Abstract In this paper, we examine the relation among different information asymmetry measures in Taiwan Stock Exchange and exploit the ability of the microstructure measures to measure asymmetric information. We also investigate the role of information asymmetry measures in affecting stock returns. With a random sample of 180 firms, we find that the market microstructure measure is significantly correlated with most of the corporate finance measures that should shed lights on the level of information asymmetry in advance. We also find that the analysts’ forecast measures have no relation with the microstructure measure. One main result is that the adverse selection risk does affect the stock returns. For the whole sample period, the adverse selection component has a significant impact on the stock returns and dominates all other variables except for the number of analysts following. Other significant measures include the volatility, firm size, leverage, and market to book ratio of equity. Although these information asymmetry measures act as competent determinants in the whole- period regression, they do not have consistent performance across quarters. The inconsistent result suggests that these measures may have diverse performance with regard to different periods.

Die vorliegende Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit dem Verhalten auf Produktmärkten, welche durch eine asymmetrisch verteilte Information zwischen Anbietern und Nachfragern über die Qualität gekennzeichnet sind. Die Arbeit untersucht experimentell, ob Werbeausgaben als Qualitätssignal und Reputation als Anreizmechanismus auf solchen Märkten verstanden werden. Im ersten Teil der Arbeit werden dazu zwei Experimente durchgeführt, mit deren Hilfe untersucht wird, ob das Problem adverser Selektion mit Hilfe von Werbeausgaben als Qualitätssignal überwunden werden kann. Die Ergebnisse der beiden Experimente, welche sich durch ein unterschiedliches Design auszeichnen, unterscheiden sich stark. Während bei direkter Interaktion Werbeausgaben nicht als Qualitätssignal verstanden werden, werden bei indirekter Interaktion Werbeausgaben von einem Teil der Probanden als Qualitätssignal verstanden. Die Ergebnisse des zweiten Experiments zeigen darüber hinaus, dass von ein Verhalten, welches von dem theoretisch vorhergesagten abweicht, oftmals mit Hilfe der Erwartungen der Probanden über das Verhalten der anderen Marktseite erklärt werden kann. Im zweiten Teil der Arbeit wird untersucht, ob erkannt wird, dass die Höhe des drohenden Reputationsverlusts einen kritischen Anreiz auf das Verhalten der Anbieter hat, wenn diese unbeobachtet von den Käufern die Qualität wählen können. Die Ergebnisse des Experiments zeigen, dass mit Hilfe von potentiellen Reputationsinvestitionen nicht, wie theoretisch vorhergesagt, das Problem des moralischen Risikos überwunden werden kann. Allgemein wird ein zu hohes Vertrauen der Käufer beobachtet, welches dazu führt, dass die Anbieter keinen Anreiz haben, Reputationsinvestitionen zu tätigen. / The dissertation studies individual behavior in product markets, in which information about product quality is asymmetrically distributed between sellers and buyers. It is studied experimentally, whether individuals understand advertising spending as quality signal and reputation as incentive mechanism. In the first part, two experiments are conducted in order to study whether the problem of adverse selection can be overcome with advertising spending as quality signal. The results of the experiments which differ in the experimental design are very different. While in case of direct interaction between sellers and buyers individuals do not understand advertising spending as quality signal, they do in case of indirect interaction. Furthermore, the results of the second experiment show, that behavior not in line with the theoretical expectations can be explained with individuals' expectations about the other market side's behavior. In the second part it is studied whether individuals recognize that sellers' behavior in situations with endogenous quality depends critically on the amount of reputation loss at risk. The experimental results show that contrary to the theoretical expectations moral hazard problems are not solved by investments into reputation. In general, it is observed that there is too much trust on the buyer side. As a result of this behavior sellers have no incentive to invest into reputation.