Afrikaans text. / Public, Constitutional, & International / LLM

Thesis (LLD)--University of Stellenbosch, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The question that this dissertation addresses is which immaterial property interests may be recognised and protected under the constitutional property clause and if so, under which circumstances. The question originated in the First Certification case 1 where the court held that the constitutional property clause is wide enough to include property interests that require protection according to international norms. The traditional immaterial property interests or intellectual property rights (patents, copyright, designs and trademarks) are protected as property in private law on a sui generis basis. Since it is generally accepted that the property concept in constitutional law includes at least property rights protected in private law, it is relatively unproblematic to include intellectual property rights under the constitutional property clause. In Laugh It Off v SAB International,2 the Constitutional Court explicitly balanced the right to a trademark with the right to freedom of expression, which is accepted as authority that at least trademarks may be recognised and protected as constitutional property. The other intellectual property rights may most likely be recognised and protected by analogy. Foreign law as well as international law also indicates that intellectual property should be recognised and protected as constitutional property. However, there are other, unconventional immaterial property interests that are not protected as property in private law. Some are protected in private law, but not as property; others originate in public law; and yet others are not protected yet at all. In terms of the Constitution, South African courts may consider foreign law, but must consider international law. This dissertation determines when these interests may be protected as constitutional property by reference to foreign cases from German, American, Australian and Irish law; regional international law, namely European Union cases; and international law. The conclusion is that unconventional immaterial property interests may generally be protected if they are vested and acquired in terms of normal law, have patrimonial value and serve the general purpose of constitutional property protection. Property theories are also useful to determine when immaterial property interests deserve constitutional protection, although other theories may be more useful for some of the unconventional interests. The German scaling approach and the balancing of competing interests is a useful approach for South African courts to help determine the appropriate level of protection for specific immaterial property interests without excluding some at the outset. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die vraag waarmee hierdie verhandeling handel is of belange in immateriële goedere erken en beskerm kan word in terme van die grondwetlike eiendomsklousule en indien wel, onder watter omstandighede. Die vraag het sy ontstaan in die First Certification saak,3 waar die Grondwetlike Hof beslis het dat die eiendomsklousule se omvang wyd genoeg is om belange in eiendom in te sluit wat volgens internasionale norme beskerming verg. Sekere regte in immateriële goedere word op ’n sui generis basis in die privaatreg beskerm, naamlik die regte in tradisionele immaterieelgoederereg kategorieë of intellektuele eiendom (patente, kopiereg, ontwerpe en handelsmerke). Dit is 'n algemene beginsel van grondwetlike eiendomsreg dat die konsep van eiendom minstens belange insluit wat as eiendom in die privaatreg beskerm word. In Laugh It Off v SAB International4 het die Grondwetlike Hof 'n handelsmerkreg opgeweeg teen die reg op vryheid van uitdrukking en hierdeur implisiet erken dat minstens handelsmerke en dalk ook ander intellektuele eindemsregte deur die eiendomsklousule erken en beskerm kan word. Buitelandse reg sowel as internasionale reg dui aan dat intellektuele eiendom grondwetlike beskerming behoort te ontvang. Buiten hierdie belange is daar ook immaterieelgoederereg belange wat nie onder eiendomsreg beskerm word in die privaatreg nie. Sommige van hierdie belange word wel in die privaatreg beskerm, maar dan onder ander areas van die reg as eiendom; ander het hul oorsprong in die publiekreg; en die res word tans glad nie beskerm nie. Die Grondwet bepaal dat howe buitelandse reg in ag kan neem en dat hulle internasionale reg moet oorweeg. Die verhandeling se vraag word beantwoord met verwysing na sake uit die Duitse, Amerikaanse, Australiese en Ierse grondwetlike reg; streeks-internasionale reg van die Europese Unie; en internasionale reg. Die onkonvensionele immaterieelgoederereg belange kan oor die algemeen beskerm word as eiendom indien daar 'n gevestigde reg is, die reg in terme van gewone reg verkry is en die belang die algemene oogmerke van die grondwetlike klousule bevorder. Die teorieë oor die beskerming van eiendom is van nut om te bepaal watter belange beskerm kan word, alhoewel sekere onkonvensionele belange beter geregverdig kan word deur ander tipes teorieë. Die Duitse metode om belange op te weeg kan van besonderse nut wees vir Suid Afrikaanse howe om te bepaal watter vlak van beskerming spesifieke belange in immaterieelgoedere behoort te geniet.

