité. Dans le différend qui s'ensuit devant un tribunal arbitral d'investissement, l'État défendeur invoque l'illégalité commise par l'investisseur lors de la réalisation de l'investissement pour se défendre contre la procédure arbitrale intenté contre lui. Le but principal de cette étude est celui de démontrer que des considérations systématiques de nature strictement juridique, aussi bien que de politique juridique, exigent que la défense d'illégalité dans l'arbitrage d'investissement soit strictement restreinte et qu'un tribunal ne puisse décliner d'exercer sa compétence / juridiction que dans des cas exceptionnels. Cette étude aboutit à la conclusion d'après laquelle les tribunaux d'arbitrage devraient plutôt examiner au cas par cas au stade du fond l'ensemble des circonstances soumises devant lui et procéder à une mise en balance appropriée entre les comportements de l'investisseur et ceux de l'État hôte. / This thesis addresses the question as to how an investment Tribunal is to react if, in the context of a case brought before it for breach of standards of protection of an investment, the respondent argues that the investment for which protection is sought has been secured by resorting to some form of criminality. Against this background, a defence by the Host State that has become increasingly common is the so-called Defence of Illegality. It operates on the basis of the following scheme : a Host State breaches the substantive provision that international law accord to investments made in a foreign Country, for instance by means of expropriating without compensation the investor's investment. In the ensuing dispute before an investment Tribunal, the defendant Host State raises the illegality committed by the investor in the making of the investment as defence against the breach of the substantive provisions on the protection of the investment, of which it is accused, to avoid responsibility. This thesis intends to demonstrate that both legal and policy consideration dictate that the Defence of Illegality in investment arbitration should be strictly curtailed and that a Tribunal should only decline to exercise its jurisdiction in exceptional cases. Rather, Tribunals should look at the entire set of circumstances at the merits stage and perform a proper balancing test between the conduct of the investor and the Host State.

從個體決策制定（decision-making）的角度觀之，參與談判、創造合約，是一種既可學習處世又可瞭解「人性」的雙贏作為。個體在歷經集體談判的互動（interaction）過程後，所獲得的償值（payoffs），也許會超越前述的期望效益；然而，對於「急需達成協議卻失敗者」或「被迫達成協議者」而言，因為無法如願以償，付出與耗損的心力，往住令人無法說服自己──這樣的結果符合吾人之期望（expectancy）──於是，個體理性（individual rationality）與集體理性（collective rationality）間的弔詭（paradox）又乍然若現。 仲裁人以中立第三者的角色，受理談判參與者的爭議，裁決爭議各造的償值，是聯結個體與集體理性的制度設計之一。然而，不同的仲裁制度所依循的特定仲裁程序，及其所隱含的偏差（bias），對交付仲裁的爭議各造及仲裁人決策模式所產生的影響，著實不容忽略。 本文的旨趣在於對仲裁制度及程序所隱含的偏差進行實驗比較，以博奕理論（game theory）為分析工具，來檢視下列三個變項所形成的二種關係： 一、在最終報價仲裁（final-offer arbitration）制度之下，仲裁人的特定偏好（preferences）對爭議兩造的影響，觀察的指標為爭議率及各造的報價策略； 二、不同仲裁制度及程序對仲裁人從事仲裁判斷之影響，觀察的指標為仲裁判斷分布（distribution of arbitration awards）。 本文的結論將藉由前述二種關係的檢證結果，來觀察「爭議兩造」、「仲裁人」及「仲裁制度」三個變項的交集點──仲裁判斷（arbitration awards）──對爭議兩造在重複競局(repeated game)中報價策略的影響，並試圖探究如何縮短個體理性與集體理性之間的落差，冀能透過制度設計來提供爭議各造誠實報價的誘因，並進一步促使仲裁人在從事判斷時能秉公處理，藉以回歸仲裁公平與專業的本質。 Ashenfelter, Orley, Currie, Janet, Farber, Henry S., and Matthew Spiegel. 1992. An Experimental Comparison of Dispute Rates in Alternative Arbitration Systems. 