This study is an evaluation of the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium National Industrial Programme project, South African Royal Manufacturers (SARM), which forms part of BAE Systems/SAAB’s National Industrial Participation Programme (NIPP) obligations resulting from their participation in South Africa’s 1998 Strategic Procurement Programme (popularly referred to as the ‘arms deal’). SARM was a gold chain manufacturing plant, located in the Free State mining town of Virginia and which was implemented by the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium in partnership with the Harmony Gold Mining Company. Funding for the business was provided by the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium as part of their industrial participation obligation. This funding was supplemented with a loan obtained from the South African Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) to the value of 40% of the cash funds; while land and buildings, as well as loans in the form of gold granules and bars, were provided by Harmony Gold Company, as part of what they describe as their corporate social responsibility towards the Virginia area where they are the only mining company operating; and also simultaneously as their obligation towards gold beneficiation as required by law. The business failed after less than 12 months of operation amidst allegations of theft of gold and the sudden lay-off of approximately 500 poor black rural women. The company’s liquidation appears to be on the backburner indefinitely. The study was conducted over a period of 18 months, and this thesis written over several more. As part of this evaluation several issues were investigated. These issues are: the push for beneficiation of South African mined metals; the National Industrial Participation Programme; local government development; the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium and other similar companies which are involved in jewellery production for export as part of both the country’s beneficiation drive, as well as the 3 NIPP. These other companies are used in this study as a ‘control’ group against which SARM’s performance can be measured realistically. Different research methods were used during the evaluation, including secondary document reviews, face-to-face and telephonic interviews with key-informants, the use of e-mail to contact key-informants, as well as conducting face-to-face questionnaires with random interviewees, and a focus group discussion with SARM ex-workers. There were several limitations to this study. The primary limitation was the inaccessibility of official and legal documents pertaining to both SARM, and the 1998 arms deal. SARM no longer exists, and thus the evaluation results should be used as lessons learned for similar projects in the future.

How are arms export choices made within a state? In this dissertation I use a foreign policy analysis framework to examine this question. I focus on examining each of the three primary levels of analysis in international relations as it relates to the main question. I begin with a typical international relations level and examine the characteristics of the two states that dominate the world arms trade: The United States and Russia. I then examine the full network of relations among all states in the international system that are involved in the sale or purchase of arms. To do this I use an Exponential Random Graph Model (ERGM) to examine these relations, which I derived from data on arms sales from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). I examine the arms sales in each decade from 1950 through 2010. In order to answer the question of how arms decisions are made within the state, I focus my inquiry on the United States and Russia. It is these states that have the practical capability to use arms transfers as a foreign policy tool. I examine the foreign policy making mechanisms in each of these states to determine how arms transfers can be used as a foreign policy tool. I examine and the bureaucratic institutions within each state and come up with a state ordering preference for how arms decisions are evaluated in each state. Finally, I use case studies to examine arms relations between the both the U.S. and Russia and three other states in each case. The other states were selected based on the pattern of sales between the two countries. I examine these sales to determine the impact of bureaucratic maneuvering and interest politics on the decision-making process within Russia and the United States. I find in my network analysis that the traditional measures of state power - military spending, regime type, and military alliances - do not account for the overall structure of the arms sale network. The most important factors in the formation of the arms sale network in each of the six decades that I study are specific configurations of triadic relations that suggest a continued hierarchy in the arms sale network. I find in my case study chapters that a simple model of state interest as a decision-making rule accounts for the decisions made by the different bureaucratic actors in the U.S. Russian arms sales are driven by a state imperative to increase Russia's market share, and there is high-level involvement in making different arms deals with other countries.

No / This book focuses on the use of small arms in violence and attempts by the state to govern the use and acquisition of these weapons. It is likely that hundreds of thousands of people are killed every year as a result of armed violence ¿ in contexts ranging from war zones to domestic violence. This edited volume examines why these deaths occur, the role of guns and other weapons, and how governance can be used to reduce and prevent those deaths. Drawing on a variety of disciplines, ranging from anthropology through economics to peace and security studies, the book¿s main concern throughout is that of human security ¿ the causes and means of prevention of armed violence. The first part of the book concerns warfare, the second armed violence and crime, and the last governance of arms and their (mis)-use. The concluding chapter builds on the contributors¿ key findings and suggests priorities for future research, with the aim of forming a coherent narrative which examines what we know, why armed violence occurs, and what can be done to reduce it.

