This study investigated whether a defendant?s history of childhood sexual abuse (CSA) and/or personality disorder (PD) diagnosis affected juror decision-making in a child sexual abuse trial. The personality disorders in the study were borderline personality disorder (BPD) and antisocial personality disorder (APD). Participants were 186 college students who read a summary of the trial and then made various juror decisions. The defendant?s CSA history, alone or combined with PD diagnosis, did not affect guilt ratings or sentence recommendations, indicating that jurors did not automatically assume that a defendant who had been abused as a child was guilty (as an adult) of being an abuser. However, when the defendant had a PD diagnosis, there were higher guilt ratings than when there was no PD diagnosis. PD diagnosis was the best predictor of guilt ratings, suggesting that jurors perceive defendants more negatively if they have borderline or antisocial personality disorder.

Since theories of corporate finance are recognised to be conditional, this study explores the impact of the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009 and institutional settings in determining corporate financial decisions. The recession on the supply of credit and demand for credit affects the corporate financial channels. The credit recession causes more agency costs, bankruptcy costs and information asymmetry, which adversely influence both borrowing and investments. Firms reduce debt financing, retain more cash and cut corporate payouts due to a sharp rise in uncertainty. Moreover, the role of institutional settings on corporate decisions differs following the GFC. Three empirical chapters contribute to the literature: First, Chapter 3 investigates the role of GFC on determinants and the adjustment speed of leverage and debt maturity and reveals that the effect of bankruptcy costs, agency costs and information asymmetry only increases on debt maturity, as opposed to leverage in the post-GFC. The adjustment speed of leverage and debt maturity drops after the GFC due to the low supply and demand for credit. Chapter 4 examines how cash holdings have been affected by the GFC across countries which have different agency problems and analyses how the rise of agency costs and information asymmetry can explain cash decisions before and after the GFC. Financially constrained firms have quicker cash holdings’ adjustment compared to unconstrained firms. However, while firms in low-governance countries have slower adjustment speed of cash than those in high-governance countries in pre-crisis, it has been found that it is vice versa in the post-crisis period. Finally, Chapter 5 analyses the effect of agency problems and the GFC on dividend payouts. Contrary to firms in high-governance countries, those in common-law countries are less likely to pay out dividends, as confirmed by the substitute and outcome models, sequentially after the GFC. Also, dividends are used as a signalling device by the GFC. Overall, the GFC and institutional settings impact corporate financial policies of firms to specify where and when their shareholders invest. / Ministry of National Education of the Republic of Turkey İlim Yayma Vakfı İstanbul İktisatçılar Derneği (İKDER)

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