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Depuis ces dernières décennies, le droit de l’arbitrage international connaît une autonomie, en marge de la justice étatique, que les législateurs nationaux ne semblaient guère prévoir. Cette autonomie suscite l’intérêt mais aussi une inquiétude renouvelée par un double constat. Le premier réside dans l’absence d’une définition légale de l’arbitrage international, si ce n’est l’existence d’une définition implicite au travers de critères de distinction à l’égard de l’arbitrage interne. Ces critères, relevant d’une technique législative propre à chaque État, traduisent la conception très particulière qu’ils se font de l’institution et influent inévitablement sur la manière dont ils décident de régir l’arbitrage international. Le second relève de la complexification des échanges économiques et commerciaux transfrontaliers et de l’éclatement exponentiel des sources que connaît l’arbitrage international, sous l’impulsion des sources internationales, des réformes nationales et de la pratique qui en est faite. Le développement de ces règles met en évidence un processus qui s’inscrit dans un contexte favorable à la promotion d’une harmonisation informelle, d’un droit matériel de l’arbitrage international. Ces règles restent, aujourd’hui, insuffisantes. La faiblesse du système réside dans leur origine nationale qui conduit à soumettre la question de la réglementation de l’arbitrage à différentes législations particularistes. Même si le monisme – internationalisé – n’est pas incompatible avec les spécificités de l’arbitrage international, la solution dualiste semble plus opportune : la vraie question étant le degré de prise en compte de ces spécificités par les réglementations nationales. Aussi, l’existence d’un dualisme matériel, puis formel de l’arbitrage international, constitue une démarche préalable à la réflexion sur la potentialité d’un ordre juridique transnational considéré comme le socle normatif de l’arbitrage international. / Over the last decades, unforeseen to national legislators, International Arbitration Law acquired more and more autonomy despite the existence of domestic legislation governing international arbitration. This autonomy has sparked much interest but has also caused some concern. The reason for such concern is twofold. The first cause for concern lies in the fact that there exist no legal definition of international arbitration. Indeed, the notion of international arbitration is, as of today, derived from the various criteria which have been set to distinguish international arbitration from domestic arbitration. These criteria, which stem from legislative methods specific to each national jurisdiction, are a reflection of the very unique approach taken by national laws towards arbitration and inevitably influence the manner in which each state decides to legislate on the rules governing international arbitration.The second cause for concern is the result of the increasing complexity of cross-border economic and commercial trade and the continuous diversification of sources of international arbitration through the enactment of numerous international pieces of legislation, national reform and case law. The development of these rules reveals an ongoing process within a context favorable to an informal harmonization of substantive International Arbitration Law. These rules remain insufficient today. The weakness of the system is due to the fact that International Arbitration has been regulated through domestic legislation. This raises the question of regulating arbitration through country-specific legislation. Even if, when internationalized, monism is not incompatible with the specificities of international arbitration, the dualistic approach seems to be more appropriate. The real question here actually lies is the importance afforded by national regulation to such specificities. Moreover, the existence of material dualism followed by formal dualism in international arbitration is a first step in the ongoing legal debate around the appropriateness of Transnational Arbitral Legal Order as the normative pillar of international arbitration.

