Dans notre société que l’on peut appeler «société de l’information » ou également société de « surveillance électronique », il est désormais essentiel d’assurer la protection de données à caractère personnel. La mise en place d’une réglementation en matière de protection de données n’a pas toujours été aisée et, dans certains domaines, demeure complexe. Le domaine judiciaire est un exemple marquant de secteur d’activité où il a été difficile de mettre en place des règles spécifiques et appropriées pour la protection de données personnelles. Dans les années quatre-vingt-dix, la question s’était posée de savoir si une protection spécifique des données traitées à des fins judiciaires était nécessaire. Les conclusions avaient été diverses : d’un côté, certains avaient estimé qu’une réglementation spécifique était opportune, d’un autre côté, d’autres considéraient que l’idée de mettre en place une telle réglementation devait être abandonnée. Cette étude semble avoir été – à un certain point – abandonnée. Compte tenu de l’évolution des technologies et de l’évolution des textes européens, il semble essentiel de poser à nouveau cette question et de s’interroger sur la place à conférer aux données traitées à des fins judiciaires dans le système européen actuel de protection de données à caractère personnel. Cette nécessité est corroborée par la jurisprudence de la Cour de Strasbourg. Cette dernière a en effet, été saisie de cas de violations des droits fondamentaux liés à un traitement inapproprié des données dans le domaine judiciaire. De plus, des projets de réforme du système de protection de données personnelles sont actuellement en discussion au niveau européen. En effet, le Conseil de l’Europe et l’Union travaillent actuellement sur la modernisation des textes existants en matière de protection des données à caractère personnel. Il est donc intéressant de s’interroger sur la place réservée à la protection des données judiciaires dans le cadre de ces réformes. La thèse veut tout d’abord rappeler l’importance de protéger les données à caractère personnel en tout temps, en tout lieu et dans n’importe quel domaine d’activité, y compris le domaine judiciaire. Elle a pour but principal, d’une part, de mettre en évidence les problèmes existants en matière de protection de données judiciaires et, d’autre part, d’essayer de répondre à la question de savoir si une réglementation spécifique dans ce domaine doit aujourd’hui être élaborée au niveau européen. Dans la première partie les textes du Conseil de l’Europe et de l’Union européenne en matière de protection des données et leur applicabilité au domaine judiciaire sont tout d’abord analysés. Compte tenu du fait que les textes actuellement en vigueur au niveau du Conseil de l’Europe et de l’Union ont, à première vue, un contenu identique, il a été nécessaire d’analyser ces textes avec un esprit comparatif afin de comprendre comment ceux-ci se concilient et de vérifier leur applicabilité aux données judiciaires. [...] / In our society which can be called "information society" and also society of "electronic surveillance," it is essential to ensure the protection of personal data. The implementation of regulations on data protection has not always been easy, and in some areas, remains complex. The judiciary is a striking example of an area where it has been difficult to establish specificand appropriate rules for the protection of personal data. In the years ninety, the question was raised whether a specific protection for judicial data was necessary. The findings were different: on the one hand, some have estimated that a specificregulation was appropriate, on the other hand, others felt that the idea of establishing such rules must be abandoned. This study seems to have been - at some point - quitted. Given the improvements in technology and the evolution of European legislation, it seems essential to renew this question and try to find out which level of protection is given to judicial data in the current European system of protection of personal data. The importance to renew this question is proven by the case law of the Strasbourg Court. The latter has indeed been referred to cases of human rights violations due to improper processing of data in the judiciary. In addition, plans to reform the system of protection of personal data are currently under discussion at European level. Indeed, the Council of Europe and the European Union are currently working on the modernization of existing texts