No / The illegal proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) is a global problem, and one consequence of this illicit trade is that regions can become flooded with these guns before, during and following a violent conflict. Effective tracing of these arms requires adequate marking and record-keeping systems as well as improved international co-operation by relevant authorities. This publication argues that the main obstacles to progress in this area are political in nature, rather than technological. Other issues discussed include: the selection of categories and types of SALWs for inclusion in a tracing mechanism; and the structures and institutions required for an effective firearms tracing system.

Thesis (MMil)--Stellenbosch University, 2003. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The fundamental motivation for emerging arms suppliers to produce arms was the desire to overcome their position of dependence in the system of arms production and transfers. However, their predicament as late entrants into the system castigated them to fail in this endeavour. This failure is based on three criteria, which also assist in the identification of emerging suppliers. Firstly, the weaponry they produce is far below the sophistication characterised by higher levels of technological advancement. Secondly, they can only produce one or two advanced weapon systems. Finally, they rely on the leading suppliers for certain sophisticated components of weapon systems which they cannot produce themselves and as a result, become so dependent that they, with an exception of a few, are unable to go beyond the simple reproduction or retrofitting of existing weapon systems. The capability to produce arms was restrictedly extended to certain states in the post-war era, and even those states that obtained such a capability were confmed to producing small arms and platforms for naval vessels. Those states that went beyond these capabilities did so with the assistance of other states or specialists, the initial intention being to meet domestic requirements, and ultimately to dispose surplus Second World War equipment in the re-transfer market. The emerging supplier states' intention to develop indigenous arms industries was driven by the political urge to reduce their reliance on the leading suppliers and to nationalise the arms production process for import substitution in order to meet domestic security needs. Since the emerging suppliers began the process of defence industrialisation from the importation of complete weapon systems to import substitution, and ultimately to the promotion of exports, they mainly relied on technology imported from the leading suppliers. On the one hand, the leading suppliers attempted to hinder the efforts of emerging suppliers to promote arms exports so as to protect their oligopolistic share of the arms market through tightening the controls and regulations on technological supplies. On the other, the emerging suppliers were impelled to promote their arms exports in order to overcome the saturation of their domestic markets, to utilise effectively their arms production capacities, and to positively affect their balance of payments through the procreation of foreign exchange returns. This study reached the following conclusions and inferences: 1. The arms trade has evolved to be characterised by the transfer of military technology, which did not feature in the arms transactions of the previous periods. 2. The gap between the leading and emerging suppliers is widening with regard to the sophistication of technological capabilities, and accordingly the stratification within the arms production and transfer system is sustainable and reinforced, thus making it hard for the lower tiers to progress beyond their current status. 3. The emerging suppliers' share of and contribution into the arms market is constricted, and as such they specialise in specific (often uncomplicated) weapon systems that constitute niches in the global market. 4. The unfolding arms production and transfer system is characterised by a fiercely competitive atmosphere, and consequently, only those states that can subsidise or integrate their efforts are enabled to sustain an advanced arms production faculty. 5. As the emerging suppliers begin to introduce more and more of their wares into the market, the costs of research and development begin to soar in the same manner as those of the leading suppliers, thus urging them to become more export-oriented. 6. Participants in the system will be compelled to relinquish their comparative technological superiority in order to survive, thus narrowing the gap between the capabilities possessed by both the leading and the emerging suppliers. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die onderliggende motivering van opkomende wapenverskaffers om wapens te produseer word toegeskryf aan 'n behoefte om hulle relatiewe afhanklikheid in die stelsel van wapenproduksie en - handel te oorkom. Boonop het die laat toetrede tot die stelsel hierdie opkomende verskaffers se kanse tot sukses verder belemmer. Die rede vir die onsuksesvolle toetrede word gebasseer op drie kriteria (wat ook dien as identifiserende eienskappe van opkomende wapenverskaffers). Eerstens, die wapens wat opkomende verskaffers lewer skiet tekort aan die vereiste gesofistikeerde standaarde van die gevestigde wapenprodusente. Tweedens, hulle kan slegs een of twee gevorderde wapenstelsels produseer. Derdens, sekere komponente van wapenstelsels word verkry by die gevestigde verskaffers, wat lei tot afhanklikheid tot so 'n mate dat die opkomende verskaffer se vermoëns beperk word tot eenvoudige reprodusering of herinstallasies van bestaande stelsels. Trouens, in die post-oorlog tydperk is die vermoë om wapens te produseer doelbewus beperk tot sekere state wat 'n afgebakende reeks van handwapens en uitrusting vir vloot vaartuie kon vervaardig. State wat verby hierdie vermoë beweeg het, het dit gedoen met behulp van ander state of spesaliste, oorspronklik met die oog op die huishoudelike behoefte maar ook om ontslae te raak van surplusse uit die Tweede Wêreldoorlog. 'n Politieke begeerte om in hulle eie sekuriteitsbehoeftes te voorsien deur middel van invoersubstitusie, het die opkomende verskaffers genoop om ontslae te raak van die afhanklikheid op gevestigde verskaffers en om die wapenproduseringsproses te nasionaliseer. Hulle het hoofsaaklik gesteun op ingevoerde tegnologie om die verdedigingsbedryf te industrialiseer. Die proses het so verloop: volledige wapenstelsels is ingevoer, daarna het invoersubstitusie plaasgevind, en daarna 'n bevordering van uitvoere. Gevestigde verskaffers het endersyds probeer om (deur middel van strenger kontrole en regulasies of tegnologiese ware) die opkomende verskaffers te verhoed om hulle oligopolistiese houvas op die mark te belemmer en andersyds moes opkomende verskaffers noodgedwonge hulle uitvoere bevorder om te voorkom dat die plaaslike mark versadig word. Die laasgenoemde aspek het ook die betalingsbalans van opkomende verskaffers positief beinvloed as gevolg van die inkomste uit buitelandse valuta. Hierdie studie kom tot die volgende aanames en gevolgtrekkings: 1. Wapenhandel het só ontwikkel dat die oordrag van militêre tegnologie die hoofkenmerk geword het in die stelsel - 'n ongekende kenmerk tot dusver in die ontwikkelingsgang van internasionale wapenhandel. 2. Die gaping van tegnologiese vermoëns tussen opkomende en gevestigde wapenverskaffers word groter en daarmee saam word die stratifikasie in wapenproduksie en -lewering volhoubaar en versterk, wat lei tot 'n beperking op die vermoë van opkomende verskaffers om vooruitgang te maak. 3. Opkomende verskaffers se aandeel in en bydrae tot wapenmarkte bly beperk en spesialiseer daarom op spesifieke (meestalongekompliseerde) wapenstelsels wat gemik is op sekere nisse in die wêreldmark. 4. Die ontluikende wapenproduksie en -handelsisteem is uiters kompeterend, met die gevolg dat slegs state wat hulle pogings kan subsidieer of integreer in staat is om gevorderde fasiliteite te onderhou. 5. Met die toenemende aanbod vanaf opkomende verskaffers, styg die kostes van navorsing en ontwikkeling vir beide die opkomende en die gevestigde verskaffer wat weer beide dwing om hulle uitvoere te beklemtoon. 6. Deelnemers in die stelsel sal gedwing word om hulle vergelykende tegnologiese voorsprong prys te gee om te oorleef in die stelsel, waarna die gaping tussen die vermoëns van opkomende en gevestigde verskaffers verminder sal word.