This thesis deals with a very important issue in government, i.e. the process of procuring goods and services. The state is the biggest consumer of goods and services in South Africa and with the increasing privatisation of government services, the ambit of procurement is expanding.<br /> <br /> Government procurement is afforded constitutional status in South Africa. Section 217 of the Constitution provides that the state must contract for goods or services in a manner which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective. This does not prevent the state from using procurement as a policy instrument, i.e. to, for example, address past discriminatory policies and practices. Legislation must furthermore be enacted to make provision for the use of procurement as a policy tool.<br /> <br /> A number of statutes have been enacted to reflect the constitutional status of government procurement in South Africa. In addition to these statutes, government procurement decisions and procedures are regulated by the common law, in particular, the law of contract and the law of delict. The general rules of constitutional and administrative law also apply to government procurement.<br /> This thesis evaluates the way in which the legal regime in South Africa collectively gives effect to section 217 of the Constitution. First, the constitutional standard against which the elements of the legal regime can be measured is set out. In doing so, meaning is given to the different principles in section 217 (fairness, equity, transparency, competitiveness and cost-effectiveness) and attention is given to the legal nature of the principles and the relationship that exists between the different principles. The focus then shifts to how the principles are given effect to in legislation / how the courts give meaning to the different principles / whether there is compliance with the principles throughout the procurement process, i.e. from the time that the decision is made to procure goods or services until the conclusion of a contract and completion of contractual performances / and whether adequate provision is made for the effective enforcement of the principles in practice.<br /> <br /> It is argued that aside from a few shortcomings, the legal regime in South Africa generally gives adequate effect to section 217 of the Constitution. Not only has the procurement procedures and decisions of the state been constitutionalised, section 217 can be said to capture the most essential elements of a good procurement system. The principles of fairness, transparency and value for money, in particular, are generally regarded as the cornerstone of good procurement practices. The principles in section 217 will furthermore form part of South Africa&rsquo / s government procurement system for a very long period of time. The state will therefore always have to take serious account of the principles in section 217 and ensure compliance therewith.

Afrikaans text. / Public, Constitutional, and International / LLM

Text in Afrikaans / Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law / LLM

Thesis (LL.M.)--University of the Witwatersrand, Faculty of Law, 1998. / This thesis explores the democratic legitimacy of the power of judicial review. It discounts the countermajoritarian dilemma on the basis that constitutional democracy means more than majoritarianism, it entails judicial protection of other characteristics fundamental to democracy from invasion even by a majority government. Such characteristics include political processes and values which ensure the continuation of democratic rule. The Court may, however, be criticised if it exercises its power of judicial review in a manner which is undemocratic. I argue that the Court is obliged to exercise its power in a manner which respects the doctrine of separation of powers. In interpreting the Constitution, the Court is therefore obliged to show deference to Parliament by giving effect to the purpose of a constitutional provision. I conclude that the Court may only have recourse to the values which the legislature chose to include in the Constitution, except when the Court protects those political processes and values which ensure the survival of constitutional democracy.

This thesis deals with a very important issue in government, i.e. the process of procuring goods and services. The state is the biggest consumer of goods and services in South Africa and with the increasing privatisation of government services, the ambit of procurement is expanding.<br /> <br /> Government procurement is afforded constitutional status in South Africa. Section 217 of the Constitution provides that the state must contract for goods or services in a manner which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective. This does not prevent the state from using procurement as a policy instrument, i.e. to, for example, address past discriminatory policies and practices. Legislation must furthermore be enacted to make provision for the use of procurement as a policy tool.<br /> <br /> A number of statutes have been enacted to reflect the constitutional status of government procurement in South Africa. In addition to these statutes, government procurement decisions and procedures are regulated by the common law, in particular, the law of contract and the law of delict. The general rules of constitutional and administrative law also apply to government procurement.<br /> This thesis evaluates the way in which the legal regime in South Africa collectively gives effect to section 217 of the Constitution. First, the constitutional standard against which the elements of the legal regime can be measured is set out. In doing so, meaning is given to the different principles in section 217 (fairness, equity, transparency, competitiveness and cost-effectiveness) and attention is given to the legal nature of the principles and the relationship that exists between the different principles. The focus then shifts to how the principles are given effect to in legislation / how the courts give meaning to the different principles / whether there is compliance with the principles throughout the procurement process, i.e. from the time that the decision is made to procure goods or services until the conclusion of a contract and completion of contractual performances / and whether adequate provision is made for the effective enforcement of the principles in practice.<br /> <br /> It is argued that aside from a few shortcomings, the legal regime in South Africa generally gives adequate effect to section 217 of the Constitution. Not only has the procurement procedures and decisions of the state been constitutionalised, section 217 can be said to capture the most essential elements of a good procurement system. The principles of fairness, transparency and value for money, in particular, are generally regarded as the cornerstone of good procurement practices. The principles in section 217 will furthermore form part of South Africa&rsquo / s government procurement system for a very long period of time. The state will therefore always have to take serious account of the principles in section 217 and ensure compliance therewith.