on the protection of personal data. It is therefore interesting to examine the place reserved for the protection of judicial data in the context of these reforms. The thesis recall the importance of protecting personal data at any time, in any place and in any field of activity, including the judiciary. Its main aim, on the one hand, is to highlight existing problems in the protection of judicial data and, on the other hand, to answer the question of whether a specific regulation in this area must nowadays be developed at European level. In the first part Council of Europe and the European Union’s texts on data protection and theirapplicability to the judicial data were analyzed. Given the fact that the texts currently into force at the Council of Europe and at the European Union, at first glance, have the same content, it has been necessary to analyze them with a comparative approach in order to understand their interoperability and verify their applicability to judicial data. Despite the multitude of texts on data protection present at European level (those of the Council of Europe and of the European Union), a marginal space is reserved to judicial data. The basic principles stated in these texts are in theory applicable to judicial data but in concrete those are not applied. In any case, those texts do not provide effective protection of judicial data. [...] / Nella nostra società, che può essere chiamata “società dell'informazione” o anche società di “sorveglianza elettronica”, è ormai indispensabile garantire la protezione dei dati personali. L'attuazione della normativa in materia di protezione dei dati non è sempre stata cosa facile, e per alcuni settori di attività, essa risulta tutt’ora un’operazione complessa. Il settoregiudiziario ne è un esempio. In effetti, si tratta di un settore in cui è stato difficile elaborare ed attuare regole specifiche ed adeguate per la protezione dei dati personali. Negli anni novanta, ci si è chiesti se fosse necessario provvedere all’adozione di regole specifiche per la protezione dei dati trattati a fini giudiziari. Secondo una prima teoria una regolamentazione specifica risultava opportuna, tuttavia secondo un’altra teoria l'idea di creare una regolamentazione per la protezione dei dati personali trattati in ambito giudiziario doveva essere accantonata. Lo studio di tale questione sembra essere stato - ad un certo punto - abbandonato. Dati i miglioramenti tecnologici intervenuti negli ultimi anni e l'evoluzione della legislazione europea in materia di protezione dei dati, sembra indispensabile porsi nuovamente la questione dell’opportunità di una regolamentazione specifica per il settore giudiziario. Sembra altresì opportuno interrogarsi sull’importanza che attualmente viene attribuita alla protezione dei dati trattati per finalità legali nell’ambito dell’attuale sistema europeo di protezione dei dati personali. Tale necessità sembra essere corroborata dal contenuto della giurisprudenza della Corte di Strasburgo. Quest'ultima è stata, infatti, spesso adita per casi di violazioni dei diritti fondamentali dovuti ad un trattamento illecito dei dati personali per ragioni di giustizia. Inoltre, dei progetti di riforma del sistema di protezione dei dati personali sono attualmente in discussione a livello europeo. Infatti, il Consiglio d'Europa e l'Unione europea stanno attualmente lavorando sulla modernizzazione dei testi esistenti in materia di protezione dei dati personali. E 'quindi altresì interessante esaminare quale importanza è data alla protezione dei dati giudiziari nel contesto di dette riforme. Oltre a ricordare l'importanza della protezione dei dati personali, in qualsiasi momento, in qualsiasi luogo e in qualsiasi settore di attività, tra cui quello giudiziario, l’obiettivo principale delle tesi è, da un lato, di evidenziare i problemi esistenti in materia di protezione dei dati giudiziari e, dall’altro, di valutare l’opportunità dell’esistenza a livello europeo di una normativa specifica per questo settore. Nella prima parte i testi del Consiglio d'Europa e dell'Unione europea in materia di protezione dei dati e la loro applicabilità al settore giudiziario sono analizzati. Tenuto conto del fatto ch i testi attualmente in vigore presso il Consiglio d'Europa e l'Unione europea hanno, di primo acchito, lo stesso contenuto, è stato necessario analizzarli con un’ottica comparatistica al fine di capire come essi si conciliano e di verificare la loro applicabilità ai dati giudiziari.