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:48:36Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Daniel Henrique de Mendonca.pdf: 648601 bytes, checksum: 65cf6cc99fbe5f4d508f0c8760990e40 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-05-21 / The main aim of this study is to analyze the new legislation adopted in Brazil (Law nº 12,414/2011), which regulates the functioning of the credit positive information sharing market in the light of the asymmetric information theory and the international experience, highlighting similarities and differences as well as their possible impact on performance of the bank loans local market. For this, it was performed an intensive bibliography review on the literature existent about asymmetric information, with special attention to the role played by sharing data on individuals and companies, and the role of credit bureaus as a tool developed to reduce adverse selection and moral hazard problems. A presentation of the international experience is used as a way of highlighting the empirical aspect of the theory as well as serve as a comparison model to analyze the main points of the new Brazilian legislation in the light of the results already measurable in other economies. Special attention is given to the experience of Hong Kong, whose the creation of an effective information sharing framework is considered a recent international benchmarking. One of the main conclusions is that the implementation of this mechanism is an important step forward in structuring the national financial system, but its impact in reducing interest rates, reducing delinquency rates and increasing of the credit amount available must occur in the medium and long term / O objetivo principal do presente trabalho é analisar a nova legislação aprovada no Brasil (Lei nº 12.414/2011) que regulamenta o funcionamento do mercado de compartilhamento de informações positivas de crédito à luz da teoria sobre assimetria de informações e da experiência internacional, destacando similaridades e diferenças, bem como seus possíveis impactos no desempenho do mercado de empréstimos bancários local. Para isso, foi realizada uma pesquisa bibliográfica intensa sobre a literatura existente que trata da assimetria de informações, com especial atenção ao papel desempenhado pelo compartilhamento de dados sobre pessoas físicas e jurídicas, e a atuação dos birôs de crédito como instrumentos desenvolvidos para reduzir os problemas de seleção adversa e risco moral. Uma apresentação da experiência internacional é utilizada como forma de ressaltar o aspecto empírico da teoria, bem como servir de modelo de comparação para analisar os principais pontos da nova legislação brasileira à luz de resultados já mensuráveis em outras economias. É dada uma especial atenção na experiência de Hong Kong por ser considerado benchmarking internacional recente na criação de uma estrutura de compartilhamento de informações eficiente. Uma das principias conclusões diz respeito ao fato de que a implantação desse mecanismo é um avanço estruturante importante dentro do sistema financeiro nacional, porém, seus impactos na redução das taxas de juros, na redução da inadimplência e no aumento do volume de crédito disponível devem ocorrer no médio e longo prazo

Este trabalho apresenta três extensões ao modelo de reputação proposto por Shapiro (1983). A primeira torna o modelo original mais adequado para avaliar o problema de informação assimétrica de bens de busca e bens credenciais, a segunda permite identificar o ganho de eficiência gerado pela inclusão de um sistema de informação adicional e, a terceira mostra que a provisão de um volume maior de informação pode gerar efeitos adversos quando o produto em questão possui vários atributos. Em seguida, os desenvolvimentos teóricos são utilizados para avaliar os efeitos da introdução do Exame Nacional de Cursos sobre o mercado de cursos superiores do Brasil. Algumas das predições do modelo são testadas empiricamente, fornecendo indicações de que este Exame possui um papel relevante para mitigar o problema de informação identificado neste mercado. / This essay presents three extensions to the model first proposed by Shapiro (1983) regarding reputation. The first extension adjusts Shapiro’s original model in order to make it more suitable in dealing with the problem of asymmetric information of search goods and credence goods. The second one allows the identification of the efficiency gains obtained after the inclusion of an additional information system, while the third extension demonstrates that additional information could generate adverse effects when the good under consideration has several attributes. These theoretical extensions are then applied to evaluate the effects of the Brazilian experience regarding the introduction of the Courses National Exam - Exame Nacional de Cursos – on Brazil’s market of undergraduate school courses. Some of the theoretical predictions of the model are empirically tested, offering indications that such exam plays a relevant role while diminishing the informational problem that characterizes this market.

