Cette thèse traite de certaines questions importantes d'économie politique, plus particulièrement liées à l'indépendance des banques centrales. Le premier chapitre de la thèse montre que la probabilité de remplacement d'un gouverneur de banque centrale est positivement liée à la part du mandat déjà effectuée, aux crises bancaires et monétaires, aux élections, aux réformes des statuts des banques centrales, ainsi qu'à l'inflation. Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous montrons que le grand public connaît très bien la question de l'indépendance de la banque centrale. Cette question est analysée pour des échantillons représentatifs de 15 pays Européens, interrogés sur la proposition de créer une Banque Centrale Européenne (BCE) indépendante. Nous montrons que le comportement de l'inflation n'est pas suffisant pour expliquer la préférence des agents pour une banque centrale indépendante: les caractéristiques personnelles et les circonstances ont un impact plus fort, avec le sexe, l'emploi, le niveau d'éducation, de revenu, et le degré d'information et le souci civique montrant une significativité particulière. Le troisième chapitre de l'étude traite de la question du soutien de la banque centrale par le public. Nous employons un riche ensemble de déterminants potentiels, en combinant les données macro-économiques et socio-démographiques pour expliquer la confiance dans la BCE. Nous constatons que les personnes ayant un niveau de revenu élevé, d'éducation élevé et une orientation politique centriste ou de droite ont tendance à plus soutenir la BCE. La pertinence politique de ces résultats est importante pour la stratégie de communication de la BCE avec le public de l'UE. / This thesis addresses some important issues in the political economy particularly related to central bank independence. The first chapter of the thesis explores the determinants of removal of central bankers and shows that the probability of replacing a central bank governor is positively related to the time already spent in office, to banking and currency crises, the occurrence of elections, central bank independence reforms, and inflation. In the second chapter, we demonstrate that general public adheres the issue and importance of independence of central bank very well. Using data from Eurobarometer surveys for 1998 to 2000 for 15 EU countries, which included a specific question on this issue, we show that inflation performance is not sufficient to explain people's preferences for an independent central bank: personal characteristics and circumstances have a stronger impact, with gender, employment status, education level, income, and degree of information and civic concern showing particular relevance. The third chapter of the study deals with the issue of support of the central bank in public. We employ a rich set of potential determinants, combining macroeconomic and socio-demographic data, to explain trust in the ECB. We find that people with higher level of income and education and centre to right-wing political orientation tend to support the ECB, as well as people with optimistic expectations on the economic situation. The policy relevance of this dissertation is important for the central banks' communication policy along general policies and also for the ECB's communication strategy with the EU public.

Habilitationsschrift--Universität zu Köln, 1996. / Bibliogr. p. 232-245. Index.

Texte remanié de: Diss.--Köln, 1992. / Bibliogr. p. [182]-205.

Diss.--Hannover, 2000. / Bibliogr. p. 543-614.

Thesis--University of London. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis--University of London. / Includes bibliographical references.

Texte remanié de: Th. doct.--Droit--Paris 5. / En appendice, choix de textes et documents. Bibliogr. p. 303-314. Webliogr. p. 314.

This thesis consists of three empirical papers on central bank institutional design.Chapter 1 contributes to the debate on the importance of central bank independence (CBI) in lowering inflation rates. It stresses the relevance of employing indices of central bank independence computed dynamically in two ways. First, it recomputes the evolution of the Grilli et al. (1991) index of CBI and shows that the timing of large legislative reforms is closely related to inflation rate dynamics. Using unit root tests with endogenous structural breaks, I find that reforms that modify the degree of CBI represent structural breaks in the inflation rate dynamics. Second, employing the dynamic Grilli et al. (1991) index of independence confirms the negative relationship between CBI and inflation in a sample of 10 advanced economies.Chapter 2 presents a new and comprehensive database of central bank institutional design for 65 countries over the period 1972--2014. This chapter describes in detail the sources of information and the coding rules used to create a new index of central bank independence. It also compares this new index with the classical measures of CBI and highlights the new aspects of central bank institutional design included in this database such as financial independence and accountability. An important innovation of this new index is its dynamic nature. This enables an investigation of the endogenous determination of the level of independence of central banks and suggests several instruments for the CBI index. Using an instrumental variable approach, this chapter provides strong support for a causal, negative CBI-inflation nexus.Chapter 3 uses a political economy framework to investigate the drivers of reforms in central bank institutional design. Using the new CBI index developed in Chapter 2, this Chapter investigates the determinants of central bank reforms in a sample of 65 countries over the period 1972--2014. The results obtained suggest that the incentives generated by initial reforms which increased the level of independence, as well as a regional convergence, represent important drivers of reforms in central bank design. At the same time, an external pressure to reform, such as obtaining an IMF loan or joining a monetary union, also increases the likelihood of reforms, while government changes or crises episodes have little impact. / This thesis consists of three empirical papers on central bank institutional design.Chapter 1 contributes to the debate on the importance of central bank independence (CBI) in lowering inflation rates. It stresses the relevance of employing indices of central bank independence computed dynamically in two ways. First, it recomputes the evolution of the Grilli et al. (1991) index of CBI and shows that the timing of large legislative reforms is closely related to inflation rate dynamics. Using unit root tests with endogenous structural breaks, I find that reforms that modify the degree of CBI represent structural breaks in the inflation rate dynamics. Second, employing the dynamic Grilli et al. (1991) index of independence confirms the negative relationship between CBI and inflation in a sample of 10 advanced economies.Chapter 2 presents a new and comprehensive database of central bank institutional design for 65 countries over the period 1972--2014. This chapter describes in detail the sources of information and the coding rules used to create a new index of central bank independence. It also compares this new index with the classical measures of CBI and highlights the new aspects of central bank institutional design included in this database such as financial independence and accountability. An important innovation of this new index is its dynamic nature. This enables an investigation of the endogenous determination of the level of independence of central banks and suggests several instruments for the CBI index. Using an instrumental variable approach, this chapter provides strong support for a causal, negative CBI-inflation nexus.Chapter 3 uses a political economy framework to investigate the drivers of reforms in central bank institutional design. Using the new CBI index developed in Chapter 2, this Chapter investigates the determinants of central bank reforms in a sample of 65 countries over the period 1972--2014. The results obtained suggest that the incentives generated by initial reforms which increased the level of independence, as well as a regional convergence, represent important drivers of reforms in central bank design. At the same time, an external pressure to reform, such as obtaining an IMF loan or joining a monetary union, also increases the likelihood of reforms, while government changes or crises episodes have little impact.

Dissertation--Bremen--Universität Bremen, 2007. / Bibliogr. p. 247-271.

Thèse (M.A.)--Université Laval, 2006. / Bibliogr.: f. [33]-35. Publié aussi en version électronique.