This thesis investigates the impact of corruption by government officials on firm level and macroeconomic growth in the context of Bangladesh. I revisit and extend the existing body of work on cross-country analysis of the impact of aggregate level of corruption on macroeconomic growth. However, the macroeconomic impacts are not necessarily mirrored at the micro level. As Nguyen and Van Dijk (2012 p.2935) observe, ‘country-level research does not help us to understand the determinants of the level of corruption that individual firms face and why and how the level of corruption varies across firms within a country’. To see how firm growth is affected by the corrupt behaviour of government officials in Bangladesh, I conduct a detailed study of the firm level bribing practices using both primary and existing survey data. The cross-country study has been carried out using two data sets; first, a cross-section of 119 countries using averages over 2000-2011 and second, a panel data set for a subsample of these countries over 1985-2013. I use both CPI (constructed by Transparency International) and ICRG index (constructed by the PRS group) as measures of corruption for this impact study. In several instances, the panel data model provides more efficient estimations and also works as a robustness check of the results obtained from the cross-section analysis. Corruption is found to have a positive but small impact on economic growth. This positive impact of corruption on macroeconomic growth supports the so-called East Asian paradox, a term coined to highlight the co-existence of high corruption and high growth in East Asia. This study adds to the existing body of work by examining the effects of corruption on growth by interacting it with freedom status and executive recruitment quality . I analyse the average marginal effect of explanatory variables on the estimated growth with respect to corruption, freedom status, executive recruitment quality and their interactions. It is found that the effect of corruption varies when the freedom status changes from below average to above average and when executive recruitment quality changes from below average to above average, which is in line with the hypothesis. Unlike the cross-country studies, there is very little work on firm level impacts, barring the notable exception of the work by Fisman and Svensson (2007) on industrial sector firms in Uganda. I use two different sets of data for this analysis. For the first exercise, I carried out a survey of 250 firms in Bangladesh and for the second study I use Bangladesh Enterprise Survey data collected by the World Bank. The analyses in these two studies are done using the same methods, and the problems, for example, the problems of heterogeneity and endogeneity are solved in the both in a similar fashion. The first firm level analysis presented in chapter 5 is suspected to suffer from small sample bias and endogeneity, and the instrument used in the Instrumental Variable method is weak. The second firm level analysis overcomes this small sample bias and endogeneity problems. I find that the impact of corruption of government officials on firm growth is negative but small. The important finding that comes out from these two pieces of empirical work on the effect of corruption is that a particular segment of the industrial sector may be benefiting from bribery but it does not necessarily mean that other segments or sectors or the industrial sector as a whole benefits from bribery. Corruption does not have an enormous effect on firm’s growth and perhaps the emphasis that is sometimes put on corruption is misplaced. The analysis is based on the existing firms, firms which survive under the current climate of governance. It may well be that if corruption was to decline, then a different set of firms would emerge. A comprehensive and analytic discussion on the growth trajectory and corruption scenario of Bangladesh has also been presented in the thesis, for which in-depth interviews have been taken from firm owners and managers, and people who have expert knowledge in the concerned areas.

Why do some authoritarian regimes exhibit high levels of corruption, while others produce very little? In this study, I show how corruption is used as a signal of performance and loyalty in autocratic regimes. I find that elites in non-democratic regimes reduce corruption in the face of political competitiveness. I test this theory using extensive micro-level data on the public's experiences with bribery in contemporary Russia. This data set is comprised of over 180,000 responses to public opinion surveys from 2001-2016 in Russia's subnational units. Identification of the causal effect of political competition on corruption is achieved with the use of an exogenously-determined electoral calendar--I show how the scheduled end of a term in office is an exogenous positive shock to political competition for authoritarian leaders in Russian regions, a shock that decreases experienced bribery by over 13% in those years. A wide array of alternative measures including novel search engine data and crime statistics support my conclusions. I also show that governors' tenuous hold on their positions--all the more tenuous when in their final years of a term in office--can be bolstered by additional resources that may be at their disposal. By showing how shocks to political competition drive governors to reduce corruption levels for fear of losing their jobs, but also that those shocks have varying effects for different governors, I illustrate the power of a dissatisfied public and authoritarian formal rules to shape behavior in non-democratic regimes. I also examine the linking assumption between public dissatisfaction and corruption experiences. These findings have implications for our understanding of autocratic politics, corruption, and studies of Russia. I show that corruption in authoritarian regimes is not a byproduct of authoritarianism, nor is it merely a result of low capacity--it is also a means of rule and control for autocrats. Modern authoritarian rulers are more discriminating in their application of petty corruption than is commonly understood. Finally, I employ and extend multilevel regression and poststratification (MRP) to generate descriptive estimates of corruption as experienced by the public with much greater accuracy and precision than has been possible previously.

