The Framework Convention on Climate Change has yet to deal with tropical deforestation although it represents an important source of greenhouse gas emissions. In December 2005 negotiations on a possible regime to reduce emissions from deforestation resume under the impulse of a regime proposal based on the concept of compensated reduction. Over the course of 2006 Panamanian policy-makers working within the National Environmental Authority (ANAM) determine that such a regime is in the interest of Panama given that the integrity of the Kyoto Protocol's existing flexibility mechanisms is protected. However reducing its deforestation rate is not currently possible for Panama due to ANAM's limited institutional capacity to act on the field and limited political capacity to influence the national agenda. Important up-front flows of funds from developed countries combined with the adoption of a progressive project based compensation mechanism could contribute to reverse this trend.

No description available.

Between a Promise and a Trench examines how science is constituted as a strategic practice and site through which citizens make claims about racial democracy in Guyana. It shows how government policymaking around climate adaptation--which drew upon the recommendations of outside actors, including the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the United Nations (UN), and various NGOs and international scientific networks-- profoundly disrupted the country's delicate racial-ethnic balance. A contribution to the burgeoning anthropology on the social and political impact of climate change, the dissertation also speaks to current debates over race and citizenship, the complex relationship between expertise and democracy, and the competing post-colonial claims of Indo-, Afro-, and Amerindian Guyanese to land and self-determination. The dissertation is based on seventeen months of fieldwork and archival research conducted between, 2009-11 in coastal Guyana. It brings together three conflicting perspectives: of engineers, who drew upon datasets and models about flooding and construction of canals around IPCC and UN climate data; the state officials, who sought to reduce vulnerability to flood hazards through land evictions; and of Indo-, Afro-, and Amerindian Guyanese farmers and squatters who were evicted as a result of post-2005 engineering projects. I use the concept "politics of vulnerability" to describe how states assume that citizens experience vulnerability to climate change based on their "ethnic-political status," thereby making the extension of democratic rights contingent on citizens providing cultural knowledge to the state to manage climate change. The dissertation attends to the consequences of the canals, including collapsed housing, failed civic science programs, and erratic water allocation. In response to these failures, citizens charge that state engineering repositions environmental hazards around existing social welfare inequities between racial-ethnic communities. During my time in Guyana, I tracked these responses at four distinct sites. 1) I observed engineers at work in the field produce and interpret "datasets" and "models" about flooding and construction of canals around IPCC and UN climate data. 2) I gathered residents' "unofficial" stories about vulnerability to floods through interviews and participant observations of everyday life in two coastal villages, Sophia (a racially mixed urban squatter community) and Mahaica (a predominately Indo-Guyanese cash crop community), where people were evicted due to the post-2005 engineering projects. 3) I analyzed "official" data generated through civic science projects and fieldwork in Mahaica and Sophia by engineers, state officials, and scientists that addressed vulnerability to flood hazards and its relationship to land evictions and property rights. 4) I conducted archival research in Guyana's National Archives on documents relating to colonial-era canals (1920s-60s) that inform the current projects. Although there is a growing ethnographic literature on climate change, a critical anthropology of vulnerability has yet to emerge. This dissertation offers two key interventions in this emerging field. First, I argue that in applied contexts, the validity of climate science is structured by the ways in which governments hinge climate adaptation projects to address varying national racial-ethnic populations. Second, I argue that governments cultivate institutions of social welfare that encourage "racial-ethnic" niche markets to manage vulnerability to climate change to soothe citizens' fears of state failure and environmental insecurity in the everyday. In such contexts, experiences of vulnerability become privatized, informing a consumer-oriented practice of racial democracy.

