Thesis (M. Soc. Sc.)--University of Hong Kong, 1980.

published_or_final_version / Public Administration / Master / Master of Social Sciences

published_or_final_version / Public Administration / Master / Master of Social Sciences

Thesis (M.Soc.Sc.)--University of Hong Kong, 1980. / Also available in print.

Thesis (M.Soc.Sc.)--University of Hong Kong, 1989. / Also available in print.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Georgia State University, 2006. / 1 electronic text (193 p. : ill.) : digital, PDF file. Title from title screen. Jorge L. Martinez-Vazquez, committee chair; Andre G. Komenan, Jameson L. Boex, Neven T. Valev, Shiferaw Gurmu, Roy W. Bahl, committee members. Description based on contents viewed Mar. 23, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (p. 179-192).

Thesis (Honors)--College of William and Mary, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 59-64). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis--Princeton University. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2002. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references. Available also from UMI Company.

A central tenet of democratic theory is that the exercise of governance be both legitimate and accountable. Elections constitute the fundamental means through which these ends are met. Critical to this process is the ability of the citizen to correctly assign responsibility for government action. Institutional arrangements are central to defining the pathways of accountability. In institutional contexts with only one level of government, assigning responsibility is relatively straightforward. However, in situations of multiple and overlapping levels of government, the process of correctly assigning responsibility and ultimately holding governments accountable for their actions is much more difficult. In comparative contexts, there has been and continues to be a long-term trend towards the decentralization of political authority to sub-national levels of government. Despite this widespread current, little is known about the effects these processes have on democratic accountability. / The central proposition tested in this dissertation is that decentralized multi-level governance undermines democratic accountability. This proposition is tested through drawing on the reward and punishment calculus of economic voting: incumbent governments are rewarded (punished) for good (bad) economic conditions. When lines of accountability are clear, the individual voter can easily apportion blame (credit) to the government for economic conditions by voting against (for) the government. Where multiple levels of decentralized authority cloud responsibility, accountability for economic outcomes (either positive or negative) is likely to be undermined. / This proposition is tested comparatively using cross-national aggregate economic and election statistics as well as cross-national individual-level data. Case studies of institutional change towards multi-level governance in Belgium, Scotland and Spain are examined for the theorized effects on accountability for economic conditions. Finally, a case study of federal and provincial economic voting in Canada is conducted using individual-level data from recent Canadian Election Studies. Both comparatively and in case studies, the findings of this dissertation consistently indicate that accountability for economic conditions is undermined by the presence of decentralized multi-level governance. / This dissertation makes an important contribution to the study of multi-level governance, economic voting and comparative politics through uncovering institutional effects of decentralized multi-level governance that undermine political accountability and, ultimately, the health of democracy.