本論文研究了累積投票對中國上市公司業績的影響。我們主要研究三個問題。第一個問題是研究哪类所有权机构的公司更易于采取累积投票，第二是通過累積投票產生董事會成員和通過直接投票產生的董事會成員可能存在的差異。第三個問題是研究累積投票選出成員對公司治理和公司業績產生的影響。通過控制公司的特點，我們發現，控股股东占很大比例的公司（即便是在30%规定采取累积投票线下）更易于采用累积投票，其二，累積投票選舉產生的董事會和監事會更可能是專業人士，而且平均而言，累積投票選出的董事和監事會成員，比那些由直接投票選舉產生的董事會和監事會成員，擁有更多的公司股票. 此外，有證據表明他們更有可能代表股東利益而非管理層或大股東利益，這些證據不僅表明他們更有能力履行其職責，並且表明他們的個人利益與公司利益之間更為一致。本文延伸了現存的研究，並且證明了累積投票選舉產生的董事會對公司績效有積極的影響。但是，證據表明累計投票監事的比例增加並不會顯著改善公司績效。這些證據表明，累積投票在某種程度上改進了中國上市公司的公司治理狀況。 / This paper investigates the impact of cumulative voting on the performance of listed corporations in China. We focus on three main issues: investigating effects of corporations’ ownership structure on cumulative voting adoption, exploring differences (if any) in personal attributes between the board members elected by cumulative voting and those elected by straight voting, and identifying the influence of cumulative voting members on corporate governance and firm performance. Controlling firm characteristics, we find that corporations with controlling shareholder who owns a larger proportion (even under the 30% regulatory cumulative voting cut-off) of the shares are more likely to adopt accumulative voting but the ownership concentration of other block shareholders tend to be uncorrelated or even negatively correlated with cumulative voting. In addition, both directors and supervisors elected by cumulative voting are (a) more likely to have professional titles, (b) own more stocks on average than those elected by straight voting, and (c) are more likely to be shareholder- rather than management-affiliated or controlling shareholder (typically the largest shareholder-affiliated). Such evidence indicates that they are more capable of fulfilling their duties and suggests that their personal interests may be more compatible with those of the listed corporations. In addition, we extend the existing literature by showing a positive correlation between the percentage of cumulative voting-elected directors sitting in the board of directors and firm performance. However, we did not find a significant relationship between the increase of proportion of CV supervisors and firm performance. In summary, these results demonstrate that cumulative voting, to some extent, improves corporate governance in China’s listed corporations. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Qian, Jinghui. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 65-69). / Abstracts also in Chinese. / ABSTRACT(ENGLISH) --- p.i / ABSTRACT(CHINESE) --- p.ii / ACKNOWLEDGEMENT --- p.iii / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.iv / LIST OF TABLES --- p.v / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- The notion of cumulative voting --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- The situations in China --- p.3 / Chapter 1.3 --- Issues to be investigated in the paper --- p.5 / Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.7 / Chapter 2.1 --- Theoretical effects of cumulative voting --- p.9 / Chapter 2.2 --- Empirical findings --- p.10 / Chapter 2.3 --- Cumulative voting in China --- p.14 / Chapter 3 --- Theory and Hypothesis --- p.16 / Chapter 4 --- Data and Methodology --- p.23 / Chapter 4.1 --- Data --- p.23 / Chapter 4.2 --- Methodology --- p.25 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- Propensity score matching --- p.26 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Barber and Lyon matching --- p.32 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- Comparison between directory and supervisory members --- p.34 / Chapter 4.2.4 --- OLS and difference-in-differences regressions --- p.35 / Chapter 5 --- Empirical Results --- p.38 / Chapter 5.1 --- Sample characteristics of cumulative voting elections (CVEs) --- p.38 / Chapter 5.2 --- Comparison between cumulative voting and non-cumulative voting --- p.40 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- PSM statistical description and regression results --- p.40 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- Barber and Lyon matching --- p.49 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- Differences between CV members and NCV members --- p.50 / Chapter 5.3 --- Effects of Proportion of CV directors and CV supervisors on firm performance --- p.54 / Chapter 5.4 --- Robutness analysis --- p.59 / Chapter 6 --- Conclusions and Discussions --- p.61 / Chapter 6.1 --- Summary of findings --- p.61 / Chapter 6.2 --- Theoretical contributions and limitations --- p.63 / REFERENCES --- p.65 / Chapter Appendix I --- Variables and Descriptions --- p.70 / Chapter Appendix II --- Supplementary PSM Regression --- p.73 / Chapter Appendix III --- Supplementary Comparison CV members vs. NCV members --- p.75 / Chapter Appendix IV --- Robustness of the Regression --- p.79 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.82