As the role of cities in addressing climate change has been increasingly recognized over the past two decades, the idea of a low-carbon city becomes a dominant framework to organize urban governance and envision a sustainable urban future. It also becomes a development discourse in the less developed world to guide the ongoing urbanization process. China’s efforts toward building low-carbon cities have been inspiring at first and then obscured by the halt or total failure of famous mega-projects, leading to a conclusion that Chinese low-carbon cities compose merely a strategy of green branding for promoting local economy. This conclusion, however, largely neglects the profound implications of the decarbonization discourse for the dynamics between the central and local governments, which together determine the rules and resources for development practices. The conclusion also hinders the progressive potentials of the decarbonization discourse in terms of introducing new values and norms to urban governance. This dissertation approaches “low-carbon cities” as a part of the decarbonization discourse and employs a discourse-institutional analysis to investigate the relationships between discourse, institutional arrangement, and socio-political resources for development activities. Through an examination of the Shenzhen International Low-Carbon City (SILCC), the dissertation answers three questions: (1) How does the framework of a low-carbon city affect a specific urban development project? (2) What is the role of the state (local/national) in promoting low-carbon development? and (3) What is the influence of the decarbonization discourse on institutions and norms of urban governance? Evidence was gathered during 2014-2017 from three fieldtrips, 39 interviews and the review of government documents and other archives. The dissertation highlights how different levels of government became entangled in developing a local area and how, in doing so, the proponents continuously searched for ways of ‘positioning’ their initiative in discourses that would attract higher level government support, maintain local coalitions, and entice international attention and investment. In this regard, low-carbon cities are a state discursive project. Rather than an established material goal, a low-carbon city is an evolving process in which the decarbonization discourse introduces a new set of values, metrics and governing logics into development practices and redefines the legitimacy and accountability of urban development. Furthermore, the local state leverages the interpretive flexibility within the decarbonization discourse through strategies including carbon labeling, weak carbonization, and carbon exceptionalism. Consequently, the state takes a strategic position to reconfigure the state-society as well as the environment-economy relationships.

Thesis (M.M. (Public and Development Management))--University of the Witwatersrand, Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, Wits School of Governance, 2017 / This thesis was greatly motivated by the desire to understand and explain the foreign policy decision making process of the South African government on climate change. The study deploys Allison and Zelikow’s triple model from their famous analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis as lenses in unmasking the complexities associated with processes of foreign policy decision making, on climate decisions in South Africa. In spite of the multi-sectoral interventions of government, business, NGO’s, civil society and academics in mitigating the impact of climate change, the decision making process excluded participation of other stakeholders at the political level. This was evident in 2009 at Copenhagen when the president announced that South Africa had committed itself to reduce carbon emissions by 34% in 2020 and 42% in 2025. A possible explanation why the multi-stakeholders participation was excluded in setting these numerical targets in the climate change decision making process, lies with the failure of the incumbent government to uphold the democratic principles of inclusive participation. Drawing from the work of Allison and Zelikow (1999), that state that it is not adequate to explain government’s events on decision making through the Rational Actor Model only, it is more useful to also consider the organisational processes and government politics from which the decision emerged. In this regard, interviews and documentary analysis were deployed within a qualitative case study design to gain an indepth understanding of South African foreign policy decision making processes on climate change targets. Overwhelmingly, the study established that there was a gross exclusion of multi-stakeholders participation in foreign policy decision making on setting the climate targets, ignoring the effects of the outcome of those decisions on socio-economic issues. This study therefore concluded that, although efforts are being put into place to ensure maximum participation by both government and other actors, there is still a need for South African government to allow participation of external actors. Premised in the forgoing conclusion, it is recommended that South African government foreign policy decisions on climate change can work better if entrenched on other multi-stakeholders’ decisions and following inclusive participation at the political level. / GR2018

The cooperation of developing countries is commonly assumed to be essential for the establishment of effective regimes to manage global environmental interdependence. Yet their policies and perceptions have been inadequately studied. This thesis seeks to partially fill this gap in the literature with a detailed analysis of Indian policy on global environmental issues. It examines the cases of ozone depletion, climate change, and loss of biodiversity, and discusses developments up to the 1992 Earth Summit. The study addresses four broad questions about Indian policy: the process of policy making; the character of Indian interests and preferences; the nature and evolution of India's bargaining strategy; and the outcome of international negotiations for India. It reveals a complex picture of continuity and change in Indian policy. It demonstrates the enduring importance of traditions and values such as the "poverty is the greatest polluter" orthodoxy and the concepts of sovereignty, equity and Third World solidarity. It also highlights the impact of perceptions of vulnerability in relation to the North. It argues that Indian policy did not reflect purely powermaximising goals; policy makers were sometimes uncertain about where India's interests precisely lay, and felt constrained both by economic weakness and by the recognition of the mutual interest of all states in global environmental protection. This was reflected in the moderation in India's bargaining strategy. The Indian case suggests that developing countries did not regard their cooperation in the resolution of global environmental issues purely as a bargaining chip with which to extract concessions from the North. Still less did they perceive these issues as providing an opportunity to pose a macro-challenge to the North, linking agendas across issue areas. Instead, their goals reflected perceptions of constraints and mutual interests in bargaining with the North. Their bargaining strategy thus tended to be moderate and flexible, unlike the confrontational approach of the 1970s.