O presente trabalho tem por objeto o fenômeno dos procedimentos paralelos em arbitragem internacional, uma realidade decorrente do aumento dos fluxos econômicos e relações comerciais entre empresas originárias de diferentes países ou entre empresas e entes estatais originários de diferentes países. Essa multiplicidade de procedimentos se traduz na existência de duas arbitragens entre as mesmas partes, sobre a mesma relação jurídica e decorrente da mesma cláusula compromissória; de duas ou mais arbitragens relativas a um grupo de contratos, com diferentes cláusulas compromissórias, envolvendo as mesmas partes; ou ainda uma arbitragem e uma ação judiciais simultâneas relativas à mesma relação jurídica, entre as mesmas partes, decorrente de cláusula compromissória e cláusula de eleição de foro respectivamente. A arbitragem de investimento, sobretudo, é campo fértil para essa proliferação de procedimentos paralelos oriundos do mesmo investimento, envolvendo investidores diretos ou seus acionistas, com base em tratados bilaterais de investimento (TBIs) ou em contratos. Entretanto, sendo a arbitragem o mecanismo de solução de controvérsias comumente utilizado em contratos internacionais, surgem questões complexas para a regulação dessa problemática. A fim de sistematizar o estudo e responder às indagações sobre a maneira de solucionar e regular os efeitos negativos dos procedimentos paralelos (por exemplo, o risco de decisões contraditórias, a multiplicidade de procedimentos contra o mesmo réu e o excessivo custo despendido nesses procedimentos), dividimos o trabalho da seguinte maneira. Preliminarmente, o tema é introduzido pela conceituação dos procedimentos paralelos e de seus tipos, conflitantes e não-conflitantes. Posteriormente, divide-se o trabalho em duas partes. Na Primeira Parte, são examinados os clássicos princípios da litispendência (Capítulo I) e da coisa julgada (Capítulo II) como medidas para evitar o risco de procedimentos paralelos entre as mesmas partes, mesma causa de pedir e mesmo pedido adotados em países de Civil Law e suas variáveis em países de Common Law, tais como forum non conveniens para a hipótese de litispendência e pleas of estoppel para os efeitos da coisa julgada. Na Segunda Parte, é analisada a possibilidade ou não da transposição da litispendência (Capítulo I) e da coisa julgada (Capítulo II) à arbitragem internacional, além de outros mecanismos mitigadores dos efeitos decorrentes dos procedimentos paralelos em arbitragem internacional, como a conexão de procedimentos e o joinder de uma nova parte; e, em arbitragem de investimento, waiver, fork in the road clause e parallel treaty arbitrations (Capítulo III). / This thesis aims to analyze the phenomenon of parallel proceedings in international arbitration, a reality that emerges from the increase in economic activity and business transactions among companies from different countries or among companies and State entities whose business places are located in different countries. This multiplicity of proceedings can be manifested in a number of scenarios: the existence of two arbitrations between the same parties concerning the same legal relationship and arising out of the same arbitration agreement; two or more arbitrations related to a group of contracts, providing for different arbitration agreements, involving the same parties; or even an arbitration and a court action based on an arbitration agreement and a choice of fórum clause, respectively, simultaneously pending related to the same legal relationship, between the same parties. Investment arbitration, especially, is a breeding ground for the proliferation of parallel proceedings arising out of the same investment, involving direct investors or their shareholders, based on bilateral investment treaties (BITs) or on contracts. However, the regulation of such problematic scenarios raises complex questions, since arbitration is the mechanism for settlement of disputes commonly used in international contracts. In order to systematize this study and to answer questions of how to overcome and regulate the negative effects of parallel proceedings (such as the risk of contradictory decisions, the multiplicity of proceedings against the same respondent and the high costs incurred in these proceedings), this thesis is divided as follows: Preliminarily, the subject matter is introduced by the definition of parallel proceedings and its different types, such as conflicting and non-conflicting parallel proceedings. Subsequently, this thesis is divided into two parts. In the First Part, the classical principles of lis pendens (Chapter I) and res judicata (Chapter II) will be examined as measures to avoid the risk of parallel proceedings between the same parties, the same cause of action and the same object as adopted in the Civil Law countries and its variations in Common Law countries, such as forum non conveniens to the hypothesis of lis pendens and pleas of estoppel to the res judicata effects. The Second Part presents an analysis of the possibility of the transposition of lis pendens (Chapter I) and res judicata (Chapter II) to the field of international arbitration, as well as other mechanisms to mitigate the effects related to parallel proceedings in international arbitration for instance, the consolidation of two arbitrations and joinder of a new party to the arbitration and, in investment arbitration, waiver, fork in the road clause and parallel treaty arbitrations (Chapter III).

