The objective of the thesis is a detailed analysis of overhang seats, the peculiarity of the German electoral system. The theoretical part of this thesis focuses on research of the electoral systems and their political consequences. The second chapter devoted to the German electoral system explains his mechanical functioning and discuses his influence on the degree of proportionality and the party system. The analytical part tries to clear the phenomenon of overhang seats, his origins by means of testing presented variables using the electoral results data from 1990 - 2009. The current electoral reform is also discussed.

The aim of this master thesis is to compare electoral systems of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic and the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany. Firstly, basic terms regarding substance and types of elections, suffrage and primary classification of electoral systems are briefly characterized with the help of literature. Secondly, electoral system of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, its form in the context of the political system of the Czech Republic as a whole, its development over time and its impact on the results of elections in the last twenty years is described in detail. Furthermore, the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany is analysed in the same way, too. At the end of this thesis, advantages and disadvantages of both electoral systems are compared and their possible changes are outlined. Keywords: elections, electoral system, Parliament, Bundestag, Chamber of Deputies, comparison

Esta pesquisa traz 3 estudos independentes, sobre temas ligados às questões do que é nacionalização partidária e como nacionalização, regionalização e localismo são afetados por e afetam os sistemas eleitorais e partidários. Mais especificamente, no capítulo 1 proponho uma nova definição teórica de nacionalização dos partidos e sistemas partidários. Argumento que tal conceito pode ser dividido em 4 dimensões, que são a nacionalização da organização partidária, da oferta eleitoral, da demanda eleitoral e dos resultados eleitorais. Em seguida, aplico esse quadro teórico ao caso brasileiro para mostrar como, de fato, maior precisão conceitual altera a leitura empírica que se faz de um sistema. No capítulo 2, exploro uma das consequências da nacionalização partidária, que vem sendo teorizada pela literatura mas nunca testada de modo direto. Trata-se da ideia de que nacionalização seria o que conecta as circunscrições eleitorais e faz as proposições de Duverger passarem do nível local ao nacional. Para testar isso, incluirei nacionalização dos sistemas partidários pela primeira vez num modelo de número de partidos - aptos lidar com problemas de endogeneidade que vêm impedindo autores de fazerem isso. Assim, será possível provar e demonstrar que a não inclusão de nacionalização vem causando viés de variável omitida nos modelos da literatura. Quando esse é corrigo, através da inclusão de nacionalização por um sistema de equações simultâneas, altera-se algumas das interpretações canônicas sobre a fragmentação partidária. Por fim, no capítulo 3 reavalio a ideia comum de que sistemas eleitorais com voto pessoal levariam candidatos a ter apoio eleitoral geograficamente concentrado, portanto localista. Ofereço uma discussão teórica e evidências de que tal padrão territorial não é a regra do que vem ocorrendo, por exemplo, em sistemas de lista aberta. Além disso, tanto concentrar votos como espalhá-los vem dando dividendos eleitorais e poucos candidatos conseguem atingir patamares altos de concentração, a um nível que prediga real aumento nas chances de eleição. / This research oers 3 independent studies on the questions of what is party nationalization, how nationalization, regionalization or localism are aected by and aect the electoral systems and the party systems. More specically, in the 1st chapter a new theoretical denition of party and party system nationalization is presented, dividing such concept into four dimensions - the nationalization of party organization, of the electoral supply, of the electoral demand and of the electoral outcome. After that, such a theoretical framework is applied to the Brazilian case to demonstrate how, in fact, more conceptual precision can alter empirical readings about a given party system. The 2nd chapter explores one of the consequences of party system nationalization, which literature has theorized but never tested directly. Namely, the idea that party nationalization would be what puts the electoral circumscriptions together and what makes Duvergerian propositions move from the local to the national level. To test that, party system nationalization is included for the rst time in a model of eective number of parties, after handling endogeneity problems that have prevented scholars from doing the same. With such inclusion, it will be proven and demonstrated that omitting party nationalization from models of number of parties, which is a common practice, incurs in omitted variable bias. In fact, such correct inclusion of party nationalization trough a system of simultaneous equations corrects that bias, altering some of the canonical interpretations about party system fragmentation. Lastly, in the 3rd chapter I reevaluate the common idea that electoral systems with personal voting would lead to geographical concentration (i.e. localization) of candidates\' electoral support. I oer a theoretical discussion and then empirical evidence that such territorial pattern is not the rule of what happens for instance in open-list PR. Besides, both concentrating and spreading votes are electorally protable results and very few candidates achieve levels of concentration that predicts eective increases in the odds of being elected.

