Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:26:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Grace Cristhine de Oliveira Gosson.pdf: 754938 bytes, checksum: b812578ac5a54f3e836811b3c695d259 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-10-26 / The purpose of the present work is offering a study about the application of the binding new abridgment to the federal tributary administrative process. In order to reach such desideratum, we have initially traced the adopted reference system and we have also delimited the research object, developing the fundamental premises, significantly, the notions about knowledge, language, law and juridical rule and system, all of them viewed by the light of the juridical constructivist and by the law analytical theory optics. Afterwards, we have done a confront of the binding effect of the juridical decisions within the law systems of the common law and the civil law, indicating their characteristics and the exertion of the theory of the judicial precedent. Here it has been emphasized the juridical structure of systems like the English and the North American ones, in order to give better explicitness to the application of the stare decisis theory. We have been to several juridical ordainments, showing how to proceed according to the jurisprudential standardization. This compared law study has revealed itself relevant to us to visualize how the entrance of the binding effect has been operated in the brazilian juridical system and, for consequence, face the multiple problems related to the aplication of the binding abridgment to the administrative process. These questions overcome, we have treated the binding effect within the Brazilian system and its relation to the constitutionality control of the normative acts and rules, explaining to which institutes the binding effect is conceded, being analyzed the binding abridgment ingress through the Constitutional Emendation n. 45/2004. In the sequence, we have fragmentized the binding abridgment according to its normative structure, the diverse definitions used related to the expression as well as the juridical medicine in case of disobeying. At the end of that exposition, we have examined the application of the binding abridgment to the federal tributary administrative process and the resulting consequences of this application in the diverse processual phases (introductive, instructive, decisive and appealing). Finally, it has been offered a summary of the conclusions of the study / A proposta da presente dissertação é oferecer um estudo sobre a aplicação da novel súmula vinculante ao processo administrativo tributário federal. Para alcançar tal desiderato, traçamos, inicialmente, o sistema de referência adotado e delimitamos o objeto da pesquisa, desenvolvendo as premissas fundamentais, notadamente as noções de conhecimento, de linguagem, de direito, de norma jurídica e de sistema jurídico, vistas sob a ótica do construtivismo jurídico e da teoria analítica do direito. Em seguida, fizemos um cotejo do efeito vinculante das decisões judiciais nos sistemas jurídicos da common law e do civil law, indicando as suas características e o emprego da teoria do precedente judicial. Aqui, se enfatizou a estrutura judicial de sistemas como o inglês e o norte-americano, para dar maior clareza à aplicação da teoria do stare decisis. Passeamos por vários ordenamentos jurídicos, apontando como se procede à uniformização jurisprudencial. Esse estudo de direito comparado mostrou-se relevante para visualizar como se operou a entrada do efeito vinculante no sistema jurídico pátrio, e, por conseqüência, enfrentar os múltiplos problemas relacionados à aplicação da súmula vinculante ao processo administrativo. Superadas essas questões, tratamos do efeito vinculante no sistema brasileiro e sua relação com o controle de constitucionalidade de leis e atos normativos, explicando a que institutos ele é empregado, tendo analisado o ingresso da súmula vinculante por intermédio da Emenda Constitucional 45/2004. Na seqüência, esmiuçamos a súmula vinculante quanto à sua estrutura normativa, às diversas acepções empregadas à expressão, bem como ao remédio jurídico em caso de descumprimento. Ao cabo dessa exposição, examinamos a aplicação da súmula vinculante ao processo administrativo tributário federal e as conseqüências resultantes dessa aplicação nas diversas fases processuais (introdutória, instrutória, decisória e recursal). Finalmente, se oferece uma suma das conclusões do estudo

