Thesis (M.Com. (Economics & Economic History)) - Rhodes University, 2006. / A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Masters of Commerce in Financial Markets.

This research provides an historical, theoretical and practical appraisal of exogenous and endogenous money and money creation, with South Africa as the focus of the practical investigation. Monetary theory of recent decades can be categorised as belonging to one of two distinct paradigms: mainstream (neoclassical) or post Keynesian. The mainstream (orthodox) view presents a Euclidian or Cartesian, ergodic, deductive, and axiomatic theoretical interpretation of the world. This is perpetuated through the continued, and inaccurate, depiction in academia of exogenous money creation, the money multiplier concept, asset transformation by banks, imposed alterations to the money stock by central banks and long-run closed system equilibrium models (and associated homogeneity, and long term behavioural assumptions). In the real world, economic agents, structures, institutions and their interrelations are perpetually evolving. The post Keynesian paradigm provides the theoretical framework within which to understand such a world. Unfortunately the necessity for a multiplicity of methods and methodology makes it a paradigm that is currently prohibitively complex, preventing simple exposition. Money creation should, both historically, and according to the analysis conducted, be defined according to the actual source of change in the money stock, that is, credit extension. In a nonergodic world, changes in the stock of money take on a causal role with regard the initiation of productive processes, and thus influence future economic conditions. The simple, although powerful, technique of balance sheet analysis conducted herein provides a detailed method of identification of causal changes in money stock. Within the context of the institutional and structural environment, it clearly demonstrates the residual nature of money m modern economies. This research serves to emphasise the importance of monetary matters for economic management, as well as the important difference between the money creation process and the residual deposit securities. It serves also to discourage the perpetuation of fallacies of money creation, and capabilities of monetary authorities. In South Africa, as in most countries, the central bank can influence the conditions under which borrowers and banks mutually create money, but do not themselves create or distribute money beyond the facilitation of credit extension by banks

This research deals with achieving and maintaining price stability in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) through the practice of monetary-policy transparency (MPT). On the one hand, MPT refers to a monetary strategy whereby the central bank is insulated from political influence and made accountable to society through disclosure of its policies, procedures, economic models, data and forecasts, operations and political practices (such as objectives, personnel independence, and the like). On the other hand, price stability refers to achieving and maintaining low and stable levels of inflation conducive for long-term planning and poverty alleviation. The primary objective of this research was to investigate MPT in SSA as it represents a powerful means whereby economic agents’ expectations may be coordinated and managed by the central bank to achieve its societal, objective function of low inflation. The empirical evidence shows that, first, a dependent central bank is more likely to slip into hyperinflation. Second, a SADC (2008) model central bank law is not independent enough to be used as a benchmark for any central bank or as a charter for a regional central bank. Third, the degree of central bank independence in SSA is relatively lower than that in industrialised economies. Fourth, the determinants of MPT in SSA are trade openness, and financial depth that are important factors influencing policy-makers to adopt monetary-policy transparency. Fifth, MPT is associated with a decline in the inflation rate. Sixth, MPT had no significant effect on economic output, whilst trade openness was positively associated with real GDP.

This dissertation revolves around robustly measuring and using the information sets of the centralbank and financial markets in order to measure exogenous monetary policy. Modern central banks aggressively use all the available information at their disposal to effectively set monetary policy. This problem of “foresight” renders traditional time series methods ineffective; the information edge of central banks is too large. In the first chapter, I discuss refinements to existing narrative methods, which attempt to the central bank’s own forecasts to capture the information set of the central bank, thus removing their information edge over the econometrician. In the second chapter, I explore how the information sets of financial agents differ central banks and show that there is little direct information transfer between central banks and financial markets around monetary policy actions. Finally, the third chapter details how to use the information sets of financial sector actors to estimate exogenous monetary policy actions that is robust to financial sector revisions about the economy which can be due to the monetary policy actions.

This dissertation consists of two chapters. In the first chapter, I revisit the role of Central Banks, the principal entity responsible for economic and financial stability. I indicate that we can consider a universal role for a central bank instead of just a lender. I consider a model of the financial crisis and market rejuvenation where direct policies from the central bank are not efficient as the public authority lacks critical information about the status of the economy. In contrast, there exist agents who have superior information about the available assets and future projects of the economy. I show that the public authority can benefit from contracting the informed agents to the benefit of the society, where the central bank will trade off the benefit of higher financing from liquidity provision to informed agents for the cost of a public market contraction. Based on the insight of this chapter, I propose a proactive ``planner of last resort'' role for a central bank as opposed to a naive lender of last resort suggested by Bagehot’s dictum. In the second chapter, I investigate a fundamental and yet less explored moment of asset returns which is the expected time it takes for a given asset's return to change state from high to low or vice versa. I introduce formally the concept of ``expected traveling time'' in the context of asset prices and returns and demonstrate a number of results. Mainly, I provide pricing equations for a class of fixed-income assets, which their payoff would default to zero when particular states are triggered (similar to a risky bond). Moreover, I show that barrier like option prices can reveal transition probabilities of the underlying asset's return. Finally, I discuss the estimation of the traveling times from historical data where I identify a considerable variation of traveling times across different assets.