China has been undergoing economic reform and institutional transition from a planned economy to a market economy in the past twenty years. An important product of this is the emergence of interlocking directorates, a director who sit on multiple directorate boards of corporations. The formation of interlock network reflects the ongoing changes at economic, social and corporate levels. Its functioning mechanisms are also embedded within China's unique institutional environments. Given this background, this dissertation seeks to examine the corporate network of directorship interlocks in China, specifically with regard to the following three research questions. First, what is the corporate interlock network structure? Second, why do firms form directorship interlocks? And third, how does directorship interlock influence firm performance? / Cross-sectional data from 949 listed firms in 1999 and panel data from 284 listed firms spanning eight years (1994-2001) were employed to examine the interlock network structure and test the propositions. The results show that, first, directorship interlock network reflects the key structural features of Chinese economy. Second, the formation of interlocks reflects the inter-organizational demand and the demand of external interest group coalitions. Third, due to governance failure and institutional voids, interlock network acts as a social cohesion device and enables the emerging managerial class to exploit modern corporations to the detriment of shareholders' interests. This exploitation has dampened firm performance and economic growth. Such exploitation is constrained under concentrated ownership structure and under the ownership structure with high level of state ownership. / The dissertation contributes to the current literature in the following ways. First, it reports the first examination of the structural aspect of Chinese economy. Second, borrowing the conventional wisdom in directorship interlock literature, the dissertation incorporates China's unique institutional environments in examining the antecedents and consequences of directorship interlock, transcending the narrow theoretical synthesis of current interlock studies. Third, it highlights the complex "agency problem" that has emerged during the process of China's economic development---"managerial class exploitation." Fourth, it highlights the important role of a concentrated ownership structure and state ownership in constraining and facilitating the "managerial class exploitation". The dissertation provides significant insights in the fields of transitional economy, corporate governance, and directorship interlock network. / The dissertation makes four major propositions. First, the corporate network of interlocking directorates reflects key structural aspects of the Chinese economy. Second, directorship interlock may act as a strategy helping corporations to manage inter-organizational relationships and environmental uncertainty during the institutional transition. It may also act as a device for external interest groups to counterbalance the internal corporate power and exercise their control. Third, directorship interlock may perform two functions with opposing effect on firm performance. One is to act as an inter-organizational strategy to fill the institutional voids and enhance firm performance when the market fails. The other is to act as a social cohesion device to exploit institutional voids, facilitate managerial class exploitation, and dampen firm performance when governance fails. Fourth, ownership structure is an important factor in moderating directorship interlock network effects on firm performance during the institutional transition. / Ren Bing. / "August 2005." / Adviser: Kevin Au. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-07, Section: A, page: 2653. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 265-280). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest Information and Learning Company, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstract in English and Chinese. / School code: 1307.

Xu Zhi. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 61-62 (2nd gp.)). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / ABSTRACT --- p.II / 中文摘要 --- p.V / ACKNOWLEDGEMENT --- p.XI / Chapter CHAPTER 1 --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter CHAPTER 2 --- VALUE OR GROWTH STOCK? --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1 --- Summary Statistics: Financial Ratios of h Shares --- p.7 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- Profitability analysis --- p.7 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- Debt Structure --- p.9 / Chapter 2.1.3 --- Operational Management --- p.11 / Chapter 2.2 --- Corporate Identity: Value or Growth Stock? --- p.11 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Are H Shares Value Stocks? --- p.12 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- Are H Shares Growth Stocks? --- p.12 / Chapter 2.3 --- Summary --- p.13 / Chapter CHAPTER 3 --- THE METHODOLOGY OF EVENT STUDIES --- p.14 / Chapter 3.1 --- Brief Outline of an Event Study --- p.15 / Chapter 3.2 --- Issues on Event Studies --- p.17 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Unknown Event Dates --- p.17 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Which is the best benchmark model for the normal return? --- p.18 / Chapter 3.2.3 --- Hypothesis testing and problems with heteroskedasticity and dependence --- p.21 / Chapter 3.2.4 --- A multivariate regression model (MVRM) employed in the event study --- p.24 / Chapter 3.2.5 --- Measuring long horizon security price performance --- p.26 / Chapter 3.2.6 --- Use daily return or monthly return in event study? --- p.27 / Chapter CHAPTER 4 --- ARE H SHARES WANTED: DEAD OR ALIVE? --- p.28 / Chapter 4.1 --- Definitions of Events --- p.28 / Chapter 4.2 --- Sample and Estimation Procedures --- p.30 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- Sample Selection --- p.30 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Estimation Procedures --- p.30 / Chapter 4.3 --- Empirical Results of Good and Bad Earnings Announcements --- p.31 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- Short Term Effects on Securities Prices --- p.31 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- Long Term Post-Earnings-Announcement Drifts --- p.34 / Chapter 4.3.3 --- Regression Analysis --- p.35 / Chapter 4.3.3.1 --- REGRESSION RESULTS FOR GOOD EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS --- p.37 / Chapter 4.3.3.2 --- REGRESSION RESULTS FOR BAD EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS --- p.38 / Chapter 4.3.4 --- Summary --- p.39 / Chapter 4.4 --- Empirical Results of Good and Bad News --- p.40 / Chapter 4.5 --- "Empirical Results of SEO, M&A and New Projects" --- p.41 / Chapter 4.5.1 --- Summary --- p.42 / Chapter CHAPTER 5 --- A PRACTICAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR H SHARES --- p.43 / Chapter 5.1 --- Problems Corporate Governance Deals with --- p.45 / Chapter 5.1.1 --- The Agency Problem --- p.45 / Chapter 5.1.2 --- Management Discretion --- p.46 / Chapter 5.2 --- Solutions to the Problems --- p.46 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- Incentive Contracts --- p.46 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- Large Investors --- p.47 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- Debt Choice --- p.49 / Chapter 5.3 --- Corporate Governance for H Shares: a Practical Framework --- p.50 / Chapter 5.3.1 --- Essential Elements of Good Corporate Governance --- p.51 / Chapter 5.3.2 --- Summary : A Practical Framework of Good Corporate Governance --- p.53 / Chapter CHAPTER 6 --- CONCLUSIONS --- p.58 / REFERENCE --- p.61 / APPENDIX OF TABLES --- p.63 / APPENDIX OF FIGURES --- p.64

Lui, Kai Yin. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 49-55). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Chinese Version --- p.ii / Acknowledgments --- p.iii / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.6 / Chapter 3 --- Research Hypothesis --- p.8 / Chapter 3.1 --- Institutional Setting --- p.8 / Chapter 3.2 --- The Monitoring Effectiveness of Independent Directors --- p.11 / Chapter 4 --- Methodology --- p.15 / Chapter 4.1 --- Negative Opinion Issuances --- p.15 / Chapter 4.2 --- The Personal Characteristics of Independent Directors --- p.17 / Chapter 4.3 --- Control Grouping Methods --- p.21 / Chapter 4.4 --- Board Structure --- p.23 / Chapter 4.5 --- Control Variables --- p.24 / Chapter 4.6 --- Regional Governance --- p.25 / Chapter 4.7 --- ST Companies --- p.27 / Chapter 5 --- Data --- p.29 / Chapter 5.1 --- Negative Opinion Issuance --- p.29 / Chapter 5.2 --- The Personal Characteristics of Independent Directors --- p.30 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- Treatment Group --- p.31 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- Control Group --- p.32 / Chapter 5.3 --- Board Structure --- p.32 / Chapter 5.4 --- Control Variables --- p.33 / Chapter 5.5 --- Regional Governance --- p.34 / Chapter 5.6 --- ST Companies --- p.34 / Chapter 6 --- Empirical Results --- p.36 / Chapter 6.1 --- Testing Means of Two Samples --- p.36 / Chapter 6.2 --- Event Study --- p.37 / Chapter 6.3 --- Logistic Regressions --- p.38 / Chapter 6.3.1 --- The Personal Characteristics of Independent Directors --- p.39 / Chapter 6.3.2 --- Board Structure --- p.40 / Chapter 6.3.3 --- Regional Governance --- p.42 / Chapter 6.3.4 --- Pull Set of Variables --- p.43 / Chapter 6.4 --- Checking Robustness of Results by Using ST Companies --- p.46 / Chapter 7 --- Summary and Conclusion --- p.47 / References --- p.49 / Appendix --- p.56 / "Table 1: Negative Opinion Issuance, Descriptive Statistics" --- p.56 / "Table 2: Negative Opinion Issuance, by Categories" --- p.56 / Table 3: Sample Companies Location Distribution --- p.57 / "Table 4: Personal Characteristics, Descriptive Statistics I" --- p.58 / "Table 5: Personal Characteristics, Descriptive Statistics II" --- p.59 / Table 6: Board Structure and Control Variables: Descriptive Statistics --- p.60 / Table 7: Regional Governance Indices --- p.61 / "Table 8: ST companies, Descriptive Statistics" --- p.62 / Table 9: Negative Opinion Issuance and Company Status Changes --- p.62 / "Table 10: The Level of Negative Opinion Issuance, the Respective Com- panies and Independent Directors Involved" --- p.62 / "Table 11: Personal Characteristics (ST Companies), Descriptive Statistics I" --- p.63 / "Table 12: Personal Characteristics (ST Companies), Descriptive Statistics II" --- p.64 / "Table 13: Board Structure and Control Variables (ST Companies), De- scriptive Statistics" --- p.64 / "Table 14: Mean-Comparison t-test Between Control and Treatment Groups, Personal Characteristics and Board Structure" --- p.65 / "Table 15: Event Study, by Different Event Windows" --- p.66 / "Table 16: Event Study, by Different Categories of Negative Opinions" --- p.66 / Table 17: Logistic Regression - Treatment Group Only (n = 144) --- p.67 / Table 18: Conditional Logistic Regression - Treatment Group and Control Group Paired Together According to Companies (n = 273). Personal Characteristics Variables Only --- p.68 / Table 19: Conditional Logistic Regression - Treatment Group and Control Group Paired Together According to Companies (n = 273). Board Structure and Control Variables Only --- p.69 / Table 20: Conditional Logistic Regression - Treatment Group and Control Group Paired Together According to Companies (n = 273). Regional Governance Only --- p.69 / Table 21: Conditional Logistic Regression - Treatment Group and Control Group Paired Together According to Companies (n = 273). All Variables --- p.70 / Table 22: Conditional Logistic Regression - Treatment Group and Control Group Paired Together According to Companies (n = 273). All Variables --- p.71 / Table 23: Ordered Logistic Regression - ST companies (n = 352) --- p.72

