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Hur viktig är VDn’s bakgrund egentligen? : En studie om hur utbildning och tidigare erfarenhet hos ett företags VD påverkar dess framgångLindblad, Oscar, Gustafsson, Erik January 2015 (has links)
Purpose: The study aims to examine how education and previous industry experience with a company's Chief Executive Officer (CEO), affect a company's success in the staffing industry. Method: The study uses method triangulation , a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods . The study has a quantitative approach to the cross-sectional design. The choice of combining several study designs are made to create a greater understanding of the research topic. Results & Conclusion: The findings determines whether the study's hypotheses are confirmed or dismissed. Hypothesis 1.1: A higher level of education increases the likelihood of successful entrepreneurship. The hypothesis can neither be confirmed nor dismissed. Hypothesis 1.2: A higher level of education does not increase the likelihood of successful entrepreneurship. The hypothesis can neither be confirmed nor dismissed. Hypothesis 2.1: Previous experience in the sector increases the likelihood of successful entrepreneurship. The hypothesis can neither be confirmed nor dismissed. Hypothesis 2.2: Previous experience in the industry will not increase the likelihood of successful entrepreneurship. The hypothesis can neither be confirmed nor dismissed. Suggestions for future research: It would be interesting to do the study on a larger scale, with more number of respondents would study demonstrate clearer connection. Further research could also involve more factors for business success in order to get a broader view on the definition of success. Another interesting approach for future research might be to explore how the distinction between different fields look like, instead of only one industry in this study. Other industries. It would be interesting to do a similar study on a completely different industry or small business to see what the result is then.
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Rapportering av kortsiktig rörlig ersättning till VD : En balans mellan strategi och transparens. / CEO short term bonus payments disclosure : A balance between strategy and transparency.Boberg, Fredrik, Alfredsson, Joakim January 2015 (has links)
Syftet med vår studie är att kartlägga och förklara hur transparenta svenska börsbolag är vid redovisningen av utfallet samt bakgrunden till kortsiktig rörlig ersättning för den verkställande direktören, samt att identifiera potentiella förklaringar och bakomliggande orsaker till transparensen. Vi har valt att studera de 29 bolag som representerar de 30 mest omsatta aktierna på Stockholmsbörsens Large Cap lista (OMXS30). Metodmässigt kan studien delas in i två huvudsakliga delar. I den ena delen av studien använder vi en kvantitativ ansats och tillämpar ett positivistiskt synsätt. I den andra delen av studien använder vi en kvalitativ ansats och tillämpar ett hermeneutiskt synsätt. Vid insamlingen av datamaterialet har vi inspirerats av en tvärsnittsdesign där huvudsakliga syftet har varit att samla in relevant information för att kunna bedöma transparensen utifrån en egen framtagen modell. Modellen utgörs av fem kriterier inspirerade av Ersättningsakademiens riktlinjer för rapportering av ersättning och syftar till att ge en samlad bedömning av de studerade bolagens transparens. Vi har även identifierat ett antal potentiella förklarande variabler utifrån vilka vi har studerat orsakssamband till transparensen. Vi har dessutom analyserat kommunikationen utifrån ett legitimitetsperspektiv med avsikt att få en förståelse för bolagens val av rapportering. Utifrån resultatet av vår studie kan vi finna stöd till den kritik som riktats mot en bristande transparens vid rapportering av rörlig ersättning till verkställande direktören. Vi kan även se tendenser till att det orsakssamband som tidigare studier belyst mellan transparens och styrelsens oberoende, kan gälla även för svenska börsnoterade bolag. / The purpose of this study is to describe and explain the transparency of Swedish public companies when it comes to the reporting of short term bonus payment to the chief executive officer. Furthermore we intend to identify possible explanations and underlying causes regarding the transparency. We have selected the 29 companies that represent the 30 most traded stocks on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (OMXS30). Methodology, the study can be divided into two primary parts. In the first part of the study we use a quantitative approach and apply a positivistic view. In the second part of the study we use a qualitative approach and apply a hermeneutic view. When it comes to collecting data we have been inspired by a cross section design and the primary focus has been to collect relevant information to allow an assessment of the transparency with a model we have developed. This model consists of five criteria inspired by the Ersättningsakademiens (Compensation Academy) guidelines regarding the reporting of compensation and is designed to provide an overall assessment of the studied company’s transparency. We have also identified a number of possible explanatory variables from which we have studied underlying causes to the transparency. Furthermore we have analyzed the communication from a perspective of legitimacy with the intent to obtain an understanding regarding the company’s choice of reporting. From the result of the study we find support to previous criticism regarding lacking transparency on the matter of the reporting of short term bonus payments to the CEO. We can also see tendencies to the fact that the causation that previous studies pointed out between transparency and the independence of the board, may exist in Swedish publicly traded companies as well.