Les questions préjudicielles interrogent l’office du juge administratif qui les formule.Accessoires du procès au principal, elles pourraient être considérées comme des questions annexes etsecondaires. Cette étude de contentieux administratif, fondée sur l’analyse systématique de lajurisprudence administrative, vise à démontrer le contraire. Remarquables tant par leur variété que parleurs incidences sur le procès, les questions préjudicielles restent souvent perçues comme descomplications de procédure inutiles visant à retarder la résolution du litige. Cette étude prend le partid’expliciter comment le juge administratif au principal en vient à construire une question préjudicielle,et quel en est le fondement juridique. De ce point de vue, si les parties au litige jouent bien souvent unrôle essentiel dans le relevé d’une exception, c’est en dernière analyse, le juge au principal qui détientle pouvoir de formulation de la question. Par ailleurs, la mise en oeuvre des questions préjudicielles,traditionnellement présentée comme paralysant l’office du juge, apparaît sous un nouveau jour. Loind’immobiliser l’office du juge au principal, l’étude minutieuse du droit positif révèle les importantspouvoirs que possède encore le juge a quo dans la maîtrise du procès dont il est compétemment saisi.Enfin, la réception par le juge a quo de la décision préjudicielle correspond à un partage de lasouveraineté juridictionnelle impliquant l’édiction d’un acte juridictionnel issu d’un processus decodécision. Cette étude livre un éclairage sur le fonctionnement et la complexité d’un mécanisme icitraité sous l’angle de l’office du juge lorsqu’il se place en situation de juge a quo. Elle permetégalement d’envisager les principales problématiques juridiques relatives à la fonction juridictionnelle. / Preliminary issues challenge the role of the administrative law judge who formulates them.They are regarded as being accessory to the principle case at bar. They may even be perceived assecondary issues. This study of administrative litigation, based on a systematic analysis ofadministrative case law, aims to establish the opposite. Preliminary issues are characterized by theirdiversity as well as by their influence on the lawsuit, however, they are often perceived as useless andcumbersome procedural complications aiming to delay the resolution of the dispute. This study aimsto explicit the process by which the administrative law judge builds a preliminary issue and what is thelegal foundation of such an issue. From this angle, albeit the fact that the parties to the main disputeplay an essential role, it is the judge, who mainly retains the power to formulate the preliminary issue.This analysis challenges the traditional portrayal of preliminary issues as paralyzing the judicial“office”. To the contrary, far from immobilizing the “office of the judge”, an in depth study of positivelaw reveals the extensive powers that the judge a quo possesses with regards to the case at bar.Finally, the reception by the judge a quo of the preliminary ruling corresponds to a sharing of juridicalsovereignty implying the passing of a juridical act emanating from a process of co-decision. Thisstudy aims to shed light on the functioning and the complexity of a mechanism rarely examined fromthis angle. This study equally allows for an exploration of the main legal issues relating to the judicialfunction and the “Office” of the administrative law judge when placed in the situation of judge a quo.

Submitted by Ana Valéria de Jesus Moura (anavaleria_131@hotmail.com) on 2018-05-30T15:33:16Z No. of bitstreams: 1 ANA CONCEIÇÃO BARBUDA SANCHES GUIMARÃES FERREIRA.pdf: 6225011 bytes, checksum: 14a0290c3aeb54a346421970e5a467ee (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ana Valéria de Jesus Moura (anavaleria_131@hotmail.com) on 2018-05-30T15:34:13Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 ANA CONCEIÇÃO BARBUDA SANCHES GUIMARÃES FERREIRA.pdf: 6225011 bytes, checksum: 14a0290c3aeb54a346421970e5a467ee (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-05-30T15:34:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ANA CONCEIÇÃO BARBUDA SANCHES GUIMARÃES FERREIRA.pdf: 6225011 bytes, checksum: 14a0290c3aeb54a346421970e5a467ee (MD5) / Com esta pesquisa, pretendeu-se demonstrar para o sistema de justiça brasileiro a importância de se adotar a Teoria da Transcendência dos Motivos Determinantes nas decisões proferidas pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal, no controle concentrado de Constitucionalidade. Isso se faz a partir da articulação com o Direito dos Animais e da análise de julgados da Magna Corte de Justiça sobre o tema da tutela de proteção aos animais não-humanos. As decisões definitivas de mérito proferidas pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal, nas ações diretas de inconstitucionalidade, produzem