Corporate governance has gained considerable prominence in the last decade as it has become a much more widely discussed and debated issue. The debate as to which model of corporate governance China should adopt continues as China forges a new era of interaction with the global market, especially since its accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001. The state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector in China is a significant contributing factor in China's endeavour to continue to develop its economy, provide employment and reduce poverty. Therefore, the success of SOE reform is important to China's future economic prosperity and ability to contend with social justice issues. The commencement of the reform process began in the late 1970s and many SOEs have attained significant progress in some important areas. However, all too many SOEs experience poor overall performance. Thus, the consequence of the corporate governance model and corporate structure selected will be considerable, especially as the country's market economy gains momentum. This thesis contributes to the ongoing body of work relating to corporate governance in China, and some clear results have been found. It also reviews the institutional setting in China and elements of the corporate governance literature in detail. As the ownership of firms is considered to be one of the key elements to enhance corporate governance, the empirical study considers issues relating to changes in ownership, concentration and ownership structures. It conducts an empirical study of the ownership and performance of listed corporations in China and based on these analyses, the thesis provides policy recommendations as to which model of corporate governance may best be suited to China during this transitional phase. The findings suggest that the ownership structure is a key element to enhancing corporate governance in China. The wealth affects of changes in listed firm ownership, which for the most part had the effect of reducing state ownership, were found to be positive. Concentration ownership structures per se were not found to enhance listed firm performance. The most significant findings were the following. Firstly, that institutional ownership, through the Legal Person holding companies, have a positive bearing on listed firm performance and thus by implication, upon improving corporate governance. Secondly, medium levels of Legal Person ownership were found to be the most effective. Thirdly, foreign institutions and individual investors were found to be positively correlated to performance. Similar results were found for offshore ownership, but to a lessor extent. Conversely, state ownership was found to be negatively correlated to performance. Other issues that were identified in the empirical analysis are that size does matter, in that large firms were found not to perform as well as smaller firms. Leverage appears to matter also, as highly leveraged firms were found not to perform well. The industry in which a firm operates was also found to have an affect on performance. The policy recommendations are based on the findings and observations of this thesis. The assumption is made that the present gradualist approach and regime will continue. As state ownership is shown to have a negative bearing on listed firm performance, the recommendation is that the state, at its various levels, should divest its holdings. This could be achieved through a privatization program in which the state denationalises a large proportion of its holdings. One of the keys would then be managing the change of ownership. Based on the observations and findings of this study, it is recommended that a privatization program should be instigated that supports blockholders and institutions, and does not focus purely on dispersing large proportions of holdings to diverse small shareholders. In addition, mergers and acquisitions that embrace economic efficiency should be encouraged and supported. The empirical study demonstrates that the ultimate ownership and control of tradeable shares ought to be channelled to pension funds, private institutional investors that should be encouraged to take strong stakes in the firms, to strategic investors, especially minority blockholders, and a proportion to international investors. This strategy would be in China's best interests in its present stage of development.

The Asian REIT market has been developing quickly in recent years and gradually attracted attention of international investors. However, compared with other developed markets such as the US and Australia, very little is known about the Asian REIT market. This research examines the impact of the quality of corporate governance on the performance of two major and similar REIT markets - Hong Kong and Singapore. In this research, the quality of corporate governance is measured by a scoring system that is based on the APREA Corporate Governance Scoring Framework (APREA CGSF) developed by Lecomte and Ooi (2012) for Singapore REITs but modified to suit the characteristics and regulatory requirements of both Hong Kong and Singapore REIT markets. Firm performance is measured by Tobin’s Q. The empirical analysis is based on panel data during 2007-2011 from Hong Kong and Singapore REIT markets. The empirical results show that the quality of corporate governance (as measured by the Integrated Corporate Governance Index or ICGI) has a significant and positive impact on firm performance, holding other factors constant. However, closer examination shows that only about 20% of all the governance provisions included in the ICGI have significant impact on firm performance. This research also finds that REITs with corporate governance that takes into consideration of the interests of other stakeholders in addition to those of the shareholders (such as provision for corporate social responsibility) do not perform better. Incidentally, the empirical results strongly suggest that Singapore REITs perform better than Hong Kong REITs after controlling for all known factors including the quality of corporate governance. This result calls for a deeper explanation. A more detailed study from a new institutional economics perspective may shed light on this issue. / published_or_final_version / Real Estate and Construction / Master / Master of Philosophy

by Chan Tsz Kit, Lee Wing Chun, Vincent. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 50-52). / ABSTRACT --- p.ii / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.iii / LIST OF TABLES AND FIGUARES --- p.v / Chapter / Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Background and Features of GEM --- p.2 / Features of Small Cap Companies --- p.4 / Market Statistics --- p.5 / Number of IPO in the Market --- p.5 / IPO Fund Raised in the Market --- p.6 / IPO Fund Raised by Type --- p.7 / Business Nature of Listed Firms --- p.8 / Performance of GEM Market in Terms of GEI --- p.9 / GEM Corporate Governance --- p.10 / Two GEM Listing Rules Non-compliance Cases to Date --- p.10 / Other Controversy Issues of GEM --- p.11 / Selective wavier by tom.com --- p.11 / General relaxation of listing rules --- p.12 / Property acquisition by Timeless Software --- p.13 / Errors made by GEM companies --- p.13 / Excessive valuation --- p.14 / Quality of listed company --- p.15 / Undisclosed holdings of Panda-Recruit --- p.15 / Chapter II. --- LITERATURE REVIEW --- p.16 / Chapter III. --- DATA AND METHODOLOGY --- p.26 / Data Description --- p.27 / Chapter IV. --- EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE --- p.31 / Intraday and Weekly Stock Returns --- p.31 / Intraday Trading Volume --- p.36 / Discussing Conclusion for Quantitative Studies --- p.40 / Chapter V. --- QUALITATIVE STUDY OF GEM MARKET --- p.41 / Factors Contributed to the Prevailing Weak Sentiment on GEM --- p.41 / Blue-chip Backing --- p.41 / Mega-dollar Tech Deals Sent Tech Stocks to Higher Levels --- p.42 / Understanding on Issuer's Business is Key --- p.43 / Major Issues GEM Faces --- p.44 / Lack of Condemnation on the Listed Firms' Non-compliance --- p.44 / Attractiveness for Large Cap Issuers --- p.45 / Retail Investors Participation --- p.46 / PRC Second Board --- p.47 / Activities of Institutional Investors --- p.47 / GEI - A Good Proxy of GEM's Performance? --- p.48 / Discussing Conclusion for Qualitative Studies --- p.49 / BIBIOGRAPHY --- p.50

by Wong Kar Shun. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 252-164). / Abstract also in Chinese. / ABSTRACT --- p.i / PREFACE --- p.ii / Chapter chapter i --- introduction / Chapter 1.1 --- Research Questions and Objectives --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Background of Study --- p.3 / Chapter 1.2.1 --- The Importance of Corporate Disclosures --- p.3 / Chapter 1.2.2 --- The Nature of Corporate Disclosures in Hong Kong --- p.5 / Chapter 1.2.3 --- A Brief Review of Previous Empirical Voluntary Disclosure Studies --- p.9 / Chapter 1.2.3.1 --- Agency-Theory Based Studies --- p.10 / Chapter 1.2.4 --- Corporate Governance and Voluntary Disclosures --- p.15 / Chapter 1.3 --- Research Model and Hypotheses --- p.19 / Chapter 1.4 --- Research Approach and Design --- p.23 / Chapter 1.4.1 --- The Postal Survey --- p.24 / Chapter 1.4.2 --- Annual Reports --- p.24 / Chapter 1.4.3 --- Variables Measurement --- p.25 / Chapter 1.4.3.1 --- The Measurement of Dependent Variables --- p.25 / Chapter 1.4.3.2 --- The Measurement of Independent Variables --- p.27 / Chapter 1.4.4 --- Data Analysis --- p.30 / Chapter 1.5 --- Justifications of the Study --- p.30 / Chapter 1.6 --- Significance and Potential Contributions of the Study --- p.32 / Chapter 1.7 --- Organization of the Thesis --- p.35 / Chapter chapter ii --- literature review on corporate disclosure / Chapter 2.1 --- Scope of Review --- p.36 / Chapter 2.2 --- Theoretical Literature Review on Corporate and Voluntary Disclosure --- p.38 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Overview --- p.38 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- The Agency theory of Disclosure --- p.39 / Chapter 2.2.3 --- Signaling Theory --- p.42 / Chapter 2.2.4 --- Contingency Theory --- p.45 / Chapter 2.2.5 --- Capital Need Theory --- p.46 / Chapter 2.2.6 --- Proprietary Cost Theory --- p.47 / Chapter 2.2.7 --- Other Theories or Justifications for Corporate and Voluntary Disclosure --- p.48 / Chapter 2.2.8 --- Conclusion of Disclosure Theories --- p.49 / Chapter 2.3 --- Empirical Literature Review of Corporate Disclosure --- p.50 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- Corporate Disclosure Surveys --- p.50 / Chapter 2.3.1.1 --- The Usefulness and Information Value of Annual Reports as Perceived by External Users --- p.51 / Chapter 2.3.1.2 --- External Users' Information Requirements --- p.54 / Chapter 2.3.1.3 --- Corporate Preparers' Attitudes to Disclosure / Comparison of the