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CEO remuneration in listed European insurance companies : Trends and justifications over the years 2005-2009Palmén, Sara, Suleyman, Avare January 2010 (has links)
In the ever so increasingly competitive business climate of the 21st century, human resources are vital for corporate success. Employees need proper incentives to perform in goal-oriented manners. Incentive systems, especially Chief Executive Officer [CEO] remunerations, have been a popular topic since the 1990s, and this tendency has increased both during the 2002-2003 corporate scandal era, as well as the financial crisis which sparked in 2007. The recent tendency appears to lean towards companies cutting their executive bonuses as well as criticism and suspiciousness towards large bonus payments. While remuneration policies within the banking industry have been thoroughly debated and researched, another financial industry that is left largely untouched are the insurance companies. The focus of this research is therefore CEO remuneration in European insurance companies. This descriptive study, of annual reports of stock-listed insurance companies, uses a purposive cluster sample to explore quantitative trends in CEO remunerations. In addition, a content analysis of five randomly selected companies out of the sample provides a deeper, complementary understanding of the justifications of the trends. The research questions are: What trends on CEO remuneration can be found over the years 2005-2009 in annual reports of European insurance companies, concerning total remuneration, fixed salary and short-term bonus? What justifications do companies make for the remunerations over the years 2005-2009? The quantitative part of the research inductively tests the assumption that CEO remuneration has decreased during the past few years 2008 and/ or 2009 due to the impact of the financial crisis. The content analysis part of the research deductively tests if agency theory concerns and issues concerning attraction and retention play a role in determining remuneration policies. From this research, it is concluded that short-term variable pay is largely performance-based. Still, many other aspects serve as input factors when determining compensation levels. Based on the content analysis, it is revealed that interest alignment and attraction- and retention-issues are important determinants of remunerations. Subjective factors such as discretionary judgements also play a crucial role. The quantitative trends found in this study show that total remunerations have decreased markedly in 2008, and more vaguely in 2009. The financial crisis has had an impact on especially the short-term variable part of salaries, but also on base salary levels. Although not all companies that were investigated in the content analysis explicitly mention it in their annual reports, over the years 2005-2009, all of them become more concerned about remuneration policies and business risk factors. Over the investigated years, these companies also become more attentive to creating proactive and sophisticated value creating remuneration policies that are in line with international standards, in order to act legitimate towards stakeholders.
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Narcissistic chief executive officers and corporate acquisitions : An upper echelons perspective / Narcissistiska verkställande direktörer och företagsförvärv : Ett upper echelons perspektivWhite, Stuart January 2018 (has links)
This study investigates how chief executive officer narcissism impacts the organizations strategic decisions and outcomes. Rooted in the idea that the organization is a reflection of its top managers, I theorize that narcissistic chief executive officers may influence the decision process leading to corporate acquisitions. Furthermore, taking into account the Dotcom bubble and subprime-crash, research on merger waves is incorporated into the research framework as an outside of the organization effect impacting organizational outcomes. Using a sample of 116 acquisitions by 60 chief executive officers at public listed U.S. firms this is tested from 1994-2017. The results show little to no connection between chief executive officer narcissism and corporate acquisitions in total, international acquisitions or through truly large acquisitions. Though there is a positive connection between observable characteristics such as education and age influencing the decision to acquire firms. When comparing the sample of 116 acquisitions to a general market sample of 4379 acquisitions, a connection to merger wave theory is identified. / Denna studie undersöker hur verkställande direktör narcissism påverkar organisationens strategiska beslut och utfall. Med förankring i idén att organisationen är en reflektion av sina ledare, teoretiserar jag för hur narcissistiska verkställande direktörer kan influera beslutsprocessen som leder till företagsförvärv. Vidare, genom att ta i beaktning IT bubblan och finanskrisen, inkorporeras forskning om merger waves i det teoretiska ramverket som en extern faktor vilket påverkar organisatoriska utfall. Med ett urval av 116 uppköp av 60 verkställande direktörer på publika företag i USA testas detta under perioden 1994-2017. Resultatet visar lite till ingen koppling mellan narcissistiska verkställande direktörer och företagsförvärv vare sig totalt, internationella förvärv eller genom mycket stora förvärv. Däremot visar denna studie en koppling mellan observerbara egenskaper såsom utbildning och ålder påverkar beslutet att förvärva företag. När urvalet 116 förvärv jämförs med ett generellt marknadsurval på 4379 förvärv, påvisas det en koppling till merger wave teori.