Regulating carbon markets in order to fight the effects of climate change has in recent years become an integral part of many economies around the world. Ensuring that policymakers implement market-based climate change legislation according to international best practice is an essential part to guarantee that a carbon market system operates smoothly within a country’s economy. There are many opportunities that exist in South Africa towards developing a lucrative carbon market; however, the information to implement such a system is hard to come by and complex to analyse. This dissertation will aim to shed some light on this relatively new field of the law as it will provide an overview of international best practice within the carbon market sphere. Furthermore, this dissertation will examine the legal nature of a carbon credit; analyse international instruments regulating carbon markets and discuss existing South African policies and legislation related to climate change and carbon markets. This will lead to the ultimate objective of this dissertation: to propose a possible framework for the regulation of a South African carbon market based upon international best practice. This dissertation revealed the imperative need for South African policymakers to implement legislation to conform to international best practice within carbon markets. In this regard the dissertation also revealed that the infrastructure to regulate such a market already exists within South Africa. Only subtle changes to these infrastructure systems will be required in order for to accommodate a functioning carbon market. The study revealed that the only way to convince entities around the world to emit fewer emissions and to contribute towards the fight against climate change is to attach a monetary value to emissions. Associating a price to carbon is the only way to sanction entities that produce emissions and compensate entities that mitigate emissions. A carbon tax coupled with a carbon offset mechanism, as opposed to a emissions trading scheme, would be the best option with regards to establishing a South African carbon policy. This will ensure a fair playing field, as carbon tax liable entities would be held responsible to pay the same fixed price per ton of carbon that they emit. Coupling the carbon tax with a carbon offset mechanism, trading with carbon credits, will incentivise companies to invest in “greener” technologies and to emit fewer emissions. This dissertation revealed that international best practice in the carbon market sphere, still poses significant difficulties such as price volatility associated with carbon credits; validation and verification inconsistencies within the different carbon standards; and supply and demand fluctuations. These difficulties where highlighted in this dissertation and solutions relating to these difficulties were discussed. The time has come for South Africa to enter the carbon market sphere, whether it be through the introduction of a carbon tax or otherwise. This dissertation illustrates that the infrastructure and stakeholders associated to a South African carbon market needs to be developed. If, when and how the government will actually implement such a carbon market system, remains a question to be answered.

Transnational networks are growing in prevalence and importance as states, nongovernmental, and intergovernmental organizations seek to meet climate change goals; yet, the organizations in these networks struggle between the global, technical and local, contextual sources of power, authority, and knowledge used to influence decision-making and governance. This dissertation analyzes these contestations in Pacific Islands climate change diplomacy and governance efforts by asking: i) What do power relations look like among the Pacific Islands' networked organizations? ii) To what authority do organizations appeal to access sources of power? iii) What sources of knowledge are produced and reproduced by these organizations? and iv) How do these patterns fit within the broader history of the Pacific Islands and climate change? I draw from interviews, document analysis, event participation, and social network analysis of Pacific Island climate change diplomacy and governance. This examination leads me to propose the concept of "Climate Empire," which can be understood as the network of knowledge and communicative services that imagine, build, and administer the globe through a decentralized and deterritorialized apparatus of rule. In the Pacific Islands, Climate Empire upholds technical bureaucratic and scientific approaches to overcoming climate challenges; however, the global spaces in which these approaches are produced are reconnected with the spaces of local resistance through data collection networks and efforts to relocalize knowledge. Thus, the local/global divisions found in diplomacy and governance in the Pacific Islands collectively produce and reform Climate Empire as organizations interact in the network. Further research is necessary to understand the extensiveness of Climate Empire, as well as to ensure the inclusion and empowerment of Pacific Island voices in climate governance for both justice and efficacy.

