Through a theoretical framework of myth in genesis, operation and review, this thesis evaluates the relationship between Australian society and the myth of the digger, a tradition of Australian military manhood which originated in the First World War. The digger in genesis was a product of early twentieth century Australia???s need to establish for itself a distinct national identity. Deriving strongly from existing mythology of the bushman/pioneer and foster by the work of CEW Bean, it was quickly adopted by both governments and citizens anxious to promote the contributions of the Australian soldiers and to understand the relationships that these had with the emerging Australian society. The digger in operation from the First World War to the end of the Second World War to the early 1960s demonstrates the way in which Australian (enamoured of its simple and seemingly enduring qualities) Embedded the myth at the core of orthodox thinking about national Identity, despite its exclusivity and prescriptive, authoritarian control by conservative institutions. The era of the Vietnam War acted as a key review phase for the myth as its relevance was questioned significantly. Despite temporary rejection from many and fragmentation into a variety of icons, Australia???s brief flirtation with radical thinking did not last beyond the mid-1970s. A return to conservative values in the 1980s-1990s coincided with political reconciliation over the Vietnam War ??? by the mid-1990s, the digger myth had retained its position of relevance and importance within Australian culture, demonstrating its capacity to become adapted and appropriated to reflect an increasingly democratic and pluralistic society. The current prevailing version of the digger, the &quotnew professional&quot, demonstrates the parallel transition of Australian military culture. It co-exist with other representations, providing a scaffold through which individuals interact with it to develop their own understanding of the application of the digger myth to both their own lives and Australian society.

Through a theoretical framework of myth in genesis, operation and review, this thesis evaluates the relationship between Australian society and the myth of the digger, a tradition of Australian military manhood which originated in the First World War. The digger in genesis was a product of early twentieth century Australia???s need to establish for itself a distinct national identity. Deriving strongly from existing mythology of the bushman/pioneer and foster by the work of CEW Bean, it was quickly adopted by both governments and citizens anxious to promote the contributions of the Australian soldiers and to understand the relationships that these had with the emerging Australian society. The digger in operation from the First World War to the end of the Second World War to the early 1960s demonstrates the way in which Australian (enamoured of its simple and seemingly enduring qualities) Embedded the myth at the core of orthodox thinking about national Identity, despite its exclusivity and prescriptive, authoritarian control by conservative institutions. The era of the Vietnam War acted as a key review phase for the myth as its relevance was questioned significantly. Despite temporary rejection from many and fragmentation into a variety of icons, Australia???s brief flirtation with radical thinking did not last beyond the mid-1970s. A return to conservative values in the 1980s-1990s coincided with political reconciliation over the Vietnam War ??? by the mid-1990s, the digger myth had retained its position of relevance and importance within Australian culture, demonstrating its capacity to become adapted and appropriated to reflect an increasingly democratic and pluralistic society. The current prevailing version of the digger, the &quotnew professional&quot, demonstrates the parallel transition of Australian military culture. It co-exist with other representations, providing a scaffold through which individuals interact with it to develop their own understanding of the application of the digger myth to both their own lives and Australian society.

Title page, table of contents and abstract only. The complete thesis in print form is available from the University of Adelaide Library. / In recent years, the adequacy of classical models to explain expert decision-making in environments involving time pressure, high stakes, uncertainty and dynamic conditions has been questioned. An alternative model to describe decision-making in these conditions is the recognition-primed decision-making (RPD) model (Klein, 1989). This model is descriptive and suggests that expert decision-makers learn to recognise typical situations and solutions and use these mental shortcuts to fill in gaps in their understanding and inform their decisionmaking. The model has been validated in many domains (Klein, 1999), but to date has not been applied in the Australian Army. Moreover, the model has been criticised because it largely ignores the influence of the wider context in dynamic decision-making. The aim of this research is to address these issues. The setting has been the unit level of operations in the Australian Army. In particular, the focus is on the Commander, as slhe has the largest impact on the strategic direction of an operation. The approach combines a number of complementary data collection methods, drawing on both qualitative and quantitative data. The main methods of data collection include in-depth, semi-structured interviewing; Q-sort analysis; and observational research in the field. These are triangulated to increase validity. Computer simulation is also used to investigate its adequacy for further naturalistic decision-making (NDM) research. The outcome is frrstly a validation of the RPD model in the Australian Army and revision to include contextual variables perceived to impact on NDM. The effect of these contextual variables on RPD requires further research using naturalistic techniques. Computer simulation has been found to be an unsatisfactory technique to employ in this instance. These are important outcomes as the Australian Army moves towards an era of Networked Centric Warfare where established structures for team work are being revised. Establishing a better understanding of contextual factors that impact on NDM enables policy makers to take this knowledge into account when hypothesising about the effect that structural changes might have on business processes. Thus, having better defined models, and research techniques identified to achieve this, is a benefit. / http://proxy.library.adelaide.edu.au/login?url= http://library.adelaide.edu.au/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?BBID=1277501 / Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, School of Psychology, 2007