efeitos erga omnes e vinculante, retirando do ordenamento jurídico o ato normativo ou lei incompatível com a Constituição (art. 102, §2º da CF). Contudo, tais efeitos abrangem somente o dispositivo da sentença. O STF declarou a inconstitucionalidade da estadual Lei nº 15.299/2013 que regulamentava a atividade da “vaquejada” como prática desportiva e cultura, mas os limites objetivos desta declaração somente vincularam tão somente ao Estado do Ceará, uma vez que não são reconhecidos os efeitos transcendentais desta decisão. No caso em tela, o Direito Fundamental de Proteção ao Meio Ambiente (artigo 225 da Constituição Federal) sobrepõe-se aos valores culturais da atividade desportiva, diante da crueldade intrínseca aplicada aos animais na vaquejada. Este fundamento foi o motivo determinante para o deslinde de mérito da causa. Contudo, o STF não vem reconhecendo a extensão do efeito vinculante de que são dotadas suas decisões em controle concentrado de constitucionalidade. Argumenta-se sobre a fragilidade da configuração do STF como corte constitucional em razão especialmente das matérias variadas de sua competência e forma de constituição. Ao lado destes impasses, outro se insurge, relativamente a Emenda Constitucional 96/2017, que acresceu novo inciso ao art. 225, §1º, da Constituição Federal, no ensejo de não serem considerados cruéis as práticas desportivas que utilizem animais, desde que sejam manifestações culturais. Demonstra-se que a superação legislativa ofende direito fundamental, apresentando-se como inconstitucional, em razão da prescrição contida no artigo 60, § 4º, da CF. Examina-se, ainda, a importância da consolidação do microssistema de precedentes judiciais gestado pelo novo Código de Processo Civil, que oportuniza um diálogo entre as fontes contidas no Civil Law, Common Law, Stare Decisis, sinalizando que a aplicação pelo STF da Teoria da Transcendência dos motivos determinantes pode contribuir e promover a consolidação dos princípios da segurança e coerência jurídica, primados dos Direitos Fundamentais, no qual se insere o Brasil. / The present research demonstrates the importance for the Brazilian justice system in adopting the Theory of Transcendence of Determining Motives in the decisions handed down by the Federal Supreme Court, in the concentrated control of Constitutionality and it happens from the articulation with the Law of the Animals and the analysis of Judged by the Magna Court on the protection of non-human animals. The final decisions of merit rendered by the Federal Supreme Court in the direct actions of unconstitutionality produce erga omnes and binding effects, removing from the legal system the normative act or law incompatible with the Constitution (article 102, § 2 of the CF). However, such effects cover only the sentence device. The STF declared the unconstitutionality of state law number. 15,299 / 2013, which regulated the activity of the "vaquejada" as sports practice and culture, but the objective limits of this statement were only binding on the State of Ceará, because the transcendental effects of this decision are not recognized. In the present case, the Fundamental Right to protect the environment (Article 225 of the Federal Constitution) overlaps with the cultural values of sporting activity, given the intrinsic cruelty applied to animals in the “vaquejada”. This plea was the determining factor for the merits of the case, but the Supreme Court has not been acknowledging the extent of the binding effect of its decisions on concentrated constitutionality control. It argues about the fragility of the configuration of the STF as a constitutional court due in particular to the varied matters of its competence and form of constitution. Beside these impasses, another problem appears, regarding Constitutional Amendment 96/2017, which added a new subsection to art. 225, paragraph 1, of the Federal Constitution, in the event that sporting practices that use animals are not considered cruel, provided that they are cultural manifestations. It demonstrated that the overcoming of legislation offends fundamental right, presenting itself as unconstitutional, due to the prescription contained in article 60, § 4, of the CF. It also examines the importance of consolidating of the judicial precedents micro-system established by the new Code of Civil Procedure, which provides a dialogue between the sources contained in the Civil Law, Common Law, Stare Decisis, indicating that the STF’ s application of Transcendence of the determinant motives can contribute and promote the consolidation of the principles of security and legal coherence, primacy of Fundamental Rights, in which Brazil is inserted.

