On October 1, 1990 the Rwandan Patriotic Front launched a war from and with the support of the Republic of Uganda against Rwanda. This war was accompanied by unspeakable violations of International Humanitarian Law. Both conflicting parties violated the basic rules protecting the civilian population in situations of armed conflicts. The United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of its Charter, passed resolution 955 of November 8, 1994 establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to prosecute alleged responsible of such violations. This study investigates the background of the ICTR and questions the nature of the conflict that prompted the Security Council to establish another ad hoc international criminal tribunal after the one established for the former Yugoslavia. It further inquires into its jurisprudence and reflects critically on the ICTR's approach to serious violations of IHL under Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II. / Jurisprudence / LL. M. (Law)

La justice est un attribut fondamental de l’Etat moderne. Elle assure, dans unesociété démocratique, la sauvegarde de l’édifice normatif ainsi que la protection des droitset libertés. Une justice indépendante et efficace est un symbole de l’Etat de droit. Ellerévèle la réalité de la séparation des pouvoirs et consacre le règne du droit. Maisl’efficacité de tout appareil judiciaire dépend de la nature et de l’ampleur des moyens dontil dispose. Or, dans nombre d’Etats francophones, le système judiciaire connaît denombreuses faiblesses, liées tantôt aux avatars des processus de stabilisationdémocratique, tantôt aux situations plus fragiles de sortie de crise. La question durenforcement des capacités des institutions judiciaires se trouve ainsi posée. Et c’est surcette base que l’Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) a investi, depuisune trentaine d’années, le champ de la coopération juridique et judiciaire. Ayant inscrit lapromotion de la démocratie au coeur de son action politique, la Francophonie a pris desengagements forts et développé, en s’appuyant sur ses réseaux institutionnels, desprogrammes destinés à accompagner ses Etats membres dans le renforcement descapacités de leurs systèmes de justice. Cet engagement est perceptible dans le corpusnormatif de l’Organisation. Il marque la ferme volonté des Etats francophones d’ancrerleurs relations dans un cadre de coopération, attaché à la protection des droitsfondamentaux et à la régulation des pouvoirs majoritaires. La justice est donc désormaisérigée en priorité dans le champ des préoccupations francophones. Elle y est saisie tantaux niveaux national et international que dans sa dimension transitionnelle. / Justice is a fundamental attribute of modern States. In a democratic society, itguarantees the safeguard of the standard-setting framework as well as the protection ofrights. An independent and effective justice is a symbol of the rule of law. It illustrates theseparation of powers and establishes the primacy of law. But the efficiency of any judicialsystem depends on the nature and the extent of the resources at its disposal. Yet, inmany Francophone countries, the judicial system faces many weaknesses, sometimesrelated to the avatars of democratic stabilisation processes, sometimes to more fragilepost-crisis situations. So the question of the capacity development of the judicialinstitutions arises. For thirty years, the International Organization of La Francophonie(OIF) has entered the legal and judicial cooperation field on this basis. By including thepromotion of democracy at the heart of its political action, the OIF has indeed made strongcommitments and developed programs aimed at accompanying its member States in thecapacity development of their justice systems, thanks to its institutional networks. Thiscommitment can be seen in several statements of the Organization. It demonstrates thewill of the Francophone States to anchor their relationships in a cooperation framework,dedicated to the protection of fundamental rights and the regulation of majorities’ powers.Today, justice is consequently established as a priority in Francophone concerns. It isentered in both national and international level and in its transitional dimension

This study involves a critical appraisal of the legal implications of South Africa’s withdrawal from the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the context of its international and regional human rights obligations. The dissertation also investigates the history and formation of the ICC, South Africa’s involvement and its role as a guardian of international and regional human rights obligations in Africa. The study reviews the circumstances leading to South Africa’s notice of withdrawal from the ICC, including the legal implications and international human rights obligations. This inquiry considers South Africa’s proposed withdrawal from the ICC which is supported by points of departure and a comprehensive literature review. The decision to withdraw from the ICC is considered to be a political one. However, this study raises questions about the executive’s withdrawal in regard to its domestic, regional and international human rights obligations, irrespective of whether it is a member of the ICC. The study surveys the background to South Africa’s participation in the ICC, its membership of the African Union and the implications of ICC membership including the obligations imposed on member states. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL. M.