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Building Renewed Relevance: Portraits of CEOs Rebranding Iconic Nonprofit OrganizationsLowman, Helen A. 18 May 2020 (has links)
No description available.
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Ersättning till verkställande direktörer : En studie om rörlig ersättning och ersättningsprogram i svenska fastighetsbolag mellan åren 2018 - 2022 / Chief Executive Officers Remuneration : A study about variable remuneration and incentive programs in Swedish real estate companies between the years 2018 – 2022Hellkvist, Daniel, Lord, Linus January 2023 (has links)
Bakgrund: Ersättning till verkställande direktörer är ett ämne som blossar upp i samhällsdebatten med jämna mellanrum, speciellt vid skandaler där en VD:s agerande går att ifrågasätta. Trots att rörlig ersättning funnits i mer än 130 år i Sverige och ämnet uppmärksammas i dagstidningar, finns det begränsad forskning kring ämnet. Syfte: Att få en fördjupad förståelse för hur fastighetsbolag i Sverige, med ett högt börsvärde, ersätter sina verkställande direktörer med rörlig ersättning. Vidare att se hur dessa företag utformar sina ersättningsprogram samt skapa en förståelse för varför det finns incitament för rörlig ersättning. Studien syftar även till att ge en förståelse för hur den svenska bolagsstyrningen är uppbyggd samt tillföra kunskap avseende normbildningen av ersättning till VD. Referensram: Avsnittet inleds med en redogörelse kring svensk bolagsstyrning samt normbildningen avseende ersättning. Vidare görs en fördjupad redogörelse kring ersättning för verkställande direktörer och ersättningsprogram. Avsnittet följer av en presentation av agentteorin som sedan sätts i ett svenskt perspektiv. Slutligen avslutas avsnittet med en redogörelse av två perspektiv på redovisning samt redovisning av värdeförändringar i förvaltningsfastigheter. Metod: Undersökningen bygger på en metodkombination där både kvalitativa samt kvantitativa metoder använts. Årsredovisningar har varit underlag för insamling av data varvid en dokumentärstudie utförts med en sekventiell design. Vidare har ett icke-sannolikhetsurval tillämpats där urvalet baserat sig på ett subjektivt urval. Slutsats: Informationsvärdet i företagens årsredovisningar varierar avseende ersättning till VD. Utbetalande av rörlig ersättning sker kontant i de undersökta företagen. Andelen rörlig ersättning för VD uppgår, i de undersökta företagen, till ca 20% av total ersättning. Kortsiktiga ersättningsprogram är dominerande i dessa företag. Vidare är redovisningsbaserade mått mest frekvent använda i företagens ersättningsprogram, men kompletteras upp med andra prestations mått. Justeringar av verkligt värde för fastighetsbestånden avspeglas inte i VD:s rörliga ersättningar, således är förvaltarskap utmärkande för VD i fastighetsbolag. / Background: CEO remuneration is a topic that recurs in the public debate at regular intervals, especially in the case of scandals where a CEO’s action can be questioned. Even though variable remuneration has existed for more than 130 years in Sweden and the subject is noticed in daily newspapers, there is limited research on the subject. Purpose: To gain a deeper understanding of how real estate companies in Sweden (with a high market capitalization) reward their CEOs with variable remuneration. Furthermore, to see how the companies design their incentive-program and to gain an understanding of why there are incentives for variable remuneration. The study also aims to provide an understanding of how the Swedish corporate governance are organized and to add knowledge regarding the setting of norms for CEO remuneration. Framework: The section begins with a description of Swedish corporate governance and the standards regarding CEO remuneration. Furthermore, an in-depth report is made regarding CEO remuneration and incentive-programs. The section continues with a presentation of Agency Theory, which is then put into a Swedish perspective. The episode ends with a description of two perspectives in accounting and reporting of value changes in investment properties. Method: The study is based on a combination of methods where both qualitative and quantitative methods were used. Annual reports have been the basis for data collection, whereby a documentary study was carried out with a sequential design. Furthermore, a non-probability sample has been applied where the sample was based on a subjective sample. Conclusions: The information value regarding CEO remuneration, in the annual reports, differ among the corporations. Payment of variable remuneration is made in cash. The share of variable remuneration for the CEO amounts to approx. 20 percent of total remuneration, according to the investigated corporations. Short-term incentive-programs are dominant in these corporations. Furthermore, accounting-based key performance indicators are most frequently used in the corporation’s incentive- programs, however they are supplemented with other key performance indicators. Fair value adjustments for the property holdings are not reflected in the CEO’s variable remuneration, thus stewardship is distinctive for CEOs in real estate companies.