Financial markets perform two major functions. The first is the provision of liquidity in order to facilitate direct investment, hedging and diversification; the second is to ensure the efficient price discovery required in order to direct resources to where they can be best utilised within an economy. How well financial markets perform these functions is critical to the financial welfare of every individual in modern economies. As an example, retirement savings across the world are mostly invested in capital markets. Hence, the functioning of financial markets is linked to the standard of living of individuals. Technological advancements and new market regulations have in recent times significantly impacted how financial markets function, with no period in history having witnessed a more rapid pace of change than the last decade. Financial markets have become very complex, with most of the order execution now done by computer algorithms. New high-tech trading venues, such as dark pools, also now play outsized roles in financial markets. A lot of the impacts of these developments are poorly understood. In the EU particularly, the introduction of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) and advancements in technology have combined to unleash a dramatic transformation of European capital markets. In order to better understand the role of high-tech trading venues in the modern financial markets' trading environment generally and in the UK in particular, I conduct three studies investigating questions linked to the three major developments in financial markets over the past decade; these are algorithmic/high-frequency trading, market fragmentation and dark trading. In the first study, I examine the changing relationship between the price impact of block trades and informed trading, by considering this phenomenon within a high-frequency trading environment on intraday and inter-day bases. I find that the price impact of block trades is stronger during the first hour of trading; this is consistent with the hypothesis that information accumulates overnight during non-trading hours. Furthermore, private information is gradually incorporated into prices despite heightened trading frequency. Evidence suggests that informed traders exploit superior information across trading days, and stocks with lower transparency exhibit stronger information diffusion effects when traded in blocks, thus informed block trading facilitates price discovery. The second study exploits the regulatory differences between the US and the EU to examine the impact of market fragmentation on dimensions of market quality. Unlike the US's Regulation National Market System, the EU's MiFID does not impose a formal exchange trading linkage or guarantee a best execution price. This has raised concerns about consolidated market quality in increasingly fragmented European markets. The second study therefore investigates the impact of visible trading fragmentation on the quality of the London equity market and find a quadratic relationship between fragmentation and adverse selection costs. At low levels of fragmentation, order flow competition reduces adverse selection costs, improves market transparency and enhances market efficiency by reducing arbitrage opportunities. However, high levels of fragmentation increase adverse selection costs. The final study compares the impact of lit and dark venues' liquidity on market liquidity. I find that compared with lit venues, dark venues proportionally contribute more liquidity to the aggregate market. This is because dark pools facilitate trades that otherwise might not easily have occurred in lit venues when the spread widens and the limit order queue builds up. I also find that informed and algorithmic trading hinder liquidity creation in lit and dark venues, while evidence also suggests that stocks exhibiting low levels of informed trading across the aggregate market drive dark venues' liquidity contribution.

Cette thèse a pour sujet les effets que l’information a sur les incitations. Les trois articles fournissent et explorent des résultats lorsque l’information est la principale variable d’intérêt, est endogène, pas homogène entre les acteurs et évolue dans le temps d’une manière qui n’est pas nécessairement rationnelle. Le premier article étudie les problèmes de hold-up dans les hiérarchies verticales avec la sélection adverse montrant qu’alors que le pouvoir de négociation des travailleurs augmente, les distorsions provenant de l’asymétrie d’information disparaissent. En outre, il étudie l’effet de la scolarité et du degré d’hétérogénéité de la population de travailleurs sur la répartition du pouvoir de négociation dans les marchés réglementés. Le deuxième article assouplit l’hypothèse des croyances homogènes dans les relations principal-agent avec sélection adverse. Dans un apprentissage évolutif qui est imitatif, les principaux peuvent avoir des croyances différentes sur la répartition des types d’agents dans la population. La convergence à une croyance uniforme dépend de la taille relative de la polarisation dans les croyances. En outre, le modèle est une version d’un cobweb stable. Notre approche offre des explications pour l’alternance des périodes avec quantité oscillante et relativement stable. Le troisième article étudie la fac¸on dont le contenu informatif des politiques juridiques, comme la responsabilité stricte et négligence, en cas de soucis morales, influence la conception optimale des régimes de responsabilité. Plusieurs cas récents ont montré qu’un individu ayant causé un dommage s’expose non seulement a une sanction légale — par exemple, une amende — mais aussi a un boycott social, la désapprobation ou la stigmatisation. L’article montre que le choix d’une stratégie dépend de façon complexe de l’importance du dommage et du “coût moral”. / This thesis focuses on the effects that information has on incentives. The three papers provide and explore some results when the information is the main variable of interest, it is made endogenous, not homogeneous between actors and evolving over time in a way that is not necessarily rational. The first paper studies hold-up problems in vertical hierarchies with adverse selection showing that as the bargaining power of the worker increases, distortions coming from asymmetric information vanish. Moreover, it studies the effect of schooling and degree of heterogeneity in the workforce on the allocation of bargaining power in regulating markets. The second paper relaxes the common assumption of homogeneous beliefs in principal-agent relationships with adverse selection. In an evolutionary learning set-up, which is imitative, principals can have different beliefs about the distribution of agents’ types in the population. Convergence to a uniform belief depends on the relative size of the bias in beliefs. In addition, the set-up is a version of a stable cobweb model. Our approach offers explanations for alternating periods of oscillating and relatively steady quantity. The third paper studies how the informative content of legal policies as strict-liability and fault-based, in case of moral concerns, influences the optimal design of liability regimes. Many recent cases show that an individual found to have caused harm faces not only the possibility of a legal sanction — e.g., the damages he must pay — but also social boycott, disapproval or stigma. The paper shows that the choice of a policy depends in a complex way on the magnitude of the harm and the “moral cost”.Keywords: Bargaining, Adverse Selection, Hold-up, Evolutionary Game Theory, Heterogeneous Beliefs, Bifurcation Theory, Boycott, Law Enforcement, Strict Liability, Negligence.

