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Chapter I of this study of the Arabian Ba'th Socialist Party discusses the evolution of Arab nationalism and concludes that Ba'th was a natural outcome of this evolution; two intellectuals supporting Arab nationalism were Party co-founders Michael Aflaq and Salah Bitar, Part One of Chapter II summarizes their lives to facilitate understanding of their thought and its impact on Ba'th; Part Two examines the Party's first convention (source of the Ba'th constitution), the reasons for it, and the necessity of establishing Ba'th; and Part Three outlines Ba'th ideology and organization. Chapter III analyzes Ba'th's promotion of Syrian-Egyptian union and that union's resultant adverse effect upon Party cohesiveness, The Conclusion discusses the groups into which Ba'th split after 1961 and their new interpretations of Ba'th ideology.

This period of the history of the Jews in the Yemen was selected for study on account· of the richness of the material which is available. The sources used in this research for the study of the political, economic and social situation of the Jews in the Yemen may be divided into the following groups: 1. The MSS. A - Hebrew MSS. B Arabic MSS. The printed sources A - Hebrew printed B - Arabic printed sources c - European printed sources Trave1lers A - Contemporary travellers B - Modern travellers In addition to the Hebrew and Arabic sources we have a series of eye-witness reports from travellers who visited the Yemen during the last three centuries, and whose observations have had remarkable and enduring results. The information obtained from these sources is plentiful and of great interest and importance for the history of the Yemen in general and supplies us with personal observations on the people, both Arabs and Jews. Such journevs increased the volume of knowledge and broadened its horizons owing to the opportunities taken for study and investigation. Although these sources have been mentioned in both the footnotes and the bibliography, it would be worth mentioning them here to estimate their relative informative value. One of the most essential Hebrew sources on which we have relied most in this dissertation is Korot Ha-Zman, written by Habshush. All we can learn about Habshush must be gleaned from his own writings. He was primarily a coppersmith by profession and it was only in his later years that he took up writing. In the Spring of 1893, Habshush was occupied in writing his Hebrew account of the history of the Jews'in the Yemen. The Autumn of the same year he spent writing his account about his journey with Halevy.1 His decision to write his own works was perhaps partly due to the influence of the European travellers who spread culture among the Jews in the Yemen in the nineteenth century. But his method of writing and his bitter complaints against the treatment of Ha1evy.

The First World War's 1916 Arab Revolt has become, in the West, a renowned episode in part because of the presence of one dominating character: T.E. Lawrence. However, "Lawrence of Arabia" is only the most prominent of the many Western agents sent to advise the Revolt. The narratives of these advisers have come to dominate the most Westerners popular conception of the Arab uprising. Most scholars have portrayed the British advisers to the Arab Revolt as "pro-Arab." The aim of this thesis is to challenge that portrayal through a careful analysis of the writings (published and unpublished) and actions of the four advisers: T.E. Lawrence, Sir Ronald Storrs, Major Sir Hubert Young, Lt Col. Sir Percy Joyce. / I argue for a more subtle, complex, heterogeneous version of the advisers Pro-Arab approach. By examining the advisers' published accounts and the available archival resources the contrast between the rhetoric surrounding their legends and the actual practice of their war experiences will be laid bare. The goal of the thesis is to use primary sources to demonstrate, in various areas of their relationships with Arabs, a discourse of superiority versus inferiority. This work has consequently attempted to present a less altruistic agenda emerging from the advisers' wartime conduct. In its place I have demonstrated numerous instances where they coerced and enforced their own interpretation of Arab desires and even an "Arab" identity onto the Revolt itself and furthermore, cemented these interpretations into Western popular culture.

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