Title page, table of contents and abstract only. The complete thesis in print form is available from the University of Adelaide Library. / In recent years, the adequacy of classical models to explain expert decision-making in environments involving time pressure, high stakes, uncertainty and dynamic conditions has been questioned. An alternative model to describe decision-making in these conditions is the recognition-primed decision-making (RPD) model (Klein, 1989). This model is descriptive and suggests that expert decision-makers learn to recognise typical situations and solutions and use these mental shortcuts to fill in gaps in their understanding and inform their decisionmaking. The model has been validated in many domains (Klein, 1999), but to date has not been applied in the Australian Army. Moreover, the model has been criticised because it largely ignores the influence of the wider context in dynamic decision-making. The aim of this research is to address these issues. The setting has been the unit level of operations in the Australian Army. In particular, the focus is on the Commander, as slhe has the largest impact on the strategic direction of an operation. The approach combines a number of complementary data collection methods, drawing on both qualitative and quantitative data. The main methods of data collection include in-depth, semi-structured interviewing; Q-sort analysis; and observational research in the field. These are triangulated to increase validity. Computer simulation is also used to investigate its adequacy for further naturalistic decision-making (NDM) research. The outcome is frrstly a validation of the RPD model in the Australian Army and revision to include contextual variables perceived to impact on NDM. The effect of these contextual variables on RPD requires further research using naturalistic techniques. Computer simulation has been found to be an unsatisfactory technique to employ in this instance. These are important outcomes as the Australian Army moves towards an era of Networked Centric Warfare where established structures for team work are being revised. Establishing a better understanding of contextual factors that impact on NDM enables policy makers to take this knowledge into account when hypothesising about the effect that structural changes might have on business processes. Thus, having better defined models, and research techniques identified to achieve this, is a benefit. / http://proxy.library.adelaide.edu.au/login?url= http://library.adelaide.edu.au/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?BBID=1277501 / Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, School of Psychology, 2007

This thesis examines the early military career and life of Lieutenant General Sir Frank Berryman from 1894 through to the end of his involvement in the Middle East campaigns. It begins with his family background and education on the outskirts of Melbourne before tracing, in detail, his personal life and military career until the end of 1941. The specific focus of this investigation is not just his military education and his role in the Cyrenaica and Syrian campaigns, but also the development of his personality and character. Personality and character provides a window of insight that not only helps to illuminate Berryman?s performance as an officer and his professional relationships but it also allows for a deeper understanding of this complex individual. This thesis argues that these, the 'lost years' and 'forgotten battles' , are integral to developing an understanding of this exceptional officer. In Berryman we see an important staff officer and commander whose place in Australia's military history has been largely overlooked. One of the central themes of this work is that Berryman has been misunderstood and misrepresented within the existing historiography. He was one of the most important figures in the Australian Army during the Second World War and it was during the period covered in this thesis that he established his reputation as a commander and staff officer. Key to this investigation, therefore, is the themes of Berryman's developing leadership and culture of command. This work seeks to reveal the nature and experience of a highly successful officer who is also, to a great extent, representative of a generation of permeant Staff Corps officers who have largely been ignored within the genre of Australian military biography. Ultimately this thesis concludes that Berryman was a central figure in the Australian Army's success in Cyrenaica and Syria. He demonstrated all of the qualities essential for a successful commander and senior officer and it was in these battles and his earlier military and life experiences that set the stage for his exceptional performance and contribution to the success of the Australian Army, not only in the Middle East but also later in the South West Pacific Campaigns.

