When the national Democratic Party began to transform to progressive era politics because of the New Deal, conservative reactionaries turned against the social welfare programs and used red scare tactics to discredit liberal and progressive New Deal Democrat professors in higher education. This process continued during the Second World War, when the conservatives in Texas lumped fascism and communism in order to anchor support and fire and threaten professors and administrators for advocating or teaching “subversive doctrine.” In 1948 Texas joined other southern states and followed the Dixiecrat movement designed to return the Democratic Party to its original pro-business and segregationist philosophy. Conservatives who wanted to bolster their Cold Warrior status in Texas also played upon the fears of spreading communism during the Cold War, and passed several repressive laws intended to silence unruly students and entrap professors by claiming they advocated communist doctrine. The fight culminated during the Civil Rights movement, when conservatives in the state attributed subversive or communist behavior to civil rights organizations, and targeted higher education to protect segregated universities. In order to return the national Democratic Party to the pro-business, segregationist philosophy established at the early twentieth century, conservatives used redbaiting tactics to thwart the progressivism in the state’s higher education facilities.

No abstract available / History / M.A.

Text in Afrikaans / Die portefeulje Verdediging het vanaf 1948 tot 1959 besondere eise aan F.C. Erasmus gestel. Hy moes 'n parate en doeltreffende Unieverdedigingsmag, wat Suid-Afrika teen moontlike kommunistiese aggressie kon verdedig, daarstel. Hy moes ook die Nasionale Party se verdedigingsbeleid, tot nag toe abstrakte beginsels vervat in die partyprogram, implementeer. Erasmus het die Mag d.m.v. 'n ingrypende hervormingsprogram met 'n Suid-Afrikaanse identiteit beklee en Afrikaanssprekendes in groat getalle daarheen gelok. Nieteenstaande die beperkte hulpbronne tot die land se beskikking en sterk kritiek teen hom, het Erasmus Suid-Afrika se verdediging met rasse skrede laat vooruitgaan. Hy het die organisasie, opleiding en krygstuig van die Mag uitgebou en gemoderniseer, en ook die grondslag van 'n onafhanklike, plaaslike krygstuigvervaardigingsbedryf gele. Voorts het Erasmus 'n prominente rol in Suid-Afrika se internasionale militere strategie gespeel. Hy bet onvermoeid gepoog om die Europese koloniale moondhede te oorreed om 'n Afrika-verdedigingsorganisasie op die been te bring. 'n Hoogtepunt van sy dienstermyn aan die internasionale front was Brittanje se oordrag van Simonstad aan Suid-Afrika. / The Defence portfolio placed heavy demands on F.C. Erasmus from 1948 to 1959. He had to transform the South African armed forces into an efficient and combat ready Union Defence Force. He also had to implement the National Party's defence policy, which hitherto consisted of abstract principles contained in the party's political programme. Erasmus made far reaching changes to the Union Defence Force, furnishing it with a distinct South African identity. Despite criticism against him and the country's limited resources Erasmus improved South Africa's defence significantly. He modernized the organization, training and equipment of the Union Defence Force and established the basis for an independent local armaments industry. Erasmus also played a prominent role in South Africa's international military strategy. He laboured unceasingly to persuade the European colonial powers to enter into an African defence alli~nce. One of his greatest achievements is the transfer of Simonstown to South Africa. / History / M.A. (Geskiedenis)

Text in Afrikaans / Die portefeulje Verdediging het vanaf 1948 tot 1959 besondere eise aan F.C. Erasmus gestel. Hy moes 'n parate en doeltreffende Unieverdedigingsmag, wat Suid-Afrika teen moontlike kommunistiese aggressie kon verdedig, daarstel. Hy moes ook die Nasionale Party se verdedigingsbeleid, tot nag toe abstrakte beginsels vervat in die partyprogram, implementeer. Erasmus het die Mag d.m.v. 'n ingrypende hervormingsprogram met 'n Suid-Afrikaanse identiteit beklee en Afrikaanssprekendes in groat getalle daarheen gelok. Nieteenstaande die beperkte hulpbronne tot die land se beskikking en sterk kritiek teen hom, het Erasmus Suid-Afrika se verdediging met rasse skrede laat vooruitgaan. Hy het die organisasie, opleiding en krygstuig van die Mag uitgebou en gemoderniseer, en ook die grondslag van 'n onafhanklike, plaaslike krygstuigvervaardigingsbedryf gele. Voorts het Erasmus 'n prominente rol in Suid-Afrika se internasionale militere strategie gespeel. Hy bet onvermoeid gepoog om die Europese koloniale moondhede te oorreed om 'n Afrika-verdedigingsorganisasie op die been te bring. 'n Hoogtepunt van sy dienstermyn aan die internasionale front was Brittanje se oordrag van Simonstad aan Suid-Afrika. / The Defence portfolio placed heavy demands on F.C. Erasmus from 1948 to 1959. He had to transform the South African armed forces into an efficient and combat ready Union Defence Force. He also had to implement the National Party's defence policy, which hitherto consisted of abstract principles contained in the party's political programme. Erasmus made far reaching changes to the Union Defence Force, furnishing it with a distinct South African identity. Despite criticism against him and the country's limited resources Erasmus improved South Africa's defence significantly. He modernized the organization, training and equipment of the Union Defence Force and established the basis for an independent local armaments industry. Erasmus also played a prominent role in South Africa's international military strategy. He laboured unceasingly to persuade the European colonial powers to enter into an African defence alli~nce. One of his greatest achievements is the transfer of Simonstown to South Africa. / History / M.A. (Geskiedenis)