Denna uppsats undersöker tillämpningen av artikel 8 i Rådets förordning (EG) nr 1/2003 av den 16 december 2002 om tillämpning av konkurrensreglerna i artiklarna81 och 82 i fördraget (härefter ”Förordningen”). Enligt nämnda artikel får interimistiska åtgärder tillgripas för att motverka en överhängande risk för allvarlig och irreparabelskada på konkurrensen. I detta sammanhang anser Konkurrensverket att begreppetskada på konkurrensen behöver klargöras, och undrar om det kan likställas medbegreppet konkurrensskada. Därför har vi definierat begreppen i förhållande till varandra för att kunna dra slutsatser angående tillämpningen av artikel 8 i Förordningen. Vår utredning visar att konkurrensskada är ett snävt begrepp som syftar på en ren förmögenhetsskadasom drabbar individuella skadelidande på grund av en konkurrensrättsligöverträdelse. Begreppet utgår i allra högsta grad från ett individperspektiv ochkan, men behöver inte, sammanfalla med skadan som åsamkas konkurrensen, ekonomineller samhället. Skada på konkurrensen däremot, är ett allomfattande begrepp somåsyftar den allmänna skadan som åsamkas ekonomin i stort på grund av en överträdelseav konkurrensrätten. Trots att begreppet är allmänt hållet och öppet för fri tolkning av rättstillämparen, ställs specifika krav för förordnande av interimistiska åtgärder enligt artikel 8 i Förordningen, nämligen en prima facie konkurrensrättslig överträdelse som medför en risk för allvarlig och irreparabel skada på konkurrensen. Risken för att konkurrensenskadas måste preciseras på ett konkret och trovärdigt sätt och allvarlighetskravetinnebär till exempel att en konkurrent riskerar att försättas i konkurs. För attvara irreparabel får inte en skada kunna läkas av ett senare beslut av konkurrensmyndigheten. Skadan får inte heller endast vara av ekonomisk art. Slutsatsen är att det ställs höga krav för tillämpningen av artikel 8 i Förordningen,vilket kan förklara den nuvarande avsaknaden av praxis. Behovet för interimistiskaåtgärder anses dock vara stort, inte minst på grund av de långa handläggningstiderna i konkurrensmål. Därför anser vi att konkurrensmyndigheterna bör överväga att tillförordnainterimistiska åtgärder oftare, och att de kan förlita sig på den rättspraxis somfinns för att säkerställa att besluten kommer att motstå en överklagan.

<p>Den här uppsatsen syftar till att utreda vilket lands lag som blir tillämplig vid en internationell tvist gällande utomobligatoriska förpliktelser vid immaterialrättsintrång, särskilt vid upphovsrättsintrång. Tyngdpunkten ligger i de problem som uppstår då någon gör sig skyldig till ett upphovsrättsintrång med relation till flera länder.</p><p>Utgångspunkten är Rom II-förordningen och dess åttonde artikel. I artikeln stadgas det att tillämplig lag för en utomobligatorisk förpliktelse som har sin grund i ett immaterialrättsintrång skall vara lagen i det land där skydd görs gällande.</p><p>Vad innebär då uttrycket ”där skydd görs gällande”? När det gäller registrerade rättigheter, såsom patent och varumärken, innebär artikeln att tillämplig lag ska var lagen i det land där rättigheten är registrerad. Det går dock inte att tillämpa samma princip på oregistrerade rättigheter. När det gäller oregistrerade rättigheter ska istället lagen i det land där intrånget skett vara tillämplig.</p><p>Upphovsrätt är en sådan oregistrerad rättighet som, enligt svensk rätt, uppstår så fort verket är färdigt och har uppnått en viss verkshöjd. Det här synsättet görs även gällande i de flesta andra länder i världen då upphovsrätten i mångt och mycket bygger på Bernkonventionens lydelse från 1886.</p><p>Svårigheten som domstolarna kommer att ställas inför är då någon gör sig skyldig till ett upphovsrättsintrång med relation till flera länder. Eftersom skyddet görs gällande i det land där intrånget skett blir frågan om vilket lands lag som ska vara tillämplig i dessa fall.</p><p>Domstolarna kommer att behöva ta ställning och i den här uppsatsen framställs en del förslag till möjliga lösningar.</p><p>Uppsatsen diskuterar även om reglerna i artikel 8 Rom II-förordningen är de bästa då det gäller upphovsrättsintrång generellt.</p> / <p>This essay aims to investigate which national law that is applicable to an international dispute concerning non-contractual obligations in international property rights (IPR) violations, particularly in copyright infringement. The emphasis lies on the problems that arise when someone is found guilty of copyright infringement with a connection to several countries.</p><p>The starting point is the Rome II-regulation and its eighth article. The article states that the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising from an infringement of an intellectual property right shall be the law of the country for which protection is claimed.