Cette thèse se propose d’analyser toutes les questions liées au financement descampagnes électorales en vue des élections présidentielles. En effet, l’éclosion desaffaires de corruption politique, ayant révélé l’influence de l’argent dans la viepolitique, le financement des campagnes électorales a fait l’objet de débats dansplusieurs démocraties. Une comparaison entre la France et le Brésil, deuxdémocraties ou les systèmes électoraux différent, tente de montrer que le pouvoir del’argent peut influencer les élections, spécialement celles du président de laRépublique. Cette recherche aborde donc des questions relatives à laréglementation et au contrôle du financement des campagnes électorales à la Hautefonction publique. Y sont décrits de manière exhaustive avec pour modèlecomparative, les points positifs ainsi que les faiblesses des deux systèmes face à unmême ‘’ennemi’’ : l’influence de l’argent dans la vie politique. / This thesis intends to analyse all matters regarding financing election campaigns inpresidential elections. Actually, after political corruption outbreaks, revealing theinfluence money has on politics, financing of the election campaigns turned out to bethe object of discussion in many democracies. A comparison between France andBrazil, two democracies with two different electoral systems, intends to show how thepower of money can influence election, mainly in presidential campaigns. Thisresearch address issues relating to regulation and control of election campaignsfinancials of the highest public role. They are exhaustively described, having ascomparative models France and Brazil, strong points as well as weak points of bothsystems facing the same enemy: the influence of money in the political life.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T20:23:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Felipe Jose de Oliveira Duch.pdf: 832037 bytes, checksum: 6a73461cb63df41cf7dc11b7d900fb12 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-01-26 / The presidential electoral system of the United States allows the election of a candidate without conquering the majority of the popular votes. The minority s victory is a consequence of the distortion between the preference of the citizens expressed through the popular vote and the official result decided in the Electoral College. This phenomenon occurred in five occasions, most recent in 2000, however in others twenty four elections only 1% of the popular votes in one or some states could provide the victory of the minority. This research retrocedes in the politician-electoral history, until the promulgation of the Constitution of 1787, to identify the chronic problems of the electoral system that oppose its legitimacy - obviously the equality politics absence between the voters of different states. We reconstructed the causes that had taken the authors, in the Constitutional Convention, to prioritize the federalism in the construction of an institutional engineering to hindered the tyranny of the majority, but, also created a presidential electoral system with characteristics that constrained the democracy, particularly the equality politics and the popular participation. We perceive, however, a democratic evolution during its history and research what it caused this process, to verify the possibilities of the reinforcement of a more democratic electoral process. The reasons contemporaries of the politics-electoral stability, however, seem to less inhabit in the original ideation of the Convention, and more in the existence of strong consensus in the elites politics-economic regarding the preservation of the status quo in the order politics of this country. The methodology involves a historical retrospect in such a way, what it estimates documentary and a bibliographical research, how much an analytical reflection informed by the theory politics, especially in the fields of the democratic theories and the equality politics / O sistema eleitoral presidencial dos Estados Unidos permite que um candidato seja eleito sem conquistar a maioria dos votos populares. A possível vitória da minoria é conseqüência da distorção entre a preferência dos cidadãos expressada através do voto popular e o resultado oficial decidido no colégio eleitoral. Esse fenômeno ocorreu em cinco ocasiões, o mais recente em 2000, porém em outras vinte e quatro eleições apenas 1% dos votos populares em um ou alguns estados poderiam provocar a vitória do candidato menos votado. Retrocedemos na história político-eleitoral, até a promulgação da Constituição de 1787, para identificar os problemas crônicos do sistema eleitoral que precarizam sua legitimidade notadamente a ausência de igualdade política entre os eleitores de diferentes estados. Reconstruímos as causas que levaram os autores, na Convenção Constitucional, a priorizar o federalismo na construção de uma engenharia institucional que impedisse a tirania da maioria, que, por sua vez, criou um sistema eleitoral presidencial com características contra-democráticas, principalmente no que tange a questão da igualdade política e a participação popular. Percebemos, entretanto, uma evolução democrática durante sua história e pesquisamos como e o que ocasionou esse processo, para verificar as possibilidades do fortalecimento de um processo eleitoral mais democrático. Os motivos contemporanêos da estabilidade política-eleitoral, todavia, parecem residir menos no ideário político original da Convenção, e mais na existência de forte consenso nas elites políticas e econômicas a respeito da preservação do status quo na ordem política desse país. A metodologia adotada envolve tanto uma retrospectiva histórica, o que pressupõe uma pesquisa bibliográfica e documental, quanto uma reflexão analítica informada pela teoria política, especialmente nos campos das teorias democráticas e da igualdade política

