This study examined the investigation of tender irregularities within the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (CoT) and employed semi-structured interviews with investigators attached to the CoT Group Audit and Risk (GAR) Division within the Protection Service to obtain data. A literature study relating to aspects of tender irregularities and the investigation of non-compliance was conducted. From the results of this research, it appears that participants do not optimally investigate the non-compliance of tender procedures by service providers to reduce tender irregularities within the CoT. However, it is apparent that participants experience challenges to efficiently investigate the non-compliance of tender procedures by service providers within the CoT to reduce tender irregularities. The study makes recommendations that could assist investigators at the CoT GAR Division to enhance their investigations of the non-compliance of tender procedures by service providers. / Criminology and Security Science / M. Tech. (Forensic Investigation)

跨國公司與開發中國家官員之賄賂關係被稱為骯髒聯盟。非國家行為者是形塑與改變國際規範之重要參與者，本研究檢視重點在於國際透明組織為切斷骯髒聯盟之供需關係，如何運用其獨特之跨國倡議網絡模式，透過建立聯盟(coalition-building)途徑，促成國際公約並且改變簽署國之國家行為。該非政府組織影響國際關係之具體成果為1997年簽署之OECD反賄公約，該公約是第一個從供應方(supply-side)切斷跨國商業賄賂鏈之國際規範，其立法歷程與會員國之國家偏好改變足以證明國際透明組織之影響力。 主流學派之結構現實主義者主張國際關係是結構決定論，以強權國家為主要的、具決定性之行為者，國家偏好是外生給定的利益排序。本研究主張以建構主義為基礎之全球反貪運動則是反其道而行，國際透明組織建構之跨國倡議網絡，擅用人氣政治與切身性政治，以合作取代對抗，有效促成已開發國家採取集體行動，簽署OECD反賄公約。當強權之間拒絕改變現狀時，非國家行為者之理念說服行動可以逐一改變國家偏好，進而改變國際規範。在倡議國際反貪議題上，國際透明組織的確是國際新規範之催生者。 本文採案例研究，主體為國際透明組織，客體為OECD反賄公約，交叉運用深度訪談與調查式過程追蹤研究，密集而深入取得相關當事人提供之第一手資料，彌補既有文獻靜態分析之不足。 / Non-state actors are essential participants in shaping and changing international norms. There has been a long-standing practice of a tacit “dirty alliance” between multinational corporations and developing countries officials. This research focuses on Transparency International(TI), which seeks to sever the supply and demand chain relationships of the dirty alliance by mobilizing a unique model of transnational advocacy network (TAN), engaging coalition-building, lobbying for a new set of international norms and persuading the changes of signatory states’ behavior. The fruits are the adoption of the 1997 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, which is the first supply-side norm to cut off transnational business bribery chain. Both the key events of the legislative process and the changes of state preferences among the signatories validify the argument for the TI’s significant influence. Contrary to mainstream international relations theories such as structural realism claiming structural determinism, predominant role of powerful states, and exogenously given nature of state preferences, this research proves constructivism prevails. TI’s TAN model artistically exercises popularity politics as well as proximity politics, advocates cooperation instead of confrontation against bribe-givers and bribe-takers, and effectively persuades developed countries to take collective actions by adopting and ratifying the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. While powerful states resist changing the status quo, non-state actors indeed demonstrate their capability of persuading states to change their preferences. TI is entitled to be the midwife in formulating new international norms against transnational corruption. This research applies case study methodology, making TI as the subject and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention as the object. Diligent analysis and interpretations are based on the cross-references of in-depth interviews and investigative process-tracing method to extract the primary data from relevant parties so as to supplement the deficiencies of the available literatures.