The Reagan Administration took office in 1981 and began to implement against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), what became known as the Reagan Doctrine. The was an effort to break with previous the previous presidential administration’s policies toward the USSR and would involve the rollback of Communism, instead of simply just co-existing with Communism (Détente) or containing the spread of it. Part of the area that was subject to the Reagan Doctrine included the volatile southern African region, which had two Marxist-Leninist Regimes, namely Angola and Mozambique. Using Graham Allison’s bureaucratic political model, this study attempts to answer the question: “Even when all the prerequisites were met, why was there a decision to only implement a modified form of the Reagan Doctrine in Mozambique, instead of a full-blown effort, such as in, for example Angola or Afghanistan?” As will be shown in the research, the Reagan Doctrine was not a written doctrine, but had many different facets, as will be shown. The most significant part of the Reagan Doctrine was the recognition and arming of insurgents who confronted the Soviet backed regimes including RENAMO. There have been claims that the US Government did not recognize RENAMO. This is false as will be shown by the fact that President Reagan urged FRELIMO to negotiate with the RENAMO resistance. The real significance of this is that even if all prerequisites were met, why was there such reluctance to apply the doctrine with the veracity as compared to the effort in Angola and Afghanistan in arming RENAMO. Was the United States Government still trapped in the “Vietnam Syndrome”? Did the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) have the 3 same political and charismatic qualities as the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)? Were special interests or lobbyists influencing government bureaucrats to view decisions in a specific way? A significant part of this study is devoted to the question of how much influence did the bureaucracy and the politicians (both appointed and career) had on the important national security decision-making process involving Mozambique. Another question that could be asked is: Was the doctrine indirectly applied through third parties? In 1989 when the Reagan Administration ended, did President Reagan and the Reagan Administration achieve their objectives toward Mozambique. If so, was this due to the Reagan Doctrine or other factors? If not, did any actors or events interfere with the strategy? / Political Sciences / M.A. (International Politics)

The Reagan Administration took office in 1981 and began to implement against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), what became known as the Reagan Doctrine. The was an effort to break with previous the previous presidential administration’s policies toward the USSR and would involve the rollback of Communism, instead of simply just co-existing with Communism (Détente) or containing the spread of it. Part of the area that was subject to the Reagan Doctrine included the volatile southern African region, which had two Marxist-Leninist Regimes, namely Angola and Mozambique. Using Graham Allison’s bureaucratic political model, this study attempts to answer the question: “Even when all the prerequisites were met, why was there a decision to only implement a modified form of the Reagan Doctrine in Mozambique, instead of a full-blown effort, such as in, for example Angola or Afghanistan?” As will be shown in the research, the Reagan Doctrine was not a written doctrine, but had many different facets, as will be shown. The most significant part of the Reagan Doctrine was the recognition and arming of insurgents who confronted the Soviet backed regimes including RENAMO. There have been claims that the US Government did not recognize RENAMO. This is false as will be shown by the fact that President Reagan urged FRELIMO to negotiate with the RENAMO resistance. The real significance of this is that even if all prerequisites were met, why was there such reluctance to apply the doctrine with the veracity as compared to the effort in Angola and Afghanistan in arming RENAMO. Was the United States Government still trapped in the “Vietnam Syndrome”? Did the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) have the 3 same political and charismatic qualities as the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)? Were special interests or lobbyists influencing government bureaucrats to view decisions in a specific way? A significant part of this study is devoted to the question of how much influence did the bureaucracy and the politicians (both appointed and career) had on the important national security decision-making process involving Mozambique. Another question that could be asked is: Was the doctrine indirectly applied through third parties? In 1989 when the Reagan Administration ended, did President Reagan and the Reagan Administration achieve their objectives toward Mozambique. If so, was this due to the Reagan Doctrine or other factors? If not, did any actors or events interfere with the strategy? / Political Sciences / M.A. (International Politics)

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / In the early 1950s, President Dwight Eisenhower encouraged citizens to “Wake Up! Sign Up! Look Up!” to the Soviet atomic threat by joining the Ground Observer Corps (GOC). Established by the United States Air Force (USAF), the GOC involved civilian volunteers surveying the skies for Soviet aircraft via watchtowers, alerting the Air Force if they suspected threatening aircraft. This thesis examines the 1950s response to the longstanding problem posed by the invention of any new weapon: how to adapt defensive technology to meet the potential threat. In the case of the early Cold War period, the GOC was the USAF’s best, albeit faulty, defense option against a weapon that did not discriminate between soldiers and citizens and rendered traditional ground troops useless. After the Korean War, Air Force officials promoted the GOC for its espousal of volunteerism and individualism. Encouraged to take ownership of the program, observers appropriated the GOC for their personal and community needs, comprised of social gatherings and policing activities, thus greatly expanding the USAF’s original objectives.