</p><p>What does then the phrase “for which protection is claimed” mean? In the case of registered rights, such as patents and trademarks, the article implies that the applicable law shall be the law of the country where they are registered. It is not possible however to apply the same principle to unregistered rights. In the case of unregistered rights it is instead the law of the country where the violation occurred that shall be applied.</p><p>Copyright is an unregistered right which, according to Swedish law, appears as soon as the work is finished and has reached a certain level of originality. This approach is also applicable in most other countries of the world where copyright law is largely based on the Berne Convention from 1886.</p><p>The difficulty that courts will face is when someone is claimed guilty of a copyright infringement with a connection to several countries. Given that protection is claimed in the country where the violation occurred, the question will be of which national law that should be applied in these cases.</p><p>The courts will have to take a position and this paper presents some possible solutions. The essay also discusses if the rules of article 8 of the Rome II-regulation are the best applicable rules in the case of copyright infringement in general.</p>

Den här uppsatsen syftar till att utreda vilket lands lag som blir tillämplig vid en internationell tvist gällande utomobligatoriska förpliktelser vid immaterialrättsintrång, särskilt vid upphovsrättsintrång. Tyngdpunkten ligger i de problem som uppstår då någon gör sig skyldig till ett upphovsrättsintrång med relation till flera länder. Utgångspunkten är Rom II-förordningen och dess åttonde artikel. I artikeln stadgas det att tillämplig lag för en utomobligatorisk förpliktelse som har sin grund i ett immaterialrättsintrång skall vara lagen i det land där skydd görs gällande. Vad innebär då uttrycket ”där skydd görs gällande”? När det gäller registrerade rättigheter, såsom patent och varumärken, innebär artikeln att tillämplig lag ska var lagen i det land där rättigheten är registrerad. Det går dock inte att tillämpa samma princip på oregistrerade rättigheter. När det gäller oregistrerade rättigheter ska istället lagen i det land där intrånget skett vara tillämplig. Upphovsrätt är en sådan oregistrerad rättighet som, enligt svensk rätt, uppstår så fort verket är färdigt och har uppnått en viss verkshöjd. Det här synsättet görs även gällande i de flesta andra länder i världen då upphovsrätten i mångt och mycket bygger på Bernkonventionens lydelse från 1886. Svårigheten som domstolarna kommer att ställas inför är då någon gör sig skyldig till ett upphovsrättsintrång med relation till flera länder. Eftersom skyddet görs gällande i det land där intrånget skett blir frågan om vilket lands lag som ska vara tillämplig i dessa fall. Domstolarna kommer att behöva ta ställning och i den här uppsatsen framställs en del förslag till möjliga lösningar. Uppsatsen diskuterar även om reglerna i artikel 8 Rom II-förordningen är de bästa då det gäller upphovsrättsintrång generellt. / This essay aims to investigate which national law that is applicable to an international dispute concerning non-contractual obligations in international property rights (IPR) violations, particularly in copyright infringement. The emphasis lies on the problems that arise when someone is found guilty of copyright infringement with a connection to several countries. The starting point is the Rome II-regulation and its eighth article. The article states that the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising from an infringement of an intellectual property right shall be the law of the country for which protection is claimed. What does then the phrase “for which protection is claimed” mean? In the case of registered rights, such as patents and trademarks, the article implies that the applicable law shall be the law of the country where they are registered. It is not possible however to apply the same principle to unregistered rights. In the case of unregistered rights it is instead the law of the country where the violation occurred that shall be applied. Copyright is an unregistered right which, according to Swedish law, appears as soon as the work is finished and has reached a certain level of originality. This approach is also applicable in most other countries of the world where copyright law is largely based on the Berne Convention from 1886. The difficulty that courts will face is when someone is claimed guilty of a copyright infringement with a connection to several countries. Given that protection is claimed in the country where the violation occurred, the question will be of which national law that should be applied in these cases. The courts will have to take a position and this paper presents some possible solutions. The essay also discusses if the rules of article 8 of the Rome II-regulation are the best applicable rules in the case of copyright infringement in general.

