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No description available.

No description available.

In the years after 1959 Britain's disengagement from her colonial Empire was comprehensive and rapid. A newly re-elected Conservative government, well aware that many special interests would suffer in the process, set out nevertheless to press the policy of decolonisation speedily to its end. This new tempo of policy was a natural enough response to the experiences of the preceding years. The decade and a half since the war had encompassed both the rise of articulate and aggressive colonial nationalism and a steep decline in Britain's own power in the world. What Macmillan and Macleod recognised, in essence, was that a point had been reached beyond which the continuation of the old gradualist tempo of devolution would precipitate more colonial unrest than Britain could hope to contain. Thus the period from the end of the war to the general election of 1959 appears in retrospect as the penultimate phase of Britain's colonial experience, spanning those events and movements of ideas in terms of which the hurried conclusion of the early sixties may be understood. This work attempts to discuss the domestic politics of colonial policy in the period. It is motivated not by any general belief that the approach to decolonisation is best studied from the domestic point of view, but simply by the hope of illuminating an area of the picture which, by comparison with the events in the colonies themselves, has remained in shadow. The study deals with the activities of the major political parties and certain pressure groups within that area of British political activity having the Colonial Office and Parliament as its focal points. It is organised around two broad questions. Firstly, how were colonial problems and issues dealt with in British politics; that is, what kinds of attitudes and activities were stimulated among parties and groups by the existence, and the changing character, of this area of British responsibility? Secondly, how far did domestic political activity affect the course of governmental policy?

Traditionally, François Bigot has been considered an interesting subject for historical investigation not only because he was important, having presided over Canada's civil administration at the time of the Conquest, and was attainted in a large criminal proceeding at the Châtelet in Paris; but owing to the voluminous testimony accumulated by the court, there is more evidence at the historian's disposal than for his predecessors. There is, however, every reason to doubt the court's objectivity. Although the court believed Bigot was only too typical of colonial administrators, historians have tended to exaggerate the intendant's crimes and to represent him as some strange atypical monster who single-handedly corrupted the administrative corps of the colony. Not only is this interpretation unsatisfactory since it begs the question of how it was possible for this 'monster' to perpetrate his crimes unmolested for over two decades, but by turning him into something unusual, vitiated the value of the materials as evidence for a more generalized picture of colonial administration. The questions which arise, therefore, relate not only to the 'intendant' as an individual but to the administrative corps of the Marine as a whole, and they are related. Who was Bigot? Where did he acquire his attitudes to work and responsibility? How did he view his own activities? What did his friends and family think of him? Questions about his early career would have been much easier to answer had any good secondary works on the Marine existed. Fortunately, access to the Gradis Papers has made it possible not only to reconstruct a cogent picture of 18th century administrative practice but has also imparted much about his family and trade interests. This thesis attempts to illuminate pre-Conquest Canada by tackling her administrators as persons rather than official functionaries, with the result that Bigot's actions are made intelligible in the context of his times.

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This study sets out to examine the development of British colonial policy towards West Africa between the years 1938 and 1947. It is primarily a study of the so-called 'official mind' of British colonialism because, as the sources indicate, the nationalists were mainly excluded from the review process. It has been decided to begin the thesis with the Colonial Secretaryship of Malcolm MacDonald. With the assistance of the West Indian Crisis, which propelled the colonial issue into the political arena in Britain, and Hailey's 'African Survey', which set out the deficiencies of British rule in Africa, MacDonald was supplied with the political lever and the requisite guidelines for him to successfully initiate a review of colonial policy in 1938. In particular MacDonald wished to see resolved the potential contradictions which existed in Britain's colonial policy. As he put it, "Important decisions may have to be taken in order to prevent Native Authorities on the one hand and Legislative Councils on the other from developing along divergent lines with undesirable results". This theme dominated the British West African policy review until 1947, by which time constitutions designed to effect such a harmony had either been implemented or announced.

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No abstract included. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate