This dissertation looks at the concept of “trafficking in persons” and how it has been created, interpreted and utilized in the international sphere and in Canada. Using the approach of Critical Legal Pluralism (CLP), it examines the legal regulation of trafficking as being created through a bi-directional constitutive process, with paradigmatic conceptions of trafficking having a hand in creating regulation as well as being influenced by it. Through a review of data retrieved using a variety of qualitative methods as well as classic legal analysis, this dissertation explores the operation of various social actors and their effect on the determination of what trafficking is, and who is worthy of protection from it. In Part One the international framework is outlined through a discussion of the creation of the dominant paradigm of trafficking and implementations of it. Chapter One traces the history of the anti-trafficking movement by looking at the development of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, and by examining the creation of dominant discourses around trafficking. Chapter 2 uses CLP to examine the influences of a variety of actors on the creation of these discourses and the repercussions the discourses have had on the implementation of anti-trafficking policies. Part Two then turns to the Canadian context. In Chapter Three, classical legal methodologies are employed to discuss Canada’s obligations under international law with respect to trafficking, as well as the creation of definitions of trafficking in the Canadian legal regulatory context. Chapter Four then reviews data from Canada to discuss the ways in which various actors have been involved in the creation and operation of the dominant paradigm and how it in turn affects the operation of trafficking-related legal constructs. Ultimately, it is found that due to the influence of the dominant paradigm and the motivations that aid in its operation, programs and policies framed under the rubric of “trafficking” necessarily fail to achieve meaningful redress for the groups they purport to benefit. On this basis, an alternative approach is suggested to address phenomena currently being dealt with through anti-trafficking frameworks. A move is suggested away from a focus on “trafficking” to a sectoral approach, accounting for the complexities and histories of individuals subject to exploitative circumstances.

Les arguments du mouvement Critical Legal Studies sur l’indétermination du droit ne sont doublés d’aucune théorie sur la légitimité des interprétations qu’offrent les juges et donc d’aucun critère juridique pour critiquer une décision. La théorie pluraliste critique du droit, qui prend acte de la pluralité du droit officiel pour redéfinir le phénomène juridique plutôt que de nier qu’il puisse exister, pourrait toutefois fournir un tel critère. En effet, elle présente plusieurs correspondances avec les travaux de Dworkin, qui défend que les citoyens sont en droit d’obtenir les fruits d’une attitude interprétative en germe dans le concept même de droit. Ces deux théories maintiennent que le droit sert à reconnaître la valeur de l’histoire d’un groupe dans sa conception de lui-même tout en soutenant qu’il doit trouver une pertinence contemporaine pour être effectif et légitime. Les pluralistes priorisent toutefois la résonance actuelle des règles de droit et croient que toute communauté est divisée entre diverses définitions du bien. Selon eux, le droit est avant tout un procédé pour penser la conduite humaine et lui conférer un sens, qui dépend des capacités créatrices des citoyens. Chaque règle est alors la cause d’une pluralité d’ordres juridiques concurrents. Suivant ce portrait, seule l’acceptation d’une interprétation par un groupe, sa capacité à lui reconnaître un sens, pourrait rendre cette interprétation légitime. Ce critère nous mène vers un modèle de justice négociée où deux personnes s’adressent à un juge pour développer une lecture en commun du droit, pour identifier une interprétation légitime dans leurs univers juridiques respectifs. / No theory of the legitimacy of judges accompanies the Critical Legal Studies’ arguments on the indeterminacy of law, which entails there are no criteria to identify a legitimate interpretation. Critical legal pluralism, which redefines law to take account of its inherent plurality rather than denying its very possibility on these grounds, could however provide such criteria. Indeed, it presents many resemblances with Dworkin’s theory of law which argues that citizens are entitled to reap the benefits of the interpretative nature of law. Both theories defend that law allows to bridge a group’s past, which is essential to its self-understanding, with the present, and both insist that law must be made to appear relevant in the present. Pluralists however prioritize the current significance of law and stress that communities are split by a variety of definitions of the good. According to them, law is mainly a process to think about human conduct and grant it meaning, and it depends as such on citizens’ creative capacities. Accordingly, only an interpretation that is accepted by a group and seen as meaningful can be considered legitimate. This criterion forces us to consider a form of negotiated justice, where two persons consult a judge to develop a common reading of a rule which would be legitimate in each person’s legal universe.