1950 m. visuotinis aplinkos apsaugos poreikis dar nebuvo akivaizdus, todėl teisė į aplinką nebuvo paminėta Europos žmogaus teisių ir pagrindinių laisvių apsaugos Konvencijoje. Dėl aplinkos taršos iškilo asmenų teisės į aplinką problema ir šios teisės gynimo būtinybė. Dėl šios priežasties galima teigti, kad Europos žmogaus Teisių Teismo praktikos vaidmuo aiškinant teises, įtrauktas į EŽTK, šiomis dienomis yra labai svarbus spendžiant aplinkos problemas žmogaus teisių kontekste. Teismas interpretuoja aplinkos teises kitų teisių, esančių EŽTK, pagrindu, įskaitant teisę į privatų ir šeimos gyvenimą. Kadangi tam tikra rimta žala aplinkai gali pažeisti ir asmenų teises, ypač teisę į privatumą ir būsto neliečiamumą, šiame magistro baigiamajame darbe nagrinėjama EŽTK 8 straipsnio taikymo su aplinka susijusiose bylose problema. Magistriniame darbe siekiama išnagrinėti svarbiausius EŽTK 8 str. taikymo ginant pažeistas žmonių teises su aplinka susijusiose bylose ypatumus Europos Žmogaus Teisių Teismo jurisprudencijoje, ir šio straipsnio taikymą bei aiškinimą Lietuvos teismuose. Todėl yra analizuojami teismų sprendimai, susiję su aplinkos teisių pažeidimais, kylančiais dėl aplinkos būklės blogėjimo. Darbe nagrinėjamos Konvencijos 8 straipsnio taikymo sąlygos su aplinka susijusiose bylose. Jos yra dvi: ryšys tarp pažeidimo ir valstybės bei rimta tiesioginė žala, pasiekianti minimalų sunkumo lygį. Taip pat analizuojami šio straipsnio taikymo ypatumai. Pagrindiniai ypatumai yra susiję... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / In the 1950s, the universal need for environmental protection was not yet apparent, therefore there was no mention of right to environment in the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Due to pollution of natural environment, there arise an important problem of the human right to environment and the necessity of the protection of this right. For this reason it is possible to state that the role of the European Court of Human Rights practice and its interpretation of the rights, included in the ECHR, to respond environmental concerns within the context of human rights is especially relevant nowadays. Court interprets the environmental rights on the basis of other rights, which are included in the ECHR, including the right to private and family life. Since some serious damage to the environment may violate the rights of individuals and, in particular their right to privacy and the inviolability of home, in this master's final work a problem of the application of Article 8 ECHR in environment-related cases is examined. Master's Work seeks to examine the most important specificities of application of Article 8 of the ECHR in defending violated human rights in environment-related cases in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the application and interpretation of this Article in the courts of Lithuania. Therefore the judgments, related to interference in individual rights derived from environmental degradation, are analyzed. It examines... [to full text]

This thesis bearing the name "The European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8" has the objective to define the right to respect for private and family life through the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. The work is concentrating on the topic of registered partnership, especially upon the question of whether a homosexual pair can be recognized as a family in the sense of Article 8 of European Convention on Human Rights. Further issues discussed are the question of children and their biological parents, whether a child has a right to know his biological parents, and the problem of implementation of Article 8 in the Czech Republic focusing on the question of problems in implementation of the right to respect for private life and for family life. The first two chapters are aimed at defining the pertinent terms and outlining the historical development of this area of law. Main part of the work are the last two chapters, which are concentrating on the above mentioned issues through the interpretation of selected relevant jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. This interpretation of the jurisprudence has resulted in answers on the set questions, with respect to the fact that it is a current interpretation of the Convention by the Court. The main finding is the necessity to realize that the Convention as a living instrument will keep developing according to the development of society, which leads to the results and answers being pertinent only at the time of writing of this work, with the future development being possibly different from current results.