Perceptions between Preparers and Users --- p.55 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Studies --- p.59 / Chapter 2.3.2.1 --- Introduction --- p.59 / Chapter 2.3.2.2 --- The Independent Variables Used in Empirical Disclosure Studies --- p.60 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1 --- "Agency Theory, Signaling Theory and Political Cost Related Variables" --- p.60 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.1 --- Firm Size --- p.60 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.2 --- Listing Status --- p.62 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.3 --- Raising Capital --- p.62 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.4 --- Assets-in-Place --- p.63 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.5 --- Leverage --- p.64 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.6 --- Size of Auditor --- p.64 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.7 --- Industry Type --- p.65 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.8 --- Ownership Structure --- p.66 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.9 --- Independent Non-executive Directors --- p.66 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.2 --- Proprietary Cost Variables --- p.67 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.3 --- Contingency Variables --- p.68 / Chapter 2.3.2.3 --- The Dependent Variables Used in Disclosure Studies --- p.69 / Chapter 2.3.2.3.1 --- Disclosure Index Studies --- p.69 / Chapter 2.3.2.3.2 --- Specific Disclosure Choice Studies --- p.75 / Chapter 2.4 --- Chapter Summary --- p.79 / Chapter chapter iii --- literature review on corporate governance / Chapter 3.1 --- Introduction --- p.81 / Chapter 3.2 --- Theoretical Literature Review on Corporate Governance --- p.81 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- The Definition and Scope of Corporate Governance --- p.81 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- The Theoretical Context of Corporate Governance --- p.83 / Chapter 3.2.2.1 --- Agency Theory of Corporate Governance --- p.84 / Chapter 3.2.3 --- The Evolution and Functions of Various Corporate Governance Structures --- p.86 / Chapter 3.2.3.1 --- The Board of Directors --- p.86 / Chapter 3.2.3.2 --- Independent Non-Executive Directors --- p.88 / Chapter 3.2.3.3 --- Board Committees --- p.88 / Chapter 3.2.3.3.1 --- Audit Committee --- p.90 / Chapter 3.2.3.3.2 --- Remuneration Committee --- p.90 / Chapter 3.2.3.3.3 --- Non-executive Chairman --- p.91 / Chapter 3.2.4 --- Corporate Governance Movement in Various Parts of the World --- p.92 / Chapter 3.2.4.1 --- Corporate Governance in U.K --- p.92 / Chapter 3.2.4.2 --- Corporate Governance in the USA --- p.94 / Chapter 3.2.4.3 --- Corporate Governance in Continental Europe --- p.94 / Chapter 3.2.4.4 --- Corporate Governance in the Far East --- p.95 / Chapter 3.2.4.4.1 --- Corporate Governance in China --- p.95 / Chapter 3.2.4.4.2 --- Other Asian Countries --- p.96 / Chapter 3.2.4.4.3 --- Corporate Governance in Hong Kong --- p.96 / Chapter 3.3 --- Empirical Literature Review of Corporate Governance --- p.99 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- Corporate Governance Surveys --- p.99 / Chapter 3.3.1.1 --- Price Waterhouse Survey in 1995 --- p.99 / Chapter 3.3.1.2 --- HKSA's surveys in 1995 and 1997 --- p.102 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- The Effectiveness of Corporate Governance on Firm Performance --- p.104 / Chapter 3.3.2.1 --- Independent Non-executive Directors --- p.105 / Chapter 3.3.2.2 --- Ownership structure --- p.106 / Chapter 3.4 --- Chapter Summary --- p.106 / Chapter chapter iv --- hypotheses development / Chapter 4.1 --- Introduction --- p.108 / Chapter 4.2 --- The Research Model I: The Relationship between Corporate Governance / Specific Firm Attributes and the Extent of Voluntary Disclosures --- p.109 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- Corporate Governance Structures Variables --- p.111 / Chapter 4.2.1.1 --- The Ratio of Independent Non-executive Directors to Total Directors on Board (INDs) --- p.111 / Chapter 4.2.1.2 --- The Existence of Audit Committee --- p.113 / Chapter 4.2.1.3 --- The Existence of Dominant Personality --- p.114 / Chapter 4.2.1.4 --- The Percentage of Family Members on Board --- p.115 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Corporate Ownership Structures --- p.116 / Chapter 4.2.2.1 --- Family's Share Ownership --- p.116 / Chapter 4.2.2.2 --- Concentration of Share Ownership / The Existence of a Non-director Dominant Shareholder (s) --- p.117 / Chapter 4.2.2.3 --- Directors' Personal Share Ownership --- p.119 / Chapter 4.2.2.4 --- Independent Non-executive Directors' Personal Share / Chapter 4.2.2.5 --- Ownership --- p.120 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- Controlling Variables --- p.121 / Chapter 4.2.3.1 --- Firm Size --- p.121 / Chapter 4.2.3.2 --- Assets-in-Place --- p.122 / Chapter 4.2.3.3 --- Financial Leverage --- p.123 / Chapter 4.2.3.4 --- Profitability --- p.123 / Chapter 4.2.3.3 --- Industry Type --- p.124 / Chapter 4.2.3.6 --- Excluded Variables --- p.125 / Chapter 4.3 --- Research Model II (The Relationship between Disclosure Strategy adopted by firms and Corporate Governance/Specific Firm Attributes) --- p.126 / Chapter 4.4 --- Chapter Summary --- p.126 / Chapter chapter v --- research methodology and design / Chapter 5.1 --- Introduction --- p.129 / Chapter 5.2 --- The Research Approach --- p.129 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- The