The ill-effects of corruption on the society, polity and economy of a country are far reaching. They have a corrosive effect on the rule of law, on governance and on the welfare of the society. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996, which is the supreme law of the country, places as an expectation and obligation on the government accountability of state, and a government free of corruption and the malignancy of economic nepotism. South Africa’s anti-corruption framework is designed as a control-based approach that is multi-faceted and executed through legislation, supporting regulations, audit trails, anti-corruption structures, law enforcement, and public vigilance and reporting structures, amongst others. Be that as it may, South Africa is battling the scourge of corruption and other self-serving behaviours, often amongst the upper echelons of governing power, as demonstrated by the State capture. Some of the acts of corruption stems from the very same institutions that are meant to be the upper guardians of law and order. Numerous corrupt practices occur almost daily, including but not limited to fraud, bribery, extortion, nepotism, conflict of interest, cronyism, favouritism, theft, fronting, embezzlement, influence-peddling, insider trading/abuse of privileged information, bid-rigging and kickbacks and money laundering. The list is not exhaustive. Based on the findings of this study, numerous recommendations and /or suggestions are made. The value of the study lies in the contribution it makes in South Africa’s fight against corruption to become comparable to countries whose corruption perception index is all time favourable, such as Botswana, Seychelles, Hong Kong and Singapore. / Criminology and Security Science / D. Litt. et Phil. (Criminal Justice)

Depuis le début des années 2000, de plus en plus de pays décident d’introduire à leur droit pénal un nouvel outil de « justice négociée » utilisé pour des délits de corruption transnationale. Ainsi, cette troisième voie, s’ajoutant à la décision de poursuivre ou non, est maintenant utilisée pour les personnes morales par les procureurs aux États-Unis, au Royaume-Uni, en France, au Brésil, au Canada et ailleurs. De cette façon, les compagnies peuvent, sans reconnaissance de culpabilité, éviter un procès criminel par le paiement d’une amende et par des engagements de meilleure gouvernance. Dans cette recherche, notre attention se pose plus particulièrement sur le cas de la France. Longtemps pointé du doigt par les instances internationales comme un mauvais élève de la lutte à la corruption transnationale et avec une culture juridique particulière, il nous semble surprenant que Paris décide d’aller de l’avant, en 2016, avec une justice plus souple, inspirée de principes anglo-saxons. Comment pouvons-nous expliquer ce changement soudain ? Nous répondons à ce questionnement en nous inspirant des littératures sur les mécanismes de diffusion des politiques publiques qui s’attardent à comprendre comment le choix d’un gouvernement peut être influencé par les décisions d’acteurs externes. Représentant chacune un mécanisme causal, quatre hypothèses sont retenues, soit celles de coercition, de compétition, d’émulation et d’apprentissage. À travers un traçage de processus minutieux et surtout l’analyse des discours des politiciens français, nous arrivons à la conclusion que la diffusion des outils de « justice négociée » pour lutter contre la corruption transnationale amène une explication suffisante pour comprendre le changement législatif soudain de l’Hexagone. De façon plus générale, l’interaction des différents mécanismes de diffusion de politique nous amène à penser que l’utilisation d’une justice plus souple pour ce type de délit n’est pas près de s’arrêter. / Since the early 2000s, more and more countries have decided to introduce into their criminal law a new tool of "negotiated justice" for foreign bribery offenses. Thus, this third route, in addition to the decision to prosecute or not, is now used for legal persons by prosecutors in the United States, United Kingdom, France, Brazil, Canada and elsewhere. In this way, companies can, without admission of guilt, avoid a criminal trial through the payment of a fine and through commitments to better governance. In this research, our attention is particularly focused on the case of France. Long pointed out by international organizations as a bad student in the fight against transnational corruption and with a particular legal culture, it seems surprising to us that Paris decides to move forward with a more flexible justice, inspired by Anglo-Saxons principles, in 2016. How can we explain this sudden catching up? We respond to this questioning by drawing inspiration from literature on the mechanisms of policy diffusion, which focuses on understanding how the choice of a government can be influenced by the decisions of external actors. Each representing a causal mechanism, four hypotheses are retained, namely those of coercion, competition, emulation and learning. Through careful process tracing and especially the analysis of the speeches of French politicians, we come to the conclusion that the diffusion of the tools of “negotiated justice” to fight against foreign bribery provides a sufficient explanation to understand the sudden catching up of the Hexagon. More generally, the interaction of the different policy diffusion mechanisms leads us to believe that the use of more flexible justice for this type of crime is not about to stop.

The Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department (JMPD) is one of the South African institutions with growing levels of corruption. This is despite the presence of several anti-corruption strategies as well as institutions implemented to deal with this epidemic. The ineffectiveness of these strategies and institutions is attributed to, amongst others, the application of ineffective detection methods. The under-detection of corruption in the JMPD is affecting road safety, the economy, and the image of the JMPD itself. It is against this background that the researcher sought to establish how intelligence analysis could add value in detecting corruption in the JMPD. A qualitative research approach was applied to investigate this problem. As such, it has been proven that the use of hotlines and the over-reliance on whistleblowers is less effective in detecting corruption in the JMPD. The results have further shown that intelligence analysis may add value in detecting corruption in the JMPD. / Umnyango wamaphoyisa edolobha elikhulu eGoli (JMPD) ungenye yezikhungo zaseNingizimu Afrika ezithola amazinga akhulayo enkohlakalo. Lokhu kungakhathaliseki ukuthi kukhona amasu amaningi okulwa nenkohlakalo kanye nezikhungo ezisetshenziselwa ukubhekana nesifo sobunkohlakalo. Ukungafezeki kwalawa masu kanye nezikhungo kubhekwa ukuthi, phakathi kwabanye, ukusetshenziswa kwezindlela ezingafenele zokuthola. Ukutholakala kwezinkohlakalo ku-JMPD kuthinta ukuphepha komgwaqo, umnotho nomfanekiso we-JMPD uqobo. Kungokumelene nalesi sizinda ukuthi umcwaningi lufuna ukusungula ukuthi ukuhlaziywa ngobuhlakani kungasiza kanjani ekutholeni inkohlakalo ku-JMPD. Indlela yokucwaninga efanele yasetshenziswa ukuphenya le nkinga. Njengalokhu, kuye kwafakazelwa ukuthi ukusetshenziswa kwama-hotlines nokuxhaswa ngokweqile kwababika ngenkohlakalo akwanele ukuthola inkohlakalo ku-JMPD. Imiphumela ibonise ukuthi ukuhlaziywa kobuhlakani kungasiza ekutholeni inkohlakalo ku-JMPD. / Lefapha la Sephodisa la Teropokgolo ya Johannesburg (JMPD) ke nngwe ya ditheo tsa Aforika Borwa tse di itemogelang maemo a a golang a bobodu. Seno ke kwa ntle ga go nna teng ga ditogamaano tse dingwe tse di kgatlhanong le bobodu ga mmogo le ditheo tse di diragadiwang go samagana le leroborobo la bobodu. Go se nne le nonofo ga ditogamaano tseno le ditheo e amana, mo go tse dingwe, le tiragatso ya mekgwa ya go lemoga go se nne le nonofo. Go nna kwa tlase ga go lemoga bobodu mo go JMPD go ama pabalesego ya tsela, ikonomi le setshwantsho sa JMPD ka boyona. Ke mabapi le lemorago leno gore mmatlisisi o ne a batla go tlhomamisa gore tshetshereganyo ya tsa matlhale e ka thusa mo go lemogeng bobodu mo go JMPD. Boitlhagiso jwa patlisiso ya boleng bo ne jwa diragadiwa go tlhotlhomisa bothata jono. Fa go le jalo, go ne ga netefatswa gore tiriso ya megala ya tlhamalalo e e kgethegileng ya tshoganyetso le go ikaega thata ka batho ba ba tlaleyang ga go a lekana go lemoga bobodu mo go JMPD. Dipholo di bontshitse gape gore tshekatsheko ya tsa matlhale e ka thusa go lemoga bobodu mo go JMPD. / Criminology and Security Science / M.A. (Criminal Justice)