La protection des données personnelles sensibles consistait, jusqu'au RGPD, en un contrôle préalable réalisé par une autorité indépendante, malgré l’obstacle posé à la libre circulation. Cette protection renforcée est aujourd'hui remplacée par l’obligation du responsable de traitement d’élaborer une étude d’impact. Une telle mutation implique un risque de pré-légitimation des traitements et peut être favorable au responsable de traitement. Or, est-elle conforme au droit fondamental à la protection des données personnelles ? La thèse interroge le contenu de ce droit et la validité du RGPD. À partir d'une étude comparative allant des années 1970 à nos jours, entre quatre pays et l’Union européenne, les données personnelles sensibles sont choisies comme moyen d'analyse en raison de la protection particulière dont elles font l’objet. Il est démontré qu’en termes juridiques, la conception préventive fait partie de l’histoire de la protection européenne des données et peut donner un sens à la protection et à son seul bénéficiaire, l’individu.Un tel sens serait d’ailleurs conforme aux Constitutions nationales qui garantissent aussi l’individu malgré leurs variations. Cependant, cette conception n’est pas forcement compatible avec l’art. 8 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’UE. La thèse explique que cette disposition contient la garantie d’une conciliation (entre les libertés de l’UE et celles des individus) qui peut impliquer une réduction de la protection de ces dernières. Or, il revient à la CJUE, désormais seule compétente pour son interprétation, de dégager le contenu essentiel de ce droit ; objectif auquel la thèse pourrait contribuer. / Before the GDPR, protection of sensitive personal data consisted of a prior check by an independent authority despite limiting their free movement. This has been replaced by the obligation of the controller to prepare a privacy impact assessment. With this modification, one can assume a risk of pre-legitimization of data processing, putting the controller at an advantage. Is that compatible with the fundamental right to the protectionof personal data ? This thesis questions the content of this right and the validity of the GDPR. It is based on a comparative study from 1970s until present day between four European countries and the European Union, in which sensitive data are chosen as a meanto the analysis due to their particular protection. Research shows that in legal termsthe preventive conception is a part of the history of protection in the European Union. By limiting freedom of processing it gives meaning to protection and its only subject,the individual. Such an interpretation is compatible with National Constitutions despite their variations. However, the preventive conception of data protection is not so easily compatible with article 8 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. The thesis puts forward that this article contains the safeguard of a balancing, between EU liberties and individuals’ freedoms, which implicates reduced protection. It is up to the European Court of Justice to identify the essence of this right, an aim to which this thesis could contribute.

R I G H T T O R E S P E C T F O R P R I V A T E A N D F A M I L Y L I F E I N T H E C A S E - L A W O F T H E E U R O P E A N C O U R T O F H U M A N R I G H T S Abstract The aim of the thesis is to explain wording and application of the Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention) from the perspective of the European Court of Human Rights (the ECHR). The scope of Article 8, which guarantees the right to respect for private and family life, is very broad. For this reason the thesis especially deals with the issue of the right of the child to know his/her origin and information about his/her early childhood. In particular it attempts to outline the way how the ECHR deals with the conflict of the right to know one's origin with the right of the parent to stay anonymous. The thesis is divided into five chapters which illustrate the particular aspects of the application of Article 8. These chapters are linked through the judgements Gaskin, Mikulić, Odiévre, Jäggi and Phinirikadou which are related to the right of the child to know his/her origin. Chapter 1 provides with the general introduction to the protection of human rights at the European level and also analyses the Convention and the ECHR. The goal of chapter 2 is to outline the inner...