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This thesis is a technical inquiry into remedies for high inflation. In its center there is the usual tradeoff between inflation aversion on the one hand and some benefit from inflation via Phillips curve effects on the other hand. Most remarkable and pioneering work for us is the famous Barro-Gordon model - see (Barro & Gordon 1983a) respectively (Barro & Gordon 1983b). Parts of this model form the basis of our work here. Though being well known the discretionary equilibrium is suboptimal the question arises how to overcome this. We will introduce four different models, each of them giving a different perspective and way of thinking. Each model shows a (sometimes slightly) different way a central banker might deliver lower inflation than the one shot Barro-Gordon game at a first glance would suggest. To cut a long story short we provide a number of reasons for believing that the purely discretionary equilibrium may be rarely observed in real life. Further the thesis provides new insights for derivative pricing theories. In particular, the potential role of financial markets and instruments will be a major focus. We investigate how such instruments can be used for monetary policy. On the contrary these financial securities have strong influence on the behavior of the central bank. Taking this into account in chapters 3 and 4 we come up with a new method of pricing inflation linked derivatives. The latter to the best of our knowledge has never been done before - (Persson, Persson & Svenson 2006), as one of very view economic works taking into account financial markets, is purely focused on the social planer's problem. A purely game theoretic approach is done in chapter 2 to change the original Barro-Gordon. Here we deviate from a purely rational and purely one period wise thinking. Finally in chapter 5 we model an asymmetric information situation where the central banker faces a trade off between his current objective on the one hand and benefit arising from not perfectly informed agents on the other hand. In that sense the central bank is also concerned about its reputation.

The thesis has two overarching objectives. One is to understand monetary policy in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia during 1990s and early 2000s; the other to use these findings to shed light on monetary policy in less developed, but highly open and financially integrated market economies. In order to achieve its aims, it analyses specific factors with significant influence on the conduct or outcomes of monetary policy in these countries; it analyses the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in Central Europe, based on a technique called vector autoregression; and examines use of principal types of constraints on policy discretion, such as central bank independence, exchange rate commitments and domestic targets for monetary policy, in countries of the sample. The thesis finds that strong internal and external pressures, together with frequent bouts of fiscal irresponsibility and sizeable additive and parametric uncertainty regarding the working of the economy, led, in all four countries, to pronounced macroeconomic vulnerability and a need for periodic adjustment to dangerous fiscal and external imbalances. Reaction of policy-makers in countries of the sample to this environment can be characterized as discretion constrained by a strong nominal anchor and real exchange rate considerations. Experience of Central European countries shows that various elements of a commitment by monetary authorities are not duplicatory or contradictory, but interdependent in contributing to the goal of constraining discretion. During the period studied, the two key overall developments in policy were the gradual shift of emphasis from exchange rate targets to domestic targets and (within domestic targets) a shift from monetary targets to inflation targets. This approach has been largely successful.

The distinctive features of inflation targeting include the publishing of the formal (official) target band or point target for the rate of inflation at one or more time horizons and the explicit confirmation that low and steady inflation is the long-run objective of monetary policy. There are four main preconditions of inflation targeting: 1) an independent central bank that is free from fiscal and political pressures; 2) a central bank that has both the ability to forecast inflation and the capability to model inflation data; 3) the presence of fully deregulated prices and an economy that is affected by changes of commodity prices, as well as exchange rates; and 4) the presence of sound banking system and well developed capital markets. In most developing countries, the use of seigniorage revenues as a source of financing government debts, the lack of commitment by monetary authorities to low inflation as a primary goal, the absence of the central bank’s functional independence, and of powerful models to make domestic inflation forecasts, prevent the satisfaction of these preconditions. This dissertation investigates the extent to which Malawi meets the preconditions for inflation targeting by comparing the situation in that country to other developing countries, which have already adopted the framework. Malawi is committed to the central bank’s functional independence as well as the pursuit of prudent fiscal policy measures for the attainment of low inflation. Despite the failure to meet all the preconditions, this study recommends that Malawi should adopt an inflation targeting framework due to the strength of commitment of the monetary authorities in satisfying these preconditions.

This dissertation studies how the digitalization of commercial banking affects bank competition, financial stability, and monetary policy transmission. In the first chapter, The Digital Banking Revolution: Reduced Form Evidence, I use hand-collected data and a novel identification strategy to show that after adopting digital platforms, banks branchlessly operate in more markets, and mid-size banks, those with relatively high quality digital platforms but without extensive branch networks, grow faster. Further, bank balance sheet composition tilts to uninsured deposits on the funding side, and to high income borrowers on the loan side. In the second chapter, The Digital Banking Revolution: Aggregate Effects on Competition and Stability, in order to disentangle the underlying mechanisms and quantify aggregate effects, I build a structural model of the U.S. banking system and compare the observed digital equilibrium to a counterfactual without digital platforms. The model allows for endogenous adoption of digital platforms, branch networks, market entry, and accounts for digitalization among non-banks. Digitalization decreases local and national market concentration, and average markups fall in deposit and loan markets, holding fixed the size of the banking sector. Consumers capture most of the surplus created by digitalization, however it accrues mostly to wealthier segments of the economy. As for stability, it increases the average market share of lightly-regulated mid-sized banks, increases the uninsured deposits ratio of the banking sector while re-sorting uninsured deposits towards larger digital banks, and doubles credit risks associated with lending in market segments that are less-well served by digital technologies. In sum, digital banking increases competition and poses risks to financial stability. In the third chapter, Destabilizing Digital "Bank Walks", which is co-authored with Tano Santos and Luigi Zingales, we study the impact of digital banking on the value of the deposit franchise and the transmission of monetary policy through bank balance sheets. We find that when the Fed funds rate increases, deposits flow out faster and the cost of deposits increases more in banks with a digital platform. The results are similar for insured and non-insured deposits. We find that correcting for digital betas and deposit outflows results in a deposit franchise value that is significantly lower for digital-broker banks relative to a traditional bank without digital platform. We apply this analysis to Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) and find that the reduced value of the deposit franchise explains why SVB was insolvent in early March 2023, even before the bank run occurred.