Les SIV infectant les chimpanzés et les gorilles sont les précurseurs des virus de l'immunodéficience humaine de type 1. Les quatre groupes du VIH-1 sont le résultat de quatre transmissions virales des grands singes à l'Homme. Des méthodes non invasives ont permis d'identifier le réservoir des VIH-1 M et N dans deux communautés de chimpanzés (Ptt) au Cameroun et de montrer que les gorilles (Ggg) sont infectés par un SIV proche des VIH-1 O et P. Si le SIVgor n'a jamais été détecté chez les chimpanzés, la phylogénie montre que les Ptt ont transmis ce virus aux gorilles. Par une méthode pluridisciplinaire, nous avons étudié les caractéristiques de l'infection SIVgor en milieu naturel. Nous avons prospecté 13 sites au Cameroun et 2 en RCA. Au total, 2120 fèces de gorilles et 442 de chimpanzés ont été collectées. L'infection SIVgor a été détectée dans 3 sites Camerounais et les prévalences varient entre 3,2% et 4,6%, résultats plus faibles que ceux retrouvés chez les chimpanzés. Nous avons ensuite montré que plusieurs groupes sociaux de Ggg dont les domaines vitaux se chevauchent sont infectés et que les prévalences SIV dans les groupes peuvent dépasser 25%. Les virus touchant les gorilles du même groupe sont génétiquement proches montrant des liens épidémiologiques. Enfin, un suivi de l'infection réalisé de 2004 à 2009 sur un site a permis de découvrir un foyer d'infection, 2 cas de séroconversions et de retrouver une femelle gorille infectée à 5 ans d'intervalle. Dans ce site, la prévalence SIV est stable et le nombre de femelles infectées est plus important que le nombre de mâles. La structure sociale des gorilles et leur comportement peuvent alors expliquer en partie la répartition et la prévalence du SIVgor, ainsi que les différences avec l'infection chez les chimpanzés.Cette étude multidisciplinaire montre la faisabilité du suivi de l'infection SIV chez les gorilles en milieu naturel. Si le SIVgor est pathogène, le suivi pourra s'avérer essentiel chez cette espèce menacée d'extinction. / SIV infecting chimpanzees and gorillas are the precursors of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus type 1. The four groups of HIV-1 are the results of four different viral transmissions from apes to humans. Using non invasive methods we discovered the reservoir of HIV-1 M and N in two communities of chimpanzees (Ptt) in Cameroon and found that Gorillas (Ggg) are infected by a SIV close to HIV-1 O and P. While SIVgor has not yet been detected in chimpanzees, phylogeny shows that Ptt transmitted this virus to Ggg. Using a multidisciplinary approach, we studied the characteristics of the infection in wild living gorillas. We prospected 13 sites in Cameroon and 3 in CAR. 2120 fecal samples of gorillas and 442 of chimpanzees were collected. SIVgor infection was detected in 3 sites in Cameroon and the prevalence ranges from 3.2% to 4.6%, lower than in chimpanzees. Several social groups of gorillas with overlapping home-ranges were infected and the prevalence within group could exceed 25%. Viruses of the same group are genetically close, showing epidemiologic links. In a follow up study between 2004 and 2009 on one site, we discovered a focus of infection with 2 cases of seroconvertion and we re-sampled one infected female 5 years after. In this site, the prevalence of SIVgor is stable and the number of infected females is higher than the males. The social structure of gorillas and their behavior can partly explain for the repartition and prevalence of SIVgor, as well as the differences with the infection in chimpanzees. This multidisciplinary study proves the feasibility of a follow up study in wild living gorillas. If SIVgor turns out to be pathogenic, a follow up will be essential for this endangered species.