This thesis is about the economic aspects of public procurement of services through auctionsin Sweden. It focuses on two different institutions, auctions used to find foste r-parents forboarded out children in the 19th century, and auctions of cleaning service contracts in the 20 thcentury. I n both cases, the contracting entity is the municipality or its representative, thelowest bidder wins the auction, and is paid in accordance with his/her bid.In the child auctions, c hildren were allotted to foster-parents by means of an open biddingprocess, the descending English auction, where the bids were given continuously to theauctioneer. In modern public procurement sealed bids ar e used in accordance with the firstprice,sealed bid auction. The first part of this thesis is about price formation in the childauctions and a study is made of the children who were auctioned several times, indicatingasymmetric information among bidders or adverse selection in this market. These subjects arestudied using field data on 601 child auctions held in Northern Sweden during the period 1863to 1889. The empirical findings in the first paper suggest that the foster-parents had a cleareconomic motive in these auctions. The child characteristics significantly affect the amount ofcompensation paid to the foster-parent. There is also evidence that farmers preferred older,more productive children. The second paper studies whether a re-auctioned child commandeda higher or lower price than a child that was not re-auctioned. The results indicate some formof asymmetric information because foster-parents demanded a higher level of compensationfor a re-auctioned child. The results also suggest that the probability that a child was reauctionedincreased if he/she was not healthy.The third paper in the thesis discusses a kind of "paradox". Although there is a competitiveeffect on the bids in the auction of cleaning service contracts, the contracting entity has anoption, given by law, to restrict the number of bidders. In th is paper, an implementation costis introduced fo r the contracting entity to justify such a restriction. The results, based onSwedish municipality data, indicate that contract and municipality characteristics, assumed toaffect the implementation cost, affect the volume of the procurement, and the number ofbidders, but not necessarily the choice of allocation mechanism. The final paper studiesregional differences in bids, costs, and competition in municipal procurement using the samedata as in paper [3]. The results show higher estimated costs for completing the contract, butlower estimated mean bids in the major city area of Stockholm compared with the res t of thecountry. This is explained by lower profit margins and higher operational costs in the majorcity area. An analysis is also carried out of why the lowest bidder is not always the contractedbidder. / <p>Härtill 4 delar.</p> / digitalisering@umu

Asymmetric information is a large potential problem for insurance markets, especially for markets insuring health risk. Despite a large theoretical attention over the last 30 years, the empirical evidence of the extent of the problem is still limited. In part this is due to methodological problems. The fundamental problem being that the private information, on which agents' act, is generally not observable to the researcher. This thesis provides empirical evidence on selection and moral hazard, using a private dental insurance natural experiment that solves many of the methodological problems. The initial decision to select into the insurance is analyzed in the first paper. Interestingly, results indicate both adverse selection and its opposite, advantageous selection, in different parts of the sample. These results are captured in a theoretical model where agents differ in their degree of risk aversion. In the second paper the decision to opt out of insurance is related to new information on risk. Results indicate that updating is asymmetric. Agents do not take the insurer's information fully into account, even though it is public. Finally, the moral hazard effect of dental coverage is analyzed in the last paper. The treatment effect of insurance coverage is separated from self-selection, using propensity score matching, IV and difference-in-differences. The results give strong empirical evidence of moral hazard. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögsk., 2004 xii s., s. 3-12: sammanfattning, s. 13-104: 3 uppsatser