Thesis (M.S.)--Missouri State University, 2009. / "May 2009." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 89-97). Also available online.

This study examines post-apartheid South African foreign policy under former President Nelson Mandela, and the apparent ambiguities that were its recurrent feature in the period from 1994 to 1999. Its focus is on the inherent irreconcilability of the economic national interests and the foreign policy principles which included the promotion of and respect for universalist principles and interests such as human rights, democracy, international peace and security. In examining South African foreign policy during this period, it would appear that the country was trapped between two competing priorities: the need to promote "universalist" principles and the need to satisfy its national economic interests. The main aim of the study is to explain how this "irreconcilability" between universalist principles and national economic interests would later create ambiguities and contradictions in South Africa's foreign policy, weaken respect for its foreign policy principles, and ultimately lead to ideological failure among politicians who employed 'short-term gain' policy decision-making in dealing with 'pariah states'. The study further demonstrates that "realist" national interests are frequently short-term, realizable and vital for a country, while universalist interests are long-term, idealistic and usually not easily realizable. It will be argued, therefore, that a country faced with making decisions about its vital national interests, will not make efforts to pursue long-term universalist interests if that choice would in any way endanger its fundamental national interests. In order to better assess this ambiguity, this thesis will provide a case study of Pretoria's arms sales to 'pariah states' during the period. The purpose of this study is not to attempt to explain all of the issues around post-apartheid foreign policymaking, or even to argue whether the sale of arms to 'pariah states' was 'politically incorrect', but to provide a 'piece of the puzzle' which might explain how the social and economic situation may have compelled Pretoria to sell arms when these actions disregarded universalist principles of foreign policy. The conclusion seems to confirm the realist view that universal values and principles can be regarded only when they are in harmony with a state's perceived self-interests.