A separação histórica entre as ciências naturais e as ciências sociais fundamenta-se na distinção ontológica entre os domínios da natureza e da cultura, e na ideia moderna de que a condição (cultural) humana corresponde a um afastamento radical dos outros animais. Porém, somando-se a outros críticos insatisfeitos com essa visão dualista, muitos estudiosos do comportamento animal tem utilizado o termo cultura em referência a não humanos, provocando uma controvérsia que ainda parece longe de um consenso. Neste trabalho, investiguei o sentido da noção de cultura para os antropólogos e o uso etológico (limitando-nos aos primatas) do termo, com os objetivos de compreender melhor a controvérsia e identificar caminhos possíveis na busca por um consenso. Na Antropologia, a noção moderna de cultura se desenvolveu do século XIX até os anos 1950. Cultura passou a ser vista como um fenômeno emergente exclusivamente humano, dependente de nossa capacidade de utilizar símbolos e correspondendo aos padrões e normas comportamentais, artefatos, ideias e, principalmente, valores que os indivíduos adquirem no processo de socialização. Mais recentemente, essa concepção de cultura, e a epistemologia dualista que a sustenta, tem sido alvo de críticas e intenso debate. Ainda que não compartilhem um arcabouço teórico comum, virtualmente todos os antropólogos contemporâneos concordam que o comportamento cultural humano é fundamentalmente simbólico. A discussão recente em torno da atribuição de cultura a primatas não humanos remonta aos estudiosos japoneses que, na década de 1950, acompanharam a dispersão de uma nova técnica de manipulação de alimento em Macaca fuscata, e descreveram o fenômeno com os termos pré-cultura, subcultura e cultura infra-humana. A partir da década de 1960, as pesquisas de campo com populações selvagens e as evidências experimentais de aprendizagem em contexto social levaram ao estabelecimento da Primatologia Cultural e os prefixos foram abandonados. Entre primatólogos, o termo cultura se refere a padrões comportamentais que dependem de um contexto social para se desenvolver, e que podem atravessar gerações. Eu sugiro uma estratégia analítica que distingue os motivos de discordância entre descrições, explicações, teorias e visões de mundo, e argumento que a controvérsia é complexa e inclui discordâncias entre visões de mundo sem, no entanto, dividir os envolvidos em grupos homogêneos (digamos, primatólogos contra antropólogos). Por conta disso, a redefinição e o uso que os primatólogos fazem do termo acabam por manter ilesos os fundamentos da dicotomia natureza/cultura, o que pode explicar, parcialmente, a manutenção da controvérsia. Concluo que o diálogo entre os dois lados da fronteira será imprescindível para os pesquisadores que estiverem interessados em buscar uma abordagem consensual. É possível alcançar um consenso, mas a busca por uma abordagem sintética do comportamento animal que inclua os humanos deverá levar ao abandono ou reconstrução das dualidades natureza/cultura, inato/adquirido e gene/ambiente, e também da atribuição de primazia causal aos genes. Além disso, é necessário discutir a fundo sobre como incluir a questão do simbolismo e do significado em uma perspectiva comparativa / The Western ontological distinction between nature and culture, and the idea that the human (cultural) condition makes us radically different from other animals, are evident in the historical separation between the natural and social sciences. In parallel to other critics of this dualist view, some animal behaviorists have been using the term culture in relation to nonhumans, starting a controversy that is still far from cooling down. In this study, I investigated the meaning of the term culture as used by anthropologists, and also its recent use by ethologists (limiting myself to primatology), in order to better understand the controversy and identify possible paths that might lead to a consensus. In Anthropology, the modern concept of culture developed between the 19th century and the 1950s. It came to be seen as an emergent phenomenon exclusive to human social life. It was dependent on our capacity to use symbols and corresponded to behavioral patterns and norms, artifacts, ideas, and values that individuals acquire in the process of socialization. But this conception of culture, and the dualist epistemology supporting it, have since been largely criticized and intensely debated. Although contemporary anthropologists do not share a common ground or framework, virtually all of them agree that human cultural behavior is fundamentally symbolic. Recent attribution of culture to nonhuman primates started with Japanese scholars who, from the 1950s onward, have followed closely the spread of novel behaviors in Macaca fuscata, which they described with expressions such as preculture, subculture and infrahuman culture. Since the 1960s, field studies on wild populations and experimental research on learning in a social context, have led to the establishment of Cultural Primatology, and the prefixes were abandoned. Among primatologists, the term culture refers to behavioral patterns that depend on the social context to develop and that might be recurrent through generations. I suggest that it might be analytically useful to distinguish the matters of a disagreement between descriptions, explanations, theories and worldviews, and argue that this controversy goes all the way up to the highest reason of disagreement (worldviews). Still, one cannot divide those involved in it into a few homogeneous groups (say, primatologists contra anthropologists). Primatologists redefinition and use of the term do not alter the foundations of the criticized nature/culture dichotomy, and that might at least partially explain the maintenance of the controversy. It is possible to reach a consensus, but the search for a synthetic framework for animal behavior that includes humans might lead to the abandonment or reconstruction of the related dichotomies of nature/culture, innate/acquired and gene/environment, as well as of the causal primacy attributed to genes. It is also necessary to discuss how to include symbols and meanings in a comparative perspective