Submitted by Danilo Valença Hernandes Vila (danilovhv@yahoo.com.br) on 2018-05-08T23:42:45Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_versão_final.pdf: 1192731 bytes, checksum: 7477c22036ef1b94b0fcd1bded38d99c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Pamela Beltran Tonsa (pamela.tonsa@fgv.br) on 2018-05-09T22:24:39Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_versão_final.pdf: 1192731 bytes, checksum: 7477c22036ef1b94b0fcd1bded38d99c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzane Guimarães (suzane.guimaraes@fgv.br) on 2018-05-10T12:49:15Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_versão_final.pdf: 1192731 bytes, checksum: 7477c22036ef1b94b0fcd1bded38d99c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-05-10T12:49:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_versão_final.pdf: 1192731 bytes, checksum: 7477c22036ef1b94b0fcd1bded38d99c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-03-28 / Esta dissertação tem como objetivo estudar o controle concreto de constitucionalidade dos processos de crime comum contra prefeitos, definidos pelo art. 1º do Decreto-Lei 201/67, julgados pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal desde 1968 até 2016. Para tal, examinamos a literatura sobre o DL 201 e Poder Judiciário nas áreas do direito, ciência política e administração pública. Coletamos do site do Supremo 190 casos de recursos, inquéritos e ações penais originárias referentes ao art.1º do DL 201. Os processos foram lidos e extraímos informações para montagem de uma base de dados que nos permitisse analisar o processo de judicialização desse instrumento jurídico. Nosso achado é que, em via de controle concreto como recurso somado a uma decisão precedente de ação penal originária do DL 201, entre 1971 e 1987, ocorreu uma judicialização do tipo arbitragem de interesses em conflito, criando uma jurisprudência sobre o DL 201 com força vinculante sobre a primeira instância, para 'salvar' os prefeitos de um suposto uso politizado desse Decreto-Lei em nível local. A partir de 2003, em controle concreto de ação penal originária, não constatamos força vinculante para o Supremo nem para instâncias inferiores. Ao assumir cargos de deputado federal e fazer o processo subir ao Supremo, os ex-prefeitos praticam uma judicialização como tática de oposição, que tem como conseqüência grande número de prescrições e arquivamentos desses processos, um aumento de decisões majoritárias dos órgãos colegiados e queda da correlação entre voto do relator e resultado do julgamento. / This dissertation aims to study the concrete control of constitutionality of common crime proceedings against mayors defined by art. 1 of Decree-Law 201/67, judged in the Federal Supreme Court from 1968 to 2016. To this end, we have examined the literature on DL 201 and Judiciary in the areas of law, political science and public administration. We collected from the Supreme's website 190 cases of appeals, inquiries and criminal prosecutions referring to DL 201’s article 1. The cases were read and we extracted information to set up a database that would allow us to analyze the judicial process of this legal instrument. Our finding is that, through concrete control as a resource, added to a previous decision of criminal action originating in DL 201, between 1971 and 1987, there was a judicialization of the type of arbitration of conflicting interests, creating a jurisprudence on DL 201 with binding force on the lower courts to 'save' the mayors from an alleged politicized use of this Decree at the local level. As of 2003, in concrete control of the originating criminal action, we did not find a binding force either for the Supreme Court or for lower instances. In assuming positions of federal deputy, and bringing the process rise to the Supreme, the former mayors pratice a judicialization as a tactic of opposition, which has as consequence a great number of prescriptions and fillings of these actions, an increase of majority decisions of the collegiate organs and fall of correlation between the rapporteur's vote and the outcome of the trial.