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具會計專長之執行長與投資人、會計師及分析師之反應 / Chief Executive Officer with Accounting Expertise and Reactions of Investors, Auditors and Analysts陳嬿如, Chen, Yen Ju Unknown Date (has links)
本研究以1980年至2015年美國及加拿大上市公司為研究對象,探討具有會計專長之執行長(CEO)與外界反應的關係。在探討外界反應之前,本文先檢視具有會計專長之CEO對於盈餘品質的影響,透過此結果,推論專業人士(包含會計師與分析師)與市場投資人之反應。本研究預期,當CEO具有會計專長時,會使盈餘品質降低,故審計風險隨之提高,導致審計公費增加,且分析師的追隨意願降低,同時也將影響市場投資人的反應。
研究結果發現,具會計專長CEO與盈餘管理、審計公費、公司累積異常報酬呈現顯著正相關,與分析師追隨數則為顯著負相關,顯示當CEO具有會計專長時,因有盈餘操控的情況,所以審計公費提高、分析師追隨數減少;但市場投資人或許無法體認盈餘操控的事實,故仍相信具有會計專長之CEO,有可能為公司帶來正面的影響。 / This study investigates the relationship between CEOs with accounting expertise and external reactions of investors, auditors and analysts. The sample firms used in this study are all the stock-listed companies in America and Canada during 1980-2015.
Before examining such external reactions, this paper explores the association between CEOs with accounting expertise and earnings quality, which help us to obtain an explanation why auditors, analysts and investors have such reactions.
The empirical results show that CEOs with accounting expertise manage earnings more aggressively than CEOs without such expertise. As a consequence, the firms with such CEOs will be charged higher audit fees and have less analyst following. However, investors might not recognize this fact; they still believe that CEOs with accounting expertise will have a positive influence on firms. Our findings could offer a reference for a company looking for a CEO that could bring accounting quality.
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Die Eignung der insolvenzrechtlichen Überschuldungsprüfung nach § 19 InsO als Instrument der Insolvenzprophylaxe unter spezieller Berücksichtigung der mittelständischen GmbH / The ability of the over-indebtedness-check according to § 19 as an instrument of bankruptcy prohylaxis under specific observance of small and medium-sized limited liability companiesRep, Thomas 17 August 2013 (has links) (PDF)
Liest und verfolgt man die diversen in der jüngeren Vergangenheit ergangenen Presseverlautbarungen und Stellungnahmen zum Thema Überschuldung im Allgemeinen und dem insolvenzrechtlichen Überschuldungsbegriff im Besonderen, drängt sich einem der Verdacht auf, dass ein wie auch immer geartetes Problembewusstsein zu diesem Thema gewollt in die Bedeutungslosigkeit geschrieben worden ist. Nach überwiegend herrschender Meinung seien die insolvenzrechtliche Überschuldung und der damit einhergehende Insolvenzantragsgrund mittlerweile obsolet. Dieser Meinungsstand verwundert doch stark angesichts der nach wie vor hohen Anzahl an Unternehmensinsolvenzen, insbesondere im Bereich mittelständischer Unternehmen. Obgleich bei einem Gutteil der betroffenen Unternehmen als Insolvenzantragsgrund die Zahlungsunfähigkeit angegeben worden ist, darf dies nicht darüber hinweg täuschen, dass einer Illiquidität in aller Regel eine Überschuldung vorausgeht. Dabei spielt es objektiv betrachtet keine Rolle, ob es sich um eine bilanzielle, rechnerische oder insolvenzrechtliche Überschuldung handelt; in allen Fällen vermag das Vermögen die Schulden nicht mehr zu decken, m.a.W.: die Schuldendeckungsfähigkeit ist nicht mehr gegeben. Die Erhaltung der Schuldendeckungsfähigkeit eines Unternehmens ist so gesehen der erste Schritt zur Insolvenzprophylaxe. Allerdings sind die normierten handelsrechtlichen Rechnungslegungsvorschriften aus vielerlei Gründen nur bedingt geeignet, die Schuldendeckungsfähigkeit eines Unternehmens verlässlich zu überprüfen. Insoweit erscheint es folgerichtig, gerade für die mittelständische GmbH eine Ergänzung der aktuellen Rechnungslegung durch eine permanente Schuldendeckungskontrolle, wie sie bereits durch die ältere Zerschlagungsstatik bzw. statische Interpretation der Bilanz gefordert wurde, vorzusehen und damit den organschaftlichen Vertreter der mittelständischen GmbH in die Lage zu versetzen, im Rahmen seiner Selbstinformationsverpflichtung den Bestand des Unternehmens zu sichern und die externen Gläubiger angemessen zu schützen. Die präventive Anwendung der insolvenzrechtlichen Überschuldungsprüfung nach § 19 InsO zur Schuldendeckungskontrolle ermöglicht dem organschaftlichen Vertreter zweierlei: In Abhängigkeit von der Frühzeitigkeit der Vornahme einer solchen Prüfungshandlung kann deren Informationsgehalt entweder insolvenzprophylaktisch im Sinne einer erfolgreichen außergerichtlichen Sanierung wirken oder aber zumindest den Weg zu einer rechtzeitigen und geordneten Insolvenzantragstellung weisen. Das Ergebnis der Überschuldungsprüfung kann so dazu beitragen, erste Indikatoren bestehender Fehlentwicklungen und Schieflagen bereits im Vorfeld einer sich abzeichnenden Krise aufzuzeigen. Anzeichen dieser Art sind in aller Regel schon lange vor Eintritt der Insolvenzantragspflicht im Zahlenwerk der betreffenden Unternehmen erkennbar.