A separação histórica entre as ciências naturais e as ciências sociais fundamenta-se na distinção ontológica entre os domínios da natureza e da cultura, e na ideia moderna de que a condição (cultural) humana corresponde a um afastamento radical dos outros animais. Porém, somando-se a outros críticos insatisfeitos com essa visão dualista, muitos estudiosos do comportamento animal tem utilizado o termo cultura em referência a não humanos, provocando uma controvérsia que ainda parece longe de um consenso. Neste trabalho, investiguei o sentido da noção de cultura para os antropólogos e o uso etológico (limitando-nos aos primatas) do termo, com os objetivos de compreender melhor a controvérsia e identificar caminhos possíveis na busca por um consenso. Na Antropologia, a noção moderna de cultura se desenvolveu do século XIX até os anos 1950. Cultura passou a ser vista como um fenômeno emergente exclusivamente humano, dependente de nossa capacidade de utilizar símbolos e correspondendo aos padrões e normas comportamentais, artefatos, ideias e, principalmente, valores que os indivíduos adquirem no processo de socialização. Mais recentemente, essa concepção de cultura, e a epistemologia dualista que a sustenta, tem sido alvo de críticas e intenso debate. Ainda que não compartilhem um arcabouço teórico comum, virtualmente todos os antropólogos contemporâneos concordam que o comportamento cultural humano é fundamentalmente simbólico. A discussão recente em torno da atribuição de cultura a primatas não humanos remonta aos estudiosos japoneses que, na década de 1950, acompanharam a dispersão de uma nova técnica de manipulação de alimento em Macaca fuscata, e descreveram o fenômeno com os termos pré-cultura, subcultura e cultura infra-humana. A partir da década de 1960, as pesquisas de campo com populações selvagens e as evidências experimentais de aprendizagem em contexto social levaram ao estabelecimento da Primatologia Cultural e os prefixos foram abandonados. Entre primatólogos, o termo cultura se refere a padrões comportamentais que dependem de um contexto social para se desenvolver, e que podem atravessar gerações. Eu sugiro uma estratégia analítica que distingue os motivos de discordância entre descrições, explicações, teorias e visões de mundo, e argumento que a controvérsia é complexa e inclui discordâncias entre visões de mundo sem, no entanto, dividir os envolvidos em grupos homogêneos (digamos, primatólogos contra antropólogos). Por conta disso, a redefinição e o uso que os primatólogos fazem do termo acabam por manter ilesos os fundamentos da dicotomia natureza/cultura, o que pode explicar, parcialmente, a manutenção da controvérsia. Concluo que o diálogo entre os dois lados da fronteira será imprescindível para os pesquisadores que estiverem interessados em buscar uma abordagem consensual. É possível alcançar um consenso, mas a busca por uma abordagem sintética do comportamento animal que inclua os humanos deverá levar ao abandono ou reconstrução das dualidades natureza/cultura, inato/adquirido e gene/ambiente, e também da atribuição de primazia causal aos genes. Além disso, é necessário discutir a fundo sobre como incluir a questão do simbolismo e do significado em uma perspectiva comparativa / The Western ontological distinction between nature and culture, and the idea that the human (cultural) condition makes us radically different from other animals, are evident in the historical separation between the natural and social sciences. In parallel to other critics of this dualist view, some animal behaviorists have been using the term culture in relation to nonhumans, starting a controversy that is still far from cooling down. In this study, I investigated the meaning of the term culture as used by anthropologists, and also its recent use by ethologists (limiting myself to primatology), in order to better understand the controversy and identify possible paths that might lead to a consensus. In Anthropology, the modern concept of culture developed between the 19th century and the 1950s. It came to be seen as an emergent phenomenon exclusive to human social life. It was dependent on our capacity to use symbols and corresponded to behavioral patterns and norms, artifacts, ideas, and values that individuals acquire in the process of socialization. But this conception of culture, and the dualist epistemology supporting it, have since been largely criticized and intensely debated. Although contemporary anthropologists do not share a common ground or framework, virtually all of them agree that human cultural behavior is fundamentally symbolic. Recent attribution of culture to nonhuman primates started with Japanese scholars who, from the 1950s onward, have followed closely the spread of novel behaviors in Macaca fuscata, which they described with expressions such as preculture, subculture and infrahuman culture. Since the 1960s, field studies on wild populations and experimental research on learning in a social context, have led to the establishment of Cultural Primatology, and the prefixes were abandoned. Among primatologists, the term culture refers to behavioral patterns that depend on the social context to develop and that might be recurrent through generations. I