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T14:58:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Felipe Jose de Oliveira Duch.pdf: 832037 bytes, checksum: 6a73461cb63df41cf7dc11b7d900fb12 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-01-26 / The presidential electoral system of the United States allows the election of a candidate without conquering the majority of the popular votes. The minority s victory is a consequence of the distortion between the preference of the citizens expressed through the popular vote and the official result decided in the Electoral College. This phenomenon occurred in five occasions, most recent in 2000, however in others twenty four elections only 1% of the popular votes in one or some states could provide the victory of the minority. This research retrocedes in the politician-electoral history, until the promulgation of the Constitution of 1787, to identify the chronic problems of the electoral system that oppose its legitimacy - obviously the equality politics absence between the voters of different states. We reconstructed the causes that had taken the authors, in the Constitutional Convention, to prioritize the federalism in the construction of an institutional engineering to hindered the tyranny of the majority, but, also created a presidential electoral system with characteristics that constrained the democracy, particularly the equality politics and the popular participation. We perceive, however, a democratic evolution during its history and research what it caused this process, to verify the possibilities of the reinforcement of a more democratic electoral process. The reasons contemporaries of the politics-electoral stability, however, seem to less inhabit in the original ideation of the Convention, and more in the existence of strong consensus in the elites politics-economic regarding the preservation of the status quo in the order politics of this country. The methodology involves a historical retrospect in such a way, what it estimates documentary and a bibliographical research, how much an analytical reflection informed by the theory politics, especially in the fields of the democratic theories and the equality politics / O sistema eleitoral presidencial dos Estados Unidos permite que um candidato seja eleito sem conquistar a maioria dos votos populares. A possível vitória da minoria é conseqüência da distorção entre a preferência dos cidadãos expressada através do voto popular e o resultado oficial decidido no colégio eleitoral. Esse fenômeno ocorreu em cinco ocasiões, o mais recente em 2000, porém em outras vinte e quatro eleições apenas 1% dos votos populares em um ou alguns estados poderiam provocar a vitória do candidato menos votado. Retrocedemos na história político-eleitoral, até a promulgação da Constituição de 1787, para identificar os problemas crônicos do sistema eleitoral que precarizam sua legitimidade notadamente a ausência de igualdade política entre os eleitores de diferentes estados. Reconstruímos as causas que levaram os autores, na Convenção Constitucional, a priorizar o federalismo na construção de uma engenharia institucional que impedisse a tirania da maioria, que, por sua vez, criou um sistema eleitoral presidencial com características contra-democráticas, principalmente no que tange a questão da igualdade política e a participação popular. Percebemos, entretanto, uma evolução democrática durante sua história e pesquisamos como e o que ocasionou esse processo, para verificar as possibilidades do fortalecimento de um processo eleitoral mais democrático. Os motivos contemporanêos da estabilidade política-eleitoral, todavia, parecem residir menos no ideário político original da Convenção, e mais na existência de forte consenso nas elites políticas e econômicas a respeito da preservação do status quo na ordem política desse país. A metodologia adotada envolve tanto uma retrospectiva histórica, o que pressupõe uma pesquisa bibliográfica e documental, quanto uma reflexão analítica informada pela teoria política, especialmente nos campos das teorias democráticas e da igualdade política