On October 1, 1990 the Rwandan Patriotic Front launched a war from and with the support of the Republic of Uganda against Rwanda. This war was accompanied by unspeakable violations of International Humanitarian Law. Both conflicting parties violated the basic rules protecting the civilian population in situations of armed conflicts. The United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of its Charter, passed resolution 955 of November 8, 1994 establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to prosecute alleged responsible of such violations. This study investigates the background of the ICTR and questions the nature of the conflict that prompted the Security Council to establish another ad hoc international criminal tribunal after the one established for the former Yugoslavia. It further inquires into its jurisprudence and reflects critically on the ICTR's approach to serious violations of IHL under Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II. / Jurisprudence / LL. M. (Law)

The development of joint criminal enterprise at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has been controversial since the doctrine was first created in 1997. For the judgments rendered by the ICTY to be perceived as legitimate, the doctrines used to bring charges against defendants must also be perceived as legitimate. The purpose of my thesis is to study the application of joint criminal enterprise at the ICTY and examine how the doctrine has influenced the length of sentences given. I find that joint criminal enterprise may be influencing longer sentences and the three categories of joint criminal enterprise are being used differently on defendants of different power levels. By empirically analyzing the patterns developing at the ICTY, I can see how joint criminal enterprise is influencing sentencing and the fairness of trials.

Le Tribunal spécial pour le Liban (TSL) est établi en vertu d’un accord bilatéral conclu entre l’ONU et le Gouvernement libanais; mais ses instruments constitutifs ne sont entrés en vigueur qu’en vertu de la résolution 1757 (2007) du Conseil de sécurité adoptée sur la base du Chapitre VII de la Charte. Le TSL, siégeant aux Pays-Bas, composé de juges étrangers et libanais, s’avère un tribunal pénal internationalisé sui generis. Son mandat principal consiste à poursuivre les responsables de l’attentat du 14 février 2005 ôtant la vie à l’ancien Premier Ministre libanais Rafic HARIRI et de 22 autres personnes ; toutefois la compétence du TSL peut être élargie pour couvrir des attentats connexes. Plusieurs caractéristiques distinguent le TSL du fait qu’il est le premier tribunal pénal créé sous les auspices des Nations Unies, sans appartenir à la discipline du droit international humanitaire, et qui ne juge que des crimes de terrorisme en temps de paix à la lumière du droit national libanais ; comme il est le premier tribunal pénal international qui mène des procès in absentia; et le premier qui est doté d’un Bureau pour la Défense - comme organe autonome du TSL – sur un même pied d’égalité avec le Bureau du Procureur en conférant des pouvoirs larges aux conseils de la Défense. Le TSL fonctionne selon son propre Règlement de procédure et de preuve - adopté par ses juges - associant à la fois le système romano-germanique et le système anglo-saxon. Le fonctionnement du TSL confronte des défis juridiques, de par son financement mixte assuré à travers la contribution conventionnelle du Gouvernement libanais et les contributions volontaires des États membres, ou de par sa primauté restreinte qui est juste limitée aux juridictions libanaises, générant une coopération problématique avec les États tiers et hésitante avec le Liban. Également, le Statut du Tribunal est réticent sur la question des immunités. La mise en place du TSL a créé une grande polémique politique au Liban, son fonctionnement au cœur d’un cadre géopolitique instable provoque des enjeux stratégiques pertinents ayant des impacts sur la scène politique au Liban et au Moyen-Orient. Le TSL encourt des enjeux stratégiques du fait que son premier acte d’accusation incrimine des membres appartenant au Hezbollah - une résistance armée contre Israël - allié de l’Iran et de la Syrie. Le Printemps arabe et ses implications sur la révolte syrienne générèrent une instabilité politique et sécuritaire au Liban, alertant une nouvelle série d’attentats terroristes. La mission principale du TSL consiste à mettre fin à l’impunité au Liban, principalement celle relative aux assassinats politiques. Du fait que le TSL est établi juste pour juger un seul attentat et un nombre restreint de crimes connexes dans un cadre temporel et spatial restreints, alors qu’un grand nombre de crimes graves de droit international humanitaire et de crimes politiques et terroristes restent impunis au Liban, le TSL est conçu comme un instrument de justice sélective. Pour ses détracteurs, le TSL concrétise le dilemme entre « paix civile » et « justice internationale », bien que sa finalité consiste à consolider la réconciliation nationale à travers la découverte de la vérité. / The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) is created through a bilateral agreement concluded between the UN and the Lebanese Government; but its essential instruments didn’t come into force until the adoption of the binding resolution 1757 (2007) of the Security Council adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The STL, sitting in the Netherlands, composed