Postal Survey --- p.130 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- The Empirical Testing of Hypotheses --- p.130 / Chapter 5.3 --- Survey Design and Data Collection --- p.131 / Chapter 5.3.1 --- The Development of the Survey Instrument --- p.131 / Chapter 5.3.2 --- Pilot Study --- p.132 / Chapter 5.3.3 --- Questionnaire Contents --- p.133 / Chapter 5.3.4 --- Sample of Main Survey --- p.136 / Chapter 5.3.5 --- Questionnaire Distribution and Response Rate --- p.136 / Chapter 5.3.6 --- Testing for Non-Response Bias --- p.139 / Chapter 5.3.7 --- Characteristics of Sample Preparer Firms --- p.139 / Chapter 5.3.8 --- Respondent Titles --- p.141 / Chapter 5.4 --- The Measurement of the Research Models --- p.143 / Chapter 5.4.1 --- The Measurement of Variables in the First Research Model --- p.143 / Chapter 5.4.1.1 --- The Measurement of the Dependent Variable --- p.143 / Chapter 5.4.1.2 --- The Measurement of the Independent Variables --- p.144 / Chapter 5.4.2 --- The Measurement of Variables in the Second Research Model --- p.146 / Chapter 5.4.2.1 --- The Measurement of the Dependent Variables --- p.146 / Chapter 5.4.2.2 --- The Measurement of the Independent Variable --- p.146 / Chapter 5.5 --- Data Analysis Tools --- p.147 / Chapter 5.5.1 --- Descriptive Analysis of the Survey Data --- p.147 / Chapter 5.5.2 --- Multivariate Analysis --- p.148 / Chapter 5.6 --- Summary --- p.156 / Chapter chapter vi --- field survey findings / Chapter 6.1 --- Introduction --- p.151 / Chapter 6.2 --- "Analysts Users' Perceived Importance, Attributes and Usage Behaviour of Annual Reports" --- p.152 / Chapter 6.2.1 --- Major Sources of Corporate Communication --- p.152 / Chapter 6.2.2 --- Attributes of Annual Reports (vs Other Source of Information) --- p.154 / Chapter 6.2.3 --- Preparers' Perceived Importance of Different Types of Annual Report Users --- p.155 / Chapter 6.2.4 --- Number and Time Spent on Reading Annual Reports by Users --- p.157 / Chapter 6.2.5 --- Extent of Usage of Various Types of Information in the Annual Reports by Users --- p.158 / Chapter 6.3 --- Disclosure Process and Strategy --- p.160 / Chapter 6.3.1 --- The Extent that Users' Information Needs are Considered as a Top Priority in the Disclosure Process --- p.160 / Chapter 6.3.2 --- Disclosure Strategy/Process of Firms --- p.161 / Chapter 6.3.3 --- External Factors Affecting Corporate Disclosure Strategy --- p.164 / Chapter 6.3.4 --- Internal Participants Affecting Corporate Disclosure Strategy --- p.166 / Chapter 6.3.5 --- Impact of Corporate Governance Structures on Corporate Disclosures Strategy --- p.167 / Chapter 6.4 --- Costs/Benefits and Importance of Different Voluntary Disclosure Items Perceived by Preparers and Users --- p.169 / Chapter 6.4.1 --- Benefits of Voluntary Disclosure --- p.171 / Chapter 6.4.2 --- Costs of Voluntary Disclosure --- p.172 / Chapter 6.4.3 --- Net Benefits and Costs of Voluntary Disclosure --- p.173 / Chapter 6.4.4 --- Perceived Importance of Different Types of Voluntary Disclosure Items by Users --- p.176 / Chapter 6.5 --- Preparers' and Users' Perceptions of Capital Market Functioning and the Effectiveness of Corporate Disclosure --- p.178 / Chapter 6.5.1 --- The Short Term/Long Term Efficiency of Hong Kong Capital Market --- p.178 / Chapter 6.5.2 --- The Impression of Share Values --- p.179 / Chapter 6.5.3 --- The Qualitative Characteristics of Financial Reportingin Hong Kong --- p.180 / Chapter 6.5.4 --- The Existence of Communication Gap and its Impact on Share Values --- p.182 / Chapter 6.5.5 --- Adequacy and Effectiveness of Current Corporate Disclosure in Hong Kong --- p.183 / Chapter 6.5.6 --- The Need of More Disclosure Requirements and Types of Information Disclosures --- p.185 / Chapter 6.6 --- Summary --- p.188 / Chapter chapter vii --- hypothesis testing / Chapter 7.1 --- Introduction --- p.190 / Chapter 7.2 --- Descriptive Analysis of the Variables in the Research Model --- p.190 / Chapter 7.3 --- Test for the First Research Model (Extent of Voluntary Disclosures as the Dependent Variable) --- p.195 / Chapter 7.2.1 --- Bivariate Analysis --- p.195 / Chapter 7.2.2 --- Multiple Regression Models and Assumption Testings --- p.198 / Chapter 7.2.3 --- Test of Violation of Multiple Regression Assumptions --- p.199 / Chapter 7.2.4.1 --- Linearity --- p.200 / Chapter 7.2.4.2 --- Normality --- p.201 / Chapter 7.2.4.3 --- Constant Variance of Residuals --- p.201 / Chapter 7.2.4.4 --- Non-Multicollinearity --- p.202 / Chapter 7.2.4.5 --- Log Transformation of the Model --- p.203 / Chapter 7.2.4.6 --- Multivariate Empirical Results --- p.204 / Chapter 7.2.4.7 --- Extent of Voluntary Disclosure --- p.205 / Chapter 7.4 --- Testing of the Second Research Model --- p.207 / Chapter 7.3.1 --- The Testing of Assumptions of the Second Research Model --- p.208 / ANOVA Results --- p.208 / Chapter 7.5 --- Chapter Summary --- p.212 / Chapter CHAPTER VIII --- "SUMMARY, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION" / Chapter 8.1 --- Overview of the Study --- p.214 / Chapter 8.2 --- The Current State and Effectiveness of Corporate Disclosure in Hong Kong --- p.217 / Chapter 8.3 --- Discussion of the Current State of Annual Report Disclosure and the Corporate Governance --- p.220 / Chapter 8.4 --- Discussion of Hypotheses Testing Results --- p.221 / Chapter 8.4.1 --- Hypothesis Related to Corporate Governance --- p.221 / Chapter 8.4.2 --- Hypothesis Related to Other Specific Firm Attributes --- p.226 / Chapter 8.5 --- Limitations of the Study --- p.228 / Chapter 8.5.1 --- Limitations of the Survey Questionnaires --- p.228 / Chapter 8.5.2 --- Credibility of Disclosures --- p.229 / Chapter 8.6 --- Contributions of the Study --- p.230 / Chapter 8.1 --- Recommendations for Further Study --- p.231 / Chapter 8.2 --- Conclusions --- p.233 / appendix --- p.235 / Chapter 1. --- Mailed Survey Instrument (Corporate Report Preparers' Version) --- p.235 / Chapter 2. --- Mailed Survey Instrument (Financial Analysts' Version) --- p.244 / REFERENCE --- p.252