Modern breech-loading rifles flooded into Arabia and the region around the Persian Gulf between 1880 and World War I. This work examines in detail, and analyzes, the introduction of modern arms to Arabia, the origin of those arms, the trade patterns by which they were moved, and the international and local political factors that affected the trade. The international arms trade was driven by three major factors. First, the rapid technological development of small arms in the nineteenth century fed the market, resulting in the availability of hundreds of thousands of obsolete military rifles for resale. Each time new rifles were adopted by the armies of Europe, old stocks were dumped on the private arms market. Second, international politics and European colonial rivalry contributed to the growth and maintenance of the arms trade. The French Consul at Muscat protected the trade in the Persian Gulf, while French arms dealers commanded a substantial portion of the trade. British efforts to slow the flow of arms through Muscat was hampered by European politics. Third, the internal politics of the region created a demand for the modern arms. Inside Arabia, the resurgent Saudis fought Rashidis and Hashimites in a series of wars, while other tribal raids and wars further built the demand for modern rifles: if one group had modern weapons, its enemies felt a need for them also. Outside Arabia, a strong demand for weapons in Persia and on the Northwest Frontier of India helped pull weapons to the markets of the Gulf. This thesis deals first with the changing technology of weapons in the nineteenth century, so that the military impact of the new weapons can be understood. The types of modern rifles introduced to the Peninsula is then reviewed, finding that the Peabody-Martini and the Martini-Henry, and their numerous variations, were the weapons most commonly imported in the decades around the turn of the century. With this information as background, the international politics of the arms trade are examined. Emphasis is on the Anglo-French rivalry at Muscat that gave treaty protection to French arms dealers. European fears that modern arms would reach Africa and make colonial control of the continent difficult or impossible led, in 1890, to the arms control provisions of the General Act of Brussels. The Act did not, however, extend to Arabia. The heart of the work is a detailed examination and analysis of the arms trade in and around Arabia. The arms trade in the region was centered in two main entrepots, Djibouti in French Somaliland and Muscat in southeast Arabia. By the late l890s, the bulk of the trade was passing through the Suez Canal before transshipment at one of these ports. Just over half of the arms reaching Muscat were exported to Persia and the Northwest Frontier, with the remainder reaching Arabia or Mesopotamia. The patterns of the private arms trade were complex, both at sea and on land, and are discussed at length. The political use of weapons by the Ottoman Government, and by European states, contributed to the flood of guns into Arabia. The Ottomans, in particular, used their stocks of obsolete weapons to arm their client tribes in Arabia. Ottoman purchases of Sniders, Martinis, and finally Mausers, gave them a constant supply of older rifles for distribution. The arms trade in Arabia was controlled by international and local political developments, and fed by the availability of modern arms on the international market. The trade was complex and impossible to prevent so long as the European states and the Ottomans continued to sell or distribute obsolete rifles as new guns were adopted.

Despite increasing levels of military spending and a growing number of recurring conflicts, research has until now failed to consider the impact of arms transfers on the durability of peace. Investigating the recurrence of conflicts allows us to delve deeper into the enduring impact of arms transfers, shedding light on whether weapons induce, suppress, or merely postpone conflict relapse. This thesis studies the impact of post-conflict arms transfers on the likelihood of conflict recurrence, hypothesizing that the effect is conditional on the outcome of the previous conflict. By conducting a multinomial logistic regression analysis, the initial results of this study imply that post-conflict arms transfers can have a stabilizing effect, regardless of whether the initial conflict ended in a military victory or a negotiated settlement. However, a closer analysis of results implies that the advantages and disadvantages of arms transfers are highly contextual and depend on a series of factors that may fuel or contain violence.

In this paper I look at the evolving role of Russia in the Middle East, analyzing transfers of Russian military equipment to its main ally in the region, the Syrian Arab Republic. By using Syria as a case study, I provide insight as to the evolution of Russia’s Middle Eastern policy, examine the motivations that play a role in Moscow’s decision-making process and the discuss the changes that have taken place in the Middle East military landscape. My research illustrates that Russia is a prestige seeking state that is motivated my domestic issues. Furthermore, sixty years of arms transfers indicate that Russia has never sold game-changing weapons to Syria as this would be counterproductive to Moscow’s main goal in the region: the brokering of a new Middle East peace deal. / text