of foreign and Lebanese judges, is an internationalized criminal tribunal sui generis. Its primary mandate consists on prosecuting those responsible for the 14th February 2005 attempt which caused the death of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic HARIRI and 22 other people; nevertheless the STL’s jurisdiction can be extended to cover connected attacks. Many features distinguish the STL, since it is the first criminal tribunal that was created under the UN’s framework outside of the International humanitarian law’s discipline; it judges terrorism crimes in peace time under the Lebanese domestic law; moreover, it is the first international criminal tribunal which holds trials in absentia, establishes an Office for the Defense as an autonomous organ equally with the Office of the Prosecutor giving the defense counsel large powers. The STL works according to its proper Rules of Procedure and Evidence – adopted by its judges – associating the civil law system and the common law system. The STL’s functioning confronts legal challenges due to its combined funding mechanism, assured by the conventional contribution of the Lebanese Government as by the voluntary contributions of member States; or due to its restricted primacy limited only to Lebanese courts, arising a problematical horizontal cooperation. In addition, the STL’s Statute expresses reluctance on the immunities’ question. The implementation of the STL has created a large political controversy in Lebanon; its work in an unstable geopolitical framework triggers relevant strategic issues having impacts on the political scene in Lebanon and Middle-East. The STL incurs strategic challenges since its first indictment incriminates Hezbollah members – an armed resistance against Israel – ally of Iran and Syria. The Arab spring and its implications on the Syrian revolution generate instability to the political and security conditions of Lebanon, alerting a new series of terrorist attempts. The main mission of the STL consists to end impunity in Lebanon related first and foremost to political assassinations. The STL is considered as an instrument of selective justice since it is established only to judge a single attempt and a small number of connected crimes in a restricted spatiotemporal framework, whereas a large number of serious crimes of International humanitarian law and political crimes perpetrated in Lebanon are still unpunished. For its detractors, the STL embodies the dilemma between "civil peace" and "international justice", although its finality seeks to consolidate the national reconciliation through the discovery of the truth.

<p>Савремени концепти међународног кривичног права одавно су напустили правне оквире, начела и традицију очувања светског мира, јер се међународно право више не примењује, оно се тумачи и то на онај начин који одговара политичким струјама у међународним односима.<br />На који начин је дошло до вулгаризације међународног кривичног права и у којој мери је оно изражено најприближније говоре случајеви покренути пред међународним кривичним судовима. Анализом рада међународних кривичних судова у смислу: конституисања суда, дефинисања материјалних и процесних норми, извођењу доказа, изменом и допуном Правилника о поступку и доказима, истицању одређених кривичних дела, различитим стандардима и начину вредновања наступелих последица, националниј припадности субјеката у поступку... могу се препознати многи проблеми који су дискредитовали постојање начелних питања истине, објективности и правичности. У овим начелима налазе се потенцијална решења ефикасности међународних кривичних судова, али стиче се утисак да би решењем ових проблема правда била достижна и за оне који су проузроковали низ озбиљних сукоба у свету. Сходно томе, потребно је запитати се да ли међународна заједница уопште жели да постоји институција као што је Међународни кривични суд?<br />Међународни кривични судови, до сада су више личили на институције које су биле подређене медијским кампањама усмереним против унапред етикетираних држава и носиоца њихове суверене власти, што се у великом броју случајева показало као идеалан параван за покретање агресивних ратова. Ако је Међународни кривични суд надлежан, између осталог, и за дела агресије, због чега целокупна међународна заједница ћути и ништа не предузима по питању окупације аутономне покрајне Косова и Метохије и&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; не супротстави се рушилачким идеологијама припајања суседним државама. Зар то не представља рушилачки фактор безбедности и мира у региону? Већина држава у свету, а посебно у Европи, има сличних проблема који су мање или више транспарентни, али уколико се настави садашњим путем слична судбина могла би и њих да задеси.<br />Да би међународни кривични судови били у могућности да обављају функцију због које су основани њихова надлежност треба да искqучи сваки вид економске и политичке зависности. Своју надлежност судови треба да заснивају на правилима бона фидес којима би као Судови региона своју правну снагу црпили из кодификованог међународног кривичног права и постулата обичајних правних правила. Такве судове је могуће успоставити, под условом да се постојећи политизовани бирократски систем судија и тужилаца у међународним кривичним судовима замени новим регионалним решењима и концепцијама независних механизама контроле.