suggest that it might be analytically useful to distinguish the matters of a disagreement between descriptions, explanations, theories and worldviews, and argue that this controversy goes all the way up to the highest reason of disagreement (worldviews). Still, one cannot divide those involved in it into a few homogeneous groups (say, primatologists contra anthropologists). Primatologists redefinition and use of the term do not alter the foundations of the criticized nature/culture dichotomy, and that might at least partially explain the maintenance of the controversy. It is possible to reach a consensus, but the search for a synthetic framework for animal behavior that includes humans might lead to the abandonment or reconstruction of the related dichotomies of nature/culture, innate/acquired and gene/environment, as well as of the causal primacy attributed to genes. It is also necessary to discuss how to include symbols and meanings in a comparative perspective

Comment humains et chimpanzés définissent et brouillent les frontières entre leurs espèces lors de leurs interactions ? Tel sera le leitmotiv de notre étho-ethnographie, à l’intersection de l’anthropologie sociale, des études des sciences, et de la primatologie. Au fondement de cette recherche se trouve un travail de terrain de longue durée mené dans un laboratoire de sciences cognitives situé au Japon, au sein duquel sont enseignées aux chimpanzés des compétences langagières dans le but de caractériser leur monde perceptuel. Cependant, au cœur même du contexte ce laboratoire, la nature des relations entre humains et chimpanzés est un aspect crucial de ce programme de recherche ; les deux espèces y forment une communauté hybride faite d’affects, de relations sociales et de collaboration scientifique. Afin de fournir une étude comparative, nous avons également mené une série d’ethnographies plus brèves – sur le modèle de la méthodologie multi-site – en observant cette même problématique à l’œuvre au sein de diverses institutions au Japon - zoo, sanctuaires et réserves - ainsi qu’au sein de la station japonaise pour l’étude de la culture des chimpanzés qui se trouve à Bossou, en République de Guinée. En outre, ce travail narre l’expérience que nous avons faite de devenir expérimentatrice au sein du laboratoire étudié. Le résultat en est multiple. Nous commencerons par explorer l’histoire des études sur les chimpanzés menées à l’Institut de Recherche sur les Primates de l’Université de Kyoto (KUPRI) ainsi que les pratiques de soin et de recherche qui s’y sont mises en place. Ensuite, nous étudierons les dynamiques qui caractérisent (1) les frontières physiques, lors d’interactions sociales entre deux espèces qui peuvent s’avérer dangereuses, (2) les frontières expérimentales, lorsque le chimpanzé n’est pas seulement celui qui fait l’objet d’une expérience mais qui met également à l’épreuve son expérimentateur, (3) et les frontières symboliques, lorsqu’est interrogée la définition de la « personne » humaine et non humaine. Ainsi, quatre points principaux sont examinés à nouveaux frais, en particulier (a) la socialisation interspécifique (b) l’incarnation des relations inter-espèces dans un espace donné (c) les relations inter-espèces dans un contexte scientifique (d) l’examen de perspectives zoocentrées sur la « personne ». Nous conclurons avec l’évocation de nos espoirs et de nos attentes quant à un dialogue fructueux entre les différentes disciplines en jeu. L’apport de ce travail consistera en effet à mobiliser des concepts et des outils de la primatologie et des sciences sociales afin de proposer une analyse plus symétrique des relations entre humains et animaux. / How do humans and chimpanzees set and blur boundaries between species when interacting with each other? This is the leitmotif of this etho-ethnography at the intersection of social anthropology, social studies of science and primatology. This endeavor is based on long-term fieldwork conducted in a cognitive sciences laboratory in Japan, which teaches chimpanzees language-like skills as means to understand their perceptual world. However, in this laboratory setting, the human-chimpanzee relationship is a vital part of the research philosophy and both species constitute a hybrid community of affections, social relationships, and scientific partnering. As a comparative effort, a short-term multi-sited ethnography was conducted following the theme across institutions in Japan of zoo, sanctuary and field-site type, in addition to the Japanese field station for the study of chimpanzee culture, in Bossou, Africa. Moreover, this work draws on the experience of becoming, at the same time, an experimenter in the targeted laboratory. The result is multifold. We shall explore first, the history as well as the caretaking and research practices in chimpanzee studies at the Primate Research Institute of Kyoto University (KUPRI). Then, we shall investigate the dynamics of physical boundaries in dangerous interspecies social interactions; the experimental boundaries of testing and being tested by chimpanzees; and the symbolic boundaries concerning human and nonhuman personhood. As a result, four major points are brought to light in a renewed perspective, namely (a) interspecies socialization (b) the embodiment of interspecies social relations in space (c) interspecies social relations in scientific settings (d) animalcentric perspectives on personhood. We conclude with the hopes and prospects for a fruitful dialogue across disciplines. Overall, the differential endeavor of this work consists in mobilizing concepts and tools from both primatology and social sciences to propose a more symmetric analysis of the human-animal relationship.