Cette thèse met en lumière l’apport considérable du juge constitutionnel de la 5ème République nigérienne, dans l’œuvre de la protection audacieuse du principe de la suprématie de la Constitution (du 09 août 1999). L’exposition du schéma organisationnel de la justice constitutionnelle s’opère sans préjudice du nécessaire rappel de l’histoire socio-politique mouvementée du Niger, qui n’est pas étrangère dans l’originalité qui fonde le modèle nigérien. L’évocation de l’activité constitutionnelle va s’atteler à la mise en évidence des grandes décisions de la Cour, aussi bien dans le cadre de la défense des droits fondamentaux garantis, que celui de la régulation constitutionnelle du fonctionnement des institutions de la République. La jurisprudence relative au Président de la République, qui bénéficie d’un chapitre entier est au cœur de la problématique de la consolidation de la démocratisation du Niger post-Conférence nationale de 1991. L’étude fait ressortir une trajectoire d’analyse ambivalente. D’une part, la ré-fondation de la justice constitutionnelle par la consécration d’une juridiction spécialisée et indépendante, a eu pour effet de plonger le Niger dans l’ère de la démocratie constitutionnelle. D’autre part, l’audace du juge constitutionnel s’est avérée insuffisante, face à la dérive autoritaire du Président de la République de l’été 2009 (dissolution de la Cour). Il n’en demeure pas moins que, le constitutionnalisme démocratique ébauché sous la 5ème République semble bien demeurer la révolution appropriée de lutte contre toute résurgence autoritaire. / This dissertation highlights the considerable contribution of the constitutional judge of the 5th Republic of Niger, in the audacious protection work of the supremacy of the Constitution principle (the 9th of August, 1999). The presentation of the organizational structure of constitutional law requires taking into account Niger’s sociopolitical history, which has contributed to the model of constitutional justice of Niger. The evocation of constitutional activity underlines the major decisions of the Court, regarding the defense of the guaranteed basic rights as well as the constitutional regulation of the functioning of the Republic's institutions. An entire chapter is dedicated to the case law regarding the President of the Republic, which has been in the center of the issue of strengthening the democratization of Niger since the National Conference of 1991. The research results in the ambivalent analysis. On the one hand, the re-foundation of the constitutional justice through the institution of a specialized and independent jurisdiction marked Niger's entry into an era of constitutional democracy. On the other hand, the constitutional judge audacity has proved deficient facing the authoritarian trend of the President of the Republic in 2009 (dissolution of the Court). Nonetheless, the democratic constitutionalism designed under the 5th Republic of Niger seems to remain an appropriate revolution to fight against any authoritarian resurgence.

[pt] O presente trabalho investiga a constitucionalização, validade e facticidade do direito dos quilombos no Brasil com fundamento na ética do discurso de Habermas. A partir de casos concretos se tentou demonstrar a força da etnicidade na definição do direito dos quilombos, bem como o modo como as instituições jurídicas e políticas atuam na dinâmica de conflito em torno destes direitos. Buscou-se analisar o discurso parlamentar, judicial, do Ministério Público, agentes do mercado, da burocracia e do saber antropológicos na operação da dinâmica em torno da aplicação dos direitos étnicos e territoriais das comunidades negras rurais remanescentes de quilombos. Observa-se do ponto de vista sociológico o controle de constitucionalidade abstrato e concreto e a judicialização das relações étnicas no campo específico dos quilombos. Faz-se também análise dos discursos especializados no campo do direito, da antropologia e da historiografia em torno do Art. 68 do Ato das Disposições Constitucionais Transitórias – ADCT da Carta Constitucional de 1988. / [en] This paper investigates the constitutionalization, validity and factuality of the rights of Quilombos in Brazil basis it on the ethical Habermas s speech. From concrete cases it was tried to demonstrate the strength of the ethnicity in defining the right of Quilombos, and how the legal and political institutions work in the dynamics of conflict around these rights. It was sought to analyze the speech of Parliamentary, Judicial, Prosecution, Market Agents, Bureaucracy Agents and the Anthropological knowladge on the dynamics of the operation around the application of ethnic and territorial rigths of the remaining rural black communities of quilombos. From the sociological point of view the constitutional control abstract and concrete and the legalization of ethnic relations in the specific field of quilombos. It is also analyse specialized discourses in the field of Law, Anthropology and Historiography around the article 68 of the Constitutional Provisions - ADCT of the Constitutional Charter of 1988.

