Tandis que la Drôle de Guerre est l’occasion d’une première confrontation avec la réglementation et la réquisition, la signature de l’armistice marque pour les entreprises de la Gironde occupée le début d’un dialogue complexe et fécond avec le gouvernement de Vichy et les autorités allemandes. Celles-ci font face à une polycratie franco-allemande, imposant des nouveaux cadres, administratifs et territoriaux, à leur activité. L’entreprise devient un enjeu réel de pouvoir. Apparaissent à la fois des réels points de convergence (aryanisation des « entreprises juives », rémunérations du travail) et d’importantes surfaces de tension (contrôle du port, concentration de la production, départ d’ouvriers pour l’Allemagne). Par ailleurs, le régime de Vichy ne lésine pas sur les moyens, en vue de faire de l’entreprise une vitrine idéologique (Révolution nationale) : cérémonies collectives, structures d’entraide, corporatismes, associations politiques, mouvements collaborationnistes. Armé d’un redoutable arsenal législatif et répressif, il parvient – avec le soutien des Allemands – à en faire un lieu d’exclusion, d’où sont violemment extraits les éléments jugés indésirables, que ce soit pour leurs activités politiques (les communistes) ou pour leur appartenance religieuse abusivement qualifiée de « raciale » (les juifs). À l’inverse, la stratégie consistant à faire de chaque établissement un lieu d’intégration à ses idéaux, ne rencontre qu’un succès mitigé. L’attachement des acteurs de l’entreprise à la personne même du maréchal Pétain, réel au début de la période, s’estompe sous l’effet des épreuves et des sujétions dont sont victimes les Girondins. De ce point de vue, la politique sociale de l’État français (Charte du travail et comités sociaux) ne lui permet pas – sauf exception – de « ramener » patrons et ouvriers dans le giron vichyste. Dans un contexte de graves pénuries (matières premières, main-d’œuvre, moyens de transport), les entreprises girondines cherchent bien des alternatives à ce qu’on appelle communément la « collaboration économique » : utilisation de produits de remplacement, reconversion des activités, réadaptation de l’appareil productif, essor des pratiques illicites (marché noir). Mais rares sont les patrons à ne pas devoir se poser la question de l’opportunité de proposer une offre de services à l’occupant. Cette offre est largement répandue, mais variable selon les métiers, les branches et les temps de l’Occupation. Les occupants tirent ainsi profit des atouts du tissu économique local, puisqu’ils parviennent à intégrer à leur économie de guerre les industries anciennement mobilisées pour la Défense nationale et plus encore les richesses tirées du sol girondin : le bois, la résine, le vin. / While the Phoney War occasioned a first confrontation with regulations and requisition, the signing of the Armistice marked the start of a complex period for the enterprises in occupied Gironde, in that it prompted a fruitful dialogue with the Vichy government and the German authorities. These enterprises faced a French German polycracy, which imposed new administrative and territorial executives on their activities. Enterprise became a real power issue. There were points of convergence (the aryanisation of “Jewish enterprises”, the remuneration of work) as there were of conflict (the control of the port, the concentration of production, the workers' departure for Germany). Moreover, the Vichy regime did all it could to make enterprise an ideological showcase (“Révolution Nationale”): ceremonies, support groups, corporatism, political associations, collaborationist movements. Armed with a formidable legislative and repressive arsenal, it managed – with the support of the Germans – to create a place of exclusion, from which were violently removed, any elements that were judged undesirable either for their political activities (communists) or for their religious affiliation, abusively qualified as “racial” (Jews). On the contrary, the strategy which consisted in making each establishment a place of integration of its ideals, was not met with much success. The attachment that the actors of the enterprises had for Maréchal Pétain himself, which was very real in the beginning, soon faded with the trials and constraints that the people of Gironde had to suffer. From this point of view, the social policy of the French State (“Charte du Travail”) did not allow it – with some exceptions – to “bring” employers and workers back to the Vichy realm. In a context of severe shortage (primary goods, labour and means of transport), enterprises in Gironde looked for alternatives to what we commonly call the “economic collaboration”: use of products of replacement, reconversion of activities, readjustment of the productive machine, development of illicit practices (black market). Few entrepreneurs, however, missed the business opportunity that lay in offering their services to the occupying forces. These services were widespread, but varied according to jobs, fields of activity and times of the Occupation. In this way, the occupying forces benefited, from the strengths of the local economic fabric, since they managed to integrate into their war economy not only the industries that had earlier been mobilized for the “Défense Nationale” but also the natural resources of the land: wood, resin, wine.

This paper explores the mechanisms and processes within the German foreign trade Aryanisation project in Sweden from the mid-1930s to 1945. Aryanisation as a concept has, similarly to the Holocaust and National Socialism before it, for the longest time been seen as a uniquely German affair. While that situation has greatly changed when it comes to the Holocaust, Fascism and National Socialism, Aryanisation is still defined as a German affair affecting only Jews in Germany even by the US Holocaust museum’s Holocaust encyclopaedia.1 As a result, research into Aryanisation efforts in Nazi Germany’s foreign trade sector has been relatively sparse. Drawing on the small existing body of research that was sparked by Swedish historian Sven Nordlund, this paper seeks to complete the picture of the German trade Aryanisation campaign in Sweden by examining its inner workings on the German side of affairs. The study is framed within an elastic interpretation of the rationality v ideology binary and further tied to Holocaust research by highlighting characteristic elements of modernity, bureaucracy and artificiality in how NS ideology crept its way into every aspect of life, even trade with a neutral country. Through a thorough analysis of a large body of associated correspondence and official documents, this study uncovers the complex and evolving picture of German perspectives and processes within its project to shape its trade relations to Sweden according to Nazi ideas.