published_or_final_version / Public Administration / Master / Master of Public Administration

Thesis (LLD) -- Stellenbosch University, 1988. / Article 1 Section 8 Clause 8 of the Constitution of the United States of America empowers Congress "to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries". This simple clause sums up in a few words the philosophy and underlying principles of modern copyright law. Copyright law, like other branches of intellectual property law (i.e. the laws of patents, trade marks and designs), seeks to create a system whereby the creator of original works or intellectual property is afforded a qualified monopoly in the use or exploitation of his work in order, first, to compensate and reward him for the effort, creativity and talent expended and utilized in the creation of his work, and secondly, to act as an incentive for him to use his talents and efforts to create more and better works or items of intellectual property. The qualified monopoly is limited in duration and after the expiry of the term the work falls into the public domain and can be freely used and reproduced by others. A balance is struck between the interests of the individual and the public interest. The rationale behind this philosophy is the establishment of a profit incentive for creators of intellectual property. The effectiveness of the profit motive is dependent upon the degree to which the creator of the intellectual property is able to maintain and enforce his qualified monopoly. If the law is not effective in enabling the creator of intellectual property to maintain and enforce his monopoly then the efficiency of the operation of the profit motive will be impaired. Consequently, the soundness and effectiveness of the law of copyright is a . significant factor in the promotion of the creation of intellectual property and ultimately• in enriching our culture and promoting our knowledge and well-being. Viewed from a different perspective, the purpose of copyright is to prevent one man from appropriating to himself what has been produced by the skill and labour of others1 . In broad terms, copyright may be described as the exclusive right in relation to a work embodying intellectual property (i.e. the product of the intellect) to do or to authorize others to do certain acts in relation to that work, which acts represent in the case of each type of work the manners in which that work can be exploited for personal gain or profit. Copyright is an immaterial property right. The subject of the right is a work of the intellect or spirit and thus an intangible. Copyright in a work is akin to ownership in a tangible article. The following analysis of the essential nature of copyright by Slomowitz AJ in Video Parktown North (Pty) Limited v Paramount Pictures Corporation is instructive: "It seems to me that when he who harbours an idea, by dint of his imagination, skill or labour, or some or all of them, brings it into being in tactile, visible or audible form, capable thereby of being communicated to others as a meaningful conception or apprehension of his mind, a right of property in that idea immediatelycomes into existence. The proprietary interest in that object of knowledge is the ownership of it and is called 'copyright'. It might just as well be called 'ownership', but we have chosen to call it by another name, reserving 'ownership' as the appellation for the proprietary interest in corporeal things, by way of semantic, but not, as I see it, legal, distinction. In this sense, copyright has sometimes been called 'intellectual property', as it indeed is. " Copyright subsists in the work of the intellect embodied in a material form which is a tangible article. The tangible or physical form of the work embodies two separate items of property, i.e. the copyright in the work of the intellect and the ownership of the tangible article. Ownership of the two items of property must be distinguished and can vest in different persons. Transfer of the ownership of one of the i terns of property does not necessarily affect transfer of the ownership of the other item of property.

Thesis (LLM)--Stellenbosch University, 1989. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: English abstract not available / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die tradisionele opvatting was dat Outeursreg gemoeid is met die beskerming van die materiele vorm waarin idees vasgele is. Sedertdien het die klem egter verskuif na die beskerming van die idee self mits dit egter in stoflike vorm vervat is. In hierdie tesis word ondersoek ingestel na wat presies die objek van Outeursreg is en watter rol stoflike aanbieding in Outeursreg sped. Ter aanvang word gekyk na die ontstaan en ontwikkeling van Outeursreg. Daar word gekyk na die pick wat Outeursreg in die regsisteem beklee met spesifieke verwysing na die tradisionele indeling van subjektiewe regte. Dit blyk hieruit dat Outeursreg, as bestaandeel van Immaterieel goedereg, 'n onstoflike regsobjek het nl. die produk van die outeur se geestesarbeid of dan sy idee. Die verwysing na die vereiste van stoflike aanbieding van idees verg egter nadere ondersoek. Die Wet op Outeursreg 98 van 1973 word ontleel met betrekking tot die aard van beskermde werke; vereistes vir Outeursregbaskerming; definisies van terme soos "outeur" en "maak" asook die van die onderskeie werke; die eiendomsregterminologie en skendingshandelinge. Regsvergelykend word oorsigtelik ook na die Amerikaanse Reg verwys. Uit hierdie ontleding blyk stoflikheid vir doeleindes van die tradisionele Outeursregwerke te verwys na tasbare aanbieding daarvan, mar dat sb 'n eng definisie nie gehandhaaf kan word ten opsigte van moderne tegnologiese ontwikkelings soos uitsendings en programdraende seine nie, aangesien hierdie werke van sä 'n aard is dat tasbare vasle:gging daarvan nie noodwendig altyd plaasvind nie. Onder die skrywers wat hierdie probleem bespreek is professors Copeling en Van der Merwe wat aan stoflikheid 'n alternatiewe, wyer betekenis toedig nl. kommunikeerbare of sintuiglik waarneembare aanbieding. 'n Botsing tussen die tradisionele en aanbevole definisie van stoflikheid in die regspraak word ook uitgewys. Ten einde tegnologie te akkommodeer word die wyer definisie van stoflikheid in hierdie tesis voorgehou. Die implikasies van hierdie wyer definisie van stoflikheid is egter verreikend. Professor Copeling bevestig dan ook dat dit die moontlikheid van Outeursreg in mondelinge kommunikasies inhou. Gevolglik word daar veral gekyk waarom idees as sulks beskerm word deur Onregmatige Mededinging, maar nie deur Outeursreg nie - 'n vraag wat beantwoord word met verwysing na die invloed van moderne tegnologie op die tradisionele indelings van die Immaterieel goederereg. Uit hierdie ondersoek blyk dit dat Onregmatige Mededinging berus op die Immaterieel goederereg in plaas van die Deliktereg. Die uitgebreide definisie van stoflikheid veroorsaak dat die bestaande indelings van Immaterie61 goedereregte versmelt. Dit ruim ook die huidige konflik rondom die vereiste van stoflikheid in die Wet op Outeursreg 93 van 1973 uit die weg. Laastens word kortliks gewys op die drastiese veranderinge in die spelreels vir inligtingsprodukte wat nodig sal wees om die balans tussen die aansprake van Outeursreghebbendes en die gemeenskap te handhaaf indien die uitgebreide definisie van stoflikheid aangewend word. Uiteindelik dien stoflikheid ook in sy uitgebreide vorm steeds die tradisionele doe om die werk af te skei van die maker se persoonlikheid en dit sodoende buite die mens gelee te maak.