No description available.

This study analyzes the rule of the law of treaties permitting the provisional application of treaties or parts thereof, which usually occurs between signature and ratification (article 25 of the 1969 Vienna Convention). Chapter 1 reviews the negotiating record of article 25. Chapter 2 examines the reasons for provisional application, which include the urgency of the treaty and preparation for a new international organization. Chapter 3 considers article 25 in detail, while chapter 4 explores provisional application under customary international law, including the origins of the custom. The constitutionality of provisional application and the municipal effect of provisionally applied treaties are examined in chapter 5, along with provisional application in South African law and treaty practice. Chapter 6 considers the special role of provisional application in the field of arms control instruments. The main conclusion reached is that the principle of pacta sunt servanda applies during the provisional period. / Jurisprudence / LL.M

Text in Afrikaans / In this thesis, the place and role of incorporeal things in the new South African law of things are examined. In the Roman law and Germanic customary law not only physical but also incorporeal objects, including rights, were regarded as things. In the early South African law of property (the period until 1950) a wide interpretation was given to the concept "thing". Consequently, things were said to denote either corporeal or incorporeal objects, as was the position in Roman and Roman-Dutch law. The recognition of incorporeal things suffered a setback during the fifties with the reception of the theories of the Pandectists in the South African law of things. The reception of the Pandectists theories can in all probability be attributed to writers such as WA Joubert and CG Van der Merwe. These writers gives preference to a narrow thing concept which only includes corporeal things and can be related to a certain interpretation of the doctrine of private law (subjective) rights which they adhere to. Incorporeal things are merely considered as exceptions. However, this narrow interpretation of things, are not generally accepted as correct. Several academics and the South African legal practice acknowledge a wider and more pragmatic concept of things which includes incorporeal things. Even before South Africa's new constitutional dispensation, pressure were exercised to extend the private law concept of things, despite the resistance of Joubert and Van der Merwe against the acknowledgement of incorporeal things. Creative legislation were introduced in 1971 which extended the concept of things by creating new land use rights. Within the context of the protection of land rights, a functional division of ownership is required in order to overcome the conflict between individual rights and public interests. The fragmentation of land rights provide the greatest possible number of people with the widest possible chance of access to land, and where necessary ad hoc legislation should be introduced to provide suitable security of tenure. Needs and problems regarding land reform were also addressed through legislation by recognizing different rights in land. By doing so, further pressure was placed on the narrow thing concept. Against this background, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 started a new era for the South African private law. It is within this context that the relationship between private and public law comes to the fore. The Constitution offers the possibility of a wide interpretation of the public law concept of things. Our courts has already confirmed that the constitutional meaning of property is wider than the private law concept of property and that constitutional property is not limited to corporeal things. The application of the new constitutional dispensation on specific areas such as new property, labour related rights and intellectual property must be considered in light of the fact that the thing concept differs in the private law and public law. These constitutional developments can only sometimes be seen as an extension of the narrow thing concept. The implication is that incorporeal objects and rights can therefore be accommodated either within the existing private law paradigm, or within the wider constitutional paradigm. It is also argued that in certain circumstances ad hoc legislation should be introduced to provide the