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Three essays on CEO compensation in the UKMinhat, Marizah January 2009 (has links)
This thesis comprises three studies on CEO compensation in the UK. It specifically examines the role of CEO defined-benefit pensions, compensation consultants and CEO stock options. Firstly, research on the role of executive pensions is still at a stage of infancy due to data difficulties (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007). By taking advantage of better disclosure requirements with the introduction of Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations (DRRR) in 2002, this thesis examines the determinants and effects of CEO defined-benefit pensions. Consistent with rent extraction hypothesis (Bebchuk and Fried, 2005; Kalyta and Magnan, 2008), it finds that pensions are largely determined by CEO power over boards of directors. There is no evidence that pensions reduce the agency cost of debt as suggested by Edmans (2008) and Sundaram and Yermack (2007). Instead they increase the agency cost of equity by discouraging CEO risk-taking and reducing pay-performance relationship. Consistent with the argument in Gustman et al. (1994), Ippolito (1991) and Lazear (1990), this thesis also finds that pensions do bond a CEO to the firm she manages. Secondly, because of the lack of disclosure regarding compensation consultants used by companies, the empirical evidence is so far limited on how the practice of employing compensation consultants influences CEO pay. By taking advantage of better disclosure requirements since the publication of the DRRR (2002), this thesis examines the effect of using compensation consultants on CEO pay. Unlike Murphy and Sandino (2008), this thesis finds no evidence that firms use multiple pay consultants to justify or legitimize higher CEO pay. In light of the managerial power theory, this thesis instead finds that pay consultants are more concerned with the risk of losing business with their client firms. This latter finding explains why the use of pay consultants is associated with greater executive pay (see Armstrong, Ittner and Larcker, 2008; Cadman, Carter and Hillegeist, in press; Conyon, Peck and Sadler, 2009; Murphy and Sandino, 2008; Voulgaris, Stathopoulos and Walker, 2009). Thirdly, despite the importance of the issue, the existence of a link between the CEO stock options and earnings management is currently understudied in the UK. The UK context is appealing because of two distinctive corporate governance features that limit opportunistic earnings management. These are the absence of CEO duality in general (Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian, 2008) and the increased outside director’s membership on boards since the publication of the Cadbury Report (1992) (Peasnell, Pope, and Young, 2000). By examining earnings management prior to stock option grant and exercise periods, this thesis adds to the study of Kuang (2008) that examines earnings management during stock option vesting periods. Overall, some evidence has been found that earnings are managed downwards prior to stock option grant periods. Consistent with the US-based studies, this thesis finds strong evidence of upward earnings management prior to a stock option exercise period. It shows that the UK’s distinctive governance features have not restrained opportunistic earnings management prior to stock option grants and exercises. In brief, this thesis provides some empirical evidence that the use of two pay components in the CEO pay package, namely, the defined-benefit pensions and stock options, do not necessarily promote CEO-shareholder interest alignment. The use of pay consultants in CEO pay-setting is also fraught with managerial influence. In support of the managerial power theory, I therefore suggest that these three factors can be abused by CEOs to extract excess compensation at the expense of shareholders. In this context, these three factors can themselves be considered as the sources of the agency cost. Future research might examine the mechanisms that can be deployed to govern the use of defined-benefit pensions, stock options and pay consultants in CEO pay design.