by Wang Xiao Ling. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 70-73). / Abstract also in Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgment --- p.ii / Table of Contents --- p.iii / List of Tables --- p.v / List of Figures --- p.vi / Chapter I --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Objective of the Study --- p.3 / Chapter 1.3 --- Outline of the Study --- p.4 / Chapter II --- Background --- p.5 / Chapter 2.1 --- China's Enterprise Reform and the Development of Capital Markets --- p.5 / Chapter 2.2 --- Board of Directors in China --- p.13 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Legislation on Board - The Company Law --- p.13 / Composition of the Board of Directors --- p.16 / Functions and Powers --- p.18 / Regulations and Requirements --- p.19 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- The Board of Chengdu Brilliant Development Inc --- p.21 / Chapter 2.2.3 --- Difference between Board in China's Company Law and that in Hong Kong Company Ordinance --- p.24 / Chapter 2.3 --- Chapter Summary --- p.26 / Chapter III --- Literature Review --- p.27 / Chapter 3.1 --- Theoretical Background --- p.27 / Chapter 3.2 --- Empirical Studies --- p.30 / Takeover Evaluation --- p.30 / Management Buyout --- p.31 / Adoption of Poison Pills --- p.32 / CEO Turnover --- p.32 / Financial Performance --- p.33 / Chapter IV --- Testable Hypotheses --- p.35 / Chapter V --- Research Methodology --- p.37 / Chapter 5.1 --- Variables and Sample --- p.37 / Chapter 5.2 --- Empirical Results --- p.43 / Board Composition and Corporate Performance with Full Sample --- p.43 / Excluding IPO Firms --- p.51 / Insider Dominated Board and Outsider Dominated Board --- p.51 / Alternative Measures for Firm Performance --- p.55 / Cross-sectional Test --- p.58 / Financial Distress --- p.60 / Industry Classification --- p.62 / Chapter 5.3 --- Discussion --- p.64 / Chapter VI --- Conclusion and Implications --- p.67 / Chapter 6.1 --- Conclusion and Implications --- p.67 / Chapter 6.2 --- Suggestions for Further Research --- p.69 / Bibliography --- p.70 / Appendix Legislation on the Board (The Company Law in PRC) --- p.74

Xiao, Rui. / "August 2010." / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 28-30). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / 摘要 --- p.ii / ACKNOWLEDGMENTS --- p.iii / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2. --- Literature Review --- p.2 / Chapter 3. --- Research Hypothesis --- p.5 / Chapter 3.1 --- Institutional Background --- p.5 / Chapter 3.2 --- Hypothesis Development --- p.6 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Firm Performance and Outside Succession --- p.6 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Board Composition and Outside Succession --- p.6 / Chapter 3.2.3 --- Predecessor Characteristics and Outside Succession --- p.7 / Chapter 3.2.4 --- Successor Characteristics and Outside Succession --- p.7 / Chapter 3 2 --- 5 Performance Consequences and the Source of Successor --- p.9 / Chapter 4. --- Methodology --- p.9 / Chapter 4.1 --- Measurement --- p.9 / Chapter 4.2 --- Bivariate Probit with Sample Selection --- p.11 / Chapter 4.3 --- Event Study --- p.13 / Chapter 5. --- Data --- p.15 / Chapter 5.1 --- Sample Selection and Data Sources --- p.15 / Chapter 5.2 --- Descriptive Statistics --- p.16 / Chapter 6. --- Empirical Results --- p.17 / Chapter 6.1 --- The Determinants of Outside Succession --- p.17 / Chapter 6.1.1 --- Univariate Tests of Outside Succession and Firm Performance --- p.17 / Chapter 6.1.2 --- Univariate Tests of Outside Succession and Board Composition --- p.18 / Chapter 6.1.3 --- Univariate Tests of Outside Succession and Predecessor Characteristics --- p.18 / Chapter 6.1.4 --- Regression Results --- p.18 / Chapter 6.2 --- Outside Succession and Successor Characteristics --- p.21 / Chapter 6.2.1 --- Univariate Tests --- p.21 / Chapter 6.2.2 --- Regression Results --- p.21 / Chapter 6.3 --- Market Reaction and CEO Succession --- p.22 / Chapter 6.4 --- Post-turnover Performance and Outside Succession --- p.23 / Chapter 6.5 --- Robustness Tests --- p.26 / Chapter 7. --- Conclusion --- p.26 / Reference --- p.28 / Table 1. The Percentage of CEO Outside Succession during the Sample Period …… --- p.31 / Figure 1. CEO Turnover and Outside Succession in Each Year --- p.32 / Figure 2. Outside Succession Rate in the Turnover Sample --- p.32 / Table 2. Literature Summary of Outside Succession --- p.33 / Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Variables --- p.34 / Table 4. Outside Succession Rates at Different Performance Levels --- p.36 / Table 5. Relation between Outside Succession Rates and Board Composition --- p.37 / Table 6. Relation between Outside Succession Rates and CEO Predecessor Characteristics --- p.38 / Table 7. Outside Successions Regression Results --- p.39 / Table 8. CEO Successor Characteristics --- p.41 / Table 9. Regression Results of the CEO Successor Characteristics --- p.42 / Table 10. Cumulative Abnormal Returns around the Announcement of CEO