O aumento de gastos com a atenção à saúde apresenta-se como um fato econômico de merecida relevância no cenário internacional, sendo resultante da elevação progressiva de preços dos produtos e serviços deste mercado. Pela sua importância social e peculiaridades recebe um tratamento especial nos estudos econômicos. A economia da saúde avalia os fatores que influenciam demanda e oferta neste mercado, direcionando suas observações à interação entre seus agentes e atores, destacando seus comportamentos em relação às suas reações com o tratamento do risco de ficar doente. Possíveis falhas de mercado, envolvendo risco moral, assimetria de informação e seleção adversa, podem ser atribuídas como causas de uma demanda que foge às regras de equilíbrio econômico e favorece a elevação da oferta. Esses problemas remetem à discussão sobre como a mudança de incentivos pode acarretar aumento de gastos e perda de eficiência no provimento dos bens e serviços de saúde dos Estados Unidos da América (EUA) e no mercado de saúde suplementar brasileiro, levando em conta que a situação de elevação dos gastos com saúde, que se agrava no Brasil nos últimos dez anos, já vem sendo vivida há mais tempo em outros países e particularmente nos EUA, mostrando que o problema apresenta tendência de ser persistente. / The health care expenditure increase that presents itself as an economic fact of worldly relevance on the international scene, being the result of the gradual increase of prices of products and services in this market. Due to its social relevance and peculiarities it deserves a special treatment in economic studies. Health economics evaluates the factors influencing supply and demand in this market, directing its comments to the interaction between actors and their agents, highlighting their behaviors in relation to their reactions to the treatment of the risk of getting sick. Possible flaws in this market , involving moral hazard, information asymmetry and adverse selection can be attributed as causes of a demand that evades the rules of economic equilibrium and favors lifting the offer. These problems relate to discuss how changing incentives may lead to increased expenses and loss of efficiency in the provision of goods and services of health of United States of America (USA) and the Brazilian health plan market, taking into account the situation of rising health spending, which deepens in Brazil over the past ten years, as has been the longest lived in other countries and particularly the USA, showing that the problem shows a trend to be persistent.

O aumento de gastos com a atenção à saúde apresenta-se como um fato econômico de merecida relevância no cenário internacional, sendo resultante da elevação progressiva de preços dos produtos e serviços deste mercado. Pela sua importância social e peculiaridades recebe um tratamento especial nos estudos econômicos. A economia da saúde avalia os fatores que influenciam demanda e oferta neste mercado, direcionando suas observações à interação entre seus agentes e atores, destacando seus comportamentos em relação às suas reações com o tratamento do risco de ficar doente. Possíveis falhas de mercado, envolvendo risco moral, assimetria de informação e seleção adversa, podem ser atribuídas como causas de uma demanda que foge às regras de equilíbrio econômico e favorece a elevação da oferta. Esses problemas remetem à discussão sobre como a mudança de incentivos pode acarretar aumento de gastos e perda de eficiência no provimento dos bens e serviços de saúde dos Estados Unidos da América (EUA) e no mercado de saúde suplementar brasileiro, levando em conta que a situação de elevação dos gastos com saúde, que se agrava no Brasil nos últimos dez anos, já vem sendo vivida há mais tempo em outros países e particularmente nos EUA, mostrando que o problema apresenta tendência de ser persistente. / The health care expenditure increase that presents itself as an economic fact of worldly relevance on the international scene, being the result of the gradual increase of prices of products and services in this market. Due to its social relevance and peculiarities it deserves a special treatment in economic studies. Health economics evaluates the factors influencing supply and demand in this market, directing its comments to the interaction between actors and their agents, highlighting their behaviors in relation to their reactions to the treatment of the risk of getting sick. Possible flaws in this market , involving moral hazard, information asymmetry and adverse selection can be attributed as causes of a demand that evades the rules of economic equilibrium and favors lifting the offer. These problems relate to discuss how changing incentives may lead to increased expenses and loss of efficiency in the provision of goods and services of health of United States of America (USA) and the Brazilian health plan market, taking into account the situation of rising health spending, which deepens in Brazil over the past ten years, as has been the longest lived in other countries and particularly the USA, showing that the problem shows a trend to be persistent.