Primauté absolue du droit de l’UE ou suprématie des dispositions constitutionnelles ? Consacrée à l’analyse des conflits nés ou à naître entre normes constitutionnelle et celles du droit de l’UE, cette étude doctorale s’est focalisée sur l’analyse du lien entre les termes primauté et recours pour relever que dans ce genre de litiges contentieux un syllogisme juridique inédit est appliqué. Il s’agit de celui qui préserve cumulativement le critère hiérarchique caractérisant les ordres juridiques internes des États membres, à son sommet le principe de suprématie des dispositions constitutionnelles sur toutes les autres et l’application effective de la primauté matérielle du droit de l’Union ; les évolutions récentes du droit interne de l’UE convergent toutes dans ce sens : dans le cadre d’un litige contentieux, la primauté n’est plus une problématique de légalité constitutionnelle, le conflit est contourné. En la matière, les débats sur l’autorité et la force du droit international classique sur le droit constitutionnel ne se pose plus. Il a été séparé entre la force et l’effet des traités du droit international de l’Union. Pourtant sur le plan des principes, même au sein d’un État fédéral, le contenu définitionnel et surtout le maniement du texte constitutionnel n’ont pas été revisités ; la Constitution est le fondement sans être le contenu de validité de la primauté du droit de l’Union, le texte suprême opère en tant que technique de renvoi, il cadre deux types de champs en fonction du critère de l’objet du litige contentieux. Suprématie et primauté sont deux principes de nature juridique différente qui ne s’affrontent pas. La prévalence de la primauté matérielle du droit de l’Union n’affecte nullement la suprématie au sommet de la hiérarchie pyramidale des normes de chacun des États adhérents. / Absolute primacy of Community law or supremacy of constitutional provisions ? Devoted to the analysis of the conflicts born or to be born between EU law and constitutional standards, this doctoral study focused on analysis of the link between the terms of primacy or preemption rule and jurisdictional actions to raise that in this kind of litigation disputes a unreported legal syllogism is applied. It's one that cumulatively preserves the hierarchical criterion characterizing the domestic legal systems of the Member States, at its peak the principle of supremacy of the Constitution over all others and the effective application of the material primacy of Union law ; recent developments in internal law of the Union converge in this sense : in a dispute litigation, primacy is no longer a problem of constitutional legality, the conflict is circumvent. Concerning this matter, the debate on the authority and the force of traditional international law on constitutional law no longer arises. It has been separated between the force and the effect of the treaties of international law of the Union. Yet in terms of principles, even within a federal State, the definitional content and especially the handling of the constitutional text have not been revisited ; the Constitution is the legal basis without being the content validity of the primacy of Union law, the supreme text operates as a reference technique, it fits two types of fields based on the criterion of the contentious issue. Supremacy and rule are two different legal nature principles which do not compete. The prevalence of the material primacy of Union law sets no supremacy at the top of the pyramidal hierarchy of standards of each of the acceding States.