La famille du XXIème siècle, héritière d’un idéal défini d’abord par l’Église puis par le Code civil, est née des bouleversements sans précédent qu’a connu la société dans son ensemble. Pendant des siècles, le rôle essentiel de la famille était lié à la transmission patrimoniale et culturelle entre générations. Aujourd’hui, la famille doit favoriser le développement individuel et la réalisation personnelle de chacun de ses membres. La famille est de moins en moins une institution normée, aux formes et aux codes prédéfinis, d’autant qu’elle doit composer avec le droit individuel à « une vie familiale normale » que consacre l’article 8 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. L’influence des droits fondamentaux qui sont par nature des droits individuels dans la vie familiale confirme bien que la famille est davantage le lieu d’épanouissement individuel qu’une entité tournée vers un intérêt commun. Tout ou presque est devenu possible en termes de combinaisons familiales. On peut désormais choisir son sexe (transsexualisme), décider de créer une famille ou de vivre seul sans que la société ne s’en émeuve particulièrement.Les liens et les rôles de chacun dans la famille ne sont plus ni pérennes ni clairement définis. Les progrès scientifiques (qui ont surtout permis une contraception efficace) et la révolution sexuelle ont complètement transformé la sexualité, la vie de couple et la procréation. Il n’y a plus un seul modèle de couple fondé exclusivement sur le mariage d’un homme et d’une femme. Le couple est maintenant homosexuel ou hétérosexuel, libre de vivre ou non ensemble, d’être fidèle, de se marier, de se séparer, de conclure un pacs, de vivre en concubinage. La conjugalité est donc désormais plurielle et repose sur l’égalité entre ceux qui composent le couple et entre les différents modèles de couples possibles. Les relations entre les parents et les enfants ont également été bouleversées. La parentalité s’impose peu à peu à côté de la parenté. La filiation va devoir composer avec les nouvelles cuisines procréatives. La procréation médicalement assistée, la gestation pour autrui ou l’utérus artificiel doivent modifier l’établissement du lien de filiation qui ne peut se déduire du seul lien biologique. Le droit devra répondre, parfois contraint sous l’influence ou la pression internationale, aux nouvelles aspirations sociales et sociologiques et tenter de trouver un équilibre entre la liberté individuelle et la dimension institutionnelle de la famille. / While it was initially born out of the ideals set out first by the Church and then by the Civil Code, family in the 21st century is really the offspring of the unprecedented upheavals that have shaken society as a whole. For centuries, the essential role of family was linked with cross-generational patrimonial and cultural transmission. Nowadays, family must instead facilitate the individual development and self-realization of every single one of its members. The family is an institution that is decreasingly bounded by predetermined norms, forms, and codes, not least because it must align itself to the individual right to a “normal family-life”, to which Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights is dedicated. More or less everything is now possible in terms of family make-up. One can now choose one’s legal sex/gender (transgenderism), decide to establish a family, or live alone, without society being particularly affected by any of it. The ties and roles of each individual in the family are no longer perennial, no clearly defined. Scientific progress (through which efficient contraception became available) and the sexual revolution have completely transformed sexuality, romantic relationships, and procreation. There is no longer a single model for the romantic relationship, based on the marriage of a man to a woman. The couple is now homosexual or heterosexual, and individuals may choose whether they want to live together or be faithful. They can also choose if and when to get married, to separate, to be joined in a civil union (pacs), or to simply live under the same rooftop. In other words, conjugality is now pluralistic and rests on the equality both of the individuals constituting the couple, and between different models of romantic relationships. Relationships between parents and children have also been completely changed. Parenting is gradually gaining on kinship. Filiation will soon be forced to reckon with the different procreational recipes. Various assisted reproductive technologies, including artificial insemination, surrogacy, and the artificial uterus must change the ways in which kinship is established since it can no longer simply be deduced from biological ties. The law will have to respond to new social and sociological aspirations, and will sometimes even have to do so under international influence or pressure. It will, in fact, have to find a new equilibrium between individual freedoms, and the institutional dimensions of the family.

This thesis examines gender verifications issues in track and field from a feminist and antiracist perspective. In 2019 the international governing body for the sport of athletics (World Athletics) introduced limits on blood testosterone levels for women with some types of Differences in sex development (DSD) in races from 400 metres to 1 mile. According the eligibility rules Caster Semenya and other athletes with heightened testosterone levels need to lower their testosterone levels in order to be eligible to compete in middle distance running races in the women’s class. This thesis discuss the relationship between gender verifications in athletics and the protection of athletes right to privacy according to article 8 ECHR and prohibition of gender and race discrimination according to article 14 ECHR. The balance between the interests for fair competition in sports and the protection of athletes human rights is an ongoing discussion. Complex relationship between states accountability and international non-governmental sports organizations can put athletes in a vulnerable position.  This paper includes three research questions. Firstly, can the state parties to the ECHR be accountable if the eligibility rules infringe human rights? Secondly, is the eligibility rules in compliance with the right to respect for private and family life according to article 8 ECHR? Thirdly, is the eligibility rules in compliance with prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sex and race according to article 14 ECHR.