The aim of the thesis is to create a RBC model incorporating corrupting sector. The thesis contributes to the few existing DSGE models with corruption by introducing the corrupting sector into the sector of firms and political parties which is regarded as a sector of public procurements where firms bribe politicians for gaining public tenders. This setting is new and is supposed to catch better the phenomenon of political corruption. The model predicts that all shocks that positively affect the economy motivate firms to invest more into the bribes and vice versa. The increase of the overall level of corruption stimulates economy but is leading an economy to the instability. The model also examines the effect of various forms of fiscal spending in the households ' utility function. The model exhibits several non-intuitive results (too high portion of stolen money by firms, stimulation of the economic performance caused by higher corruption and negative holding of government bonds) that should be solved in next research.

The purpose of this study is to find out in what magnitude corruption affects economic growth in Africa, based on 8 variables chosen; GDP per capita growth, Corruption Perception index, Capital, Education, Unemployment rate, Worldwide Governance Indicators. There is an ongoing fight against corruption world-wide. The most severe condition of corruption is centered in large parts of Africa based on data from Transparency International. For this reason, the scope is to research if the high level of corruption hasan impact on the economic growth and if so, how big of an impact it has on economic growth, based on factors implemented. A panel data analysis is conducted to econometrically estimate how corruption effects economic growth in Africa. Previous studies in this subject and literature that speak of corruption as “grease to the wheels” and “sands to the wheels” is the foundation for the study. Results show no significance when it comes to the relation between CPI and economic growth. Therefore, no conclusion can be made.

Thesis ( M.A. (African Languages)) --University of Limpopo, 2014

<p>Despite being mentioned in most international anti-corruption instruments, trading in influence appears only rarely in the spotlight of legal practice and literature. This paper aims to shed some light on the issue. The main objective is to highlight the different forms of trading in influence stipulated in various international agreements and national laws in order to draw a comprehensive picture of this offence. Furthermore, by identifying and critically appraising the core issues connected with trading in influence, this paper aims to provide recommendations which may be of use to states obliged to implement or to consider implementing this offence.</p>