Dans la plupart des disciplines juridiques, le motif légitime se présente comme un standard de justification des actes. Il fait obstacle à l’application de la norme, en fondant un droit ou en exonérant d’un devoir. Le droit pénal se montre réticent à l’endroit de cette notion floue qui connaît pourtant un essor sans précédent. Afin de justifier la marge d’appréciation laissée au juge, le motif légitime est généralement conçu comme un mobile, ce qui accentue la confusion entre les causes objectives et subjectives d’irresponsabilité. L’insuffisance de l’approche formelle du mécanisme justificatif explique sa subjectivation progressive. L’analyse du motif légitime suppose de revisiter la théorie de la justification à travers une conception substantielle de l’illicéité, apte à unifier son régime. L’étude de la finalité justificative du motif légitime permet de mieux comprendre la souplesse de ses conditions de mise en œuvre. Le motif légitime renverse la présomption d’illicéité fondant la responsabilité. Le jugement de valeur porté sur l’infraction est la raison d’être du reproche social. Elle se distingue de son attribution à l’auteur qui relève d’un jugement de réalité sur sa volonté. Le motif légitime procède des circonstances extérieures à l’infraction autorisant la vérification concrète de son illicéité. La nature objective du motif légitime est conforme à son effet exonératoire de responsabilité opérant in rem et non in personam. Ses conditions d’application semblent, en revanche, doublement dérogatoires au droit commun de la justification, tant à l’égard de ses critères larges que de son domaine étroit. Il est cantonné à des infractions de risque abstrait pour des valeurs secondaires dont la présomption d’illicéité est artificielle. Le prévenu doit rapporter la preuve de la légitimité concrète de son acte, alors que la légitimité abstraite de la répression est sujette à caution. L’expansion de ce domaine dérogatoire de la répression révèle l’insuffisant contrôle de sa nécessité abstraite. En tout état de cause, la mention spéciale du motif légitime est inutile car toute infraction en fait implicitement réserve, en sorte qu’il se conçoit comme un standard général de justification. Il confère au juge la libre appréciation de la nécessité concrète de la répression, au regard du contexte de chaque espèce qui échappe par nature à la loi ne pouvant régler a priori tous les conflits de valeurs. La justification a postériori des infractions socialement nécessaires ou insignifiantes renforce l’autorité de la loi en garantissant une application conforme à sa finalité de protection des valeurs. / In many legal disciplines, the legitimate reason is a model of justification of acts. The legitimate reason prevents the enforcement of the law, either by creating a right or by exempting someone from a duty. Despite an unprecedented boom, criminal law is hesitant about this vague notion. In order to justify judges' assessment margin, the legitimate reason is commonly considered as a motive. This accentuates the confusion between objective and subjective causes of irresponsibility. The formal approach of the justificatory process is inadequate, making the process increasingly biased. The analysis of the legitimate reason requires a re-examination of the justification theory using a solid understanding of unlawfulness which can help standardize its implementation. The study of the legitimate reason’s justificatory function allows a better understanding of the flexibility of its implementation requirements. The legitimate reason reverses the presumption of unlawfulness on which liability is based. The cause of liability is conditioned by the value judgment made about the offence, whereas the judgment of the reality of the offender’s intention is the condition of his imputation. The legitimate reason stems from circumstances that are external to the offence, and which enable the review of its lawfulness. The objective nature of the legitimate reason is aligned with the fact that it exempts from liability in rem and not in personam. However, the requirements for its application seem exceptional to the common law of justification in two regards: its broad criteria and its narrow field. It is limited to offences of abstract risk that protect secondary values for which the presumption of unlawfulness is artificial. The defendant must prove the legitimacy of his act whereas the abstract legitimacy of the suppression is unconfirmed. The expansion of this dispensatory field of suppression reveals an inadequate control of its abstract necessity. In any case, bringing up legitimate reason is useless as it is implicit to any offence and is considered as a general model of justification. It leaves the judge free to assess the necessity of the penalty on a case by case basis, as the law, by nature, cannot resolve all value conflicts. The post facto justification of socially necessary offences or even trivial offences reinforces the authority of the law by ensuring an enforcement that is aligned with the law's aim of protecting values.

The movement of people from county to country brought about an increase in international marriages. However, South African private international law rules with regard to the proprietary consequences of marriage are not on par with their foreign counterparts. The prejudicial rule which governs proprietary consequences of marriage has raised difficulties for our courts in past and recent cases. The advent of a new constitutional dispensation in South Africa forbids discrimination based on sex, gender and marital status. Furthermore, the question is asked whether parties to a marriage with a foreign matrimonial domicile may rely on section 7(3) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979. The classification of redistribution orders in private international law matters has given rise to uncertainty. The objectives of the study are to suggest workable alternatives to the current connecting factor for proprietary consequences of marriage in South African private international law and to investigate the availability of redistribution orders to spouses applying for divorce in South Africa. / Private Law / LL. M.