This DPhil thesis discusses how two divergent risk conceptions, a 'social view' and an 'economic view' of risk, are constructed through inter-expert risk communication. Different and sometimes contradictory concepts of risk are mobilised in regulatory practice, but the origins of these divergent risk conceptions are not extensively studied. This thesis seeks to unpack this divergence. Empirically, I analyse risk communication among experts in the European Union (EU) during the creation of two risk regulation standards. The two case studies, one related to the development of the two-degree target of EU climate policies (the climate case) and the other about the negotiation of the excessive deficit criteria of the Maastricht Treaty (the euro case), can shed light on the relations between risk conceptions and inter-expert risk communication. I argue that through risk communication, an initial 'view' of risk can be entrenched and developed into a paradigmatic 'risk conception'. My analysis uses historical and sociological institutionalism, by focusing on path dependence of risk communication and social construction risk conceptions among EU experts. Through the two case studies, I identify four analytical dimensions of inter-expert risk communication: networks (the institutional setting and relationships between different experts), cultures (the mentalities of experts in relation to discussing risks), dynamics (the actual processes of transmitting and receiving risk messages) and strategies (the rationales supporting the decisions of risk regulation standards). My thematic analysis reveals four key distinct 'features' of social/economic views of risk: expertise (the types of knowledge mobilised), normality (characterising risk as either 'special' or 'routine'), probability (considering risk as either uncertain or calculable) and impact (seeing risk as either negative or positive). I argue that these four features can help explain the construction of risk conceptions, and more broadly, provide an analytical framework for studying how views of risk evolve and interact over time.

Two of the main challenges facing communities and governments in developing countries are the reduction of risks of hydro-meteorological hazards and adaptation to climate change. As climate variability and change impacts are becoming more visible in the form of disasters, and are negatively affecting climate sensitive livelihoods and eroding communities' ability to fully recover, leading to increased vulnerability to subsequent climate risks. The unpredictability of current weather systems, therefore, makes it very difficult for poor governments and households to deal with adverse impacts of climate change. Furthermore, the fragmented approach to DRR and CCA with regards to practice, policy and organisational frameworks for dealing with climate risks is resulting in coordination challenges for the government departments. This study aimed to explore how local households and communities perceive and are experiencing and coping with climate change and drought, and what that means for integrating hydro-meteorological disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation. The study was carried out in Chirumhanzu district and the methods used for data collection included: 217 household surveys; six focus group discussions; participatory learning actions methods; key informant's interviews and document review. The majority of households owned low value material assets and had low levels of livelihood capitals and this exposed them to the impacts of climate variability and successive droughts. This low adaptive capacity largely affected their ability to engage effective drought risk reduction and adaptation strategies for their livelihood activities in small-scale farming and livestock rearing. Vulnerability to climate risks was exacerbated by seasonal weather forecasts, which were deemed by some households to be unreliable, inaccurate and not easily understood, while others used of indigenous knowledge. Successive droughts affected households' access to food and cash income for other household demands. Other non-climatic factors that contributed to adverse drought impacts at the household level were an emphasis on reactive humanitarian aid approach and the poor economy in Zimbabwe. Additionally, the policy framework for dealing with climate change and drought hazards is fragmented and weak; and is housed in different government departments making it difficult to coordinate and implement. To improve climate risk management, there is need for the government to appreciate that drought risk reduction and climate change adaptation are all about reducing vulnerability. Understanding this, might assist in improving government focus on addressing the underlying causes of vulnerability and mainstreaming DRR and CCA into development processes through addressing specific and generic adaptive capacities. The thesis argues that as long as rural households are involved in climate sensitive livelihood activities and not getting meaningful intervention to diversity and/or better intensify their livelihood activities, they will continue to be vulnerable to successive climate risks. This fragmented approach to dealing with climate risks, is not yielding any successful results with regards to building resilience, risk reduction or adaptation of rural households.