This thesis examines the early military career and life of Lieutenant General Sir Frank Berryman from 1894 through to the end of his involvement in the Middle East campaigns. It begins with his family background and education on the outskirts of Melbourne before tracing, in detail, his personal life and military career until the end of 1941. The specific focus of this investigation is not just his military education and his role in the Cyrenaica and Syrian campaigns, but also the development of his personality and character. Personality and character provides a window of insight that not only helps to illuminate Berryman?s performance as an officer and his professional relationships but it also allows for a deeper understanding of this complex individual. This thesis argues that these, the 'lost years' and 'forgotten battles' , are integral to developing an understanding of this exceptional officer. In Berryman we see an important staff officer and commander whose place in Australia's military history has been largely overlooked. One of the central themes of this work is that Berryman has been misunderstood and misrepresented within the existing historiography. He was one of the most important figures in the Australian Army during the Second World War and it was during the period covered in this thesis that he established his reputation as a commander and staff officer. Key to this investigation, therefore, is the themes of Berryman's developing leadership and culture of command. This work seeks to reveal the nature and experience of a highly successful officer who is also, to a great extent, representative of a generation of permeant Staff Corps officers who have largely been ignored within the genre of Australian military biography. Ultimately this thesis concludes that Berryman was a central figure in the Australian Army's success in Cyrenaica and Syria. He demonstrated all of the qualities essential for a successful commander and senior officer and it was in these battles and his earlier military and life experiences that set the stage for his exceptional performance and contribution to the success of the Australian Army, not only in the Middle East but also later in the South West Pacific Campaigns.

This thesis examines the Australia Army???s campaign on Papua from July 1942 to January 1943 with the focus on logistic support of the fighting arms and the relation of logistics to the tactics of tropical jungle warfare. It begins by examining the traditional approach to logistics in the military profession - the experience of Australian officers and forces in particular - from the First World War until May 1942, when the Australian territory of Papua was invaded. It establishes that the Army was poorly prepared because, as well as having never anticipated a prolonged land campaign in Papua-New Guinea, it lacked the logistic resources and knowledge of logistics as applicable to tropical jungle warfare. It then proceeds to examine the retreat over the Kokoda Track and the turning-point battles for Milne Bay and Imita Ridge. It demonstrates that the principal factor in the Australian retreat was logistic failure, as geography and lack of logistic resources prevented adequate supply of the fighting arms at least until lines of communication had been shortened; even then, difficulties remained. The thesis is rounded off by assessing the counter-attack across the territory of Papua for the capture of the enemy???s beachheads at Buna, Gona and Sanananda. It concludes that, as the island???s geography and tropical environment so dominated operations and since shortages of logistic equipment and units persisted, the Army could not perfect its logistic organisation by the end of this first phase of the New Guinea campaign. It fell back on improvisation and the fortitude of troops to triumph over the Japanese.

This thesis examines the Australia Army???s campaign on Papua from July 1942 to January 1943 with the focus on logistic support of the fighting arms and the relation of logistics to the tactics of tropical jungle warfare. It begins by examining the traditional approach to logistics in the military profession - the experience of Australian officers and forces in particular - from the First World War until May 1942, when the Australian territory of Papua was invaded. It establishes that the Army was poorly prepared because, as well as having never anticipated a prolonged land campaign in Papua-New Guinea, it lacked the logistic resources and knowledge of logistics as applicable to tropical jungle warfare. It then proceeds to examine the retreat over the Kokoda Track and the turning-point battles for Milne Bay and Imita Ridge. It demonstrates that the principal factor in the Australian retreat was logistic failure, as geography and lack of logistic resources prevented adequate supply of the fighting arms at least until lines of communication had been shortened; even then, difficulties remained. The thesis is rounded off by assessing the counter-attack across the territory of Papua for the capture of the enemy???s beachheads at Buna, Gona and Sanananda. It concludes that, as the island???s geography and tropical environment so dominated operations and since shortages of logistic equipment and units persisted, the Army could not perfect its logistic organisation by the end of this first phase of the New Guinea campaign. It fell back on improvisation and the fortitude of troops to triumph over the Japanese.

"December 2004" / Bibliography: leaves 390-420. / vii, 420 leaves : ill., maps, photos. (col.) ; 30 cm. / Title page, contents and abstract only. The complete thesis in print form is available from the University Library. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Adelaide, School of History and Politics, Discipline of History, 2005