International investment agreements largely cover today’s transnational investments. These agreements confer certain substantive rights to foreign investors while simultaneously obliging host-states to act in a given manner so as to not interfere with the investments. Most international investment agreements further contain an arbitration clause which provides the investor with the means to enforce the substantive rights of the agreement by directly bringing a claim against the host-state before an arbitral tribunal. Consequently, privately contracted arbitrators have the authority to scrutinize and overrule essentially any sovereign act of the host-state that may affect the investment – judicial and legislative acts included. This practice affects not only the parties of the dispute; when the arbitral award claims superiority to the state’s electoral choices, it further constrains the exercise of sovereignty by the population of the host-state. As a result, the arbitrators who manage the disputes and the investors who initiate them have become central power-holders in the context of both international and domestic law. Meanwhile, the arbitrators and investors alike seem to be unaccountable to the states and individuals who are adversely affected by their power assertions. A commonly accepted feature of democracy is that those who govern and wield power should be accountable to those who are governed and subjected to this power. This thesis relates this notion to a Foucauldian understanding of power, domination and resistance. The primary aim of the thesis is to examine the interplay between the prominent subjects involved in investor-state arbitration and to what degree these subjects hold power in the form of transformative capacity. After this investigation into the relations of power, the thesis scrutinizes the subjugated subjects’ ability to exercise effective resistance through institutionalized accountability mechanisms. The thesis detects an accountability deficit in the regime and concludes that foreign investors and arbitrators hold a dominant position within the context of investor-state arbitration, while states and individuals find themselves in a state of domination. The international investment regime, as it currently stands, is thus found to suffer from a democracy deficit, while it concurrently seems to undermine domestic democratic institutions.

Skiljerätten är ett system för tvistlösning utanför de allmänna domstolarnas monopol på rättskipning. För att skiljeförfaranden ska vara effektiva har möjligheten att överpröva och ogiltigförklara skiljedomar begränsats till ett fåtal regler i svensk rätt. En av dessa regler är ogiltigförklaring av en skiljedom som strider mot grunderna för den svenska rättsordningen, också kallat ordre public.  Genom Sveriges anslutning till Europeiska Unionen har unionsrätten blivit en integrerad del av svensk rätt med skyldigheter för staten att i sin dömande verksamhet tolka och tillämpa EU-rätten för att försäkra dess genomslag och de rättigheter som är förenade med den. I denna uppsats undersöks hur den svenska skiljerätten påverkats av EUrätten genom EU domstolens praxis kring ordre public och hur svenska domstolar vid överprövning av skiljedomar bedömt ordre public i en EU-rättslig kontext. I uppsatsen behandlas ordre public genom att undersöka vilka materiella regler i EU-rätten som utgör ordre public när svenska domstolar ska överpröva skiljedomar. Vidare så behandlas vilken granskningsnivå domstolar ska tillämpa vid överprövning av en skiljedom som strider mot en materiell regel i EU-rätten som utgör ordre public. Slutsatsen är att EU:s konkurrensrätt med säkerhet utgör materiell ordre public, samt att flera regler i EU-rätten som utgör bestämmelser av central vikt och har en tvingande funktion, potentiellt kan utgöra materiell ordre public. Vidare så är granskningsnivån för EU-rättslig ordre public underkastad principen om processuell autonomi och EU-domstolen har lämnat frågan åt de nationella domstolarna och lagstiftarna. För att överprövningen av skiljedomar som strider mot materiell EU-rättslig ordre public ska vara tillåten måste den vara förenlig med principerna om effektivitet och likvärdighet. Slutsatsen i denna del är att Sverige lever upp till EU-rättens krav men att granskningsnivån vid materiell EU-rättslig ordre public är präglad av osäkerhet och potentiellt svårtillämpad. Klargörande i praxis från Högsta domstolen och EU-domstolen skulle därför vara välkomna.