Les cinq études détaillées au cours de cette thèse interrogent divers aspects de la théorie de l’esprit, de la conscience de soi ainsi que du lien (multiple ou unique) qui unit ces deux capacités sociocognitives si particulières. Les deux premières études mettent en évidence différentes variables qui peuvent – ou non- influencer l’attribution d’intention et de fausse croyance à autrui. La troisième étude porte plus précisément sur les différents composants de la conscience de soi et sur leur trajectoire développementale. La quatrième étude interroge le lien développemental entre la théorie de l’esprit et la conscience de soi, alors que la dernière étude questionne la présence de ce lien chez les chimpanzés (Pan Troglodytes). Nous démontrerons, tout au long de cette thèse, que la théorie de l’esprit et la conscience de soi sont composées de différents éléments et que leur acquisition est graduelle. / Doctorat en Sciences Psychologiques et de l'éducation / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

La transmission sociale de comportements chez les animaux non humains fait l'objet de nombreuses recherches en psychologie ou en biologie. Dans une perspective didactique de type anthropologique, nous montrons que certains comportements chimpanzés qualifiés de culturels par les primatologues sont comparables à ce que nous qualifions d'oeuvres en didactique. A ce titre, leur transmission peut faire l'objet d'une lecture didactique. Reprenant des données recueillies en primatologie, nous proposons une analyse didactique de l'action conjointe du jeune chimpanzé et de sa mère considérés comme des sujets institutionnels, relativement à l'oeuvre "cassage de noix". Le logiciel Transana nous a permis de procéder à plusieurs types d'analyses : 1/ analyses par tranche d'âge 2/ analyses par « action / succession d'actions » 3/ mise en évidence de biographèmes. Ayant décrit ce que font, à chaque tranche âge, les jeunes primates et leur mère, nous montrons que l'âge du petit chimpanzé constitue un déterminant des formes de l'action didactique. A partir des normes révélées par l'analyse par âge, nous avons identifié des épisodes dans lesquels les petits chimpanzés sortaient de la norme et où leur rapport au cassage de noix évoluait. Nous avons alors réalisé une étude de ces épisodes en les considérant comme des biographèmes que nous avons situé dans la biographie didactique des sujets observés. Les analyses transversales de certaines actions ayant un fort effet du point de vue de l'apprentissage nous conduisent à supposer que la nature et la forme de l'action didactique est influencée par d'autres déterminants, notamment le sexe du petit et le fait que la mère soit ou non primipare. / The social transmission of non-human animal behaviors has been studied by many psychologists or biologists. Adopting the anthropological viewpoint of the comparative approaches in didactics, we study the learning of nut-craking by young chimpanzees in Taï. This behavior described as "cultural" by primatologists are comparable to what didaticians call "oeuvres". In this respect, this object can be subjected to a didactic analysis. Using the data collected by primatologists, we offer a didactic analysis of the joint action of young chimpanzees and their mother (looked upon as institutional subjects) relating to nut-craking. The Transana software we used enabled us to carry out several types of analyses : 1/ longitudinal analyses by age group ; 2/ cross-sectional analyses by « action/sequence of actions » ; 3/ the highlighting of biographemes. Having described what young primates and their mother do in the course of each age group, we demonstrate that the chimpanzees' age constitues a determinant of the form of didactic action . Our method for studying the nut-craking learning process among wild chimpanzees applies for all acculturation situations. Using the norms the age analysis revealed, we identify episods called "biographems" in which young chimpanzees we can observe that their relation to nut-cracking evolved and located those biographems within the didactic biography of the subjects we observed. Since the cross-sectional analyses of certain actions had a strong effect in terms of learning, we assume that the nature and form of didactic action is influenced by other determinants, in particular the young chimpanzee's sexe and whether the mother is primiparous or not.