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Corruption has been a global issue since ancient times till today, and acts of corruption take place regardless of the political system we exist under, hence, corruption can be said to be a type of conventional crime. As such crimes directly affect the functions, reliability and efficiency of governments, as well as national competitiveness of a country, relating to political austerity, economic prosperity and public sentiment, it would be sufficient enough to affect social stability, the rise an -+d decline of a nation¡¦s might, and the survival of governments. Throughout history, keeping corruption in check has always been a priority without exception by past governments in bringing peace and stability of the country; and ¡§Integrity¡¨ is the most fundamental requirement of a government. Should the administration of a government lacks the measure of integrity, the trust of the people towards the government will decline with poor governance, dishonest officials and rampant corruption, as a result, the integral administration of a government shall descend into a crisis; therefore, there is not one country around the world that is not constantly advancing its efforts in curbing corruption and governing impartially. Thus, in order to raise the integrity competence of the government, and to respond to the expectations of the public, the government convened a meeting with relevant agencies from the consensus of the meeting on the sustained development of Taiwan¡¦s economy, to jointly deliberate and enact the ¡§Anti-Corruption Action Plan¡¨, which has already been checked and ratified by the Executive Yuan on November 30, 2006. The purpose of enacting the plan was to immediately eliminate corruption and other factors that destabilize economic development, as well as to incorporate economic crimes that seriously impair the image of the government, hoping to effectively raise the integrity competence of the government and enhance national competitiveness. Since its establishment in 1995, Transparency International, the only international organization devoted to fighting against corruption, has according to the results of various corruption studies, established a Corruption Perception Index based on countries as the assessment subjects, and published it worldwide simultaneously. After several years, this economic index has become the most widely used instrument as a measure of the corruption situation in a country. The Swiss International Institute for Management Development has since 1989 been releasing its annual research report on the economic competitiveness of countries within major economic blocs. This has led to the close attention of various governments and related civic agencies around the world, moving on to adopt this report as its benchmark in governance and operations. The information published by the abovementioned organization has more than proven that the morality of government ethics is closely correlated to the overall performance of civil servants in notion, spirit, virtue, lives and work attitude. The ¡§Integral Governance Ethics Action Plan¡¨ currently driven to be implemented will improve not only the impartial image of government departments but also has the functions of educating and guiding the society. In view of this, various countries around the world place extreme importance in enacting and actualizing its anti-corruption policies. According to Transparency International, from their observations in the past 12 years, there has been little change in Taiwan¡¦s position on the Corruption Perception Index. On the whole, since 1995 till 2006, Taiwan¡¦s position has been hovering in the narrow range of 25th to 35th. From the viewpoint of comparison between countries around the world, Taiwan is yet to be classified a country with average integrity. However, it is worth noting that on November 6, 2006, Transparency International-Taiwan announced the findings of the 2006 Corruption Perception Index conducted by Transparency International, that Taiwan was placed jointly with Israel at 34th position with 5.9 points, as compared to 2005 , though the score has remained the same, its position has dropped by 2 places. While in comparison with Asian countries such as, Singapore (9.4 at 5th position), Hong Kong (8.3 at 15th position) and Japan (7.6 at 17th position), Taiwan was only slightly superior to South Korea (5.1 at 42nd position), indicating that the corruption situation in Taiwan remains one of the utmost issue pending improvement. Again, according to the 2006 Global Competitiveness Position officially released by the Swiss International Institute for Management Development on May 11, 2006, among the 61 economies, Taiwan was positioned 18th, dropping by 7 places as compared to its standing in 2005. The position of Taiwan in the 4 main index categories in 2006 unanimously slides down, except for ¡§Enterprise Efficiency¡¨ at position 14th, thus having certain comparative advantage. However, ¡§Economic Performance¡¨, ¡§Government Efficiency¡¨ and ¡§Infrastructure Construction¡¨ respectively positioned at 27th, 24th and 20th were on the contrary weaker; hence, there is still much room for improvement in enhancing national competitiveness. From the ranking results above, this should be a serious warning to Taiwan which has only just completed its democratic transformation, as it strives towards quality administration in the 21st century. Looking to the future, it is only with advocating integrity and anti-corruption by the different political parties and factions as well as blue and white collar classes and academic circles of Taiwan, that a united and collaborative networking relationship can be created. By striving together to build the National Integrity System of Taiwan, it is only then that Taiwan will have a chance to ascend to a country of high integral governance, and be able to play an even more active and important role in the international effort against corruption. In conclusion, among the ¡§Rebuilding Project of the Government¡¨, an integral governance is the basic demand of the people. The strength of national competitiveness is the key to whether a country is being able to have a foothold in the international community, and raising national competitiveness begins with the strengthening of ethical administrative work, and also forms the basic foundation for the current administration to be rebuilt on. According to the statistics from surveys carried out by the Ministry of Law recently, most of the people in society subjectively feel the improvement in the ¡§Integrity of the Government¡¨, though there is still considerable expectations, and how to have the people and government band together to form a climate of integrity, is the unshirkable mission of all civil servants in Taiwan. Though ¡§Uprighting Government Ethics, Stamping Out Corruption¡¨ is the principal task of administrative revolution and administration rebuilding ,it is an even more important index parameter of national competitiveness. Essentially erecting an ¡§Integrity Pride, Corruption Ashamed¡¨ benchmark, and by resolutely upholding the ¡§dare not desire, cannot desire, unable to desire and no necessity to desire¡¨ conviction, so that corruption cases within the government organizations have no avenue of arising again, it is then that a nation of integrity and transparency can be established. Consequently, the results of the present study can be sum up with the following conclusions and recommendations: 1. The acts of the government in stamping out corruption urgently needs to be strengthened. 2. The faith of people in judiciary officials remains low. 3. The promotion of anti-corruption by the government is still insufficient. 4. The undesirable practices of social nepotism and bribery needs further education. 5. Establish an integrated anti-corruption apparatus to give full support; to have a clean administration, clearing away all economic hindrance, lifting the national competitiveness of Taiwan, and stride into the ranks of countries with high integral governance in the world. Keywords: Keeping corruption in check, national competitiveness, integral governance, Transparency International and Swiss International Institute for Management Development.

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Texte remanié de: Thèse de doctorat--Science politique--Paris 1. / Bibliogr. p. 471-476.