</p> / <p>Savremeni koncepti međunarodnog krivičnog prava odavno su napustili pravne okvire, načela i tradiciju očuvanja svetskog mira, jer se međunarodno pravo više ne primenjuje, ono se tumači i to na onaj način koji odgovara političkim strujama u međunarodnim odnosima.<br />Na koji način je došlo do vulgarizacije međunarodnog krivičnog prava i u kojoj meri je ono izraženo najpribližnije govore slučajevi pokrenuti pred međunarodnim krivičnim sudovima. Analizom rada međunarodnih krivičnih sudova u smislu: konstituisanja suda, definisanja materijalnih i procesnih normi, izvođenju dokaza, izmenom i dopunom Pravilnika o postupku i dokazima, isticanju određenih krivičnih dela, različitim standardima i načinu vrednovanja nastupelih posledica, nacionalnij pripadnosti subjekata u postupku... mogu se prepoznati mnogi problemi koji su diskreditovali postojanje načelnih pitanja istine, objektivnosti i pravičnosti. U ovim načelima nalaze se potencijalna rešenja efikasnosti međunarodnih krivičnih sudova, ali stiče se utisak da bi rešenjem ovih problema pravda bila dostižna i za one koji su prouzrokovali niz ozbiljnih sukoba u svetu. Shodno tome, potrebno je zapitati se da li međunarodna zajednica uopšte želi da postoji institucija kao što je Međunarodni krivični sud?<br />Međunarodni krivični sudovi, do sada su više ličili na institucije koje su bile podređene medijskim kampanjama usmerenim protiv unapred etiketiranih država i nosioca njihove suverene vlasti, što se u velikom broju slučajeva pokazalo kao idealan paravan za pokretanje agresivnih ratova. Ako je Međunarodni krivični sud nadležan, između ostalog, i za dela agresije, zbog čega celokupna međunarodna zajednica ćuti i ništa ne preduzima po pitanju okupacije autonomne pokrajne Kosova i Metohije i&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ne suprotstavi se rušilačkim ideologijama pripajanja susednim državama. Zar to ne predstavlja rušilački faktor bezbednosti i mira u regionu? Većina država u svetu, a posebno u Evropi, ima sličnih problema koji su manje ili više transparentni, ali ukoliko se nastavi sadašnjim putem slična sudbina mogla bi i njih da zadesi.<br />Da bi međunarodni krivični sudovi bili u mogućnosti da obavljaju funkciju zbog koje su osnovani njihova nadležnost treba da iskquči svaki vid ekonomske i političke zavisnosti. Svoju nadležnost sudovi treba da zasnivaju na pravilima bona fides kojima bi kao Sudovi regiona svoju pravnu snagu crpili iz kodifikovanog međunarodnog krivičnog prava i postulata običajnih pravnih pravila. Takve sudove je moguće uspostaviti, pod uslovom da se postojeći politizovani birokratski sistem sudija i tužilaca u međunarodnim krivičnim sudovima zameni novim regionalnim rešenjima i koncepcijama nezavisnih mehanizama kontrole.</p> / <p>Modern concepts of international criminal law have long since left the legal frameworks, principles and tradition of preserving world peace, because international law is no longer applicable, it is interpreted in a way that is consistent with political currents in international relations.<br />How has the vulgarisation of international criminal law come about and to what extent is it most closely illustrated by cases brought before international criminal courts. By analyzing the work of international criminal courts in terms of: constituting a court, defining substantive and procedural norms, presenting evidence, amending the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, highlighting certain criminal offenses, different standards and the way of evaluating the consequences, the national affiliation of the subjects in the proceedings ... many problems can be identified that have discredited the existence of fundamental questions of truth, objectivity and fairness. These principles provide potential solutions to the effectiveness of international criminal courts, but the impression is that by resolving these problems, justice would be attainable for those who have caused a number of serious conflicts in the world. Accordingly, one has to wonder if the international community wants an institution such as the International Criminal Court at all?<br />International criminal courts have so far been more like institutions subordinate to media campaigns against pre-labeled states and holders of their sovereign power, which in many cases proved to be an ideal front for launching aggressive wars. If the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over, among other things, acts of aggression, for which reason the entire international community is silent and does nothing about the occupation of the autonomous provincial Kosovo and Metohija and does not oppose the destructive ideologies of annexation to neighboring countries. Doesn&#39;t that represent the destructive factor of security and peace in the region? Most countries in the world, and especially in Europe, have similar problems that are more or less transparent, but if they continue along the same path, a similar fate could befall them.<br />In order for international criminal courts to be able to perform the function for which they were founded, their jurisdiction should exclude any form of economic and political dependence. Courts should base their jurisdiction on bona fides rules which, as the Courts of the Region, derive their legal power from codified international criminal law and the common law rules. Such courts can be established, provided that the existing politicized bureaucratic system of judges and prosecutors in international criminal courts is replaced by new regional solutions and concepts of independent control mechanisms.</p>