Myanmar, an isolated country in Southeast Asia, held general elections for the People¡¦s Assembly in 2010, the first in twenty years and the second in fifty years. The military junta that has ruled the country for decades has been facing strong criticism from the international community. This research has systematically examined the historical development of the electoral laws and the overall electoral system of the Union of Myanmar (since October 2010 officially known as the Republic of the Union of Myanmar) during the period of 18 June 1989 up until the latest elections on 7 November 2011. Why did the military bother organizing elections? The latest elections were meant to give the impression that they would create a legitimate government. In reality, they were designed to preserve military rule under a façade of democracy. The junta learned a valuable lesson from the last free elections in 1990, which ended in a fiasco for the pro-junta parties, and did not leave it to the people's will in 2010. In order to effectively extend military rule, in 2008 the junta used a flawed referendum to approve a supremacy constitution, according to which the military automatically receives 25% of the seats in parliament. This constitution helped the junta impose several severe limitations on parties willing to participate in the 2010 elections, thus ensuring that the military-backed political parties would win most of the seats at stake. This thesis attempts to show the powerlessness of the masses against a system based on the creation of self-serving laws used by the ruling junta to control the society.

The results of Vancouver’s 2008 municipal election led to critiques that South Asian candidates, and possibly all visible minority candidates, face reduced electability under Vancouver’s at-large electoral system than they would under a different municipal electoral system. This thesis employs numerous quantitative research methods to assess whether visible minority candidates do face reduced electability under the at-large system compared to a ward system proposed for Vancouver in 2004. The extent that Vancouver’s 2008 election results fulfill three U.S. Supreme Court conditions for establishing minority vote dilution is also assessed as part of this thesis research.

The results of Vancouver’s 2008 municipal election led to critiques that South Asian candidates, and possibly all visible minority candidates, face reduced electability under Vancouver’s at-large electoral system than they would under a different municipal electoral system. This thesis employs numerous quantitative research methods to assess whether visible minority candidates do face reduced electability under the at-large system compared to a ward system proposed for Vancouver in 2004. The extent that Vancouver’s 2008 election results fulfill three U.S. Supreme Court conditions for establishing minority vote dilution is also assessed as part of this thesis research.

Demokratizacija ar liberalizacija – ilgi ir sudėtingi procesai. Tai labai gerai atsispindi Centrinės Azijos regione. Čia po SSRS žlugimo, kaip ir kitos po-sovietinės valstybės taip Kirgizija bei Kazachstanas, turėjo sukurti naujas arba stipriai modifikuoti senas konstitucijas bei rinkimų sistemas. Oficialiai abi šalys pasirinko demokratinius režimus. Tai pažymima abiejų valstybių konstitucijų pirmosiose pastraipose. Tačiau reali valstybių politika iki šiol koncentruojasi ties jų lyderiais ir „klanais“ bei atskirais regionais. Aptariamose valstybėse de Jure ir de facto demokratija įkūnijama įvairiais būdais. Iš principo esminės demokratinės teisės, tokios kaip: žodžio laisvė, spaudos laisvė, religijos ir bendravimo laisvės yra uždraustos arba iš dalies suvaržytos. Šiame darbe bus pristatomos skirtingos demokratinės tranzicijos teorijos, bei jų taikymo galimybė Kazachstano ir Kirgizijos atvejais. Peržvelgiama ne tik teorijų raida, bet ir pateikiama demokratizacijos ir liberalizacijos klasifikacija. Trumpai pristatomi abiejų valstybių istorinės raidos ir dabartinis kontekstai. Darbe dėmesys labiausiai sutelkiamas rinkimų sistemos ir konstitucijų formavimuisi pokomunistinių laikotarpiu bei tolimesnei jų raidai. Išskiriami atskiri valstybių valdymo atvejai, kuriuos įteisino kintančios konstitucijos ar rinkimų įstatymai. / Democratization and liberalization are very elaborate processes. This is very obvious in the region of Central Asia. Just after collapse of USSR countries like Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan had to create new or completely modify old constitutions and electoral laws. Officially both countries had chosen democratic systems. That is also marked in the first articles of their constitutions. However real politics in these countries is based on their leaders, “clans” and separate regions preferences. De jure and de facto democracies are accomplished in many different ways. Traditionally democratic freedoms such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion and freedom of association – while provided for in the constitutions - are suppressed and/or severely limited. Several democratic transition theories and their adoption in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan will be presented in this study. It will be overviewed not only their development but also marked different classification. Most of the study will be concentrated into electoral systems development and development of each country’s constitutions after collapse of USSR. It will be marked different types of ruling systems, which have provided each electoral law or constitution amendments.