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Förklaringar till förklaringarna : En studie om bolagsstyrning utifrån samtliga 317 svenska börsnoterade bolag och dess förklaringar till avvikelser från Svensk kod för bolagsstyrningEriksson, Malin, Ganelius, Elin January 2020 (has links)
Skandaler orsakade av bristande bolagsstyrning har kontinuerligt uppmärksammats i flera svenska börsnoterade bolag. Bolagsstyrning syftar till att skydda ägarnas intresse och kapital från verkställande direktörens (VD) opportunism. Ägarnas osäkerhet har bidragit till en ökad efterfrågan på information om hur bolag styrs och verkar. Ett sätt för ägarna att hantera osäkerheten är att använda sig av olika kontrollmekanismer för att få ökad information om bolaget. Kontrollmekanismen Svensk kod för bolagsstyrning (Koden) har använts för att bedöma informationsasymmetrin mellan ägare, styrelse och VD i svenska börsnoterade bolag. Samtliga 317 svenska börsnoterade bolag studerades för att sedan urskilja 122 bolag som hade avvikelser från Koden år 2018, vilka utgjorde studiens urval. Informationsinnehållet i förklaringarna till avvikelserna från Koden har tolkats utifrån agentteorin. En metodtriangulering i form av både en kvantitativ samt en kvalitativ metod har genomförts för att uppfylla studiens syfte. En kvantitativ metod har använts för att samla in data om bolagen och dess förklaringar. Den kvalitativa metoden har medfört att informationsinnehållet i de insamlade förklaringarna till avvikelserna kunde tolkas. Studiens resultat visar att 78% av förklaringarna till avvikelser från Koden år 2018 inte har ett godtagbart informationsinnehåll. Sju förklaringar till det låga informationsinnehållet i förklaringarna har identifierats: <ul type="disc">Antalet avvikelser Alternativa kontrollmekanismer Okunskap Ägarstruktur VD:n sitter i styrelsen Undanhålla information VD:ns opportunism Studien visar att det finns informationsasymmetri mellan ägare, styrelse och VD och att det fortfarande finns brister i bolagsstyrningen i Sverige. Det går att ifrågasätta Koden som kontrollmekanism för att hantera informationsasymmetri. / Scandals caused by insufficient corporate governance have been continuously noticed in several Swedish publicly listed companies. Corporate governance aims to protect the interests and capital of the owners from the opportunism of the chief executive officer (CEO). The insecurity of the owners has contributed an increased demand for information regarding how the companies are managed and operated. A way for the owners to handle the insecurity is to use mechanisms of control to increase the flow of information from the companies. The control mechanism Swedish code of corporate governance (The Code) has been used to assess the information asymmetry between owners, board of directors and the CEO in Swedish listed companies. All 317 Swedish listed companies were studied to distinguish a sample of 122 companies that had deviations from The Code in 2018, which constituted the study’s selection. The information content of the explanations for the deviations from The Code has been interpreted based on the agency theory. A triangulation of methods of both a quantitative and a qualitative method has been used to fulfil the purpose of the study. A quantitative method has been used to collect data about the companies and their explanations. The qualitative method has been used to interpret the information content of the collected explanations for the deviations. The result of the study shows that 78% of the explanations for deviations from The Code in 2018 does not have sufficient information content. Seven explanations for the low information content of the explanations has been identified: <ul type="disc">Number of deviations Alternative mechanisms of control Ignorance Ownership characteristics The CEO being a part of the board of directors Withhold information The opportunism of the CEO The study indicates that there’s information asymmetry between owners, board of directors and management. In conclusion there are still shortcomings in corporate governance in Sweden and it is questionable if The Code is a well-functioned control mechanism to handle information asymmetry.
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