L'arbitrage des litiges fiscaux entre particuliers et Etats semblait, récemment encore, ne pas aller de soi. Ces dernières années ont cependant vu naître une jurisprudence arbitrale mettant la fiscalité à l'épreuve du droit international des investissements. La présente thèse s'attache à retracer et évaluer ce phénomène, qui soulève de nombreux sujets juridiquement complexes et politiquement délicats.Ces arbitrages sont sous-tendus par une dialectique subtile opposant protection des investisseurs et souveraineté fiscale de l'Etat d'accueil. La poursuite de ces deux objectifs concurrents constitue la trame de questions épineuses. Les arbitres doivent ainsi, par exemple, apprécier la portée réelle des garanties de stabilisation ou d'exemption fiscales accordées à des investisseurs étrangers, ou encore déterminer si une mesure fiscale constitue une expropriation déguisée, une discrimination prohibée ou un traitement injuste ou inéquitable, au sens d'un traité d'investissement.Avant de trancher ces litiges, les arbitres doivent nécessairement examiner si l'Etat a véritablement – et valablement – consenti à ce que l'exercice de ses prérogatives fiscales soit apprécié par une justice « privée », et si les garanties matérielles inscrites aux traités d'investissement s'appliquent aux mesures fiscales.Une vue d'ensemble de ces affaires révèle, d'une part, que la fiscalité s'accommode sans difficulté particulière de la voie arbitrale, celle-ci constituant une méthode fonctionnelle de règlement des litiges fiscaux internationaux, et d'autre part, que les solutions jurisprudentielles sont globalement satisfaisantes, les arbitres sachant prendre en compte les particularités du sujet. / One might not think that tax disputes should ordinarily be susceptible to resolution through arbitration. However, recent years have seen the unfolding of an arbitral jurisprudence that puts taxation to the test of international investment law. The present thesis seeks to give an account of and evaluate this phenomenon, which raises numerous legally complex and politically delicate issues.These arbitrations consist, fundamentally, in balancing the need to protect investors with the respect for the fiscal sovereignty of the host State. The pursuit of these two competing goals lays the ground for inevitably thorny questions. Thus, arbitrators are called upon to examine the validity and reach of stabilization guarantees or of tax exemptions granted to foreign investors, or even to determine if a tax measure amounts to a disguised expropriation, a prohibited discrimination, or inequitable treatment, in the meaning of an investment treaty.Before resolving these issues, arbitrators must ascertain whether the State has really – and validly – consented to submit the exercise of its taxation powers to the scrutiny of a ‘ private ' legal process, and whether the relevant guarantees enshrined in investment treaties apply to the tax measures in question.An analysis of these matters reveals that arbitrators can address questions of tax law without any particular difficulty and that arbitration is a practical method of dealing with these international tax disputes. Moreover, the solutions reached by international arbitral tribunals are, on the whole, satisfying, as arbitrators take into account the particular needs entailed in balancing the public and private interests at stake.

Esta tese analisa as normas processuais aplicáveis à arbitragem. O reconhecimento da prevalência da autonomia da vontade das partes e, subsidiariamente, dos árbitros para estabelecer regras para condução do procedimento arbitral, afastou a aplicação das regras processuais do local da realização da arbitragem. A ausência de uma lei processual de regência ou da aplicação mandatória das regras processuais da lex fori possibilitou, por um lado, a harmonização da prática processual arbitral e, por outro lado, embates recorrentes sobre a forma adequada para a condução do procedimento. A ausência de uma lei de regência não significa que o processo arbitral possa ser discricionário. Existe uma pluralidade de fontes normativas que influenciam a tomada de decisão processual nas arbitragens. Propõe-se a análise destas fontes normativas à luz do direito transnacional. O método transnacional adotado inclui normas nacionais e internacionais, bem como outras fontes normativas que não se enquadram tipicamente em uma categoria tradicional, admitindo que o quadro regulatório do processo arbitral seja formado por uma confluência de fontes que operam em ordens jurídicas e planos normativos diversos. Diante dessa pluralidade de fontes normativas, defende-se a necessidade de maior normatização in concreto, incentivando que as partes e os árbitros realizem uma conferência preliminar para definir a melhor forma de conduzir o procedimento em cada arbitragem. / This thesis analyzes the procedural rules that apply to arbitration. The recognition that the parties and, subsidiarily, the arbitrators are free to establish the rules for conducting the arbitral proceedings has prevented the procedural rules of the place where the arbitration is held from being applied. The absence of a governing procedural law or the mandatory application of the procedural rules of the lex fori has, on the one hand, made the harmonization of arbitration procedure possible and, on the other, led to recurrent conflicts regarding the appropriate way to conduct an arbitration. The absence of a governing law does not mean that the arbitration procedure could be discretionary. The existence of a plurality of normative sources that influence procedural decision-making in arbitration is verified. The analysis of these normative sources in light of transnational law is proposed. The transnational method adopted includes domestic and international rules, as well as other normative sources that do not typically fit in a traditional category, allowing the regulatory framework of an arbitration proceeding to be formed by a confluence of sources that operate in different legal systems and on various normative planes. In light of this plurality of normative sources, the need for more active case management and rule-making is defended, encouraging the parties and the arbitrators to hold a preliminary conference to determine the best method for conducting the arbitration in each arbitration proceeding.