required security and protection. An analysis of the literature indicates that this is the preferable approach, rather than the dogmatic view that incorporeal things, in the form of other rights, are not considered as things. The new public law thing concept will have no influence on the further development of the private law in certain cases, but in combination with the existing theoretical and practical pressures to adopt a wider thing concept, the narrow private law approach could be given the final death-blow. / In hierdie verhandeling word die plek en rol van onstoflike sake binne die nuwe Suid-Afrikaanse sakereg ondersoek. In die Romeinse reg en Germaanse gemenereg is nie net stoflike nie maar ook onstoflike objekte, insluitende regte, as sake beskou. In die vroee Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsreg (die tydperk tot 1950) is daar 'n wye interpretasie aan die begrip "saak" geheg. Daar is gevolglik verklaar dat sowel stoflike as onstoflike objekte sake is, soortgelyk aan die posisie in die Romeinse en Romeinse-Hollandse reg. Die erkenning van onstoflike sake het 'n terugslag beleef gedurende die vyftiger jare met die resepsie van die Pandektiste se teoriee in die Suid-Afrikaanse sakereg. Die resepsie van die Pandektisme kan waarskynlik toegeskryf word aan skrywers soos WA Joubert en CG Van der Merwe. Hierdie skrywers verkies 'n enger omskrywing van die saakbegrip wat slegs stoflike sake insluit, in navolging van 'n bepaalde interpretasie van die leerstuk van subjektiewe regte. Onstoflike sake word bloot as uitsonderings verklaar. Hierdie eng interpretasie wat aan die saakbegrip geheg word, word egter nie algemeen as korrek aanvaar nie. Verskeie akademici en die Suid-Afrikaanse regspraktyk erken 'n wyer en meer pragmatiese saakbegrip wat onstoflike sake insluit. Desondanks Joubert en Van der Merwe se weerstand teen die erkenning van onstoflike sake, is daar reeds voor Suid-Afrika se nuwe konstitusionele bedeling druk uitgeoefen om die privaatregtelike saakbegrip uit te brei. Kreatiewe wetgewing het in 1971 die lig gesien wat die privaatregtelik saakbegrip uitgebrei het deur die skepping van nuwe grondgebruiksregte. In die konteks van die beskerming van grondregte word 'n funksionele verdeling van eiendomsreg vereis ten einde die konflik tussen individuele regte en die openbare belang te oorkom. Die fragmentasie van grondregte bied aan die grootste moontlike aantal mense die wydste moontlike geleentheid om toegang tot grand te verkry. Behoeftes en probleme ten aansien van grondhervorming is oak by wyse van wetgewing aangespreek deur die erkenning van verskillende regte in grand. Sodoende is verdere druk op die eng saakbegrip geplaas. Teen hierdie agtergrond het die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 108 van 1996 'n nuwe era in die Suid-Afrikaanse privaatregtelike sakereg ingelui. Binne hierdie konteks staan die verhouding tussen die privaat- en publiekregtelike saakbegrip op die voorgrond. Die Grondwet skep die moontlikheid om 'n wyer interpretasie aan die publiekregtelike saakbegrip te heg. Ons howe het reeds bevestig dat die konstitusionele betekenis van eiendom wyer is as die privaatregtelike eiendomskonsep en dat eiendom as 'n konstitusionele reg nie beperk word tot stoflike sake nie. Die nuwe konstitusionele bedeling se toepassing op spesifieke velde soos new property, arbeidsverwante regte en intellektuele goedereregte moet beoordeel word met inagneming van die feit dat die saakbegrip in die privaat- en publiekreg van mekaar verskil. Hierdie konstitusionele ontwikkelings kan soms as uitbreidings van die eng saakbegrip gesien word en soms nie. Die implikasie hiervan is dat onstoflike sake en regte of binne die bestaande privaatregparadigma of binne 'n wyer konstitusionele paradigma verklaar kan word. Daarword ook geargumenteer dat ad hoc wetgewing in sekere gevalle uitgevaardig moet word ten einde die nodige sekerheid en beskerming te verleen. 'n Analise van die literatuur dui daarop dat hierdie 'n lofwaardige benadering is, wat verkies moet word bo die dogmatiese siening dat onstoflike sake, in die gedaante van ander regte, nie as sake beskou kan word nie. In sommige gevalle sal die nuwe publiekregtelike saakbegrip geen invloed op die verdere ontwikkeling van die privaatreg uitoefen nie, maar in kombinasie met die reeds bestaande teoretiese en praktiese druk om 'n wyer saakbegrip te aanvaar kan dit die eng privaatregtelike benadering 'n finale nekslag toedien. / Private Law / LL.D.