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The thesis provides a comparative estimation of the electoral cycles' influence on the monetary policies among a group of developed and developing countries. We use a non-linear central bank's reaction function which captures the regime switching behavior of the monetary authority depending on the proximity of elections. Moreover, we compare the reaction function with partial adjustment, which controls for policy inertia, with a non-inertial policy rule with serially correlated errors which takes into account other shocks determining the central bank to deviate from its policy rule. The estimation was performed via OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS, the preference being given to the last one due to correction of endogeneity problem and efficiency gains. Robust evidence about election induced monetary policies was found in 2 out of 10 developed economies and 4 out of 10 developing economies. In these countries, the central banks tend to be less inflation averse and/or less counter-cyclical (or even pro- cyclical) during electoral periods in comparison with normal times. Additionally, we find that the legislative framework, in these countries, incorporates significant deviations from the best practices of central bank independence. Finally, following the dynamic inconsistency problem, we document a strong...

The thesis presents a formal model of intertemporal decision problem of working on a task for distant reward which depends on the number of periods the subject actually spends working, where the subject faces varying opportunity costs of working each period before the deadline. Three psychologically plausible causes of procrastination are incorporated into the model as transformations of the decision problem. In order to assess a hypothesis that procrastination is an evolved and stable habit, the third transformation renders the model dynamic in that past decisions and circumstances affect the present. The model is first explored via qualitative analysis and simulations are performed to further reveal its functionality.

Σκοπός της παρούσας διπλωματικής είναι να εξετάσει την επίδραση στην μακροοικονομική απόδοση της ανεξαρτησίας της Κεντρικής Τράπεζας. Αποτελεί ενδιαφέρον θέμα τόσο για τις νεοεισερχόμενες χώρες της Ευρωπαικής Ένωσης αλλά και για τις χώρες που εμφανίζουν ιδιαίτερα υψηλό πληθωρισμό. / The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of the central bank independence on the macroeconomic performance.It is considered to be a very interesting topic not only for the 'newcomers'countries to the European Union but also for the countries with high inflation.